AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET INVASION AND U.S. RESPONSE

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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has raised a number of serious issues and choices for the United States. The train of events seem likely to have an important influence on overall American foreign policy in the 1980s. Reassessment of Soviet motives and of U.S. roles in the world are already in progress. Emerging American attitudes, in turn, will shape more specific policy decisions on the following issues: (1) whether to continue the quest for an expanded detente with the Soviet Union in the areas of arms control, trade, and people-to-people contacts; (2) what measures are needed to enhance U.S. security interests in the Persian Gulf region; (3) what kind of role -- if any -- the U.S. should play in supporting opposition Afghan forces and the government of Pakistan's request for security and stability; and (4) to what extent and in what ways should the U.S. enter into cooperative ventures with the People's Republic of China that are directed against the Soviet Union and its allies.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

AFGHANISTAN: BASIC FACTS AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION

Afghanistan is a landlocked, arid, and economically underdeveloped country of mountains, deserts, and river valleys located in southern Central Asia at the confluence of the Middle East and the South Asian subcontinent. Unlike neighboring Iran, it is also relatively poor in natural resources. About the size of Texas, it shares boundaries with the Soviet Union to the north, Iran to the southwest, and Pakistan to the east. It also has a very short border with China in the remote Hindu Kush range to the northeast. With an ethnically diverse population of approximately 21 million comprising several distinct tribal groups living on some 260,000 square miles, Afghanistan is 99% Muslim; 80% Sunnis, the majority sect of Islam (unlike neighboring Iran where Shi'ites are predominant), and nearly all are devout, some might say fanatic, adherents of their faith.

Afghanistan has been invaded countless times during its long history; its previous conquerors have included Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and Tamerlane. The British invaded it twice during the 19th century as their empire in India expanded westward and when they sought to halt the spread of Russian influence southward into Persia and Central Asia, and toward the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean beyond. Although the British were defeated by the Afghans in the first Anglo-Afghan war (1838-42), they succeeded in gaining control of Afghan foreign relations in 1879. Afghanistan thereafter served as a buffer state between Tsarist Russia (and later the Soviet Union) and the British Empire. The British imposed acceptance of a boundary line between Afghanistan and British India in 1893 that divided the tribal homelands of the traditionally warlike Pashtuns (Pathans), the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan. This so-called "Pashtunistan" issue has been a cause of continuing tension between the Afghans and the Pakistanis since the independence and partition of British India in 1947.

A third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 brought an end to the British overlordship of Afghanistan and signalled the onset of a period of fragile

independence and relative neutrality under a succession of Afghan monarchs that lasted until 1973. In that year, the last king was deposed by his cousin, former premier Mohammad Daoud, who led a relatively bloodless coup and established himself as leader of the first Afghan republic.

Under Daoud, Afghanistan continued to pursue the Soviet-leaning neutralist foreign policy followed since the World War II period. This policy tacitly -- if warily -- acknowledged the dominant influence of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Afghanistan remained independent and pursued its own generally ineffectual socio-economic policies domestically. Moreover, it accepted economic assistance from and maintained relations with most other countries. The United States maintained sizable AID and Peace Corps programs there for many years prior to 1978. [Total U.S. economic assistance, FY 1946-78, was $504.2 million, of which 80% were grants.] The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, however, provided much more substantial economic and development assistance than any other governments and played a major role in the training and equipment of Afghanistan's armed forces, especially after 1954.

The Daoud regime, never more than nominally socialist, began in 1976 to move increasingly to the right in both domestic and foreign policy. The Soviet Union viewed with growing displeasure the Shah of Iran's attempts to draw Afghanistan into a Western-oriented, Tehran-centered regional economic and security sphere. It was during this 1974-78 period that the Soviets took a new interest in Afghan Communist affairs, and began to support the growth of a unified party. The two Afghan Communist factions merged to form a single Communist "People's Democratic" party in 1977. It has been alleged that an unsuccessful preemptive strike against the party by Daoud in April 1978, in which a key communist leader was assassinated and many party leaders arrested, provoked the showdown on Apr. 27, 1978, when Deputy Air Force Commander Maj.Gen. Abdul Qader led a bloody and apparently hastily-organized coup. Two weeks later a new revolutionary council named Nur Mohammad Taraki as its chairman and announced the establishment of the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," with Taraki as Prime Minister and Parcham ("Banner") faction leader Babrak Karmal as his deputy. Taraki had been Cultural Officer in the Afghan Embassy, Washington, from 1952-53; had served with the USAID in Kabul from 1962-63. He had subsequently become Secretary-General of the Khalq ("Masses") faction of the Communist Party.

The installation of an Afghan Communist regime under Taraki was perhaps premature under the circumstances, yet pressures from the Daoud regime may have influenced the Afghan Communists to stage their coup before they were organizationally prepared to govern the country. The split in the Communist movement between the Khalq faction under Taraki and the Parcham faction led by Babrak Karmal and generally considered to be more doctrinaire Marxist, more pro-Soviet, and less nationalistic than the Khalquis, was not significantly reduced by their merger. Within a few weeks of the coup, the Taraki faction was able to dominate the government and "exile" a number of Parcham leaders, including Karmal, to ambassadorships abroad. A purge in August-October 1978 resulted in the removal of a number of Parcham leaders from any public office, and many, including Babrak Karmal (then Afghan envoy to Czechoslovakia), elected to remain in Eastern Europe as "private citizens."

The Taraki regime soon set about initiating a series of changes by decree that flew in the face of conservative Afghan tradition. These included the elimination of rural usury, equal rights for women, and new regulations of dowries, marriage, and land reform, which was probably intended to be a

prelude to Soviet-style collectivism. These efforts generated a severe backlash and fueled the growth of a nationalist-Muslim guerrilla movement in the countryside. The Taraki government also adopted a new red flag barely distinguishable from that of the U.S.S.R. and signed at Moscow a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation, the military provisions of which have been interpreted as almost a formal alliance.

In the meantime, U.S.-Afghan relations, which had been relatively cordial before the overthrow of King Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1973, and which continued to be correct during the Daoud regime, had grown increasingly strained. The Carter Administration continued U.S. bilateral assistance to Afghanistan, although there was some sentiment in Congress for terminating such programs under the terms of section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), which prohibited assistance to "any Communist country." In fact, the Administration consciously had refrained from labeling the Taraki regime as Communist, both publicly and in its internal analyses of the political situation, in order to avoid triggering the response mandated under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act.

The kidnapping and subsequent killing of U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs in a shootout between his left-wing extremist Afghan captors and government security forces at a Kabul hotel on Feb. 14, 1979, cast a pall on already worsening U.S.-Afghan relations. Soviet security advisers appeared to be directing the operation, and the Afghan government disregarded U.S. suggestions that an attempt to rescue Dubs by force be delayed. This created an atmosphere of distrust that never really was overcome during the months that followed. Subsequently, U.S. economic assistance was phased out, the Peace Corps removed, and the size of the U.S. Embassy staff reduced.

Although the Administration had announced a sharp cutback in aid following the death of Ambassador Dubs, it was not totally halted until Aug. 14, when the President signed P.L. 96-53, the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979, into law. Section 505 of the Act prohibited any further assistance to Afghanistan unless the President certified to Congress that the Afghan government had officially apologized and assumed responsibility for the death of Ambassador Dubs and agreed to provide "adequate protection" for all U.S. government personnel in Afghanistan. The President did have the option of overriding this prohibition if he were to determine it was in the national interest because of "substantially changed circumstances."

Taraki was displaced as Prime Minister in late March 1979, without violence, and named President by his ambitious foreign minister, American-educated Khalq leader Hafizullah Amin. The new Prime Minister relentlessly pursued the same iconoclastic domestic policies, and major uprisings began to occur in the Pashtun tribal area of eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistan border. Sporadic revolts, largely uncoordinated, spread to all the country's 29 provinces. Major incidents occurred between April and June 1979, including one in the major northwestern city of Herat, where rebels killed an undetermined number of Russian technicians, their wives and children before the army could restore order. Until the Soviet invasion began on Dec. 24, most of the fighting has occurred between the overwhelmingly conscript Afghan army, with its Russian advisers, and the Afghan guerrillas, including some Pashtun tribesmen from the Pakistani side of the border. There are some 10 separate rebel groups, divided by tribal loyalties and by ideologies, which range from the secular leftist to monarchial rightist. Most, however, are devout Muslims, and two of the major leaders are well-known religious figures. A single leader who could provide overall coordination and direction for these diverse forces has not yet

emerged. In addition, there have been reports of inter-group squabbling among the various factions, as a result of both the ethnic diversity and rivalries of Afghanistan and a certain amount of opportunism by some of the combatants. Six of the largest groups, under pressure from the Islamic Conference, have repeatedly attempted to organize a unified command, to be called the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan. While one of the six has withdrawn from the negotiations, the remianing five appear to be inching toward a loose alliance. Expected benefits of the proposed alliance include not only improved organization and effectiveness, but also the promise of multi-million dollar aid from the Islamic Conference. Some skeptical observers see less patriotism and more self-aggrandizement as the primary motivation for some of the rebels, who have traditionally followed a profession of banditry, preying on travelers and city dwellers. Undoubtedly, there is some truth to both views of the Afghan insurgents.

By January 1980, the fighting and general unrest inside Afghanistan had caused over 400,000 Afghan refugees to cross the border into neighboring areas of Pakistan; at least 30,000 had fled to Iran. From February 1979 on, Radio Afghanistan began accusing Pakistan and Iran of aiding the guerrillas. Although Pakistan has continued to deny these charges, it is possible that the Pakistanis were unofficially supporting the Afghan guerrillas on a modest scale. They have been housing and feeding the refugees "on humanitarian grounds" with United Nations assistance in 12 camps situated along their border from the northernmost reaches of the country to Baluchistan province in the south.

Tension persisted within the government between Prime Minister Amin and a faction led by President Taraki, while the guerrilla campaigns continued and government programs floundered. The conflict came to a head in September shortly after Taraki's return via Moscow from the nonaligned conference in Havana. Apparently, Taraki had agreed to a Soviet plan that he oust the strong-willed Amin, who had rejected Soviet urging that he broaden the base of the party and at least temporarily halt the collectivist policies that were enraging conservative rural Afghans. It is thought by some American specialists that Amin also refused Moscow's proposal that Soviet combat forces be introduced to put down the tribal rebellions.

At any rate, the ouster of Amin was forestalled, according to an account, when Taraki was killed by forces loyal to Amin in a shootout at the presidential palace on Sept. 14 or 15, although his death was not officially confirmed for several days. During the three months following the death of Taraki, the internal security situation continued to worsen. By early December, only Kabul, the capital, and five other major urban centers were firmly controlled by government forces. The largely conscripted Afghan army had been weakened by rebellion, desertions, and purges of its senior ranks. Many units, complete with Soviet-supplied weapons, had gone over to the rebels with whom they sympathized. Over 4,000 Soviet military advisers had been assigned to the army down to the battalion level; Soviet civilian technicians were also helping to run the government.

In the weeks following the coup which toppled Amin, the new Soviet-installed Afghan regime of Babrak Karmal established firm control of Kabul, the capital, and other urban centers. Skirmishes between the rebels, on the one hand, and both Soviet troops and Afghan army contingents, on the other, contined to be reported by the foreign press. American correspondents were banned from further activity in Afghanistan in mid-January, following a number of dispatches that obviously displeased the Karmal regime. Some press accounts indicated a Soviet effort to maintain as low a profile as possible

and to use Afghan forces whenever possible. At the same time, Soviet units have dug in around the capital.

In an apparent attempt to soften clearly evident popular Afghan resentment at the Soviet influx, the Afghan government has reportedly taken several symbolic steps to defuse the tense political atmosphere. For example, Soviet-style political slogans and portraits of past and present Afghan Communist leaders began to disappear from the streets of Kabul in late January. The Karmal government has also invited proposals for a new national flag design to replace the red Soviet-style banner adopted by the Taraki regime following the Communist coup in April 1978 and has announced its intention of creating a commission to consider the various proposals. It is expected that a new flag would restore the color green, a symbol of Islam, that had been eliminated by the communists. There has also been speculation that the revolutionary "reform" program of the previous Communist governments has been toned down, in light of the fierce reaction to it by traditional Afghan leaders in the countryside.

Nearly all the merchants in the capital city of Kabul closed their shops to protest the Soviet presence on Feb. 21. Two days later, the Afghan government declared martial law in the capital after large anti-Soviet demonstrations and recurrent shootings were reported. A number of Afghan civilians, possible as many as 300, were killed in these first major public protests since the Afghan Communists overthrew the Daoud government in 1978. The strike continued until Feb. 28 when government forces arrested large numbers of Shi'ite Hazara tribesmen for their suspected role in the anti-Soviet riots of the previous weeks and months. (While Kabul reported the release of 1,500 of the protesters in early April, many remained in custody as late as mid-April.) These arrests were followed by a reduction in overt resistance to the Soviets. On the surface, life in the city regained a semblance of normalcy.

Other cities reported continued demonstrations of dissatisfaction with the Soviets. Strikes paralyzed many cities, with Herat being especially hard-hit.

In early March, the Soviet-installed Babrak Karmal government announced plans to draft a new constitution "embodying individual rights and a legal system based on Islamic law", as well as agreement by the cabinet to change the country's Soviet-appearing red national flag. This was inperpreted by some observers as an attempt to adopt a more conciliatory policy in order to minimize some of the popular antipathy to the new regime.

The Soviet Role and Invasion

Russian interest in Afghanistan predates Soviet history, reflecting both geopolitical factors and the ethnic ties between the Afghans and the people of Soviet Central Asia. Since Tsarist times, Russia has been a competitor for influence in this traditionally neutral buffer along its southern border.

The creation of the Soviet state in 1917 marked the beginning of a closer relationship between the two countries. The Soviet government supported Afghanistan in its war for independence from Great Britain in 1919. In 1921, the Soviet and Afghan governments signed a nonaggression pact. The suppression by Moscow of the Muslim population in Soviet Central Asia led Afghanistan to distance itself from the Soviet Union in the 1930s. By the 1950s, relations had begun to improve, although until 1978 Afghanistan

remained essentially a neutral buffer state.

Even before the April 1978 coup which ousted President Daoud, the Soviet Union had become Afghanistan's major trading partner and its primary source of economic and military assistance. Between 1954 and 1977, the Soviet Union provided $1.3 billion in aid on terms that were highly favorable by Soviet standards. According to Soviet sources, Soviet-built plants provided 25% of Afghanistan's industrial output in 1977. There were, by that time, already 1,300 Soviet technicians in the country. The major part of Afghanistan's transportation network (including roads and airports), as well as its electric power capacity, were built with Soviet assistance. The Soviets developed Afghanistan's natural gas industry, which supplies some 3 billion cubic meters of gas per year to the Soviet Union via a Soviet-built pipeline.

Soviet military aid prior to 1978 was no less substantial. Between 1956 and 1977, the Soviet Union supplied 95% of Afghanistan's weapons and military needs, in addition to training some 3,700 Afghan military personnel in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union supplied over $600 million worth of weapons including surface-to-air-missiles, fighter planes, helicopter, tanks, and armored vehicles.

While there is no clear evidence of direct Soviet involvement in the April 1978 coup which installed Nur Mohammad Taraki, there is little doubt of Soviet support. The Soviet Union had become increasingly concerned by President Daoud's apparent shift to the right in domestic and foreign policy. They were aware of Daoud's plans to seek larger scale U.S aid during a planned official visit to Washington in September 1978 and also resented his dismissal of a number of Soviet-trained military officers and his public denunciation of Cuba's self-proclaimed nonaligned status. They also viewed with displeasure the reversal of Daoud's 1974-76 policy of assigning Soviet military advisers down to the company level.

The Soviet Union was a clear beneficiary of the April 1978 coup. The new Taraki-led government, while not really in the mold of a Soviet puppet regime, provided a definite pro-Soviet tilt to Afghan domestic and foreign policies. The Soviet Union gave strong public endorsement to the new government. A 20-year bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty was signed on Dec. 5, 1978. It contained more specific language regarding military and security cooperation than is usually found in similar Soviet treaties. During 1978, the number of Soviet technicians and military advisors more than quadrupled.

As Islamic resistance to the government's Marxist program mounted, the Taraki government became increasingly dependent on Soviet assistance in fighting the rebels. Visits to Kabul by high-level Soviet military delegations in April and August of 1979 signaled a more direct Soviet military involvement in the Afghan government's fight against rebel forces.

At the same time, Soviet leaders almost certainly were apprehensive over the Taraki-Amin leadership's moves to elminate Parcham leaders in the summer of 1978. Some analysts argue that Babrak Karmal, who went into exile in Eastern Europe, had been the Soviet candidate for party leadership. There were also indications that the Soviet Union had unsuccessfully urged Afghan leaders to broaden the base of the government and to slow their ruthless modernization program in order to quell the growing insurrection by Islamic rebels. When the more militant and dogmatic Hafizullah Amin removed Taraki and assumed full control of the government in September 1979, Western analysts generally assumed that Amin's action had Soviet support and signaled

a Soviet decision against seeking accommodation with Islamic nationalists and an all-out effort instead to crush the rebellion. Subsequent analyses concluded that during Taraki's visit to Moscow immediately prior to his ouster and death, Soviet leaders had in fact advised him to remove Amin, but that the effort backfired.

The Soviet Union, nonetheless, publicly backed Amin after he took over and stepped up its aid to the government's campaign to crush the rebellion. Despite Soviet support, Amin appeared to be losing ground against rebel forces. A large Soviet military delegation headed by a Deputy Defense Minister, General Ivan Pavlovsky, had been in Afghanistan from August through October to assess the insurgency and devise a plan to cope with it. U.S. officials say that Pavlovsky delivered a grim report on his return home, and that this assessment undoubtedly was a major factor in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in December.

The Soviets made one last effort to cooperate with Amin in early November when a combined Soviet-Afghan operation was launched in Paktia province south of Kabul, the site of a major guerrilla concentration near the Pakistan border. The campaign was initially successful, but the victory was short-lived, since the insurgents regained control of the area once the Afghan-Soviet force returned to its bases.

The first public sign of Soviet displeasure with Amin and growing concern for its substantial investment in Afghanistan appeared in Pravda on Dec. 7, 1979. The paper carried a message from Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin on the anniversary of the signing of the bilateral frindship treaty. The Soviet greeting to the Amin government was correct but cooler than past Soviet messages. It did not contain the usual assurances of continued Soviet aid and support for the government, although Soviet support was reaffirmed in lower level Soviet media commentary.

By early December, while the Iran crisis was dominating public and media attention, the U.S. Administration was concerned over signs that the Soviet Union might be preparing to escalate its military presence in Afghanistan, as evidenced by a major buildup of Soviet forces along the Afghan border. On Dec. 8 and 9, a unit of Soviet troops with tanks and heavy armor was airlifted to the Soviet-controlled Bagram air field north of Kabul. This force moved north to eliminate rebel troops along the road between Kabul and the Soviet border (the subsequent invasion route). The U.S. Administration stepped up its warnings to the Soviets against direct intervention, as revealed in a State Department briefing for reporters on Dec. 22.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began on Dec. 24 with the airlifting of 5,000 Soviet airborne troops to Kabul. U.S. officials quoted in the press speculate that there was probably one last Soviet attempt on Dec. 24 to persuade President Amin to revise his policies along lines more acceptable to Moscow. The Soviet ambassador reportedly met with Amin that day to urge him once more to permit Soviet combat forces to operate against the rebel forces inside Afghanistan, and pursue less ambitious social and economic policies.

According to the same official U.S. sources, Amin may have sensed danger and then moved in a small armored convoy from the presidential palace in the center of Kabul to Darulaman palace 7 miles to the southwest. On Dec. 27, the day of the coup, elements of a 5,000-man Soviet airborne division made their way from the Kabul airport in armored vehicles across the city to the Darulaman palace. Many were reportedly Soviet Central Asian Tajiks and Uzbeks, members of ethnic groups also represented in Afghanistan. After a

short violent armed clash between Amin's guards and the Soviets, the President was apparently captured, "tried," and executed, along with members of his family and retinue.

Soon thereafter, although it is not clear exactly when, Amin's arch-rival, Babrak Karmal, and other exiled Parcham leaders were airlifted back to Kabul from Eastern Europe by the Russians. Prior to Karmal's actual return, a recorded statement by him was broadcast on what appeared to be Radio Kabul, but the source was later determined to be a transmitter in Termez on the Soviet side of the border, using Radio Kabul's assigned frequencies. Karmal declared that the "bloody apparatus of Hafizullah Amin" had been overthrown.

Within a few days of the invasion and Amin's ouster, Western analysts became convinced that the Soviet military action represented a massive and long-term commitment by the Soviet Union to crush the Muslim rebellion and to ensure an Afghan government favorable to Moscow. By the end of December there were said to be at least 200 Soviet aircraft involved in the campaign. By Jan. 10, the initial 5,000-man invasion force had mushroomed to an estimated 85,000. Soviet forces reportedly included four motorized rifle divisions, each consisting of an estimated 13,000 troops, 265 tanks, 300 armored personnel carriers, supported by artillery, "frog" rockets, and helicopters, and two airborne divisions. By the end of February, as the Soviet forces launched a more determined campaign against Afghan guerrillas, Administration spokesmen indicated that two more Soviet divisions were in a state of readiness to enter Afghanistan. In early April, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher reported that Soviet troop strength had increased to "well over 100,000," but Pentagon officials still estimate 85,000. In late April, H.N. Kaul, a senior correspondent for the Press Trust of India, reported that the Soviets had moved medium-range ballistic missiles into Afghanistan armed with both nuclear and conventional warheads. There have been repeated allegations of Soviet use of chemical weapons in anti-guerrilla actions. Statements by a number of U.S. Government officials and members of the Western press charged that napalm, as well as a nerve gas known as Soman, were used. Soviet officials categorically deny all such reports.

The Soviet action marks the first direct Soviet military intervention abroad since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; the first large-scale fighting by Soviet troops abroad since the fighting with Chinese forces on the Ussuri River in 1969; and the first direct Soviet military intervention in a country outside the Soviet bloc since the end of World War II.

A central issue likely to shape future U.S.-Soviet relations is why the Soviet Union now decided to undertake such an action with its entailed risks and negative repercussions. The U.S., as well as other Western and nonaligned governments, have rejected the Soviet explanation that it was simply complying with its treaty obligations to protect Afghanistan from foreign interference at the urgent request of the Afghan government; many governments have pointed out that the Soviet claim is absurd, given the fact that the existing Afghan government was ousted by the Soviets.

President Carter stated on Dec. 28 that the event had substantially changed his view of the Soviet Union. In his speech to the nation on Jan. 4, 1980, President Carter expressed the view that the Soviets might be seeking to use Afghanistan as a step in an effort to expand their influence in South Asia and the Persian Gulf region. Current Western assessments of Soviet objectives follow two conflicting lines, one emphasizing the defensive and reactive nature of the Soviet action, limited to protecting its interests in Afghanistan; the other stressing the offensive and opportunistic nature of

the move into Afghanistan as an action in support of broader Soviet regional ambitions.

Arguments supporting the defensive or reactive interpretation are based on the view that the Amin government was clearly not effective in its campaign to crush the growing rebellion and gain control of the country. There was a real danger from the Soviet perspective that Amin could fall and be replaced by an anti-Soviet Islamic government. Such an outcome would have meant the loss of the substantial Soviet investment in Afghanistan and would have represented a major setback to the Soviet position in Asia and the Persian Gulf. It could have heightened the Islamic fervor sweeping Iran and other countries of the region, intensifying Soviet fears of Islamic fundamentalism engulfing the approximately 50-million Muslim inhabitants of the Soviet Central Asian Republics. Now that some 50% of the Soviet population is non-Russian, the Soviet leadership is keenly sensitive to the danger of unrest among its national minorities. According to some analysts, however, Soviet leaders decided to intervene in Afghanistan and replace the ineffective and unreliable Amin only reluctantly and against their cautious instincts in order to eliminate these threats.

The arguments for offensive or opportunistic interpretations stress that the Soviet Union found itself facing unique opportunities in a region that has been the target of traditional Soviet ambitions. At a time of unprecedented Soviet military strength and confidence, an exploitable situation of chaos and turmoil reigned in Iran, heightening the vulnerability of the Persian Gulf and Pakistan. It was obvious to the Soviets that the United States, already hostage to its Iranian situation, would not be in a position to challenge the Soviet move into Afghanistan. The Soviets may also have speculated that the U.S. would be less likely to react since Afghanistan had little direct strategic importance. Some analysts argue that Soviet confidence on this score was strengthened by the mild U.S. response to earlier Soviet moves in Afghanistan and also in Indochina and Africa. Whatever retaliatory action the United States might take in trade or other areas, the Afghan venture was calculated to be worth the price, particularly since prospects for ratification of SALT II were already dim, and NATO had just voted to proceed with the TNF modernization which Moscow had sought so vigorously to thwart. Any loss of good will from Third World countries, according to some analysts, would be more than offset by new respect for Soviet power and Moscow's demonstrated willingness to use it. Success in crushing the Afghan rebels would leave Moscow in an unprecedented position to take advantage of Iranian instability and Pakistan's weakness to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas at Western expense. A few analysts have speculated that the Soviet action reflects the ascent of hawks in the Soviet leadership, as a result of President Brezhnev's declining health.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan may not have been motivated exclusively by either defensive or opportunistic considerations, but rather some combination of both. But whatever the original motivations, they may be in a position to achieve both objectives. Ultimate Soviet success is by no means a certainty. In February and March, signs of widespread resistance to the Soviet occupation provoked a declaration of martial law to quell disturbances. Subsequent crackdowns reduced overt demonstrations in the capital, though extensive protests continued in many other areas throughout the country. A long-term occupation appears increasingly likely, as living facilities for the troops are being constructed, and the families of a number of the troops are arriving. It has been reported that Soviet commanders have informed their troops that the duration of their stay in Afghanistan will be

two years.

In response to numerous calls from other countries for a withdrawal of Soviet forces and the neutralization of Afghanistan, Soviet President Brezhnev demanded in a speech on Feb. 22 that the United States and other governments guarantee an end to subversion of the Soviet-supported government as a prerequisite for Soviet withdrawal. President Carter responded by proposing that the U.S. and Soviet Union join in guaranteeing Afghanistan's independence after a withdrawal by Soviet troops. This response was apparently insufficient, as Soviet troop strength in Afghanistan has increased. Furthermore, all signs suggest that the Soviets expect to remain in that country for an extended length of time.

FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS

The Arab World

The Soviet military invasion of Muslim Afghanistan has been met, in general, with varying degrees of condemnation from the Arab states. Only the Marxist regime of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (P.D.R.Y.) has voiced support for the Soviet action. Algeria and Syria, however, have thus far been conspicuous by their silence. Apart from individuals and splinter groups that have declared support for the Soviets, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has stated its neutrality.

The Arab states of the Persian Gulf littoral, in concert with Saudi Arabia, were particularly vociferous in expressions of concern. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud ibn Faisal conferred on Jan. 4 with representatives of Arab and Islamic countries in order to seek a clear-cut, united Muslim stand. Saudi and other Gulf news media have called for serious military and moral action, stressing that the Soviet intervention represents a new strategy on the part of Moscow that has resulted from the inconsistencies, uncertainties and weakness of American policy. They referred to the "internal structure in the United States," which still suffered from the Vietnam experience and Watergate. They compared Soviet justification for its Afghanistan adventure with those accompanying intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It was also stated that, following bitter Soviet failures in Sudan, Somalia, and Chile, the Soviet Union had shed its reservations and had decided to undertake a policy of direct military intervention into the internal affairs of independent states. The Saudi government on Jan. 15 urged all Muslim countries to sever diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and impose economic sanctions, and it was the first government to announce a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. The Saudis also were reported to have informed British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington that they would be prepared to help finance the purchase of arms by Pakistan.

On Jan. 28, the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers met in Islamabad, Pakistan, and approved a resolution that condemned Soviet military aggression against Afghanistan, demanded the "immediate and unconditional withdrawal" of all Soviet troops, urged "all countries and peoples" to secure the Soviet withdrawal through all possible means, suspended Afghanistan from membership in the Conference, called on member states to withhold recognition of and aid to the Karmal regime, pledged support for Afghanistan's neighbors — Iran and Pakistan, and called on Muslim countries "to envision" their "nonparticipation" in the Moscow Olympics.

Iraq, a major client for Soviet military hardware and training, rebuked the Soviet Union over Afghanistan, comparing it unfavorably with the United States in its endeavors to dominate smaller countries. In Belgrade on Jan. 5, the Iraqi and Yugoslav foreign ministers called upon nonaligned countries to resist intervention in the Middle East and the Gulf, and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces in Afghanistan.

The government of Oman, following its strong denunciation of the Soviet invasion, was reported to have granted U.S. forces use of its naval and air facilities in order to support a strengthened American presence in the region. Both Egypt and Israel have issued statements offering the United States use of military facilities to heighten American power in the Middle East. Egyptian President al-Sadat on Jan. 4 emphasized that such use would not be tantamount to base rights. Subsequently, the Egyptian and U.S. air forces held joint air exercises; and Egypt announced it had set up training camps for Afghan rebels. Al-Sadat, on Jan. 28, announced he had ordered a reduction in Soviet diplomatic personnel and the expulsion of all remaining technical experts.

Reaction among the Gulf Arab states to President Carter's State of the Union speech was almost unanimously critical as his pledge to protect Western interests in the region was interpreted as a pretext for U.S. interference in their internal affairs.

The Muslim World League and the Islamic Congress have condemned Soviet aggression in Muslim Afghanistan. At the United Nations, five Arab states -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Morocco — joined Western and other Third World countries in signing a letter requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the Afghanistan situation. Eighteen Middle Eastern countries voted for the Jan. 14 U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, three abstained and two did not participate. Only the P.D.R.Y. voted against. On Feb. 28, the Islamic Conference gave its support to the European Community (EC) proposal for a "neutral" Afghanistan. It was announced in early March that Islamic diplomatic missions may follow the example of Pakistan and drastically reduce their staffs in Kabul.

Iran

A statement issued by the Iranian government on Dec. 29 termed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan "a hostile act... against all the Muslims of the world." The Khomeini regime, including the Ayatollah himself, refrained from any further condemnation of the Soviet move until Jan. 17, when Finance Minister Bani Sadr, in the first major public attack on Moscow, accused the Soviet Union of seeking to seize parts of Iranian territory in an effort to reach warm-water ports on the Indian Ocean. Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh subsequently condemned the Soviet invasion, and, on Jan. 28, Bani Sadr reiterated Iran's determination "to resist Soviet expansionism." Iran was reported to have sent reinforcements to its Afghan border. Over the past year, the Ayatollah had denounced the former Taraki and Amin regimes for the anti-Islamic tones of their policies and had called upon Afghanistan's armed forces, police and civil service to turn against the "corrupt athiests" who had attempted to subvert the country's traditional Islamic culture. In turn, Kabul increasingly had accused "prejudicial religious elements" in Iran of having aided Muslim resistance movements in Afghanistan.

On Feb. 4, Ayatollah Khomeini for the first time publicly condemned the

Soviet invasion and pledged "unconditional support" for the Muslim insurgents fighting against the Soviet-supported Afghan government. The previous day, President-elect Bani Sadr said Iran would give military assistance to the Afghan rebels but would not send troops; but he also stated he would not prevent Iranian volunteers from fighting at the side of the Afghan people.

Several thousand Afghans, together with Iranian supporters, stormed the Soviet embassy in Tehran on Jan. 1, 1980, but soon thereafter negotiated a withdrawal with Iranian authorities. In Mashad, some 5,000 Afghans and Iranians demonstrated outside the Soviet consulate. Estimates vary on the number of Afghani expatriates in Iran, with maximum figures given as 500,000. Since April 1978, according to official figures, about 30,000 Afghan refugees have emigrated to Iran.

The Khomeini regime's primary preoccupation has been the achievement of legitimacy for a theocratic form of government and internal security. Faced with continuing political fragmentation and economic chaos, it is highly sensitive to events in neighboring Afghanistan. As long as the central government in Tehran and Qom is unable to reimpose its authority over the provinces, ethnically based demands for regional autonomy, and even secession, will continue. If the Soviets are able to install a reasonably stable regime in Kabul, the potential for inciting and supporting ethnic nationalism in Iran is substantial. Of particular concern is the movement for an independent Baluchistan, which Afghanistan historically has supported as a means of gaining access to the Indian Ocean. The Afghan Marxist parties have had a close working relationship with the Iranian Communist Tudeh Party and other leftist groups. Iranian radicals have undergone training, including Marxist indoctrination and guerrilla training, at two Afghan Soviet-supervised training camps at Mazar-e-Sharif, near the Soviet border.

Pakistan and India

The recent events in Afghanistan have caused great distress in Pakistan where there is much concern about the potential for Soviet-inspired and directed subversion of the country. Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long border over which they have been at odds for many years. Autonomy-minded tribal groups in the provinces of Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier, straddling the boundary, have been a major threat to the integrity of Pakistan and a complicating factor in attempts to resolve its disputes with Afghanistan. While negotiations with the previous Afghan regimes met with little or no success, at least there was the feeling in Pakistan that the contending parties were equally matched. Soviet control of Afghanistan appears to make the country a potentially far more formidable opponent. It is feared that a Soviet-dominated regime will be aggressive in pursuing an active policy of subversion among Pakistan's dissident ethnic groups (especially Baluchis and Pashtuns), thereby raising to a much higher level the possibility of the region's balkanization and an end to Pakistan as it exists today. Having lost the east wing of the country -- Bangladesh — less than a decade ago, the Pakistanis are particularly sensitive to this prospect. The Pakistan government is also worried that the spillover of Afghan refugees (estimated at over 750,000), including anti-Soviet guerrillas, into Pakistan territory might result in direct Soviet military incursions into Pakistan.

Consequently, Pakistani officials appeared to be anxious for the return of large-scale U.S. arms shipments, which have been severely restricted since the India-Pakistan War of 1965. The government believes that several billion

dollars of U.S. arms aid is required to modernize the armed forces and strengthen defenses along the Afghan border, and independent experts generally accept this assessment. President Zia ul-Haq has also stressed Pakistan's need for substantive American economic aid.

The Carter Administration offered Pakistan $400 million in aid over a 2-year period, equally divided between military and economic aid. In March 1980, the Government of Pakistan rejected the proposal. It considered the amount of military aid inadequate to provide the weaponry needed by the Pakistani armed forces. Given this perceived inadequacy, Pakistani leaders concluded that acceptance of the offer would incur too many risks and losses, especially increased Soviet and Indian hostility towards Pakistan. It would also, they felt, weaken Pakistan's standing among nonaligned and Islamic nations. These officials are also critical of the United States for not providing Afghan rebels with arms and other supplies.

However, Pakistan remains interested in the $200 million economic aid proposal. It also looks with favor upon a Carter Administration proposal to ask Congress to state a reaffirmation of the 1959 U.S.-Pakistan Agreement on Cooperation, which states a U.S. interest in supporting Pakistan's security against Communist aggression.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses an indirect threat to India, which shares no border with the embattled central Asian country. Criticism and opposition have been expressed in many quarters over the Soviet military action, but the new government of Indira Gandhi has publicly accepted the Soviet rationale for the invasion. The government believes that private diplomacy rather than open pressure is the most suitable means of achieving a Soviet withdrawal. Consequently, the Government of India has worked to prevent the emergence of an anti-Soviet movement among the nonaligned nations.

The greatest concern of Indian leaders at this juncture revolves around Pakistan's response to the intervention -- and its possible implications. There is considerable apprehension that the crisis will lead to strengthened ties between Pakistan and the United States, with a consequent resumption of U.S. deliveries of military equipment. Such an influx of new and sophisticated weaponry is seen by Indians as having a major destabilizing effect on the always-sensitive balance of forces between India and Pakistan. The possibility of a closer military relationship between China and Pakistan is also viewed with concern by Indian leaders. After three wars with Pakistan, in which the latter employed weapons supplied by the United States, and a fourth war with China, India is suspicious of any U.S. military assistance in the region designed to strengthen Pakistan.

Separatist sentiment is strong in the two Pakistani provinces that border Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier. Both provinces are poor and underdeveloped, even by Pakistani standards, and provincial opponents of the central government have long complained that they have not received their fair share of economic development resources, especially in education, water supply, and other such areas.

In both cases, the 87-year-old British-drawn border that Pakistan shares with Afghanistan and Iran made no allowances for the fact that it was splitting up two ethnic groups, some 5 million Baluchis in the south and about 14 million Pashtuns (or Pathans) in the north. There are Baluchi and Pashtun factions of one of the leading -- and banned -- opposition political parties in Pakistan, the National Awami Party. The leader of that party,

Khan Abdul Wali Khan, is a prominent Pathan with a family history of friction, first with the British authorities and then with the Pakistan government.

Baluchistan has a bleak 750-mile coastline along the Arabian Sea with only one port of any potential, Gwadar. Some of its people fought a protracted guerrilla campaign against the Pakistan government from 1973 to 1977. Pakistani military efforts against the Baluchi insurgents had the active support of the former Shah of Iran, who supplied both arms and funds to bolster the campaign. There has been an uneasy truce since then. There is also a Baluchi population on the Iranian side of the border and a smaller pocket of Baluchis in the contiguous portion of Afghanistan. Some Baluchi nationalists dream of a "Greater Baluchistan" that would unite all the Baluchi tribes under one flag. Any outside power that could dominate the new country would have ready naval access to the Persian Gulf and a position of leverage along Iran's eastern flank.

The Afghans have periodically encouraged the movement for a new Afghan-dominated country of "Pashtunistan" to be formed from Pakistan's Pashtun-majority area, and including the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. This issue was eclipsed by the Afghan guerrilla war that has been raging since 1978, but the new Soviet-installed Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul voiced support for the creation of Pashtunistan shortly after it was created in December 1979.

People's Republic of China (P.R.C.)

China steadily escalated its condemnation of the Soviet Union following the Soviet-backed coup in Kabul and the buildup of Soviet forces throughout Afghanistan. In authoritative press and government statements, Peking said that these developments pose a direct threat to Chinese security and mark the most serious escalation of Soviet expansionism abroad in over a decade. Peking has yet to pledge authoritatively its support for the armed resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan, although Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping seemed to come close to a statement of outright support when he warmly praised on Jan. 6 "heroic resistance" of the Afghan people. Also, Peking has thus far not reaffirmed backing for Pakistan, Afghanistan's vulnerable neighbor and a traditionally close ally of the P.R.C., although Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua reportedly reassured the Pakistanis during a visit to Pakistan in mid-Jan. 1980. Chinese comment has offered general pledges to join in worldwide efforts against this and other instances of Soviet aggression, giving special prominence to calls for Sino-American "joint countermeasures." It has advised pointedly that "actual steps" must be taken in order to check the Soviet advance toward "global hegemonism," and in this regard, has highlighted statements of U.S. counteractions by President Carter and U.S. officials.

Among the other notable features of China's reaction, Peking said that:

(1) Soviet objectives in Afghanistan range far beyond a desire to control that country and represent an important step in the Kremlin's plan to gain direct access to the Indian Ocean and control Western oil supplies in the Persian Gulf region.

(2) The Soviet move came at this time in part because the Soviet Union saw that the United States was preoccupied with the crisis in Iran and had "helplessly taken a defensive position" in rivalry with the U.S.S.R. in the

Middle East.

(3) The invasion served as a warning to other Third World rulers with close ties to the U.S.S.R., demonstrating that the Soviets are unscrupulous conspirators "like Hitler" who will use and dispose of allies as they see fit.

(4) There is a clear link between the Afghanistan invasion and Soviet-backed aggression by Vietnam in Indochina because the less-than-firm world reaction against Vietnam encouraged the Soviets to feel free to invade Afghanistan.

U.S. Allies

Western Europe

Our European allies, in contrast to their somewhat qualified initial reactions to the crisis in Iran, immediately joined the United States in strongly condemning the Soviet intervention in Afganistan. The NATO Council was convened in Brussels on New Year's Day to discuss the action. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who represented the U.S. at the session, reported that the allies discussed a variety of retaliatory measures against the Soviet Union at the session, including: (1) boycotting the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow; (2) stopping wheat sales; (3) breaking off cultural exchanges; and (4) refusing to renew commercial credits.

Although no decisions were adopted at the meeting, it appeared there was a general consensus that whatever actions are taken should be "firm, convincing and credible." One NATO ambassador stated: "We dare not take actions we cannot really deliver on because our credibility will suffer."

At the Jan. 1, NATO meeting and in preliminary talks conducted by Secretary Christopher with ranking West European diplomats in London, the U.S. found a common front with the European allies. They expressed mutual concern over the "extreme seriousness" of the Soviet aggression, and the need for the Western Alliance to respond forcefully. NATO Secretary Luns called the Soviet invasion "a flagrant violation of international law and a threat to world peace."

In other allied reactions, Britain and several other NATO members instructed their ambassadors to avoid contact with the new Soviet-backed government in Kabul. On Jan. 4, several West European representatives, along with U.S., Pakistani, and other Asian diplomats, presented a request to the U.N. Security Council for a formal debate on the Soviet invasion. On Jan. 6, however, France deviated from the solidarity expressed by its West European allies, and refused to line up behind President Carter's program of economic countermeasures against the Soviet Union. French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet argued that France, as the "witness" and originator of East-West detente 15 years ago, is duty-bound not to act hastily. Francois-Poncet added that it would be a grave error to "Westernize the Afghanistan affair" since it appears primarily a conflict between the Soviets and the Islamic world rather than an East-West confrontation.

On Jan. 6, the Common Market and Canada suspended new export licenses for wheat, corn, soybeans, and other agricultural products in response to President Carter's announcement that the U.S. will refuse to sell 17 million metric tons of additional grain to the Soviet Union. The Australian

government later supported U.S. measures by promising not to increase sales to the Soviet Union to offset the grains the U.S. is denying the Soviets. Finally, the Common Market suspended export subsidies and the granting of licenses for grain and dairy product exports to the Soviet Union.

The Afghanistan incident is likely to contribute to a further cooling of relations between NATO countries and the Soviet Union, already strained by the Atlantic Alliance's decision in December 1979 to produce and deploy a new generation of American intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of striking the Soviet Union. It also appears likely that the United States and its European allies could be drawn closer together as a result of the Soviet military intervention designed to tie Afghanistan more firmly into the Soviet sphere of influence. It would not be surprising, however, if the allies prefer to structure the Western response along the lines indicated by France, so that, while strongly condemning the Soviet action, the way would be left open to a future constructive relationship with Moscow.

To date, neither the EEC nor NATO have taken further punitive actions except to agree not to undercut any retaliatory actions against the Soviets taken by another member state. The continental Europeans, not eager to jeopardize detente because of arms limitation negotiations, progress on the intra-German talks, trade, and other reasons, have thus geared their response around:

(1) Largely, symbolic and limited diplomatic gestures, such as recalling their ambassadors from Kabul, cutting development aid to Afghanistan, limiting government trips to Moscow and curtailing cultural exchanges; and
(2) Announcing increased economic support to Pakistan, India, Turkey and other nonaligned states in the region, attempting to use the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan as the basis to woo the South Asian and Islamic Persian Gulf states closer to the West.

Britain is the notable exception to the European position, siding with the United States and Canada in favor of economic sanctions, such as cancelling commercial credits, and in calling for the boycotting or moving of the summer Moscow Olympic Games. Despite pressures from other European trade partners, on Jan. 22 Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher followed President Carter's lead and asked the country's National Olympic Committee not to take part in the Games.

As the Afghanistan crisis moved into its third month, the United States has increasingly voiced its disappointment with the European response. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski urged the Europeans and the Japanese to take more "tangible actions" against the Soviet Union, saying that a policy of "rhetorical unity and substantive passivity" is not acceptable. Brezezinski did not elaborate on what steps Europe should take, but the proposed boycott of the summer Olympic Games in Moscow and a tightening of East-West economic trade are among the most discussed options in official circles. Brezezinski gave little credence to the European (Lord Carrington) proposal that the Soviets be offered a "neutralized" Afghanistan as the inducement for their withdrawal of forces.

The European nations and Japan, however, are balking at the idea of taking further steps either individually or collectively. There is no common "Western" response, and the EC countries remain divided about the correct line to take. Japan is fearful that stronger measures could increase

U.S.-Soviet confrontation in East Asia.

Japan

Japan has reacted with somewhat more caution than the West European allies, although the government has issued public statements domestically and at the U.N. strongly condemning the Soviet invasions. Japan also announced that it would refuse to recognize the new Soviet-installed government in Kabul and would continue to withhold economic aid, which it ceased in the fall of 1979 because of internal instability in Afghanistan. The Japanese government is reportedly considering a number of additional steps, but it appears hesitant to go along with U.S. economic countermeasures because officials believe trade sanctions might end up hurting Japan economically more than the Soviet Union. In 1978, Japan exported $2.8 billion worth of products to the Soviet Union, while it imported only about $1.8 billion worth of goods during the same period. The Japanese government has endorsed a boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

In successive governments since the end of the Cold War, Japanese prime ministers have sought to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union, and current Prime Minister Ohira would probably not support any measures that would seriously undermine that already cool relationship. Moreover, Japan is very aware of a sizable build-up of Soviet troops and facilities on the Kurile Islands (taken over by the Soviets at the end of World War II, but still claimed by the Japanese) as well as growing Soviet military power in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

In summary, Japan may consider adopting stronger measures against the Soviet Union, such as postponing loan commitments for joint Soviet-Japanese development projects; but is unlikely to impose any sanctions that would severely disrupt its lucrative trade with the Soviet Union or anger the Soviets politically.

U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Overview

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan appears to have triggered a major reassessment of the role of the United States in the world. This reassessment could mean a reversal of retrenchment in world affairs brought on by the so-called "Vietnam syndrome" and the reassertion of a forward policy of qualified globalism.

Ever since its setback in the Vietnam war, the United States has been caught up in a national mood of withdrawal from globalism, and the military implications of such a role. Analysts have popularly referred to this phenomenon as the "Vietnam syndrome," meaning "never again" will the United States become involved in a foreign war over less than vital interests.

Accordingly, global commitments were reduced under the Nixon doctrine, which emphasized the responsibility of U.S. allies to provide for their own security and regional responsibility in providing security. This tendency continued through the Ford and Carter Administrations. The Carter Administration has emphasized a policy of avoiding intervention by military means overseas.

Detente with the Soviet Union coincided with this development. Agreements were reached with the Soviet Union in which the United States attempted to stabilize the relationship with a mutually acceptable strategic balance and with formally agreed "rules of the game" for governing their rivalry, notably in the Third World. In some respects this arrangement conformed to the prevailing mood of the American people: it seemed to be the rationale for global retrenchment while achieving some form of strategic stability with the Soviet Union.

But the Soviet Union had its own interpretation of detente or peaceful coexistence upon which this relationship was based. This interpretation contrasted sharply with that of the United States.

Brezhnev argued that detente did not preclude Soviet support for the "National Liberation Movements" in the Third World. Ostensibly doctrine -- but perceived Soviet geopolitical interests as well -- called for such support. Accordingly, the Soviet Union pursued an interventionist policy in the Third World, specifically in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Indochina. It did so against the protests of the United States that such behavior violated detente and that the pursuit of expansionist goals in the Third World was destabilizing. An ambiguous relationship resulted: accommodation was reached through the SALT process, on the assumption held by both governments that SALT was in the interests of both nations. Meanwhile, the Soviets continued a steady expansion of their military capabilities, and the Third World became the major area of contention and potential confrontation.

Developments in the Middle East and in South Asia in 1979 highlighted U.S. losses and vulnerabilities in the Third World.

The fall of the Shah in early 1979 and the subsequent instability in the Persian Gulf region exposed the vulnerability of the Middle East oil resources vital to the Western world and underscored geopolitical shortcomings of the U.S. retrenchment policy. It compelled a reassessment of U.S. strategic interests in the area. Qualified foreign policy observers spoke confidently of a substantial weakening of the "Vietnam syndrome" as plans got underway for strengthening the U.S. position in the Middle East. Some concrete military measures were undertaken in Europe and with regard to the MX missile. The seizure of the American hostages in Tehran during the fall of 1979 quickened the pace of this apparent reversal of policy.

The invasion of Afghanistan accelerated the process of reversal from retrenchment towards reinforcement of some form of qualified globalism. The invasion appeared to challenge the United States to create a policy based on a new national consensus, one that requires the necessary military power to support whatever role it determines to play. The first step towards defining this role was taken in President Carter's State-of-the-Union message of Jan. 24 when he declared: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has profoundly shaken the policy of detente with the Soviet Union and, for some, has raised larger questions of what destiny the United States sees for itself as a leading advocate of world democracy in the decades ahead. More specifically, it has compelled the United States to face up to the ambiguity of detente itself with respect to the Third World.

The Administration has already pledged continued adherence to the SALT I and SALT II agreements so long as the Soviets do. The Soviet reply, in the form of a Pravda editorial of Jan. 29, was ambiguous. It said: "The Soviet Union, of course, is for ratification of the SALT II treaty. It is always true to its word and believes that the other side must abide by the documents it signed." One indicator of Soviet expectations in determining the relationship for the future, therefore, would seem to lie in whether they will similarly abide by SALT, even though ratification has been temporarily shelved in the United States. The Soviet response could do much to clarify whether detente has indeed been abandoned in Moscow for a renewal of the "cold war."

The Soviets gave what could be a sign of its intentions to abide by SALT II when, on Apr. 4, it gave advance warning to the United States of new missile flight tests. Notification of such tests were required under the provisions of SALT II. Officials were reluctant, however, to draw too many conclusions at this juncture, since notification was just given to the State Department. But one senior official said that this was "the first good news" about SALT in a long time.

Regional Implications: Afghanistan

U.S. options for influencing events in Afghanistan are limited to providing direct or indirect assistance to the Afghan guerrilla forces and refugees, and to supporting the regime of President Zia ul Haq in neighboring Pakistan. In both cases, the options would appear to require working through the government of Pakistan, since that country is the only haven of the Afghan insurgents to which the U.S. has access. Opposition forces operate from within both the Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier provinces of Pakistan. Given the state of U.S.-Iranian relations, it seems unlikely that the United States could channel any aid through Iran.

Regional Implications: Pakistan and India

In recent years, U.S. policy has shifted away from Pakistan and toward India. Detente and reduced U.S. involvement in South Asia reduced the importance of Pakistan as a key link in the U.S. security network created to contain the Soviet Union. Also, the secession of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) in 1971 reinforced India's claim that it was, by virtue of its size, resources, and location, the dominant power of the subcontinent.

One effect of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, however, will almost certainly be to reverse the trend of a declining U.S. interest in Pakistan — at least for a period of time. Because it shares a long, difficult-to-defend border with Afghanistan, Pakistan again is likely to assume an important strategic dimension in the view of U.S. policymakers.

It will be the task of the United States to balance its requirement to protect its security interest in this part of the world with the need to reassure India that its actions will not upset the existing balance of power on the subcontinent. This problem is complicated by the return to power of Indira Gandhi, whose previous governments have been sympathetic to Soviet foreign policy objectives. While the events in Afghanistan tend to draw the United States and Pakistan together, cooperation will be hindered by several events and factors, among them being: (1) the U.S. decision in early 1979

(required by a provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended) to suspend aid to Pakistan because of its covert development of nuclear weapons; and (2) the burning of the American Embassy in Islamabad in late 1979 by an angry crowd of Muslim demonstrators who were reacting to false rumors of American complicity in the takeover of the mosque in Mecca; (3) Pakistan's distrust of the United States, which has grown since the 1960s; (4) the failure of the U.S. and Pakistan governments in January-March 1980 to agree on an arms aid package; (5) Pakistan's new status as a member of the nonaligned bloc; and (6) the internal political impact in Pakistan of militant Islam. In addition, several issues may may be addressed: (1) whether to cooperate with Pakistan in aiding the Afghan rebels; (2) the extent of commonality with China in policy toward Pakistan; (3) defining Pakistan's needs (military, economic, and political) for greater resiliency in the new situation; (4) how to respond if U.S.-Pakistani support of Afghan rebels triggers Afghan-Soviet military countermeasures against Pakistan; and (5) how U.S. policy should relate to Pakistan's internal political situation, which many observers believe is unstable.

Regional Implications: The Middle East

The Middle East has been and remains of vital importance to the security and economic well-being of the United States and its allies. U.S. interests dictate that the region cannot be permitted to fall under the predominant influence or control of a hostile power. Since Middle East oil is, and will be for some time to come, necessary to the world economy, the United States and other consuming countries need to be assured of its availability. The present position of dependence upon Middle East oil is one of dangerous vulnerability because decisions both on access and on price are not in allied hands. The relationship has engendered substantial distrust between the producing and consuming nations.

The Soviet Union is aware that the Western powers have vital interests in the Middle East. Soviet efforts to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa, the P.D.R.Y. (South Yemen) and Afghanistan, however, indicate Soviet determination to venture in the region, while estimating the will and capacity of the West to respond.

Several Arab states perceive the United States as having been unable or unwilling to respond to Soviet moves in Africa or the Middle East, and they have pointed to U.S. refusal to support its regional allies, as demonstrated by arms embargoes against Turkey and Pakistan and the lack of U.S. action during the fall of the Shah. It is possible that these Arab perceptions of Soviet superiority in the Horn, southern Arabia and Afghanistan, coupled with increased regional instability following the Iranian revolution, could induce the governing elites of the Arab Gulf states to reorient their foreign policies in order to ensure their internal security and survival unless the United States manifests a credible commitment to their protection.

The question of an increased American presence in or near the Gulf region remains a sensitive one. The interventionist threats of former Secretary of State Kissinger and Defense Secretary Schlesinger in the mid-1970s appeared hollow and caused adverse reaction among the Gulf states. In 1979, they rejected an Omani proposal to invite Western participation in the administration of Gulf security. The Carter Administration, however, has announced plans to organize a worldwide forward deployment force which, presumably, would be used in the Gulf region in the event of a threat to Western oil supplies.

In the face of Soviet moves in the region, including the military invasion of Afghanistan, a key question remains how well the various authorities in the region can maintain sufficient control of their productive capacity, the sea lanes through the Strait of Hormuz, and their internal security.

Superpower Considerations: U.S.-Soviet Relations

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had an immediate chilling effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. It brought on sharp rhetoric between the superpowers and led to U.S. decisions affecting SALT, diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations with the Soviet Union. The Administration has announced that it is considering other counteractions in response to Soviet moves in Afghanistan. Whether the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations is merely a short-term phenomenon, as it was after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, or a more long-term shift remains to be seen. But the new problems in bilateral relations stemming from the Afghan crisis only add to the growing difficulties between the two countries that were already evident.

Major U.S. decisions to increase the defense budget and improve the military balance were already in progress before the invasion of Afghanistan. The decision by NATO countries to introduce new theater nuclear weapons in Europe had also been made. The Soviet intervention is likely to strengthen support for these moves in the United States and other NATO countries.

The first U.S. response to the Soviet intervention came in the form of strong unilateral protest against the move and an announced campaign to bring world pressure to bear against the Soviet Union. On Dec. 28, President Carter told reporters that the Soviet invasion represented a "grave threat to peace" and a blatant violation of international law. The following day, the President sent a message to Soviet leader Brezhnev over the hot-line, demanding that the Soviet Union remove its troops from Afghanistan or face grave consequences. He warned that the Soviet action would "severely and adversely" affect U.S.-Soviet relations "now and in the future."

In his reply to the Carter message, Soviet President Brezhnev defended the Soviet move as a legitimate response to a request by the Afghan government. In a televised interview on Dec. 31, President Carter rejected the Soviet reply, saying that the Soviet leader had not told the truth. He stated that the Soviet action had changed his opinion of the Russians more dramatically than any other event during his Administration.

The Soviet Union publicly responded to the Carter statements with some harsh personal attacks on the President, accusing him of propaganda "breaking all records for hyprocrisy and lies." The Soviet press characterized President Carter as "wicked and malicious" and accused the United States of complicity in arming and training the Afghan rebels.

A further U.S. response to the Soviet invasion was in the form of joint action with European and Third World nations to bring the matter of the Soviet invasion before the United Nations Security Council. The Council began its debate on Afghanistan on Jan. 5 at the request of 50 U.N. member nations. On Jan. 7, the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning the invasion and demanding that Soviet forces be withdrawn. Following the Soviet veto, the question was brought before the U.N. General Assembly, where the Soviet Union has no veto. On Jan. 14, the General Assembly voted 104-18, with 18 abstentions and 8 absentees, to condemn the

invasion and call for the removal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.

The U.S. briefly recalled Ambassador Thomas Watson from Moscow on Jan. 2. On the same day it was announced that the Carter administration had decided to ask the Senate to delay its consideration of the SALT Treaty. The Adminstration indicated that it was taking this step reluctantly because SALT II was still viewed as being in the U.S. interest. The President subsequently said that the U.S. would continue to abide by the terms of SALT I, and would not violate the provisions of SALT II as long as the Soviet Union did the same.

Specific U.S. responses to Soviet actions in Afghanistan were announced in President Carter's message to the nation on Jan. 4. The U.S. measures included:

(1) Blocking grain sales to the Soviet Union beyond the 8 million metric tons already contracted. This means withholding an additional 17 million metric tons which the Soviets have already ordered.

(2) Stopping the sale of high technology and strategic items to the Soviet Union, including computers and oil drilling equipment.

(3) Curbing Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters. The catch allowed Soviet fishing fleets in 1980 would be reduced from 350,000 tons to 75,000 tons, resulting in an estimated Soviet economic loss of $55 million to $60 million.

(4) Delaying the opening of a new Soviet consulate in New York and an American consulate in Kiev.

(5) Postponing new cultural and economic exchanges between the two countries, now under consideration.

(6) Holding open the possibility that the United States might not participate in the Moscow summer Olympics of 1980. The final decision by the Administration to seek a U.S. Olympic boycott was made on Feb. 20.

Administration officials indicated that there could be other U.S. moves in retaliation for the Soviet aggression. According to press reports on Jan. 6, possible further actions under consideration include a cutback in staffs of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, reduction of the staff of the U.S. and other Western embassies in Kabul, and multilateral Western efforts to curtail Western bank credits for Moscow. None of these measures have been implemeted thus far.

The Soviet Union dismissed these challenges in its first high-level official response, carried by the Soviet news agency Tass on Jan. 6. The authoritative Tass statement warned that the U.S. actions would be at least as harmful to the United States as to the Soviet Union and stressed that any attempt to influence Soviet foreign policy through such measures was doomed to fail. President Carter was said to have failed to consider the real international situation, overestimating the "potentialities" of the United States and underestimating the "potentialities" of the country being targeted for reprisals. It warned that the United States should not doubt the Soviet ability to defend its interests. The statement concluded with the expressed hope that a "sane, far-sighted approach" to Soviet-American relations would eventually prevail in the United States. Subsequent Soviet commentary stressed the Soviet willingness to continue the detente relationship with the

United States and Western Europe, including the arms control dialogue.

The question now is what the impact will be of the measures announced by President Carter. While these moves serve to underline U.S. displeasure over Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, there is a general consensus that they are not likely to compel the Soviets to reverse their policies in Afghanistan. Soviet leaders probably took the possibility of such U.S. reprisals into account, as possible consequences of their move into Afghanistan, and decided that they were a price worth paying. In addition, some of the reprisals clearly have an adverse impact on the United States as well as on the Soviet Union.

On the issue of SALT, the Soviets may well have concluded, prior to their move into Afghanistan, that there was no likelihood of favorable U.S. Senate action. The short-term prospects for SALT and other arms control measures have clearly been dimmed by the current crisis. A major question now is what the long-term prospects are for both the SALT process and for other arms control discussions, including the Vienna Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) and anticipated discussions on limiting theater nuclear weapons in Europe. President Carter kept the door open to an eventual SALT agreement by underlining his continued support for it and by offering to continue to abide by the terms of the SALT II accord. The Soviet response thus far suggests that Moscow is still committed to the SALT process although Soviet leaders have not explicitly agreed to President Carter's offer. A Pravda editorial on Jan. 29, as well as a TASS statement in March, did not remove the ambiguities. Pravda indicated that the Soviet Union still hoped for SALT ratification, but TASS warned that the treaty could only come into force after ratification by both sides.

The economic sanctions announced by President Carter are bound to sharply reduce the already modest U.S.-Soviet trade volume. The overall impact on the U.S. economy will be limited. Only U.S. farmers will feel any significant pinch, although the Administration has pledged to cushion that impact through a number of domestic measures. The extent of the impact of these economic reprisals on the Soviet economy will depend in large measure on whether the Soviets can find alternate Western suppliers for the goods it will no longer receive from the U.S. To make the sanctions effective, the United States will need the cooperation of its major allies. U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, at a news conference on Mar. 12, urged Western Europe and Japan to take more "tangible" actions" against the Soviet Union.

The grain cutoff could cause the Soviets the greatest potential hardship. The Soviet Union needs to import large quantities of feed grain to ensure a desired supply of meat for its population. Any Soviet meat shortage resulting from U.S. action could increase domestic pressure on the Soviet government. The Soviet Union could replace much of the lost U.S. grain with imports from countries such as Australia, Canada, and Argentina if they were willing to cooperate. The support of some countries for the proposed economic sanctions is questionable.

Similar factors apply in evaluating the impact of the U.S. decision to block high-technology exports to the Soviet Union. There are few items on the Soviet shopping list that could not be bought from other Western industrialized countries. It is hoped that U.S. allies will support the U.S. decision by refusing to sell sophisticated equipment to Moscow. In any event, an interruption of high-technology imports is not likely to have the same dramatic short-term impact on the Soviet Union as the grain cutoff,

although the long-term impact on the Soviet economy of a total Western embargo on high-technology items could be more serious.

The curtailment of Soviet fishing rights in U.S. waters will mean some loss for the Soviet fishing industry but not of a magnitude that would seriously disrupt the Soviet economy.

The decision to delay consideration of new cultural and economic cooperation agreements and to postpone the opening of new consulates, will not punish the Soviet Union to any significant extent.

The idea of boycotting the 1980 Moscow Olympics or moving them to another country has been endorsed by both the House and Senate and is receiving widespread public support in the United States. A growing number of other countries have indicated that they may join the boycott. Such a move would be largely symbolic, but could be a serious embarassment to the Soviet government which has invested heavily in the games and attaches considerable importance to the favorable worldwide publicity they are expected to bring to Moscow. Soviet leaders might be hard-pressed to explain the absence of foreign teams to its own population in ways that would not damage government prestige.

The United States can and may take other retaliatory actions. In the economic sphere, the possibilities for further measures are limited. The Soviet Union was already barred from Export-Import Bank credits and most-favored-nation status under the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. These barriers to trade are not now likely to be rescinded, although there had been some movement in that direction prior to the Afghanistan crisis. Grain sales and high-technology exports, the main items in U.S.-Soviet trade, have already been suspended.

Other possible U.S. reprisals have been suggested. There are a number of bilateral cooperation agreements still in force which could be cancelled or not renewed when they expire. The U.S. could abandon parliamentary and other high-level exchanges between the two countries. The United States could refuse to participate in the 1980 Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, although that Conference could also be used to raise questions of Soviet international behavior, specifically some of their implications for Europe.

Further actions of this nature would, however, raise some basic questions. Beyond dramatizing U.S. concern over Soviet behavior, how would these actions promote major U.S. interests? Given the fact that such moves are not seen as likely to reverse the course on which the Soviet Union has embarked in Afghanistan, will they be seen as demonstrations of American strength and resolve or will they instead be seen as evidence of U.S. helplessness in the face of a serious Soviet challenge? Do such actions by the United States address the real issues in Afghanistan or do they instead serve more to detract from them? Finally, if the U.S. and the Soviet Union are entering a period of heightened tensions, as all signs indicate, and if the U.S. is determined to face the long-term Soviet challenge directly -- through defense measures, regional alliances, etc. -- is it prudent to sharply curtail the lines of communication and exposure between the two countries?

On Mar. 3, 1980, Secretary of State Vance reaffirmed the U.S. Administration's commitment to the sanctions for as long as Soviet forces remain in Afghanistan. He again called on U.S. allies to join in a tough stand against the Soviet action.

The Soviet action in Afghanistan has raised concerns in Washington and other Western capitals over possible Soviet moves in Eastern Europe. Two countries seemingly vulnerable to heightened Soviet pressure are Romania, a relatively autonomous member of the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslavia, a nonaligned nation. The serious illness of the 87-year-old Yugoslav President Tito, suggests that the uncertain Yugoslav succession period has begun. If rivalries among the nation's ethnic groups and political factions were to bring a period of instability, the Soviet Union could be tempted to exert pressure to return Yugoslavia to its sphere of influence.

One group of Western observers sees the risk of Soviet moves in Yugoslavia as greater in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan. This group argues that Soviet leaders, having already suffered world condemnation, might feel that they have little more to lose in terms of world opinion. They see the exile of Andrei Sakharov, the prominent Soviet scientist and human rights activist, on Jan. 22, as evidence that the Soviets are now prepared to take actions from which they were previously restrained by concern for their international image.

A larger group of Western analysts discounts the danger of direct Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia. The knowledge that Yugoslavia, with Western support, would fiercely resist any Soviet incursion is a significant deterrent for the Soviets, especially at a time when they are already heavily engaged in Afghanistan, according to this group.

Superpower Considerations: U.S.-China Relations

China's strong response to the Soviet invasion suggests several possible implications for the United States and for U.S.-Chinese-Soviet relations:

(1) It shows that China feels that it is under increasing Soviet strategic pressure and suggests that Peking may have an even keener interest in pursuing closer strategic cooperation with the United States than in the past -- an interest that was reflected during Chinese discussions with Defense Secretary Brown in Peking in January 1980. Conversely, because of the Soviet invasion and China's strong response, U.S. policymakers have been more inclined to take steps to reassure China of U.S. support -- including the sale of sophisticated technology and perhaps, eventually, arms, even though such sales would represent a serious departure from what had been seen in the past as the U.S. policy of "evenhandedness" toward the Sino-Soviet powers.

(2) It demonstrates a clear Chinese desire to see the United States adopt strong countermeasures against Soviet aggression, and it implies that Peking would like to see the United States remedy what China views as America's currently "helpless" position in competition with the U.S.S.R. for influence in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region. China was reportedly unhappy over the breakdown in U.S. efforts to initiate a new program of arms sales to Pakistan, and it now appears to be more reluctant to cooperate closely with the United States in supporting Pakistan.

(3) It shows reinforced Chinese suspicion of Soviet motives in international affairs -- a development that could be expected to reduce whatever interest China may have had in seeking some sort of accommodation with the U.S.S.R. in the Sino-Soviet talks which began on China's initiative last fall. (Peking announced its suspension of those talks on Jan. 20,

1980.) Such a reduction of interest, if perceived clearly by the United States, would serve to counter the arguments of those in the United States who oppose the transfer of technology and arms to China for fear that Peking might reverse course, move closer to the U.S.S.R., and use those American supplies in ways contrary to U.S. interests. It would also affect the arguments of those Americans who judge that the United States should strive to encourage an easing of Sino-Soviet tensions in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and elsewhere.

(4) It demonstrates a continuing hard Chinese line concerning the Soviet Union and Vietnam in Indochina, as well as strong Chinese irritation with the leaders in countries like India, Japan, Great Britain, and perhaps the United States, which have been less than firm -- in China's eyes -- in maintaining pressure on Vietnam and its Soviet backer to withdraw from Cambodia and to stop interference in other areas of Southeast Asia. It implies that China would like to see a strengthening of U.S.-Chinese cooperation to counter the expansion of Soviet-backed forces in this region.

REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Restrictions on appointement of an Ambassador to Afghanistan; report to accompany S.Res. 106. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979] 5 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-127)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

05/01/80 -- Agence France Presse, citing travellers from Afghanistan, reported from New Delhi that at least 26 students, half of them girls, and a school principle were killed in Kabul between Apr. 27 and 29 during demonstrations against the regime. The travellers said at least 3,000 to 5,000 students took part in the street demonstrations.

04/29/80 -- The Washington Post, citing reports from New Delhi, said about 200 Afghan high school girls and women college students demonstrated on Apr. 27 in Kabul against the Soviet-backed regime. There were additional reports that students at a boys' school in Kabul had been killed while protesting the government's celebration of the second anniversary of the Marxist coup.

04/27/80 -- From Kabul, H.N. Kaul, a news correspondent of the Press Trust of India, reported that "highly placed sources" said the Soviet Union has deployed in Afghanistan medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

04/25/80 -- Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko ended a 2-day visit to Paris, during which time he met with French President Giscard d'Estaing and Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet on the Afghanistan crisis. French officials suggested that there was little

agreement on issues.

04/23/80 -- West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt announced in Parliament that his government had decided to join the U.S.-backed Olympic boycott.

04/18/80 -- Meeting in Zimbabwe to help celebrate the independence of the former British colony, President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan asked Prime Minister Indira Ghandi of India to try to persuade the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. A spokesman for Mrs. Gandhi said the "two leaders agreed that all of us should create conditions in which the Soviet Union can withdraw," but he added that India was still opposed to American arms supplies to Pakistan.

04/17/80 -- Tass, the Soviet news agency, reported that the Central Committee of the ruling People's Democratic Party in Afghanistan called for talks with Iran and Pakistan as part of a five-point plan to ensure pease and stability in the region. The proposals included bilateral talks with Iran and Pakistan to discuss normalizing relations and also called for a regional conference without conditions.

-- State Department spokesman Hodding Carter said the Soviet Union had suffered about 8,000 casualties since the start of the invasion in December. He added the United States could not estimate the number of deaths.

— In Salisbury, Zimbabwe, Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq attacked the United States for not playing "a much more significant role over the Soviet intervention" in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

04/15/80 -- Japanese Foreign Minister Saburo Okita, in a statement widely regarded as strong enough to assure Japanese athletes' boycott of the Olympics, expressed his government's support of a boycott.

04/14/80 -- The West German government announced that it would recommend that its national Olympic committee vote to boycott the Moscow Games.

04/13/80 — The official Soviet news agency, Tass, accused President Carter of "unprecedented pressure and blackmail" in persuading the U.S. Olympic Committee to boycott the Olympics, adding that the White House "acted in the spirit of the worst times of McCarthyism."

— On ABC Television's "Issues and Answers," Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher said the Soviet Union was "pouring additional troops" in Afghanistan and has "well over 100,000, probably 110,000 men there." He added that the Soviets were having "a great deal of difficulty in Afghanistan."

04/12/80 -- In Colorado Springs, the United States Olympic Committee voted by a 2-to-1 margin to accept President Carter's call for a boycott of the Moscow summer Games. The 1,604-to-797 vote by the USOC's House of Delegates came after Vice President Mondale addressed the meeting urging its support for the President's decision.

04/11/80 — In a signed article in the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, Gen. Aleksei Yepishev, chief of the Political Department of the Soviet armed forces, said other members of the Warsaw Pact military alliance were ready to guarantee the security of the Marxist Afghan regime against "imperialist" attacks.

04/10/80 — In a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, President Carter said he was prepared to take legal action to prevent American athletes from attending the Moscow Olympic Games.

-- The Soviet-backed Afghan regime charged that U.S.-made chemical grenades have been used by Muslim rebels in Afghanistan.

04/09/80 — Pakistani foreign affairs adviser Agha Shahi said the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan has increased to 700,000 since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

— Carter Administration officials disclosed they were invoking emergency economic powers to prevent an attempt by any athletes to travel to Moscow for the Olympics. Such action would involve amendments to the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, which officially authorizes the U.S. Olympic Committee to field teams at Olympic events.

04/08/80 -- Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca met with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reportedly to discuss an initiative sponsored by Cuba to arrange a meeting between Pakistani and Afghani leaders.

-- At a meeting with 28 sports officials, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, White House counsel Lloyd Cutler and Gen. David Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made another appeal for a pro-boycott decision by the U.S. Olympic Committee. In a related development USOC Executive Director F. Don Miller said the Administration had raised the possibility of revoking the Committee's tax exempt status.

04/07/80 -- Radio Pakistan reported that Afghan rebels shot down a Soviet helicopter last week, killing two Soviet generals.

— UPI, citing Afghan rebel sources, reported a "major offensive" by Soviet troops in Afghanistan's Laghman province northeast of Kabul.

— Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca, who arrived in Afghanistan on April 5, met for the second day in a row with President Babrak Karmal in Kabul.

-- The Washington Post reported that the prime minister of Vietnam, the foreign minister of Cuba, Isidoro Malmierca, and the deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, N.P. Firyubin, arrived in New Delhi for talks with the Indian government. There was specualtion that the officials intended to pressure India into greater support for the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan.

— A 17-member congressional delegation led by Rep. Melvin Price (D-Ill.) arrived in Islamabad, Pakistan.

04/04/80 -- Tass, the Soviet press agency, announced that the Supreme Soviet Presidium ratified the treaty between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union "on the conditions for the temporary stay of a limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan territory." Afghanistan's ruling Revolutionary Council and the Council of Ministers also approved the agreement. The new treaty was apparently signed during Afghan Foreign Minister Mohammed Dost's Mar. 13-14 visit to Moscow.

04/03/80 -- Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler met with representatives of the national governing bodies of the 32 Olympic sports at the State Department in order to present the administration's position on the Olympic boycott.

— The Soviet news agency, Tass, reported that an American, Robert Lee, who was arrested in Kabul in February and accused of being a CIA agent, appeared on Afghan television to tell viewers that representatives of Western countries and China were attempting to "sabotage" the Afghan government. On April 2 a man identified as Lee was interviewed on Soviet television.

-- Rebel sources in Peshawar, Pakistan reported a major drive by Soviet and Afghan government forces against Muslim insurgents in Nangahar province near the town of Jalalabad close to the Pakistani frontier.

03/31/80 -- The Canadian Olympic Association accepted an invitation to the Moscow Olympics.

03/29/80 -- Sovetskaya Rossiya, the official newspaper of the Russian Republic, called the Carter Administration's allegations of Soviet use of poison gas in Afghanistan "slander."

— The Washington Post, citing travelers from Kabul, reported that the Karmal regime has begun returning property confiscated in past land reform programs as part of an apparent attempt to win support from the

Afghan people.

— In New Delhi, Palestinian leader Yaser Arafat said he was asked by Kabul leaders to help mediate Afghanistan's dispute with Iran.

03/28/80 -- President Carter ordered the Secretary of Commerce to deny licenses for American goods and technology intended for the Moscow Olympics, and to revoke export licenses for items that have not yet been shipped. The President also prohibited transactions and payments associated with the Games, including NBC's payment of remaining installments of the $87 million in rights and facilities.

— In a statement related to the export ban, the White House called the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States."

-- Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in a luncheon meeting with reporters, said that U.S. allies must confront the violence carried out by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, including the use of napalm and poison gas, and 50 executions daily.

03/26/80 -- Reuters reported that the Pakistani Foreign Ministry had acknowledged that Cuban leader Fidel Castro, current chairman of the non-aligned movement, has sent a letter to President Zia ul-Haq offering "to serve the cause of peace and contribute toward a political solution" of the problems in the area. The message was delivered by Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca who arrived from Kabul Mar. 25.

— At a press conference in Paris, Michael Barry, International Human Rights Federation envoy to the Pakistani-Afghan border, "confirmed that Soviet forces in Afghanistan were using napalm and poison gas.

03/25/80 -- Rejecting the pleas of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the British Olympic Association voted to participate in the Moscow Olympics. After the vote the Foreign Office appealed to all British athletes to decide on their own to stay away from Moscow.

03/22/80 -- Tass, the Soviet news agency, reported that President Karmal had rejected a Western diplomatic effort to guarantee Afghanistan's neutrality in exchange for a withdrawal of Soviet troops.

03/31/80 -- Meeting with a group of past and prospective Olympic athletes at the White House, President Carter repeated the Administration's position that the United States "will not go" to the Moscow Olympics.

-- In a New Year's speech, Ayatollah Khomeini demanded that the Soviet Union withdraw from Afghanistan. At

the same rally, Iranian President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr also condemned the Soviet intervention, warning "we will not tolerate your military presence in our area."

03/20/80 -- In a Kabul radio broadcast, President Karmal said Soviet troops would stay in his country "as long as there is the smallest sign of provocation, interference or external aggression against Afghanistan." Citing bad weather, the Afghan government cancelled Muslim New Year celebrations.

-- In meetings between Chinese Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin and Vice President Mondale, the People's Republic of China and the United States agreed to pursue separate but "mutually reinforcing" efforts to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, the Chinese reportedly expressed their hope that more concrete U.S. action would be taken.

03/19/80 -- The Soviet-backed regime of Babrak Karmal announced its new $790 million budget for the next fiscal year, largely financed by approximately $200 million in loans and grants from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was reported to be providing an additional $40 million donated in consumer goods, including wheat, sugar, textiles, and cooking oils.

-- Abdur Rasool Sayaf, an Islamic scholar released from prison by President Karmal in January, was elected leader of the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Sayaf was vice president of Afghanistan's Jamiat Islami Party before being jailed in 1974 by President Daoud.

03/17 80 -- Twelve nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, to discuss alternatives to the Moscow Olympic Games. Suggestions included a "world-class games" to be held after the Moscow Games. The meeting, organized by the United States, Australia and Great Britain, was attended by Kenya, Costa Rica, Saudi Arabia, Portugal, the Dominican Republic, the Netherlands, Canada, the Sudan, and the Philippines.

03/15/80 -- The 21-member administrative committee of the U.S. Olympic Committee recommended that the decision on sending American athletes to the Moscow Games be delayed as long as possible. The administrative committee passed a resolution urging a decision be made based on world conditions prevailing in mid-May, just before the May 24 deadline for filing entries to the summer Games.

03/14/80 -- Romania issued a joint statement with Great Britain implicitly denouncing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The statement, following a two-day visit to Bucharest by British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, called upon the Soviet Union to negotiate a peaceful solution of the crisis and "to resume

the policy of detente throughout the world."

— Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said the Soviet Union would reject any plan for a political settlement in Afghanistan which affected the sovereignty of the Afghan government.

03/13/80 -- Afghan spokesmen said in Pakistan that a leading guerrilla commander had been killed by Soviet troops on Mar. 11. Gulai Shaer, chief of the Mashwani tribe, had led insurgent drives against the central Afghan government since the 1978 Marxist coup.

03/12/80 -- President Carter asked all U.S. companies scheduled to supply merchandise to the summer Olympics to voluntarily stop shipping their goods to the Moscow Games. This action is expected to affect between $15 and $20 million in merchandise.

— Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany revealed he had received a letter from Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev on Mar. 4, the day Mr. Schmidt arrived in Washington to confer with President Carter, warning him against supporting U.S.-sponsored anti-Soviet sanctions. Mr. Schmidt also avoided questions at a news conference on whether Bonn will boycott the Olympic Games. He said he did not consider the boycott a key issue in the West's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

— In a news conference at the National Press Club, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski urged Western Europe and Japan to take more "tangible actions" against the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, adding that a policy of "rhetorical unity and substantive passivity" is not sufficient. Mr. Brzezinski also appeared to give little encouragement to European proposals that the Soviets be offered a neutral Afghanistan in exchange for a withdrawal of their troops, but added that the United States is willing to explore the possibilities.

03/08/80 -- The Afghan government of Babrak Karmal has issued a draft call requiring all eligible men above age 21 to register by Mar. 15 ir order to strengthen its dwindling armed forces in an apparent attempt to prepare for an expected spring offensive against anti-government rebels.

03/07/80 — Soviet soldiers again patrolled the streets of Kabul and Soviet fighter jets and helicopter gunships buzzed the city as opponents of the government indicated they were preparing another round of strikes.

-- In Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the foreign ministers of the European Common Market and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

03/06/80 — The Carter Administration announced the suspension of plans to seek congressional approval for a $400 million economic and military aid program for Pakistan.

03/05/80 — Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, announced his country's intention to reject a $400 million U.S. aid package, stating it would harm rather than help Pakistan's security. U.S. officials said the rejection appeared not to rule out American aid altogether, only the amount offered by the Administration.

— Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany, in a meeting with President Carter, declared his nation's solidarity with the United States on the issue of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and said recent events there "made business as usual [with the Soviets] impossible."

03/04/80 — Afghan rebels reported that their forces had suffered a defeat at the hands of Soviet and Afghan government troops in Kunar province.

— Hizbe Islami, the single largest insurgent group, announced its withdrawal from the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, citing the insufficient number of seats to be allotted to it in the newly created revolutionary council which will be comprised of the five largest rebel groups.

— Chancellor Helmut Schmidt arrived in Washington for talks with President Carter on Afghanistan.

03/03/80 — Reports from Afghanistan claimed that Soviet and Afghan government forces were maintaining an offensive in eastern Afghanistan directed against rebel insurgents. A rebel statement issued in Peshawar, Pakistan, said the Soviets had sent almost 200 tanks, 36 helicopter gunships, and an undetermined number of MIG-21 and MIG-23 fighters into the attacks.

— In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance expressed disappointment over the reluctance of France and other Western allies to take tougher measures in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He added that a response had to be balanced between firmness and an avoidance of "the indiscriminate confrontation of earlier times." He also voiced support for the allied plan on neutrality for Afghanistan but doubted that it was possible. Mr. Vance reaffirmed the Administration's commitment to nuclear arms control agreements and SALT II.

03/02/80 — The Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan reported that Soviet and Afghan government troops had begun attacking rebel strongholds in the northeast province of Kunar. The spokesman said the troops were backed by armored vehicles, rocket-firing helicopters

and fighter-bombers.

-- The People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, published an editorial rejecting proposals for the formation of a neutral Afghanistan. "The international community can compel the Soviet aggressors to comply with the General Assembly resolution (for the withdrawal of Soviet troops) only by enforcing more rigorous sanctions against the Soviet Union," the article said.

02/29/80 -- Britain presented to the Soviet Union a proposal for the neutralization of Afghanistan.

-- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance conferred with Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. There were reportedly no signs of any movement toward a resolution of the Afghanistan crisis.

-- State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III said that the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had risen by 5,000 to a level of 75,000; in addition, there are 25,000 troops on the Soviet side of the border, he said.

02/28/80 -- Spokesman Hodding Carter III, responding to various signals from oscow suggesting a possible Soviet willingness to negotiate a solution of the Afghan crisis, said the United States was skeptical of Soviet intentions, but would welcome efforts by others to see whether Moscow was interested in withdrawing its troops in return for guarantees of Afghanistan's neutrality.

-- Reuters reported that most shops in Kabul re-opened for business today. Striking civil servants were also reported to be back on the job.

02/27/80 -- The Associated Press reported that the 7-day-long anti-Soviet strike by shopkeepers in Kabul was crippling the economic life of the city.

-- According to hospital sources in Kabul, at least 300 civilians and an undetermined number of Soviet and Afghan troops were killed in the fighting that led to the imposition of martial law.

-- The Foreign Ministers of India and Algeria urged the Nonaligned Movement not to convert itself "into an anti-Soviet movement." They called for confining the present crisis to Afghanistan and permitting the Afghan people to determine the fate of their country by themselves.

-- Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev reportedly told American industrialist Armand Hammer that Soviet troops could be withdrawn from Afghanistan "if the United States and the countries surrounding Afghanistan would guarantee that they would use their influence to see there was

no interference ...in the internal affairs of Afghanistan."

02/26/80 — According to the Associated Press, Kabul authorities reportedly made massive arrests in an effort to end anti-Soviet strikes by shopkeepers and civil servants. The officials reportedly looked upon the Shi'ites of the Hazara ethnic group as the leaders of the protest. Shi'ites comprise 10-20% of Afghanistan's population. The dominant ethnic group is Pashtoon or Pathan, which is Sunni Muslim.

— Administration sources disclosed that President Carter, responding to President Tito's appeal for the "widest efforts" to salvage Soviet-American detente, declared that the United States was willing to join with the neighbors of Afghanistan, including the Soviet Union, to guarantee the neutrality of Afghanistan if Soviet troops are withdrawn.

-- Leonid Zamyatin, an official of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee, called on President Carter to stop supplying arms and aid to "mercenaries" fighting the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. He added that the U.S. was "encouraging ...the ambitions of the Peking leaders."

02/25/80 -- The Associated Press reported that the government of Babrak Karmal was virtually paralyzed as civil servants and office workers continued their strike. Soviet and Afghan troops apparently were placed under a joint command with government authority reportedly in the hands of the Soviet military commander.

02/24/80 — Pravda, for the first time since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, reported widespread unrest and blamed foreign-supported "counter-revolutionaries."

-- Reuters, quoting refugee sources, reported that Afghanistan's Deputy Prime Minister, Sultan Ali Kishtmand, died from bullet wounds suffered during a clash within the country's ruling Revolutionary Council.

02/23/80 — Afghan army units closed off the main overland access route to Kabul on the second day of anti-Soviet demonstrations. Martial law remained in effect in the capital.

02/22/80 — The Associated Press reported that the government of Afghanistan proclaimed martial law in Kabul in an effort to stem popular rioting in which several persons were killed. Anti-Soviet demonstrations reportedly spread to other Afghan cities as well.

-- Tass, the Soviet press agency, said the Afghan government attempted to curb a wave of "plundering and

arson" instigated by "foreign agents and mercenaries."

-- The New York Times, quoting diplomatic sources and Afghan insurgent groups, reported that Soviet ground forces have begun to reinforce garrisons in three eastern provinces near the Afghan-Pakistani border. Reportedly, neither Soviet nor Afghan armored patrols have been able to secure the main highway between Kabul and Jalalabad.

-- Leonid Brezhnev said that if the United States and Afghanistan's neighboring countries would guarantee an end to outside interference there, the need for Soviet intervention would "cease to exist." The Soviet leader charged that the United States was undermining the possibility for a Soviet withdrawal by stepping up military support to the insurgents in collusion with Pakistan and China.

-- State Department spokesman Thomas Reston, in response to Brezhnev's statement, said: "There is one massive fact of outside interference and that is the Red Army in Afghanistan. That is what we seek to remove."

02/21/80 -- A general strike of shopkeepers in Kabul brought the commercial life of the capital to a halt. The protest was staged following the distribution of leaflets by anti-communist rebels that urged the shopkeepers to show their "unanimous condemnation" of the Soviet intervention.

-- Secretary of State Vance acknowledged that differences persisted between the United States and four European allies on the proper response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

-- Administration officials said that Soviet efforts to control Afghanistan had so far turned into a debacle for them, and that as many as 400,000 more troops may be needed if Moscow decided to crush the Afghan insurgent movement.

02/20/80 -- The Associated Press reported that anti-communist rebels were apparently in control of all approaches to Jalalabad, Afghanistan's fourth largest city.

02/19/80 -- In Rome, the Foreign Ministers of the nine European Common Market countries proposed that Afghanistan be declared a neutral nation under international guarantees if the Soviet Union withdraws its troops. The ministers, however, did not endorse President Carter's call for a boycott of the summer Olympic Games.

02/18/80 -- Representatives of Afghan rebel forces reported a new Soviet offensive in southeastern Afghanistan. Despite suffering heavy casualties, the insurgents claim they have captured several towns in Lahman province and an airfield in Faizabad in the northeastern province of Badakhshan.

02/15/80 -- The White House revealed that the United States began supplying light infantry weapons to Afghan insurgent groups in mid-January. The mission to deliver the largely Soviet-made weapons was being carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency. The weapons were shipped to the rebels through Pakistan across the rugged frontier with Afghanistan.

02/14/80 -- The U.S. Olympic Committee said it would "accept any decision the President makes" on not sending American athletes to the Moscow Olympics.

-- The Indian government said the United States is obstructing attempts to get the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by sending additional U.S. warships into the Indian Ocean and establishing military facilities in the region. Ministry of External Affairs spokesman, J.N. Dixit, reiterated the Indian position that both superpowers are to blame for the escalation of tensions in the area.

02/13/80 -- At his news conference, President Carter reiterated a call to the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and indicated the U.S. desire to see a "neutral country" there.

-- The New York Times reported that Egyptian defense minister Kamal Hassan Ali disclosed that Egypt was training Afghan insurgents in guerrilla warfare.

02/12/80 -- The International Olympic Committee (IOC) unanimously reaffirmed Moscow as the site of the summer Olympics. It rejected a U.S. Olympic Committee resolution that called for postponement, cancellation or relocation of the site because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, Lord Killanin, president of the IOC, said he would "keep all possible options open" between now and May 24, the deadline for final acceptances or refusals by national Olympic committees to participate in Moscow.

02/10/80 -- AP reported that State Department spokesman Hodding Carter told reporters there were now 95,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. A senior Administration official reportedly told reporters at a White House briefing that a "cosmetic" reduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan may be imminent.

-- The New York Times reported that Soviet diplomats, in private conversations with U.N. officials and others, hinted that Moscow might soon reduce the number of its troops in Afghanistan.

-- The London Times reported that the Afghan government announced an amnesty for the thousands of conscripts who had left their posts or refused to report for

duty in recent weeks.

02/09/80 — In a speech to the International Olympic Committee, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said the U.S. will oppose participation by its athletes if the Games are not moved from Moscow. Mr. Vance urged the IOC to postpone or cancel the Games, if Soviet troops are not removed from Afghanistan by Feb. 20.

— The New York Times reported that Administration specialists were studying a new Soviet ideological statement which, according to some analysts, was a de-facto extension of the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" to justify military intervention such as the one in Afghanistan.

— Reuters reported increased fighting in eastern Afghanistan. It also quoted the leader of Hezbi Islami, the largest guerrilla organization, who predicted a full-scale offensive within 6 weeks, after the worst of the winter snows had melted.

02/08/80 — The New York Times reported that the French government said it would not attend a meeting of foreign ministers requested by Secretary Vance to assess the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The French government stated it "is ready to pursue consultations with its partners on various aspects of the international situation," but that "it is opposed to the holding of a joint meeting which is not of a nature to reduce international tension."

— The paper reported that U.S. officials were particularly disappointed by the collapse of the allied meeting, since it might indicate to the Soviets greater divisions within the Western alliance than may actually exist.

02/07/80 — The New York Times reported that the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany, Pyotr A. Abrasimov, told West German television that "the nonsensical American insinuation of an impending Soviet leap toward the Persian Gulf will soon be unmasked." Abrasimov warned West Europeans "not to act in slavish obedience" to President Carter.

— The New York Times reported that Nikolai Portugalov, an official of the Soviet Communist Party Information Department, warned NATO countries that a boycott of the Moscow Olympics and cessation of contacts with the Soviet Union would "jeopardize the destinies of detente in Europe." Saying that detente does not imply "an end to class struggle on the global scale," Mr. Portugalov added that the Soviet Union "remains loyal to proletarian internationalism and class solidarity. It ...will continue to give support to the anti-imperialist struggle and to national liberation movements all over the world."

— India's Foreign Secretary R.D. Sathe, following a 4-day visit to Pakistan, described his talks with Pakistani

leaders as "friendly, frank, cordial and useful." He added that it would be too much to expect a complete meeting of the minds after a single meeting between historical rivals.

— Saudi Arabia's Oil Minister, Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, told a meeting of European business leaders that impending oil shortages in the Soviet bloc prompted Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan as a way to approach the Middle Eastern oil fields.

02/06/80 — State Department spokesman Hodding Carter said there were now about 90,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

— TASS charged that Chinese advisers aided Afghan rebels in staging "bandit raids" against Afghan government forces; it said that China and the U.S. were "training, equipping and arming" rebels at more than 70 bases in Pakistan.

— India's Foreign Secretary R.D. Sathe assured Pakistan's President Zia that he would try to persuade Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, during the latter's upcoming visit to New Delhi, that Moscow should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.

— The New York Times reported that Afghan rebel activities against Soviet and government troops increased considerably in the last few days; however, it remained difficult to ascertain the extent of rebel resistance. According to analysts, the rebels were hampered by a shortage of ammunition.

02/05/80 — French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt issued a joint statement calling for Soviet withdrawal "without delay" from Afghanistan. Reaffirming their support for the Atlantic Alliance, President Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt said that "the Soviet military intervention is unacceptable and creates grave dangers for the stability of the region and for peace."

— The New York Times, quoting officials traveling with National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, reported that Saudi leaders informed the U.S. that they are now willing to consider closer military cooperation with Washington in the Persian Gulf region to offset the impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia's attitude was described as much more cooperative now than it was last March when -- following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty -- Mr. Brzezinski visited Riyadh. Reportedly, however, the Saudis remained reluctant to allow the U.S. use of military facilities on their territory.

— The Soviet press agency TASS denounced reports in several U.S. news publications about a massacre -- in April 1979 — of more than 1,000 Afghan men and boys by Soviet and regular Afghan troops.

— Italy's Foreign Minister Attilio Ruffini announced that he and his European Economic Community colleagues agreed that "the Soviet Union has destroyed the conditions which ought to prevail" for the summer Olympic games. However, the nine reportedly were still at "different stages" in their political assessment.

— Associated Press reported that Western diplomats received information of recurring attacks against Soviet troops in northeast Afghanistan by Muslim insurgents. TASS confirmed there had been a recent upsurge of attacks in several northeast provinces.

-- The American Society of Newspaper Editors cancelled a scheduled exchange of visits with the Soviet Union, citing the invasion of Afghanistan.

02/04/80 -- National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher arrived in Saudi Arabia to hold talks with Prince Saud, the Foreign Minister, and Crown Prince Fahd, the Deputy Prime Minister, on the security situation in the region in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

— The Christian Science Monitor reported that on Apr. 20, 1979, some 1,170 unarmed Afghan males were massacred in the town of Kerala by 200 Afghan soldiers and policemen together with 20 Soviet advisers acting under Soviet orders.

— The State Department announced that U.S. intelligence information indicated 2,5000 Soviet soldiers had been killed or wounded since the intervention began.

— Ayatollah Khomeini condemned for the first time the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and promised "unconditional support" for the Muslim insurgents fighting the Kabul regime.

— Muhammad Ali continued his five-nation African tour to promote the boycott of the Moscow Olympic games, but said his primary aim was to avert a war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

-- Aeroflot, the Soviet national airline, agreed to suspend its flights into New York's Kennedy Airport until it could arrange for basic ground services for its aircraft. As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, unionized baggage handlers and other airport employees refused to service Aeroflot flights.

02/03/80 -- Zbigniew Brzezinski reportedly assured Pakistan that American forces would be deployed there in the event of a large-scale Soviet or Soviet-supported attack against Pakistan. He also visited Pakistani defense forces at the strategically important Khyber Pass on the Afghan border and met with a number of Afghan insurgents.

— The Soviet Union announced the start of operations on a new natural gas field in northern Afghanistan.

-- Kenya announced that it would boycott the 1980 Olympic summer games as a protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

— Muhammad Ali began an African mission to drum up support for President Carter's call for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

02/02/80 — President Zia and U.S. Presidential adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski held 8 hours of talks on the state of U.S.-Pakistani relations.

-- Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis announced that he had officially proposed to the International Olympic Committee that Olympia be accepted as the permanent home of the summer Olympic games.

02/01/80 — The People's Republic of China announced that it would not attend the Moscow Olympics, while the Japanese government stated that a boycott was "desirable."

-- U.S. envoy Clark Clifford announced in New Delhi that the Administration was willing to consider the sale of sophisticated electronic military equipment to India.

— A high-level American delegation consisting of Presidential adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher arrived in Pakistan for talks with President Zia.

01/31/80 -- After meeting with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, President Carter's special envoy, Clark Clifford, announced that the Indian government shares the U.S. goal of a Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, although differences exist over the proper amount of American involvement in the crisis.

-- The Administration reportedly informed key congressional leaders that it intends to enter into a long-term military support relationship with Pakistan and seek a repeal of the ban on aid to Pakistan. This represents an alteration of U.S. policy that initially called for a "one-time" exemption for Pakistan so that it could receive the $400 million aid package but still be subject to a general ban.

01/28/80 — In Islamabad, the foreign ministers of 34 Islamic nations condemned Soviet "military aggression" against Afghanistan, calling it a "flagrant violation" of international law. The delegates to the Islamic Conference also suspended Afghanistan membership in the organization and urged all Islamic states to withhold diplomatic recognition of the "illegal" regime. Unlike the U.N. resolution, the Islamic

delegates mentioned the Soviet Union by name. The resolution also called for "nonparticipation" in the Moscow Olympics.

— In a speech to the Egyptian People's Assembly, President Anwar al-Sadat stated that "all the leaders of the Persian Gulf should know very well that the source of their defense is in the United States." He announced he would give full facilities to the U.S. if any Gulf or Arab state faces a threat from Iran or the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet Embassy in Cairo was ordered to reduce its diplomatic personnel from 50 to 7 while all remaining Soviet technical experts were expelled.

01/27/80 -- At the opening of the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers in Islamabad, President Zia of Pakistan urged all Islamic nations to demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and asked for a "collective defense" arrangement to discourage future invasions of Muslim nations.

— The leaders of six Afghan rebel groups announced the formation of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan to represent several dozen guerrilla organizations fighting the Soviets and the present Kabul regime.

-- In an effort to appease popular criticism of Afghanistan's Marxist policies, government authorities ordered the removal of political slogans and portraits of past and present Afghan leaders from Kabul streets. It is reported that the red flag introduced by former President Taraki will be replaced by one including green, the color of Islam.

— The U.S. Olympic Committee's executive board announced it would study the possibility of holding a national sports festival in the event U.S. athletes do not compete in Moscow. White House counsel Lloyd Cutler said the Administration would ask for a bill in Congress paying for the cost of either moving the Games or of holding a "Free World" Olympics to be attended by nations boycotting the Moscow Olympics.

— The USOC's executive board voted unanimously to present to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Carter's request that the Olympic games be moved from Moscow, postponed or canceled. The USOC, however, deferred decision on the President's further request that American athletes boycott the Moscow Games unless Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan by Feb. 20.

— Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark stated that his country will not send a team to Moscow if Soviet forces are not out of Afghanistan by Feb. 20.

01/25/80 -- Persian Gulf states criticized President Carter's

warning that the U.S. would use force against foreign interference in the region, accusing Carter of justifying future U.S. military intervention and asserted that they were capable of providing for their own security.

01/24/80 -- The United States, in a major policy shift related to the Afghanistan crisis, announced its readiness to sell military equipment to China. The Defense Department said these sales would be limited at first to basic support equipment, such as trucks, communications gear, and early warning radar.

— In Peking, China and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding providing for the building of an earth station which would enable China to receive satellite data.

— The House and the Senate approved most-favored-nation status for China.

— The House voted 386-12 to support the Administration's request that the U.S. press for transfer, cancellation, or boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

— Britain's Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington announced cancellation of scheduled Soviet ministerial visits, cultural events, and naval exchange visits, and characterized such contacts as "not suitable" for the indefinite future. The Foreign Secretary added that Britain was still "studying" with its allies tighter rules for the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union, and was pressing for an end to the subsidized sale by the Common Market of butter, sugar, and meat.

— Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his wife, in exile, reportedly joined eight other human rights activists in a statement condemning the Soviet government for "suppressing the independence of Afghanistan."

01/23/80 -- President Carter, in the State-of-the-Union message to the Congress, called the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a "grave threat" to the Middle East oilfields and warned that the United States would use "any means necessary, including military force" to repel an attack on the Persian Gulf.

01/22/80 -- The New York Times reported that, since Nov. 25, 1979, a Soviet naval vessel -- the 6,450-ton Taman -- has been anchored at the eastern end of the Strait of Hormuz.

-- The New York Times, quoting U.S. officials and military analysts in Western Europe, reported that, in addition to an estimated 85,000 soldiers and airmen, the Soviet Union has also sent into Afghanistan about 4,000 administrators, including a large number of KGB

security officers, to reorganize and man the government bureaucracy.

01/21/80 — Reuters reported that Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh said Iran could not remain silent in the face of the threat to its southeastern province of Baluchistan-Sistan by the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, only 18 miles from the border.

According to the same report, Iran's Finance Minister, Abdolhassan Bani Sadr -- a front-runner in the presidential race -- suggested that Iran might boycott the Moscow Olympics if he is elected in the Jan. 25 election.

-- The Commerce Department announced it had revoked all licenses for the export of computer spare parts for the Soviet Union's Kama River truck plant, built with the help of U.S. technology. Commerce Secretary Philip Klutzwick said the action was taken because of indications that some of the Kama trucks had been used in Afghanistan.

01/20/80 -- A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that China had decided to cancel the Sino-Soviet talks resumed in Sept. 1979, because of the threat to "world peace and China's security" posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

01/19/80 -- Iran's Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, interviewed in Le Figaro, denounced the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan and said: "We are very worried and very alarmed over the presence of Soviet tanks some kilometers from our border with Afghanistan.... We are going to do everything to compel the Soviets to withdraw." Asked to elaborate, Ghotbzadeh said Iran is considering the possibility of helping the 50,000 Afghan refugees within its borders to wage guerrilla warfare against the Soviet occupation troops.

01/18/80 -- State Department spokesman Hodding Carter said the United States had rejected President Zia's call for transforming Pakistan's 1959 defense agreement with the U.S. into a permanent treaty. However, he added that, on Jan. 12, Secretary Vance assured Zia's envoy -- Agha Shahi -- that the U.S. was willing to reaffirm "in the strongest terms" the 1959 agreement.

-- The Washington Post reported that U.S. Defense officials said Soviet mountaineer and counter-guerrilla units were being sent into Afghanistan. Some U.S. military analysts interpreted this as evidence that the Soviets cannot depend on the Afghan army to combat the rebels.

-- AP reported that China's Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, arrived in Islamabad for talks with Pakistani officials concerning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its implications for the security of both countries.

01/17/80 — Pakistan's President Zia said he was disappointed

by the $400 million U.S. aid offer, which he dismissed as "peanuts." President Zia called for transforming the 1959 defense agreement between Pakistan and the U.S. into "a good treaty of friendship and, in conjunction with others, economic and military assistance."

01/13/80 -- Pakistan's President Zia condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, denied allegations of Pakistani military aid to Afghan resistance forces and appealed for humanitarian assistance from the U.N. -- especially the Islamic countries -- for Afghan refugees.

— PLO Political Department Chairman Faruq Qaddumi expressed support for Soviet action in Afghanistan and condemned the United States.

01/12/80 — Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported a message from General-Secretary and Premier Babrak Karmal was telegraphed to Ayatollah Khomeini. The telegram expressed the desire for "friendship" and "close ties" in the context of "Afghan-Iranian Islamic brotherhood," and likened the deposed President Hafizullah Amin to "Pahlavi" and other executioners.

— President Zia said he would welcome military supplies from the West to strengthen Pakistan's defense against Soviet threats, while a Pakistani envoy was in Washington to discuss the situation with Secretary of State Vance.

— Grain-producing countries, including Argentina, agreed to embargo grain shipments to the Soviet Union, following a meeting at the State Department.

-- Iraq's President Saddam Hussein reportedly condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

01/11/80 -- AFP, quoting a Pakistani newspaper, reported that Deputy Soviet Interior Minister Viktor S. Paputin was among 250 Russians killed in Kabul in fighting between Soviet troops and Muslim rebels -- joined by deserting Afghan soldiers -- following the installation of the new regime. The slain Soviet minister was in charge of Afghan police at the time of the coup.

— AFP reported at least two persons were killed as rioting crowds, shouting "Down with the Russians," tried to obtain the release of additional political prisoners held at the Pol-e-Charki prison, near Kabul.

— French Communist Party Secretary George Marchais defended Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan, after returning from a visit to the Soviet Union.

-- Oman's Minister for Foreign Affairs condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and affirmed the government's intention to protect the security of the Strait of Hormuz. "What we need is equipment and

training, rather than foreign troops, to protect our security."

01/10/80 -- The Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan approved the new cabinet; Radio Kabul announced the names of members of the principal party organizations.

-- The BBC quoted Western diplomats in Kabul who said that the Russians now control Afghanistan's communications and have their own men inside all the ministries.

-- AFP reported bloody fighting in northern Afghanistan's Paktia province between Soviet troops and Muslim rebels. In Kabul, several Soviet soldiers and civilians reportedly were killed in the downtown area. Japanese reporters were told by Soviet soldiers, who briefly detained them, that they had come to Afghanistan to "free the country from external oppression."

-- TANJUG reported only units of the Soviet airborne division participated in the Dec. 27, 1979, coup; practically no Afghan troops were in Kabul during the coup, Soviet units set out directly towards the former royal summer residence where Hafizullah Amin was at the time. Observers of the coup in Kabul said the entire operation against Amin appeared to have been planned precisely and in detail.

-- AFP, quoting Afghan refugees on the Pakistani-Afghan border, reported mass desertion by Afghan soldiers.

-- In his first press conference, Afghan Premier Babrak Karmal declared that Soviet troops were invited to come to Afghanistan due to a threat of outside invasion; Afghanistan, said Karmal, has entered a new phase of genuine nonalignment owing to the material and moral support of the Soviet Union. He said the Soviet Union extended its assistance to Afghanistan under the terms of the treaty of friendship and good neighborliness of Dec. 5, 1978. This assistance, he added, was intended to thwart the plans of American imperialism which, together with China, Pakistan, and Egypt, posed a threat to Afghanistan's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

01/09/80 -- Soviet troops reportedly advanced southward into Afghanistan's Baluchi region, along the Pakistan border.

-- The U.N. Security Council voted to convene a special General Assembly session to debate Soviet intervention.

-- The Afghan government declared amnesty for nearly all political prisoners; provincial governors were named for 25 of 28 provinces.

-- The West German press, quoting "well-informed circles," reported that Brezhnev had opposed the Politburo's invasion

decision.

01/08/80 -- The U.S. declared its readiness to sell Peking a ground satellite station which has military applications.

-- Egypt announced a training program for Afghan rebels.

— State Department spokesman Hodding Carter stated that Soviet troop strength in Afghanistan may have reached as many as 85,000 and that the Soviets appeared to be establishing a permanent military presence in the country.

— The Associated Press reported from Kabul that the new Soviet-backed Afghan government was secretly continuing the execution of political prisoners.

01/07/80 — President Carter declared that the U.S. will form a consortium with Western and Middle East countries to supply military and economic assistance to Pakistan.

-- The Soviet Union vetoed the Security Council's resolution demanding withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan (the vote was 13-2).

01/06/80 -- Defense Secretary Brown, visiting Peking, called for "complementary actions" between the U.S. and China to counter Soviet expansion.

— The Soviets accused President Carter of scuttling detente and exploiting the current crisis to renew the "cold war."

01/05/80 -- The U.N. Security Council opened debate on the Soviet "invasion" of Afghanistan. Speaking for more than 50 nations that formally protested Moscow's actions, Egypt and Pakistan led the debate. A draft proposal drawn up by several Third World nations called for a resolution that would not name the Soviet Union specifically but condemned "foreign forces in Afghanistan."

01/04/80 — President Carter announced a sharp reduction in shipments of American grain to the U.S.S.R, a temporary ban on sale of "high technology" items, a severe curtailment of Soviet fishing rights in American waters, and the deferral of most Soviet-American cultural exchange programs. These actions were in response to what Carter termed a "callous violation of international law" by the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan.

01/02/80 — Babrak Karmal, the new Afghan president installed by the Soviet Union, requested more defense aid from Moscow, Vietnam and Cuba to root "all enemies" of his government.

-- The U.S. recalled its Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

12/29/79 -- Soviet infantry divisions moved into Afghanistan, increasing the total number of combat troops to nearly 30,000.

-- President Carter informed Soviet leader Brezhnev that continuation of the Soviet drive would have serious consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations.

12/28/79 -- The Soviet Union confirmed that its troops were operating in support of the new Afghan government. Soviet news agency Tass justified the involvement under the terms of the Dec. 5, 1978, friendship treaty with Afghanistan.

12/27/79 -- President summarily overthrown by Soviet forces. Amin was summarily found guilty by a revolutionary tribunal of crimes against the Afghan people and was executed. Radio Kabul reported that "moral, financial, and military help" in the coup came from the Soviet Union.

12/26/79 -- The State Department accused the Soviet Union of "blatant military interference" in Afghanistan, citing a 150-plane airlift of troops and field equipment, which it said quadrupled the number of Soviet combat troops from 1,500 to 6,000.

12/13/79 -- U.S. concern about a growing Soviet role in Afghanistan was expressed to Soviet Charge d'Affaires Vasev by Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

09/12/79 -- President Mohammad Taraki was replaced by Prime Minister Amin. Taraki's death was later announced.

08/09/79 -- Amin acknowledged that up to 1,600 Soviet advisors were stationed in the country to help direct the war against Muslim rebels.

08/01/79 -- The Soviet Union urged President Taraki to broaden his political base in an effort to combat opposition of traditional Muslim religious groups.

05/18/79 -- Amnesty was announced by the Amin government for an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Afghans who had gone to neighboring Pakistan when the revolutionary regime took power in April 1978.

04/10/79 -- The Soviets replied to the U.S. in kind in Pravda, printing a warning of unspecified dire consequences if Pakistan, aided by the Iranians, Americans, Chinese and Egyptians, continued to assist Muslim rebels inside Afghanistan.

04/00/79 -- The Afghan government acknowledged trouble with "reactionary counterrevolutionaries and imperialist lackeys," and began accusing Iran and Pakistan of aiding the rebels. Fighting was reported in 23 of the country's 28 provinces.

03/24/79 - 03/28/79 -- The Soviet Union intensified its arms buildup. The Carter Administration cautioned the Soviets against interfering militarily in the civil strife in Afghanistan.

03/27/79 -- Foreign Minister Amin was named prime minister. Taraki remained president and defense minister.

02/22/79 -- The United States cut aid to Afghanistan for FY79 and 1980.

02/14/79 -- U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs was murdered in Kabul.

12/05/78 -- The Soviet and Afghan governments signed a 20-year treaty of "Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation." Each party agreed not to join any alliance directed against the other, and to consult each other on all "major international issues" affecting their interests.

05/14/78 — An interim constitution kept the existing legal system intact, but a military court was found "to try persons who have committed offenses against the Revolution."

04/27/78 - 04/28/78 — A bloody revolution brought to power a Soviet-supported Marxist regime headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki.

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
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Hazārah Toghāy
Qonduz
Ishkāshim
Sarhadd
Shebergān
Mazār-e Sharif
Khānābād
Badakhshān
Takhār
Balkh
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Kushka
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Bādghīsāt
Chārikār
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Asadābād
Qal'eh-ye Now
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Panjāb
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Vardak
Nangarhār
Landi Kotal
Peshāwar
Lowgar
Baraki Barak
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