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# CRS Report for Congress

# The DOD Service Academies: Issues for Congress

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


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# The DOD Service Academies: Issues for Congress

## SUMMARY

Congress has exercised close oversight over the DOD service academies (the Military Academy at West Point, NY; the Naval Academy at Annapolis, MD; and the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, CO) since West Point was founded in 1802. Seventy-five percent of academy appointments are made by Members of Congress. There has been considerable legislation affecting academy programs since the late 1980s. There has also been controversy over the moral and ethical standards and atmosphere at the academies. Both reflect a broader issue -- whether the special status of the academies and their graduates in their services, and within the nation and the American people, adds value to the officer accession system commensurate with their costs.

Academy graduates cost DOD more in appropriated funds than those from college Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) or through Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). The issue is whether the product is worth the cost, and whether factors other than costs are significant. The academies accept high-quality young men and women; they are among the most competitive colleges in the nation. Academy graduates outperform ROTC and OCS officers in terms of promotion and retention. The difference is not large, however, and it is impossible to attribute the difference directly to the academy background.

Since 1989, several aspects of academy programs and costs have been the object of congressional review and action. These include whether academy graduates should receive regular or reserve commissions; the appropriate active duty service obligation for academy graduates; the mix of military and civilian faculty at the academies; problems related to women and minorities at the academies; the academy prep schools; and academy athletic programs.

The long-standing reputation of the academies for high ethical standards is being questioned more than at any time in the past several decades. It is not clear, however, if the incidence of misconduct involving academy students has, in fact, risen, or the cause of the rise if it does exist. Many cite both broader social problems and aspects of the academies' environment which may not sufficiently reinforce moral and ethical standards. There are indications that many incidents of misconduct are related to relations between male and female students.

Options for Congress include: (1) doing nothing, assuming major problems are being adequately addressed and minor ones can be solved administratively; (2) insuring that minor reforms not fundamentally changing the academies are undertaken; (3) cutting or increasing enrollment; (4) making the academies exclusively military schools for persons already having undergraduate degrees; (5) adding graduate education to the academies; and (6) abolishing the academies altogether. Given the centrality of the academies in the institutional life of the armed forces, the onus of demonstrating the worth of major change in their roles may lie with the proponents of such change, rather than requiring defenders of the status quo to justify the existing situation.

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# The DOD Service Academies: Issues for Congress

## Introduction

### Purpose

This report identifies and discusses current issues of interest to the Congress concerning the Department of Defense (DOD) service academies.[1] The end of the Cold War and the resultant reduction and restructuring of the defense establishment have resulted, since the late 1980s, in a variety of specific legislative initiatives and concerns regarding the academies. Furthermore, some believe that the ability of the service academies to produce new military officers who reflect the highest moral, ethical, and professional standards of their services is being challenged more than has been the case for many decades. DOD itself regards this component of the academies' mission as very important. It states that the purpose of the academies is:[2]

> To provide an annual influx of career-motivated officers and future leaders into each Service. Those officers shall be immersed in the traditions and professional values essential to the institutional character of the U.S. Armed Forces.
>
> The annual accession of a substantial number of officers who have experienced an intensive professional military environment during the achievement of a 4-year college education is a key to maintaining institutional values essential to the military structure. The accession of those officers generates positive peer influence to convey those traditions and values, stimulating the entire force. That serves to sustain professional attitudes, values, and beliefs essential to the long-term readiness of the Armed Forces.

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[1]The U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, educates officers for the Army; the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, for the Navy and Marine Corps (up to one-sixth of each graduating class of the Naval Academy may be commissioned officers in the Marine Corps); and the U.S. Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, Colorado, for the Air Force.

[2]Section D, DOD Directive 1322.22, Subject: Service Academies. August 24, 1994; Comments on a draft of this report by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), October 18 and November 8, 1996; hereafter referred to as FMP Comments.

The individual academy mission statements -- less broad, but consonant with, the DOD-wide mission statement -- are as follows:[3]

**Military Academy**: To educate and train the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate shall have the attributes essential to professional growth as an officer of the Regular Army, and to inspire each to a lifetime of service to the nation.

**Naval Academy**: To develop midshipmen morally, mentally, and physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor, and loyalty in order to provide graduates who are dedicated to a career of naval service and have potential for future development in mind and character to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.

**Air Force Academy**: To provide instruction and experience to all cadets so they graduate with the knowledge, character, and motivation essential to leadership as career officers in the United States Air Force.

Accordingly, this report addresses two types of issues:

- **Program and cost concerns**. These include the comparative costs of various officer commissioning programs maintained by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the quality of officers they produce; whether service academy graduates should receive regular or reserve commissions; the active duty service obligation of academy graduates; and the appropriate mix of military and civilian faculty at the academies; and the operation of the academy preparatory schools.

- **Ethical, social, and moral problems and issues among academy students and staff**. These include the status of minorities and women at the academies; aspects of the status of athletics at the academies; and, most importantly, misconduct such as cheating and other forms of academic dishonesty, sexual misconduct, use of illegal drugs, alcohol abuse, other types of criminal acts, and hazing of junior cadets/midshipmen by more senior students.[4]

Both of these categories are related to a broader, central issue: whether or not the special role of the academies within their respective military services, in the nation, and among the American people, adds value to the officer accession system commensurate with their purpose and their costs.

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[3]U.S. General Accounting Office. *DOD Service Academies: Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring Needed*. Report nos. B-242092 and GAO/NSIAD-91-79. Washington, July 16, 1991: 22.

[4]Students at the Naval Academy (both men and women) are called *midshipmen*; those at the other academies are referred to as *cadets*.

## Scope

This report does not discuss so-called "civilian military colleges" -- institutions such as The Citadel or Virginia Military Institute, which operate on a military basis but which are not DOD, or even federal, military institutions. Nor does it address DOD graduate-level educational institutions such as the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, the Air Force Institute of Technology (both of which offer master's degrees to military officers in technical subjects), or the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (a fully accredited military medical school which awards the M.D. degree). Professional military education (PME) for more senior military officers (such as the intermediate level service schools, often called the "staff colleges," or the senior service schools, often called the "war colleges") are excluded as well. Finally, administrative details on how a Member of Congress exercises his or her statutory powers to appoint people to the academies are available directly from the military service liaison offices of the Senate and House of Representatives.

This report considers the three DOD service academies, and does not include material on the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA) at New London, Connecticut, or the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA) at Kings Point, New York (see the Appendix for a brief summary). The latter two institutions are omitted because the DOD academies are by far the largest, the best-known, and tend to receive the most publicity -- good and bad.

# Background

Each of the three DOD service academies has a statutorily-authorized student body of 4,000; approximately 900-1,000 new officers are graduated and commissioned from each academy each year.[5] They provide a four-year undergraduate education to young men and women who, upon graduation, receive Bachelor of Science degrees (however, academic concentrations or majors may be in the humanities or social sciences as well as the physical sciences and engineering), and are commissioned as officers in pay grade O-1 (second lieutenant in the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force; ensign in the Navy). There is no tuition, and cadets and midshipmen also receive pay,[6] although they are required to pay for a personal computer, uniforms, textbooks, and activities.[7] As members of the armed forces, they are entitled to full military health care benefits. Graduates are required to serve at least five years on active duty, and, as with all new entrants to the armed forces, incur a total eight-year military obligation, of which any time not spent on active duty must be spent in a reserve component of an armed force.

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[5]Total enrollment was approximately 4,400 until 1991. See note 45, p. 17.

[6]As of January 1, 1996, cadet/midshipmen pay was $558.04 monthly. See 37 USC 203(c)(1).

[7]*West Point. The United States Military Academy. 1994-1995 Catalog*: 14.

## History of the Academies

The academies have long histories. The Military Academy was established by public law in 1802 (Act of March 16, 1802; 2 Stat. 132); the Naval Academy was initially created by the Secretary of the Navy in 1845;[8] and the Air Force Academy was established by law in 1954 (Act of April 1, 1954; 68 Stat. 47). Not surprisingly, as the Air Force was part of the Army until 1947, most Air Force Academy concepts and procedures bear great resemblance to those of the Military Academy (something true for the Air Force and the Army generally).

Although the academies have never been the *sole* source of officers, during the 19th Century the officer procurement policy of the Army and Navy slowly evolved to the point where most career officers, and the great majority of general and flag officers (generals and admirals), were academy graduates by the beginning of the 20th Century.[9] During wartime expansion, of course, a large number of non-academy graduates were commissioned, even for comparatively short wars such as the Mexican War of 1846-1848 and the four-month long Spanish-American War of 1898. After the end of World War II in 1945, the United States, in order to sustain its Cold War posture of containing the Soviet Union and its surrogates and allies around the world, had to maintain a large standing military force for the first time in its history. The academies alone could not produce enough officers for this standing force. For the first time, therefore, most officers who were commissioned through the college Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) served a tour of active duty rather than going directly into the reserve components of the armed forces. In addition, the post-World War II officer corps contained a large number of non-academy graduates who entered during the war and who remained on active duty as officers in the much larger post-1945 peacetime force.

In addition, after World War II the military services maintained in peacetime, for the first time, Officer Candidate Schools (OCS), which provided officer training for recent college graduates and other qualified enlisted personnel on a short-term (few months) basis. OCS had hitherto been used only as a wartime expedient during both World Wars.

Not surprisingly, some of these ROTC and OCS graduates remained in the service after their active duty service obligation expired and rose to higher ranks. During the 1950s and 1960s, the academies began to lose their central position as the primary source of career officers, particularly general and flag officers. By the 1990s, the academies were no longer the major source of commission for officers of any grade through 0-10 (full, or "four-star," general or admiral). However, academy graduates continue to represent a greater

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[8]The Naval Academy was first authorized in law by a series of statutes in the 1860s. See Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 183, 12 Stat. 585; and Act of March 21, 1864, ch. 85, 13 Stat. 85.

[9]See Millett, Colonel Allan R., USMCR, Retired. "To Be An Officer." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1992: 85-86.

percentage of career officers, and reach general/flag rank at a higher rate, compared to their overall proportion in the entire officer corps, especially in the Navy.[10] For instance, in FY1995, 33 percent of all general and flag officers were academy graduates, but only 17 percent of total officers,[11] and about 16 percent of new officers commissioned in that year,[12] came from the academies.

## Congress and the Academies

Congress has had an intense interest in the role and operation of the service academies since it established the Military Academy in 1802. Some of this, of course, derives from the general constitutional responsibilities of the Congress to appropriate funds for and oversee the armed forces. However, the service academies have been the object of special congressional attention for several reasons. Since roughly the second quarter of the 19th Century, the Congress has always controlled and monitored the nature of instruction and the quality of cadets being admitted to, and graduating from, the academies. By doing so, it has felt it was buttressing civilian control of the military by insuring that the career officer corps was loyal to democratic ideals.

Sometimes the motives for congressional involvement have been less pure. During the first half of the 19th Century, cadets with real or imagined political influence attempted to obtain remission of disciplinary action or dismissal from West Point by exerting political pressure directly on Members of Congress. This was facilitated by the very small size of the Army, the Military Academy, and the national political elite at the time. In addition, the Congress was frequently dragged into factionalism related to personality conflicts among the West Point staff and faculty and the Army in general.[13]

### *The Boards of Visitors of the Academies*

In addition to its general constitutional authority over the armed forces, the Congress has specific oversight authority over each academy through the appointment of Representatives and Senators on each academy's Board of

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[10]U.S. General Accounting Office. *Officer Commissioning Programs: More Oversight and Coordination Needed.* Report nos. NSIAD-93-37 and B-247696. Washington, November 6, 1992: *passim*, esp. 38-41. Admiral J. Michael Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations from 1994 until his death in mid-1996, was the first CNO who was not a Naval Academy graduate (the position of CNO was first established in 1915).

[11]See Appendix B.

[12]FMP Comments.

[13]This pervasive theme runs through the entire text of Pappas, George S. *To the Point: The United States Military Academy, 1802-1902.* Westport, CN, Praeger, 1993.

Visitors. According to law,[14] a Board of Visitors is constituted annually for each academy, with the responsibility of inquiring "into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider." Each board is composed of the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, three other Senators designated by the Vice President or the President pro tempore of the Senate (of which two must be members of the Senate Appropriations Committee); the Chairman of the House National Security Committee, four other Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House (of which two must be members of the House Appropriations Committee); and six persons designated by the President. Presidential appointees serve for three years. Each board is required to visit the academy at least once annually and report its findings in writing to the President.

The boards have long histories, although they were not authorized by law, with the current membership, until 1948 (P.L. 816, 80th Congress; Act of June 29, 1948; ch. 714, 62 Stat. 1094). That of West Point, appointed by the Secretary of War, was founded in 1815.[15] The Naval Academy received at its founding in 1845 a Board of Visitors similar to, and explicitly modeled on, that of the Military Academy.[16]

It is difficult to determine the influence of the Boards of Visitors. They appear to have been energetic, and at least sometimes listened to, during the 19th Century.[17] In the late 20th Century, the Representatives and Senators who are statutory members are very busy people, with limited time for direct involvement in detailed investigation of academy activities every year. Nor do many Boards of Visitors have an independent knowledge base, or resources, to conduct an intensive investigation of their academies. A 1991 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on the academies concluded that because the boards do not have their own staff, and meet at the academies only once or twice yearly for a few days, they provide only "limited external review and evaluation." The short visits themselves are not necessarily indicative of inability to assess the institutions -- accrediting organizations make visits of similar lengths to determine whether civilian colleges and universities should be accredited or have their accredition renewed. Problems may result more from the lack of focused expertise and staff resources on the part of the boards. According to GAO, critics from within and without the academies have called for outside advisory

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[14]10 USC 4355 (Military Academy), 10 USC 6968 (Naval Academy), and 10 USC 9355 (Air Force Academy).

[15]Pappas, To the Point: 83; Weigley, Russell F. *History of the United States Army*. New York, Macmillan, 1967: 146.

[16]Sweetman, Jack, and Thomas J. Cutler. *The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History*. Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1995: 27.

[17]Ibid.: 27, 53, 83, 85, 91, 135, 142, 189, 201, 213, 215, 219, 226; and Pappas, *To the Point*: 83, 111, 127, 129-30, 163-66, 263, 297, 389, 296, 415.

or policymaking bodies that would have more influence and/or power to set goals and insure their accomplishment.[18]

On the other hand, the Naval Academy Board of Visitors is currently beginning what it calls a "broad assessment" of the Naval Academy, of which a central component is establishment of an independent review board to conduct a six-month review of academy operations at the request of the Superintendent. This is meant to be an inquiry more substantial than carried out by previous Boards of Visitors. It may be, therefore, that at least one Academy's Board will provide an indication of what a more energetic use of the institution can do.[19]

### *The Congressional Appointment Process*

By far the most important way in which the Congress has interacted with the academies has been the congressional appointment process for cadets and midshipmen. At West Point, "By the 1830s, the executive branch had transferred control of most cadet appointments to Congress...in 1843, Congress ratified this policy, setting the academy's enrollment at the total number of representatives and territorial delegates with an additional position reserved for the District of Columbia and ten others to be occupied by appointments at large."[20] The same process took place for the Naval Academy during its first few decades, and was embodied in public law for the Naval Academy in 1852 (Act of August 31, 1852; ch. 109, 10 Stat. 100 at 102).[21]

This policy basically has not changed. Approximately 75% of appointments to the Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies are made by Representatives, Senators, and Delegates, with the other 25% being controlled by the services or the President.[22] The congressional appointment process generates continuing congressional interest and involvement in the academies through the direct patronage of the appointment process. The Congress has also manifested

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[18]U.S. General Accounting Office. *DOD Service Academies: Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring Needed*. Report nos. B-242092 and GAO/NSIAD-91-79. July 16, 1991: 38-40.

[19]See Daemmrich, JoAnna, and Scott Shane. "Wide Review Authorized at Academy," *Baltimore Sun*, October 1, 1996: 1, 1B; and Bowman, Tom. "Naval Academy to Begin Seeking Members for New Board to Review School's Operations," *Baltimore Sun*, November 19, 1996: 4B; and Bowman, Tom. "Panel Named to Probe Academy," *Baltimore Sun*, January 9, 1997: 1.

[20]Skelton, William B. *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861*. Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1992: 139. Act of March 1, 1843; 5 Stat. 606.

[21]Sweetman, Jack, Revised by Thomas J. Cutler. *The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History*. Second Edition. Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 1995: 45.

[22]10 USC 4342 (Military Academy); 10 USC 6954 (Naval Academy); and 10 USC 9342 (Air Force Academy); all as amended by Sec. 511, FY1992 National Defense Authorization Act; P.L. 102-190, 105 Stat. 1359.

continuing concern, if reflected in different ways, that academy graduates -- and much of the senior uniformed leadership of the armed forces -- be roughly congruent with both the nation as a whole and with the enlisted force. In the aftermath of the Civil War, this was viewed in sectional and geographical terms. In the late 20th Century, while the geographical diversity insured by the congressional appointment system may still be significant, it can be argued that the use of the process to promote ethnic and racial diversity has gained in importance.[23]

## The Academies and other Officer Commissioning Programs

### Summary of Programs

There are four main sources of new officers for the armed forces:[24]

- **The Academies.**

- **Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC).** ROTC cadets and midshipmen are enrolled at civilian colleges and universities and receive military education and training both during the academic year and during the summer. ROTC faculties, composed of officers and noncommissioned officers of the appropriate service, are maintained at host institutions and provide on-campus military instruction. Many students at institutions which do not have an on-campus ROTC unit can obtain ROTC training at neighboring colleges and universities that do have ROTC. ROTC training can vary from two to four years. Some ROTC students receive scholarships covering some or all of their tuition, books, and fees (but not room and board). Nonscholarship students who have incurred a contractual obligation to be commissioned if they qualify, and all scholarship students, also receive a $150 monthly subsistence allowance.

- **Officer Candidate Schools.** OCS (the Air Force calls its OCS Officer Training School, or OTS) involves a course of instruction lasting about four to six months which enables enlisted personnel, or direct-entry college graduates, to compete for a commission in each service. The Marine Corps has a program known as Platoon

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[23]Comments on a draft of this report by Colonel John R. Brinkerhoff, USA (Ret.), USMA Class of 1950, 11 October 1996, hereafter referred to as Brinkerhoff Comments.

[24]This is a general description. There is a wide range of specific programs applicable to specific classes of individuals within the general categories of ROTC and OCS. For a description, see GAO, *Officer Commissioning Programs: More Oversight and Coordination Needed*: 71-80; and Department of Defense. *Military Manpower Training Report for FY1997*. June 1996: 25-32.

Leaders Class (PLC), in which college students undergo one or two periods of summer training only (no training during the academic year), and are commissioned after successful completion of the program.

- **Direct Appointment.** This method is almost always reserved for certain limited categories of professionals -- physicians and other allied health specialists; lawyers; and chaplains -- who are commissioned after receiving extensive civilian schooling and then receive a limited amount of military training and orientation.

The utility of each of the three major methods of producing officers (direct commissioning being excluded because of its specialized nature) to personnel managers is directly related to the lead time involved in each. The academies provide a stable flow of officers with a greater average motivation toward a military career, but require a long lead time before their output of officers can be increased or decreased. ROTC is somewhat more flexible, and can respond to changes somewhat more quickly than the academies. OCS programs, which take only a few months to train new officers, are responsive to rapidly changing needs for officers, such as those which result from a mobilization or demobilization.

Each precommissioning program also has different functions in the context of civil-military relations and maintenance of military values. The academies, as their DOD mission statement notes, maintain "institutional values essential to the military structure," and help to transmit and inculcate those values throughout the services.[25] ROTC maintains a link between the nation as a whole and the armed forces -- by accessing officers from educational institutions around the nation. OCS is congruent with American egalitarianism by providing an avenue for deserving enlisted personnel to gain officer rank.

Each military service derives a different proportion of its new officers from each source. For instance, in FY1995 the Army and the Air Force acquired a much higher proportion of their new officers from ROTC than did the Navy and Marine Corps. The Marine Corps got more than two-thirds of its new commissioned officers from OCS programs, but the Army got only 6 percent. There appears to be no real rationale for these variations -- they have simply evolved over time. Nor is there any indication that one service's philosophy on the appropriate mix of precommissioning training sources is any better, or worse, than those of other services. **Table 1** indicates the number and percentage of commissioned officers accessed in FY1981 and in FY1995 from each source of commission for each service:

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[25]See above, p. 1.

**TABLE 1. Commissioned Officers Accessed From Each Program, FY1981 and FY1995***

| SERVICE AND SOURCE OF COMMISSION | FY1981 | FY1995 |
|---|---|---|
| **Army Total** | **9,565 (100.0%)** | **(100.0%)** |
| Academies | 932 (9.7%) | 992 (17.3%) |
| ROTC | 4,139 (43.3%) | 2,834 (49.3%) |
| OCS | 735 (7.7%) | 350 (6.1%) |
| Other | 3,759 (39.3%) | 1,570 (27.3%) |
| **Navy Total** | **8,430 (100.0%)** | **5,501 (100.0%)** |
| Academies | 811 (9.6%) | 777 (14.1%) |
| ROTC | 877 (10.4%) | 1,012 (18.4%) |
| OCS | 3,842 (45.6%) | 1,111 (20.2%) |
| Other | 2,900 (34.4%) | 2,601 (47.3%) |
| **Marine Corps Total** | **1,888 (100.0%)** | **1,446 (100.0%)** |
| Academies | 134 (7.1%) | 118 (8.2%) |
| ROTC | 230 (12.2%) | 182 (12.6%) |
| OCS | 1,185 (62.3%) | 1,015 (70.2%) |
| Other | 339 (18.0%) | 131 (9.1%) |
| **Air Force Total** | **8,617 (100.0%)** | **5,042 (100.0%)** |
| Academies | 870 (10.1%) | 975 (19.3%) |
| ROTC | 2,711 (31.5%) | 1,815 (36.0%) |
| OCS | 3,005 (34.9%) | 802 (15.9%) |
| Other | 2,031 (23.6%) | 1,450 (28.8%) |
| **DOD Grand Total** | **28,520 (100.0%)** | **17,765 (100.0%)** |
| Academies | 2,767 (9.7%) | 2,862 (16.1%) |
| ROTC | 7,957 (27.9%) | 5,853 (32.9%) |
| OCS | 8,767 (30.7%) | 3,278 (18.4%) |
| Other | 9,029 (31.7%) | 5,772 (32.5%) |

*FMP Comments. Does not include warrant officers. "OCS" includes Army Officer Candidate School; Navy Officer Candidate School, Aviation Officer Candidate and Naval Flight Office Candidate programs; Marine Corps Officer Candidate Course and Platoon Leaders Class programs; and Air Force Officer Training School. "Other" includes direct appointments, Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program members, and category labeled as "other" in DOD data.

## Cost comparisons

Much effort has been expended over the past several decades in comparing the costs -- total and per capita -- of the various officer commissioning programs. It has been difficult to arrive at accurate cost comparisons due to major differences among the military services in cost reporting criteria. In 1992, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that (1) each service included different things in its cost reporting, (2) underreported costs, and (3) had not responded to GAO's urging, since the 1970s, that consistent and uniform cost reporting formats for officer commissioning programs be developed.[26] GAO's estimate of these costs for FY1990 is shown in **Table 2**. These are the most recent across-the-board comparisons of costs by source of commission available. However, DOD figures for service academy costs for FY1995 and FY1996 track closely to the FY1990 figures of GAO, indicating that the cost comparisons have probably not changed appreciably over the past several years.[27]

**TABLE 2. FY1990 Officer Commissioning Program Costs (in millions of dollars)**

| | Army | Navy | Marine Corps | Air Force | DOD Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Academies | 278 | 198 | NA | 278 | 754 |
| ROTC | 373 | 126 | NA | 125 | 624 |
| OCS | 15 | 73 | 19 | 20 | 127 |
| Total | 666 | 397 | 19 | 423 | 1,505 |

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), December 18, 1996. p. 15, 17, 21.

A similar variation among the services and programs is shown in **Table 3**, which indicates FY1990 costs per officer commissioned.

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[26]GAO, *Officer Commissioning Programs: More Oversight and Coordination Needed*: 14-28.

[27]DOD indicates that FY1995 and FY1996 costs for the academies were as follows, respectively: Military Academy: $286.4 and $291.7 million; Naval Academy: $215.7 and $224.2 million; and Air Force Academy: $260.2 and $260.8 million. Information provided by Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), December 18, 1996.

**TABLE 3. FY1990 Costs Per Officer Commissioned (in thousands of dollars)**

| | Army | Navy | Marine Corps | Air Force |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Academies | 299 | 197 | NA | 279 |
| ROTC* | 40/60 | 40/70 | NA | 40/67 |
| OCS | 26 | 27 | 17 | 27 |

*Nonscholarship/scholarship students.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), December 18, 1996. p. 24. Excludes some programs which are variations of, or include elements of both, ROTC and OCS, and apply to very few personnel.

**Table 3** clearly indicates that the cost, *in DOD appropriated funds*, per academy graduate is overwhelmingly greater than the costs of officers commissioned from other sources. This does not mean that the academies are not "cost-effective." Nor does it address the broader issue of the "cost-effectiveness" of the academies vis a vis the "total public costs" of officers commissioned from civilian colleges and universities. The latter, it has been pointed out, benefit from extensive federal, state, and local subsidies, direct and indirect, derived from agencies other than DOD. For instance, a recent superintendent of the Military Academy asserted that when the costs of a West Point graduate were compared with those of a graduate of an educationally equivalent civilian institution who receives precommissioning training through ROTC or OCS, the two were about equal.[28]

This type of comparison, however, seems of limited utility. The Congress does not explicitly appropriate "total public costs," or even "total federal costs," of academy education. It does appropriate money for the various officer commissioning programs as part of the appropriations for the Department of Defense. Thus, even if true, the broader type of comparison seems of little use to the Congress in determining what should be spent on officer commissioning programs. Supporters of the academies point out that comparative costs are only one criterion, and not necessarily the most significant or important one, for determining how to allocate resources among different programs.

## Quality Comparisons: Input

Nobody questions that the academies attract young men and women of very high academic quality. Of 10,000-15,000 people who apply each year to each

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[28]*Service Academies Are an Investment in National Security*. Remarks of Honorable Peter T. King in the House. Congressional Record, February 23, 1993: E414-E417. Quoting Lt. Gen. Howard D. Graves, USA, then Superintendent of the Military Academy.

academy, only 15-20% are found qualified. Average SAT scores for recent classes in all three academies have been in the 1200s. The proportion of entering cadets/midshipmen in the top 20% of their high school graduating class, based on grade point average, is 85% or higher; and about two-thirds are National Honor Society members. Academy cadets and midshipmen also rank very high in terms of participation in high school athletics and "leadership"-related activities. Approximately 80-90% were varsity athletes; over 25% were class presidents or vice presidents. Interestingly, however, ROTC students who receive four-year scholarships appear to have virtually identical academic, athletic, and leadership attainments in high school (similar data are not kept for OCS graduates).[29]

In general terms, it appears that academy students have academic qualifications similar to those accepted at highly selective civilian institutions.[30] In terms of participation in athletics and leadership activities, it is likely that academy students rank above those at all other four-year colleges and universities. To the extent that analyses that measure qualitative differences, rather than quantitative indicators, have been made, they tend to confirm the impressionistic prediction that service academy cadets and midshipmen are likely to be more ideologically and socially conservative than their civilian counterparts, although the extent to which the academy experience creates, rather than reinforces or attracts, these attitudes is not clear.[31] Furthermore, as one observer notes, the issue of "conservative" and "liberal" can be highly misleading in this context:[32]

> ...it is to be expected that young people applying for a service academy would have views that are generally patriotic, pro-military (or at least not anti-military), and supportive of government. Young people who are pacifists, hate the military, and dislike or distrust the government are not going to apply for

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[29]GAO, *Officer Commissioning Programs: More Oversight and Coordination Needed*: 70.

[30]One major profile of U.S. undergraduate institutions lists all three DOD service academies in its "Most Competitive" category -- those more selective than all others, requiring high school class rank in the to 10-20 percent; grade point averages of B+ to A; and SAT scores of 1250 and above. *Barron's Profile of American Colleges*, 1994 Edition: 215. Another lists the Military and Air Force Academies in its analogous "Most Difficult" rating -- 75 percent or more of freshmen in the top 10 percent of their high school class; SAT scores of 1250 or more; 30 percent or fewer applicants accepted. This profile lists the Naval Academy (and the Coast Guard Academy) one notch lower, in its "Very Difficult" range -- 50 percent of freshmen in the top 10 percent of their high school class; SATs 1150 or above; 60 percent or fewer applicants accepted. *Peterson's Four-Year Colleges*, 1997 Edition: 51-52.

[31]See, for example, Stevens, Gwendolyn; Fred M. Rosa, Jr.; and Sheldon Gardner. "Military Academies as Instruments of Value Change," *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1994: 473-84; and Hammill, John P.; David R. Segal; and Mady Wechsler Segal. "Self-Selection and Parental Socioeconomic Status as Determinants of the Values of West Point Cadets." *Armed Forces and Society*, Fall 1995: 103-15.

[32]Brinkerhoff Comments.

a service academy. This says nothing about their political party affiliation or their economic views or political philosophies -- if they have any at age 18. Many Democrats as well as many Republicans are patriotic and support the armed forces and the government. Liberals as well as conservatives support the armed forces, the government, and will go to war if necessary. I think that there are many groups who will not apply to the service academies, and these should be characterized by their core beliefs instead of resorting to the overall "conservative" label. Lunatic fringes on the left will not apply because they reject the military entirely (except for their own revolutions); nor will lunatics on the right -- who hate the government -- apply to serve the government. Service academy applicants tend to belong to the middle ground, the mainstream of political thought, as shaped by their parents primarily.

## Quality Comparisons: Output

Regardless of the caliber of high school graduates who enter the academies, a better index of academy performance might be the quality of officers they produce. How well do academy graduates perform as officers, compared to those commissioned from other sources, over the course of a military career?[33]

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[33]Numerous discussions of this topic contain the same general conclusions. See GAO, *Officer Commissioning Programs: More Oversight and Coordination Needed*: 29-42; U.S. General Accounting Office. *DOD Service Academies: Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring Needed*. Report nos. B-242092 and GAO/NSIAD-91-79. July 16, 1991: 30-36; and Congressional Budget Office. *Officer Commissioning Programs: Cost and Officer Performance*. June 1990: 8-16; and Peck, B. Mitchell. "Assessing the Career Mobility of U.S. Army Officers, 1950-1974." Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1994: 217-37. A thorough journalistic summary of the "quality" debate is in Philpott, Tom. "The Service Academies: Are They Still Worth the Cost?" *The Retired Officer Magazine*, October 1995: 30-36. See also the comments of Lieutenant General Howard Graves, Superintendent of the Military Academy, printed in the Congressional Record, cited above at note xx; Schemmer, Benjamin F. "Is it Time to Abolish West Point?" *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 1985: 80-83; McCoy, Tidal W. "'Point' Product Not Overpriced." *Armed Forces Journal International*, November 1985: 71-76; Davidson, Lieutenant General Garrison H., USA, Retired. "West Point's Doing Better Than the Journal Gave It Credit For," *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 1986: 57; Thompson, Mark. "Academies Out of Line." *Time*, April 18, 1994: 37-38; Ginovsky, John. "AF Academy Graduates are on Fast Track, Official Says," *Air Force Times*, April 16, 1990: 10; Kiely, Colonel Denis J., USMC, Retired. "Are the Academies Worth It?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1991: 36-39; and Hutcheson, Major Keith, USAF. The *United States Air Force Academy: Time to Close the Doors*. Master of Military Studies thesis, Marine Corps University, May 2, 1994 (a letter from Major Hutcheson appeared in the Washington Times, September 17, 1996: C2, with some of his data). I am indebted to Major Hutcheson, now retired from the Air Force, for sharing a copy of his thesis and his thoughts with me. See also *Talking Points on Service Academy Costs vs. Payback*, prepared by the Air Force Academy, October 3, 1995, and *Service Academies -- A National Resource*, prepared by the Air Force Academy, n.d., both furnished to the author by Major Michael Ryan, USAF.

Academy graduates are retained on active duty at a somewhat higher rate, and are selected for promotion (both on a normal, "due course" basis and at an accelerated rate for highly superior performers) to a somewhat higher degree, than their peers commissioned from ROTC and OCS. However, because the overwhelming proportion of all officers come from sources other than the academies, academy graduates, no longer dominate the ranks of general and flag officers, let alone field grade officers,[34] or company grade officers.[35] In fact, in most cases academy graduates are not a greater proportion of officers in each grade, when compared with their total number in the officer corps of each service, until the ranks of general/flag officers are reached. For instance, in FY1995, the number of Navy officers who were academy graduates was between 15 and 24 percent for each grade from 0-1 through 0-6, and did not jump abruptly until reaching the grade of 0-7 [rear admiral (lower half)]. In the same year, the number of Army officers who were academy graduates varied between 13 and 22 percent for grades 0-1 through 0-7 (brigadier general), and did not jump substantially until reaching the grade of 0-8 (major general).[36]

One source claims that academy graduates do not have a lower incidence of disciplinary action taken against them than other officers, and in some cases may have a higher rate.[37] Because so few officers are given either nonjudicial punishments or courts-martial, this index may well be meaningless.

One can conclude, however, that academy graduates outperform other officers to a certain extent in some areas. Some possible reasons are concrete. These include the automatic awarding of regular rather than reserve commissions to academy graduates, eliminating additional competition (for regular status) to remain on active duty for a full career; a higher allocation and/or first choice of career enhancing occupations; and not allowing academy graduates to leave active duty before their full active duty service obligation was over, even if officers with equivalent length of service commissioned from other sources were being given "early outs."[38]

Other explanations for the higher performance of academy graduates are more general, and may be considered in the form of the following questions: Is it because they were more motivated toward, and academically and psychologically prepared for, a military career to begin with, at the time they

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[34]Majors/Navy lieutenant commanders; lieutenant colonels/Navy commanders; colonels/Navy captains.

[35]Captains/Navy lieutenants; first lieutenants/Navy lieutenants junior grade; and second lieutenants/Navy ensigns.

[36]See Appendix B.

[37]See Hutcheson, *The United States Air Force Academy: Time to Close the Doors*: 8-9, 28-30.

[38]Comments (via email) on a draft of this report by William E. Beusse, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, October 18, 1996 (hereafter referred to as GAO Beusse Comments). Mr. Beusse has headed or contributed to numerous GAO studies on the academies.

applied to the academies? Academy admission standards are certainly higher than the average of those civilian institutions which have ROTC units, so one would expect academy graduates to have an advantage in that regard.[39] Is it because academy graduates in higher grades, including those on promotion boards -- either consciously or unconsciously have bias toward their fellow graduates?[40] The statutory and regulatory requirements of the promotion process, however, make it very difficult, for such a bias to be exhibited before the point at which officers are being considered for general or flag rank.[41] Furthermore, when officers are being considered for promotion to general or flag rank, they have an accumulated record of between 20 and 30 years of service, which is much more important than source of commission. Finally, does higher average performance of academy graduates result from the high quality of academic and military instruction and indoctrination they receive at the academies? It is likely a mixture of all three. It can be argued that:[42]

> Critics of the military academies want it both ways. When non-graduates attain a large proportion of promotions and get most of the top positions, that fact is used to degrade the contribution of the academies. However, when graduates do so well in promotions and general and flag officer appointments, that fact is attributed to a conspiracy by academy graduates to promote their fellow officers without regard for merit.

## Commissioning Programs and Civil-Military Relations

The Congress responded to the post-Cold War drawdown of the armed forces by cutting the enrollment of the academies. The authorized number of cadets/midshipmen at each academy was reduced from the previous figure of 4,417 to 4,000.[43] The House Armed Services Committee stated in 1990 that:[44]

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[39]Comments on a draft of this report by Major Michael Ryan, USAF, 1996-1997 National Defense Fellow, CRS Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division (hereafter referred to as Ryan Comments).

[40]Brinkerhoff Comments.

[41]Brinkerhoff Comments; Ryan Comments; see also Goldich, Robert L. *Defense Officer Personnel Management: The "Up-or-Out" System*. CRS Report 96-824 F, October 11, 1996; and the relevant statutes on the operation of promotion selection boards, 10 USC 611-618, illustrating the ways in which objectivity in the selection process is maintained.

[42]Brinkerhoff Comments.

[43]Sec. 511, FY1992 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 102-190, December 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1359. The figure of 4,417 was never explicitly stated in law, but was derived from adding up the maximum number of students that may be appointed under the various methods of appointment. This statute superseded Sec. 531, P.L. 101-510, FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act, November 5, 1990; 104 Stat. 1485 at 1563, which required reductions in the size of the entering classes at each academy. The Congress later decided that setting an overall end strength would allow for better management of the downsizing. See U.S. General Accounting Office. *Service Academies: Historical Proportion of New Officers During Benchmark Periods*. Report nos. B-247098 and GAO/NSIAD-92-90. March 19, 1992.

> The committee believes that the officer corps within each of the services are enriched when accessions are drawn from a variety of sources. As the active force structure is reduced to match the diminished threat, the services must scale back accessions from each of the commissioning sources to maintain the balance characteristic of the nation's armed forces.

More pointedly, people in and out of the Congress have been concerned that the drawdown not result in a substantially higher proportion of new officers coming from the academies. These observers feel that the tendency of the academies to produce a disproportionate number of senior officers needs to be counterbalanced by getting enough new officers from a wide range of civilian sources. Absent the latter, they fear, academy domination of senior positions would increase, and create dangers of an inbred military caste, unaware of broader social trends and insular in their background.[45] This potential problem has been cited periodically by academy critics since the early 19th century.[46]

However, there appears to be little data to support the "caste" hypothesis. The Association of Graduates of the Military Academy tracks whether the ancestors of a cadet are graduates of, or attended, the institution. Each officer's biographical summary in the annual Register of Graduates indicates a hereditary connection with the school. Perusal of the Register for any, or all, of the past 50 years indicates the proportion with such a connection is quite small. Furthermore, while the academies attract a substantial number of young men and women from the upper ranks of the middle class -- as do other highly selective institutions of higher learning -- there is no indication that there is much overlap with the political and intellectual elites of the United States. Comparatively few graduates of civilian institutions as selective as the academies have served in the armed forces since the draft ended in 1973. Furthermore, as noted above, because the overwhelming majority of officers are commissioned from sources other than the academies, there is no absolute domination of the officer corps of any of the services by academy graduates, and there is no disproportionate representation of academy graduates in grades below 0-7 or 0-8. In FY1995 31 percent of all officers in grade 0-9 (lieutenant general or vice admiral), and 49 percent in grade 0-10 (general or admiral) were academy graduates -- scarcely the percentages, one might argue, which can guarantee a

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[44](...continued)

[44]U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991; report to accompany H.R. 4739*. August 3, 1990. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1990 (101st Congress, second session. House. Report no. 101-665): 276,

[45]See, for example, Blazar, Ernest. "Navy & Society: 2 Cultures on Divergent Paths," *Navy Times*, September 23, 1996: 23.

[46]For recent examples, see Upp, Major General Robert D., AUS, Retired. "Are the Service Academies Obsolete?" *The Officer* [Magazine of the Reserve Officers Association], May 1992: 35-37; Evans, David. "A New Way to Train Military Officers," *Baltimore Sun*, February 18, 1992: 7; Reed, Fred. "Military Academies Fail at War Training," *Army Times*, February 19, 1990: 62. For a discussion of the issue during the 19th Century, see Pappas, *To the Point: passim*.

"caste," and far different from the situation which obtained before World War II or even well into the 1970s.[47]

## Program and Cost Concerns

Over the past several years, various specific aspects of academy programs and costs have been the object of congressional action and oversight. Many of these specific issues are indirectly related to the broader issues of ethical and moral conduct (or misconduct) at the academies, and the role of the academies in the armed forces and American society. This section summarizes these program and cost concerns, and tries to place them in their broader context.

### Regular vs Reserve Commissions for Academy Graduates

The FY1992 National Defense Authorization Act (Sec. 501, P.L. 102-190, December 5, 1991; 105 Stat. 1354) provided that all officers first commissioned after September 30, 1996 (*i.e.*, for the academies, those graduating in mid-1997 after having entered in 1993 or earlier), would receive reserve, rather than regular, commissions.[48] The new law provides that no person may receive a regular commission until the person has completed at least one year of reserve commissioned service.[49] Until enactment of this law, academy graduates and

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[47]For FY1995 data, see Appendix B. Comparison data obtained for FY1975 obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center, November-December 1996. Variation in definitions between the FY1975 and the FY1995 data make across-the-board comparisons of the differences between the two years difficult if not impossible to make.

[48]This is not the same as the distinction between "reserve" and "active duty" officers. A reserve officer is one whose commission is in a reserve component of an armed force (which may, in the case of the Army or Air Force, include the National Guard) [10 USC 101(c)(6)]. A reserve officer may be serving on full-time active duty or may be a part-time "citizen-soldier" member of the reserve components (including the National Guard). A regular officer holds a commission in the regular component of the officer's armed force [10 USC 101(b)(12)]; regular officers serve exclusively on full-time active duty.

[49]The House version of the FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act would have repealed this requirement, but the final version of the act did not include such language. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on National Security. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; report to accompany H.R. 3230.* May 7, 1996. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996 (104th Congress, second session. House. Report no. 104-563): 297; U.S. Congress. Conference Committees. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; conference report to accompany H.R. 3230.* July 30, 1996. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996 (104th Congress, second session. House. Report no. 104-724): 751. Actual administration will vary by service. The Marine Corps will screen officers for regular commissions between the fifth and seventh years of service (for almost all officers, while serving in the grade of captain). Interview with General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1996: 21. The Air Force will offer regular commissions

(continued...)

certain ROTC graduates with superior records were commissioned in the regular components of their armed force.

The distinction among the two types of commission has, in the past, been substantial. Until the post-Cold War drawdown of the armed forces began in the early 1990s, regular officers had substantially more protection against reductions in force ("RIFs"), much greater likelihood of being allowed to continue on active duty past their initial period of obligated service, and varying degrees of preferential treatment in assignments to particular occupational specialties.[50] However, in order to insure that only the best officers, regardless of regular or reserve status, were kept as the 1990s drawdown proceeded, the Congress almost completely eliminated the distinction between the two categories for purposes of tenure. It has been argued that, at least through FY1999 (after which this latter legislation expires), the difference between regular and reserve commissions has become honorary rather than substantive.

### *Arguments For Automatic Regular Commissions*

The arguments in favor of giving academy graduates automatic regular commissions are varied. Proponents assert that the lengthy commitment of time required of service academy cadets/midshipmen (at least four years at an academy and five years of active duty thereafter; possibly followed by additional obligated service as a "payback" for specialized training) act as a recruiting disincentive. The career tenure and assignment privileges granted regular officers, it is suggested, help counteract this negative aspect of choosing an academy education. Furthermore, in the past, the tenure of a regular commission allowed officers to make choices for assignments or training that

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[49](...continued)
to most officers upon promotion to major (O-4), except for medical and dental officers, who will be offered regular commissions when promoted to lieutenant colonel (O-5) or colonel (O-6). Air Force News Service (AFNS) transmission via the Internet, October 8, 1996. The Army and Navy have not yet settled on their policies. Information provided by USMA Branch, Officer Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel; and Officer Plans Branch, Bureau of Naval Personnel, November 1996.

[50]See, for example, Captain Mark L. Kimmey, USAR. "New RA Policies Stand to Confirm a Status Decline." *Army*, January 1993: 9, 15. Interestingly, until 1980, all reserve officers, and regular officers commissioned from ROTC, were entitled to an initial monetary allowance to defray the costs of uniforms. Academy graduates -- by definition people awarded regular commissions -- were not entitled to this allowance and had to bear their initial uniform costs out of pocket. In 1980, the law was amended to provide the initial monetary allowance for uniforms to all newly commissioned officers. See 37 USC 415(a), as amended by Sec. 412(1), (2), P.L. 96-513, December 12, 1980; the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA); 94 Stat. 2905.

might deviate from the path of maximum ambition, with assurance that their careers would not suffer. A regular commission was:[51]

> ...in part a protection that permitted career development without career end. In other words, if the Army sent you to study politics so you could be a Foreign Area Officer you could still expect that you would serve 30 years and meet an Army need. Instead, officers asked to prepare for these jobs now are in effect asked whether they wish to risk their opportunities for command and promotion.

Proponents also state that a regular commission's advantages are a reward and incentive for the greater effort they must put forward during four years at a service academy, compared to four years of civilian undergraduate education combined with occasional subordination to military norms (ROTC students) or none at all until after graduation (most OCS programs). Even if the distinction between a regular and reserve commission is, for now, a largely honorary one, awarding of a regular commission constitutes recognition of greater effort and accomplishment on the part of academy cadets/midshipmen.[52] Finally, it is suggested that the overall quality of academy graduates -- resulting from both the quality of students admitted to the academies and the academy education itself -- warrants the career protection of a regular commission. If a academy graduates have a "leg up" compared to reserve officers after being commissioned, it is argued, they met much higher standards than most reserve officers by being accepted into the academies in the first place.[53]

### *Arguments Against Automatic Regular Commissions*

Arguments against automatic regular commissions are made along two lines -- equity and cost-effectiveness. Senator Sam Nunn, the principal proponent of the original legislation repealing the automatic guarantee of regular commissions in 1991, has stated the equity issue as follows:[54]

> From the moment they receive their commissions, officers compete with their peers in an increasingly rigorous environment for assignments and promotions

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[51]Comments on a draft of this report by Dr. William J. Gregor, Associate Professor, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired; former Military Academy faculty member and graduate, Class of 1969, October 1996.

[52]"Duty Commissions Upon Service Academy Graduations," Remarks of Honorable Robert A. Underwood in the House. *Congressional Record*, July 12, 1995: E 1414; Compart, Andrew. "Another run at regular commissions: issue of academy grads' special status gets a champion in House." *Navy Times*, May 27, 1996: 6; and Hall, Lieutenant Colonel Michael A., Civil Air Patrol. "All-reserve commissioning would be mistake." *Air Force Times*, October 28, 1991: 29.

[53]Ryan Comments.

[54]"All Officers Should Compete for Regular Commissions," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 1992: 32.

> in a system that progressively requires fewer and fewer officers. Open, objective competition is central to the effectiveness of this system.
>
> The one feature of officer management law that is not in line with this basic philosophy of competition is the current practice for all graduates of the military service academies to be commissioned as regular officers.
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> ****
>
> I believe it is much fairer to allow performance on active duty to determine who will become regular officers rather than performance in an academic environment, no matter how rigorous. Should we in effect award regular commissions to young people of the age or 17 or 18 when they are selected for the military service academies, or should we await their performance and compare them with their colleagues who have become officers by a different route?

It has also been suggested that the certainty of a regular commission is not a major factor in attracting young people to apply to the academies. The academies already provide a free education, a considerable salary, a guaranteed five-year minimum active duty time upon commissioning, and considerable prestige among the American people generally as recruiting tools. With 10,000-15,000 applicants to each academy per year,[55] there is no evidence that the academies are obtaining insufficient applicants of requisite quality, or that many applicants were or are even aware of the distinction between regular and reserve commissions at the time they apply.

### *Regular vs. Reserve Commissions: Two Interrelated Questions*

The regular and reserve commission controversy raises two questions. First, if academy graduates are not that much better than graduates of other precommissioning programs as to warrant regular commissions, then are the armed forces and the nation getting sufficient value from the academies? The answer is not an automatic "no," but the question would appear to deserve a response. That response might be made in the form of a second, perhaps even more relevant, question: If the distinction between regular and reserve commissions no longer has any practical meaning as far as appointment, promotion, tenure, and assignment of officers is concerned, why keep it? This second question is especially important in light of the fact that the services have been moving progressively away, over the past 15-20 years, from maintaining distinctions among classes of officers such as those exemplified by the regular/reserve dichotomy.[56]

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[55]See above, pp. 12-13.

[56]See Rostker, Bernard, et al. *The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment.* Report no. RAND/R-4246-FMP. Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 1993.

## Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) of Academy Graduates

In 1989, the statutory active duty service obligation (ADSO) of service academy graduates was raised from five to six years, beginning with the class of 1996 -- i.e., that class which entered the academies in 1992 (Sec. 511, P.L. 101-189, FY1990 National Defense Authorization Act, November 29, 1989; 103 Stat. 1352 at 1439). In 1995, however, the ADSO was reduced back to five years (Sec. 531, P.L. 104-106, FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act, February 10, 1996; 110 Stat. 186 at 314), so no academy classes actually graduated with, or had to serve, an actual six-year obligation.[57] During the seven years between the enactment of the two public laws, there had been intense debate over the issue of what the ADSO should be, and it is conceivable the issue could surface again.

### *History of the ADSO*

**The Military Academy**. The ADSO has actually changed only a few times since West Point was established in 1802. In the early days of the Military Academy there were no fixed terms for either how much time cadets had to complete the course of instruction or how long they had to spend on active duty after commissioning. In 1810, the Secretary of War issued regulations requiring cadets to spend at least four years in the Army -- not at the Academy -- unless discharged earlier. "No prescribed time would be required for graduation and [a cadet would be graduated] as soon as he mastered the curriculum."[58] In 1812, the ADSO was set at five years, including both Academy service and service performed in the Army after leaving the Academy (Sec. 3, Act of April 29, 1812; 2 Stat. 720). As the Academy curriculum became more and more standardized at four years, this basically came to mean that a graduate had to serve only one year as a commissioned officer. In 1838 the Secretary of War recommended, and Congress passed, a law prescribing an ADSO of eight years -- four at the academy and four after graduation and commissioning (Sec. 28, Act of July 5, 1838, 5 Stat. 252 at 260). This figure stood for 112 years.

**The Naval Academy**. Determining the ADSO for early Naval Academy graduates is somewhat more difficult than doing so for West Point graduates. Naval officer precommissioning training was substantially different from that of the Army both before and after the establishment of the Naval Academy in 1845. Young men (often very young, in their early teens) were taken aboard ship as midshipmen, trained to be officers, and commissioned, if qualified, after several years of what was essentially seagoing apprenticeship as officer

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[57]ROTC scholarship recipients are required to serve on active duty for at least four years, regardless of whether the scholarship covers one, two, three, or all four years of undergraduate education. See 10 USC 2107(b)(5)(A)(ii). This has been true since the scholarship program first began, solely as a Navy program, in the late 1940s.

[58]Pappas, George S. *To the Point: the United States Military Academy, 1801-1902*. Westport, CN, Praeger, 1993: 30, 55, 58.

candidates. Based on this tradition, from the establishment of the Naval Academy in 1845 through 1912, midshipmen spent a substantial period of time at sea (two or three years), at first in between completion of the academic instruction at the Academy, and later two years following completion of the four year Academy course.[59] It is not clear, however, what the post-commissioning ADSO was at the Naval Academy until 1950 (see immediately below).

**A Uniform ADSO.** In 1950, the statutory ADSO for both the Military and Naval Academies was dropped to three years (Sec. 3, P.L. 586, 81st Congress; June 29, 1950; 64 Stat. 303 at 304). It was raised to five years in 1964 (Sec. 5, Public Law 88-276, March 3, 1964; 78 Stat. 148 at 153), where it stood until 1989, as noted above. (Actually, the ADSO was kept at the four-year mark by administrative regulation from 1964 through 1969.[60])

## *Arguments For an Increased ADSO*

The arguments in favor of increasing the ADSO, to the extent that they can be discerned at all, have always centered around having the government obtain a sufficient return for its investment in an academy education. It was not unreasonable, Members of Congress and others argued, that for a free education, with a monetary allowance, that a graduating cadet/midshipman be required to commit to a long period of obligated service upon commissioning. (Indeed, the Senate Armed Services Committee, which spearheaded the 1989 effort to raise the ADSO, originally proposed raising it from five to eight years; a compromise of six was reached on the floor of the Senate.[61]) This rationale was stated in the 1830s, when the ADSO was increased from a de facto one year to four, and in the 1980s, when it was, for a few years, increased from five to six.[62] The reports on the legislation which raised it from three to five years in 1964 do not state any reasons for doing so.

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[59]Sweetman and Cutler, *The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History*: 27, 39, 103-04, 108, 116-17, and 149. See Act of March 7, 1912; ch. 53, 37 Stat. 73.

[60]See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991. Part 5, Manpower and Personnel.* Hearings, 101st Congress, second session. March 5-June 20, 1990. S. Hrg. 101-986, Pr. 5. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1991: 330-31; and U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies-- Candidates*; report to accompany H.R. 7356. February 6, 1964. As reprinted in *U.S. Congressional Code and Administrative News*, 1964, Vol. X: 2035.

[61]U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990; report to accompany S. 1352.* July 19, 1989. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1989 (101st Congress, second session. Senate. Report no. 101-81): 171; Remarks of Honorable Trent Lott during debate on the FY1990 National Defense Authorization Act. *Congressional Record*, August 2, 1989: S 9434-40; S 9461.

[62]Pappas, *To the Point*: 231-32.

A related argument was that by increasing the ADSO, the academies would insure that those actually attending would be more likely to serve in the military for a full career -- i.e., decreasing the extent to which academy graduates, after commissioning, left the service comparatively soon after their ADSO was up.[63] Suggestions that the increased ADSO would hurt recruiting were regarded as dubious, given the large number of applicants to the academies.

### *Arguments Against an Increased ADSO*

The main argument against increasing the ADSO in 1989 was that it would hinder recruiting for the academies. It was suggested that asking young men and women age 18 to commit themselves for ten years, or 12 years in the case of the original eight-year ADSO proposed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, was simply asking too much -- that too many qualified candidates would look elsewhere. It was argued by DOD education and academy officials that while it was true the academies received a large number of applicants, the number of qualified applicants was far smaller, and that a longer ADSO -- particularly the eight years originally proposed by the Senate committee -- would seriously bite into the pool of qualified applicants.[64] In his "Dear Colleague" letter requesting support for repealing the six-year ADSO in 1995, Senator John McCain noted a considerable drop in applicants to the academies between 1989 and 1995.

In particular, it was asserted both in 1989, when the six-year ADSO was approved, and in 1995-1996, when it was repealed, that it would have particularly bad effects on recruiting of qualified minority and female candidates for the academies, because the number of qualified blacks, Hispanics, and women was comparatively low, and the competition for them among the institutions of higher education so high.[65]

Interestingly, neither narrative nor legislative histories indicate why the obligation was decreased to three years during the 1950-1964 period (although

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[63]"Glenn defends lengthening obligation for academy grades." Letter from Sen. John Glenn, Chairman, Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, to *Army Times*, June 25, 1990: 26; Walker, Lieutenant (j.g.) Paul, USN. "The Six-Year Service Obligation." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1990: 19-20.

[64]Willis, Grant. "Longer commitments opposed: Academy grads, doctors, aviators would feel law," *Army Times*, August 28, 1989: 8; Wolfe, Jim. " Cadets' commitment gets longer: Extra year of active duty required starting in 1992," *Army Times*, November 28, 1989: 4; McCain, Senator John. "Dear Colleague" Letter Transmitted Electronically by the Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., Congressional Press Releases, August 1, 1995.

[65]Adelsberger, Bernard J. "West Point: 6-year obligation slammed: Academy officials say proposal will damage recruiting," *Army Times*, September 11, 1989: 6; Antonelli, Kris. "Senate panel votes to ease academy service requirement," *Baltimore Sun*, July 14, 1995: 16B.

an oversized and perhaps too-highly graded officer corps resulting from the large number of World War II entrants has been suggested[66]) and what the effects, if any, of this action were on recruiting and retention.

## The Mix of Military and Civilian Faculty at the Academies

Historically, the Military Academy has had a virtually all-military faculty, including some Army officers who, after some period of service in the Army at large, have become permanent professors at West Point. The Air Force Academy, as did the Air Force itself, adopted a similar pattern from the Army. In 1991, the Military and Air Force Academy faculties were 97 percent military.[67]

Various civilian academic associations, including those responsible for accreditation of the academies, have called for substantial increases in the number of academy instructors with doctorates. They have asserted that the instructors with masters degrees simply lack the requisite qualifications for teaching what they teach at the college level, despite their unquestioned motivation and effort.[68] In 1992, the Congress endorsed this view.[69] The FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (Sec. 523, P.L. 102-484, October 23, 1992; 106 Stat. 2315 at 2409), required the Secretary of Defense to submit, by April 1, 1993, legislation to increase the number of civilian faculty, and decrease the number of permanent military faculty, assigned to the Military and Air Force Academies -- *i.e.*, bring the mix of military and civilian instructors at the latter two institutions more into line with that at the Naval Academy. The FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act [Sec. 533(a)(1), P.L. 103-160, November 30, 1993; 107 Stat. 1547 at 1658] authorized the Secretaries of the Army and of the Air Force to employ as many civilian faculty as they wished at the Military and Air Force Academies and to set their compensation at each Secretary's discretion. Both West Point and the Air Force Academy have accordingly begun to increase the proportion of civilians on their faculties. As of FY1996, both institutions have about 12-13 percent civilian faculties, and plan to reach the 25 percent mark by around FY2002, although the Military

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[66]Ryan Comments. The recall to active duty during 1950-1953 of large numbers of reserve officers for the Korean War, many with rank obtained during World War II service, could also contribute to this same effect.

[67]U.S. General Accounting Office. *DOD Service Academies: Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring Needed.* Report nos. GAO/NSIAD-91-79 and B-242092. Washington, July 16, 1991: 24.

[68]Ibid.: 25.

[69]U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act; report to accompany S. 3114.* July 31, 1992. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1992 (102nd Congress, second session. Senate. Report no. 102-352): 198; U.S. Congress. Conference Committees. *FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act; conference report to accompany H.R. 5006.* October 1, 1992. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1992 (102nd Congress, second session. House. Report no. 102-966): 707.

Academy has given consideration to holding at the 20 percent mark until it assesses the results further.[70]

### *Arguments in Favor of More Civilian Faculty*

Most instructors at the academies do not have doctorates -- the standard educational qualification required for most permanent college faculty members at four-year undergraduate institutions. In mid-1991,:[71]

> the academies require a doctoral degree for tenured faculty and a masters degree for the rest. About 50 percent of the Naval Academy faculty have doctorates [almost all civilians], while only 26 percent of the faculty at the Military Academy and 38 percent of the faculty at the Air Force Academy have earned doctoral degrees [almost all military[72]], and some of these faculty members are in administrative positions with reduced teaching loads. This does not compare favorably with faculties at civilian institutions. Of 96 civilian institutions offering undergraduate engineering degrees, 79 percent of [the members of] their faculties held doctorates.

Because of funding and strength constraints on the number of military officers who could be sent to graduate school to receive doctorates, such an increase would require a substantial increase in the proportion of civilian faculty.

Others also feel that having a substantial proportion of civilian faculty helps present cadets/midshipmen with a broader, non-military viewpoint on issues of the day. They believe instruction and debate on sensitive and controversial topics with a civilian professor is, by definition, less likely to be constrained by military discipline.[73] Furthermore, it can be argued that there is no intrinsic reason why civilians should be less devoted to the academy mission than military officers. Competition for good college teaching slots is great. Among those who want them should be some (including, perhaps, veterans or military retirees) whose patriotism, desire to serve, and belief in the mission of the academies and the armed forces should be consonant with the requirements for academy faculty positions. Furthermore, it is argued, their presence on the academy faculties would help inculcate in cadets/midshipmen the concept that the ethical, moral, and patriotic qualities that form an integral part of the academies' environment are not exclusive to those in uniform.

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[70]FMP Comments.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Ryan Comments.

[73]One academy graduate said, upon reading this report in draft, that cadets/midshipmen "get over this rapidly." Ryan Comments. Most accounts by visiting civilian professors, however, say they do notice that academy students are more restrained in the classroom than those in civilian institutions.

It may also be the case that "civilianizing" a larger proportion of the faculty slots at West Point and the Air Force Academy would save money. Currently, those slots are filled with military officers who rotate assignments every two to three years, incurring moving costs and costs for graduate education at the masters level for their replacements. While civilian faculty with Ph.D.'s might be paid more, DOD would not have to pay for their moves and their graduate education.

### *Arguments Against More Civilian Faculty*

Numerous arguments have been advanced against further civilianization of academy faculties. These include:

- The key issue in faculty competence for a service academy should not be possession of a Ph.D., but teaching ability. Military officer instructors can more than make up with dynamism and enthusiasm, accessability to students, and presence and bearing what they lack in formal education. For example, six Air Force captains, all members of the Air Force Academy class of 1987 who spent an exchange semester at the Naval Academy, stated that "while civilians offer a unique perspective, they were less available to provide extra instruction. Even in class, the instruction often proved less coherent and concise than a military officer's..."[74]

- American society inundates academy cadets and midshipmen with the values, norms, and opinions of the civilian world, as is the case with any other group of Americans. Cadets and midshipmen come from civilian life and are exposed to the same mass media and larger culture as anyone else. In the military environment of the academies, which is designed to support their general mission to train career military officers, there is no indication that more "civilianization" is necessary. From this point of view, too much civilianization may be detrimental to maintaining a sufficiently rigorous military atmosphere and climate.

- Military officers as academic instructors provide vital military role models. Their concern for developing cadets/midshipmen as officers as well as scholars; their availability well beyond an eight-hour day; their devotion to their service and to a military career generally -- all are cited as important examples of character which civilian professors simply cannot match.[75] Some assert that this is particularly true when military officer instructors are compared

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[74]"Commentary: Academy better with fewer civilian instructors," *Air Force Times*, December 21, 1992: 23.

[75]Ibid.; Knowlton, William A. "Commentary: keep officers as members of West Point ranks," *Army Times*, July 15, 1991: 21.

against civilian college instruction in which "courses are taught by the esteemed PhDs in the form of lectures attended by a horde of undergraduates, while the real work and the grading is done by teaching assistants with master's degrees or less."[76]

Finally, it may be that civilianizing military faculty slots would not save money. While the services would have to incur fewer moving and graduate schooling costs for military faculty, they would have to pay more in salaries, sabbatical subsidies, and -- perhaps most significantly -- deferred civil service retirement costs -- for civilian faculty.

## The Academy Preparatory Schools

### *The Prep Schools: Summary*

Each of the three DOD service academies operates a preparatory school. The schools were originally established to provide enlisted personnel who would otherwise be eligible for an academy appointment with remedial academic instruction. The schools' 10-month curriculum provides academic instruction (in English and mathematics) in a military environment to (1) enlisted personnel and (2) civilians who enter the prep schools directly from civilian life and who may return to civilian status, without a military obligation, if they cannot graduate from the prep school. Each school has 120-150 students. Students at the schools are paid their active duty pay if they enter from enlisted status, or the pay of a service academy cadet or midshipman if they enter a prep school directly from civilian life.[77] Together, all three cost about $28 million in FY1990. For each successful graduate entering an academy in FY1990, the Army school incurred costs of about $51,000; the Navy school, $40,000; and the Air Force school, $61,000.[78]

### *The Prep Schools: Outside Evaluations*

At the request of the House Armed Services Committee (now House National Security Committee), embodied in its report on the FY1991 National

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[76]Brinkerhoff Comments.

[77]37 USC(e)(2) and 37 USC 203(e)(1).

[78]U.S. General Accounting Office. *DOD Service Academies: Academy Preparatory Schools Need a Clearer Mission and Better Oversight.* Report nos. GAO/NSIAD-92-57 and B-246608. Washington, March 13, 1992:3. The Military Academy Preparatory School is at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; the Navy school, at Newport, Rhode Island; and the Air Force school, at Colorado Springs, Colorado. GAO has not had occasion to update its cost figures since it prepared its 1992 report, but there is no reason to think that costs have changed appreciably except for reflecting the general level of inflation.

Defense Authorization Act, the GAO analyzed the prep schools' mission and operations. The central issues identified by GAO were as follows:[79]

> The schools' missions are not clearly defined. Their mission statements refer to preparing "selected" individuals for academy admission. The schools appear to be pursuing differing goals regarding specific subgroups such as enlisted personnel, females, minorities, and recruited athletes -- the primary groups the schools now serve. For example, about 50 percent of the students enrolled at the Air Force prep school were recruited athletes; this is about double the percentage of recruited athletes at the Army and Navy schools.
>
> The Department of Defense (DOD) has limited information on the quality of the schools' programs. Program reviews of the prep schools conducted by service academy faculty do not assess the schools against a uniform set of quality and performance standards. DOD lacks the tools and information it needs to assess whether the schools are cost-effective.

A study on the prep schools done in 1993 by the American Council on Education came to many of the same conclusions as the GAO. The council noted the lack of mission focus among the schools; strongly criticized the extent to which the schools served to recruit varsity athletes (and, collaterally, the emphasis on intercollegiate rather than intramural sports at the academies themselves); and suggested that the academic year-long course at the schools could be replaced by "short, intensive courses in subject areas where students need help."[80]

### *The Prep Schools: Pros and Cons*

Few if any observers or analysts have questioned the concept of having some sort of program to provide deserving enlisted members with an academic "boost" that enables them to succeed at the academies. The problem with the prep schools is that their record of success, or cost-effectiveness, beyond that broad concept is mixed. For instance, the prep schools have furnished up to half of the black cadets/midshipmen at the academies in recent years.[81] Black prep school graduates graduate from the Military Academy at a higher rate than black cadets who enter West Point directly from civilian high schools, and show substantially improved SAT scores after the year spent at a prep school.[82] It appears that as the academy admissions process is currently constituted, the

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[79]Ibid.: 2.

[80]Willis, Grant. "Prep schools' role questioned." *Army Times*, September 6, 1993: 14; Brubaker, Bill. " An Unstated Mission: Naval Academy Using its Preparatory School To Help Football Recruits Reach Annapolis." *Washington Post*, April 8, 1996: A1.

[81]Willis, Grant. "Prep schools' role questioned." *Army Times*, September 6, 1993: 14; Peterson, Iver. "For Black Recruits, Prep School, Now in Peril, is Path to West Point." *New York Times*, September 26, 1995: 1.

[82]Ibid. See also FMP Comments.

prep schools are important components of efforts by each service to improve minority representation at the academies.[83]

On the other hand, the prep schools -- especially that of the Air Force -- arguably recruit varsity athletes disproportionately. Although some of these athletes are also minority students, the number is not large. In 1991, 20 percent of Air Force prep school students fell into both categories, compared to 15 percent at the Army prep school and 12 percent at the Naval Academy prep school.[84] Finally, although in 1994 18 percent of Annapolis midshipmen were prep school graduates, 27 percent of those found guilty of involvement in the Naval Academy's 1992 cheating scandal reportedly came from the prep school.[85]

Responding to direction in the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act,[86] DOD began a test program in mid-1995 to send 20 prep school students from the Army, Navy, and Air Force to private college prep civilian-military schools around the country, in lieu of attending their service's prep school.[87] After soliciting bids for contracts to run this program, DOD found only two institutions that met minimum requirements; they stated they could run the program for $15,000 per student per year, compared to ongoing DOD costs of $23,000 yearly (not counting student pay, which would be payable in both cases). However, in the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act,[88] Congress repealed the requirement for the privatization test, which according to DOD constituted recognition that "privatization was not a promising alternative...given the extremely low level of interest and ability demonstrated by the private sector in response to the Department's 1995 solicitation."[89]

Most people might agree that obtaining more qualified minority candidates, and giving enlisted personnel a "leg up" for entry into the officer corps, are

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[83]See especially Moskos and Butler, *All That You Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way*: 85-92.

[84]GAO. *DOD Service Academies: Academy Preparatory Schools Need a Clearer Mission and Better Oversight*: 13.

[85]Valentine, Paul W. "Naval Academy Scandal Had Prep School Pedigree." *Washington Post*, April 19, 1994: B5.

[86]Sec. 536, P.L. 103-160, November 30, 1993; 107 Stat. 1547 at 1659; U.S. Congress. Conference Committees. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994; conference report to accompany H.R. 2401*. November 10, 1993. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993 (103rd Congress, first session. House. Report no. 103-357): 675-76; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994; report to accompany S. 1298*. July 27, 1993. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993 (103rd Congress, first session. Senate. Report no. 103-112): 147.

[87]Peterson, "For Black Recruits, Prep School, Now in Peril, is Path to West Point": 1.

[88]Sec. 534, P.L. 104-106, February 10, 1996; 110 Stat. 186 at 315.

[89]FMP Comments.

desirable goals. More might question whether those prep school costs which derive from recruiting varsity athletes give as significant a return on investment the services make in recruiting them, in terms of officer quality. According to DOD, in response to the American Council of Education (ACE) study mentioned above, DOD has incorporated into its directive which sets overall policy for the schools a statement that "Primary consideration for enrollment [in the prep schools] shall be accorded to...minorities, including women, and to in-service applicants," excluding athletes.[90] However, it remains to be seen if implementation of this set of priorities meets the stated requirement. Recruiting of athletes has not been considered to be a priority of service academy admission policies, but few would question that the academies have long engaged in systematic recruitment for varsity sports.

## Ethical, Social, and Moral Problems

The academies have become, and view themselves, as the producers of officers who reflect the highest possible moral, ethical, and professional standards of their services. This moral stature has been acquired over time, since the Civil War. The progressive military success of academy graduates, especially as senior uniformed leaders, from the Civil War to the present, has contributed to it. Problems of cadet and faculty discipline at West Point in its formative years were largely stamped out by the 1840s, and at Annapolis by the 1880s or 1890s (perhaps because by the time it was an established institution, American life generally was less raucous and brawling-oriented, disciplinary problems at Annapolis never reached the stage they did during the formative years of West Point).[91] While the academies *as institutions* have faced charges of elitism or budgetary wastefulness since the early 19th century, or have been criticized for such practices as hazing of cadets and midshipmen,[92] the reputation of the academies' *individual graduates* in terms of moral and ethical probity has continued to rise. This role is now under what is arguably the greatest scrutiny in several decades, if not longer. Furthermore, these ethical and moral concerns are often discussed in relation to social issues, such as the presence of women and minorities at the academies, and academic ones, such as the status of varsity athletes.

### Differences Among the Academies?

It is not clear to what extent the incidence of unethical and immoral incidents leading to some sort of disciplinary action varies among the three academies. Each academy collates and records such actions in different ways,

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[90]Ibid.

[91]Pappas, *To the Point*: 25-278; Sweetman and Cutler, *The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History*: 19-139.

[92]Pappas, *To the Point*; and Sweetman and Cutler, The *U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History*, both *passim*.

making effective comparisons impossible.[93] Furthermore, even if the data were comparable, a different incidence of disciplinary actions could reflect different policies on enforcing discipline within each service or each academy, rather than the actual number and/or severity of incidents.

During the 1990s, the Naval Academy has received a much greater degree of national publicity regarding ethical and moral lapses than the Military and Air Force Academies. Some have asserted that the Naval Academy in fact has been more lax in its discipline.[94] They note the lack of a "non-toleration" component in the Naval Academy's honor code (see below, p. 47), and more abstractly an alleged tradition of independence rather than precise obedience to orders -- resulting, it is frequently said, from the inevitable autonomy of a ship's captain at sea. It may be, therefore, that different academies do have different incidences of disciplinary problems due to different service cultures.

However, considerations other than actual incidence of problems could account for most or all of the recent incidence of serious problems at the Naval Academy. For instance, the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, is very close to the Baltimore and Washington, DC metropolitan areas, and is right in the middle of Annapolis itself. The Military Academy is 60 miles up the Hudson River from New York City, and the Air Force Academy is fairly far removed from Denver and Colorado Springs. The Naval Academy is thus much closer geographically than the other two academies to (1) intense press and media activity;[95] (2) close scrutiny of Navy and DOD headquarters and leadership; (3) large numbers of retired naval officers and Annapolis graduates, including, but not limited to, senior admirals, (4) a variety of non-DOD public and private defense analysts and defense analytical organizations interested in the academies (with resulting products such as this report); (5) opportunities for recreation which can turn into misconduct, involving alcohol, drugs, and/or sexual activity; and (6) a major "corridor" -- the east coast interstate highway system -- for the transportation of illegal drugs from their point of entry into the parts of the country bordering the Caribbean.

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[93]Information provided from Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), September 1996.

[94]Bowman, Tom. "It's a Gentler Academy for 1993 Plebes," *Baltimore Sun*, August 8, 1993: 1B; Bowman, Tom. "Has Academy Tradition Yielded to Technical Training?" *Baltimore Sun*, February 13, 1994: 1E; Anderson, Jon R. "Drinking Mids to Face Tougher Scrutiny," *Navy Times*, September 4, 1995: 8; Thomas, Evan, and Gregory L. Vistica, "A School for Scandal," *Newsweek*, April 29, 1996: 24; Palm, Major Edward F., USMC (Ret.), "Our Mids only What Faculty Sows," *Navy Times*, May 27, 1996: 35; Argetsinger, Amy. "Naval Academy Reduces Midshipman's Privileges," *Washington Post*, April 25, 1996: B-1; Lawson, Chris, and Ernest Blazar. "Academy Imposes More New Rules on Mids," *Navy Times*, May 6, 1996: 7; Anderson, Jon R. "No Silver Lining in Sight," *Navy Times*, September 2, 1996: 9.

[95]For example, see "The Sun's Coverage of the Naval Academy," and Shane, Scott. "Academy Chief Defends Actions," both in the *Baltimore Sun*, September 21, 1996: 1, 7.

In short, there may be several reasons, unrelated to the quality of students, the Naval Academy, or the Navy as a service, why Naval Academy midshipmen may be more tempted and more often caught than their Army and Air Force counterparts. It might, therefore, be misleading to assume, because the Naval Academy is cited more in footnotes in this report, that it has more problems than the other two DOD academies, or that, even if it does, it is due to uniquely systemic problems at the Naval Academy.

## Women and Minorities at the Academies

With a very few exceptions, persons of minority racial and ethnic extraction (blacks, Hispanics, Asians/Pacific Islanders, American Indians) were not admitted until the post-World War II era. Women were first admitted to the service academies in 1976 as members of the 1980 graduating class. During the 1980s and 1990s, roughly 8-12 percent of each academy class have been women and 12-18 percent minority (there is, of course, some overlap between the two). Generally, the largest single group of minority students is blacks, followed by Hispanics and Asians, in that order, with occasional exceptions for individual classes at one academy or another.[96]

The progressive increase in the numbers of minority students at the academies has proceeded apace with the growth of equal opportunity for Americans of all races over the past several decades, without major controversy. Some concern has been voiced about minority admission standards and racial/ethnic discrimination. The admission of women to the academies, however, was and remains much more, controversial, primarily -- though not always -- because it serves as a vehicle for debating the pros and cons of the vastly increased role of women in the military during the post-Vietnam War era.[97]

The services have aggressively recruited women and minorities for many years. Part of this may be analogous to similar efforts on the part of civilian institutions of higher education. Much, however, appears to result from a conviction on the part of uniformed military leaders that with enlisted ranks 30-40 percent minority, and 5-13 percent female, mutual trust and cohesion

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[96]U.S. General Accounting Office. *Military Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities*. Report nos. GAO/NSIAD-94-95 and B-256105. Washington, March 17, 1994: 10; *Naval Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities*. Report nos. GAO/NSIAD-93-54 and B-240866. Washington, April 30, 1993: 8-11; and *Air Force Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities*. Report nos B-254084 and GAO/NSIAD-93-244. September 24, 1993: 10-11.

[97]The literature on this subject is exhaustive, and frequently polemical. For a summary, see Burrelli, David F. *Women in the Armed Forces*. CRS Issue Brief 92008, updated periodically.

between the officer corps and the enlisted force demand broadly similar social representation.[98]

In its recruiting efforts, as with civilian colleges and universities, the academies rely on factors other than academic ratings. One of these involves setting female and minority recruiting goals. Thus, West Point's goals during the 1989-1992 academic years were 10-15 percent women, 7-9 percent black, 4-6 percent Hispanic, and 2-3 percent Asians/Pacific Islanders/Native Americans.[99] The Naval Academy's goals as of 1993 were 10 percent women, 7 percent blacks, and 4 percent Hispanics.[100] Whether these are "goals" or "quotas" is not clear. College and university admissions staffs tinker with admission criteria, and such criteria are rarely cut and dried. Arguably, such targets should be an object of concern if it appeared that the caliber of any subgroup of incoming cadets and midshipmen, their performance at the academies, and their performance as officers once commissioned, seemed to be consistently lower than their fellows -- thus lowering the quality of the officer corps. Here the results appear to be mixed.

GAO analyses show that the performance of female Military and Air Force Academy cadets is not substantially different from that of male cadets -- in some areas, men score higher and, in others, women score higher. In contrast, female midshipmen at the Naval Academy are generally rated lower in academic, athletic, and military performance than their male counterparts. GAO found that minority cadets and midshipmen generally do not perform as well as non-Hispanic whites, perhaps reflecting the fact that their qualifications upon admission are generally lower as well.[101] Quantitative indices comparing the performance of male and female, or minority and white, academy graduates, as commissioned officers are not readily available, although the raw data for assembling them almost certainly are.

Some have argued that standards have been modified, and maximum use made of administrative leniency and latitude, to admit women and minorities and keep them at the academies when they would otherwise fail to meet academic, military, or physical standards.[102] It seems virtually impossible to

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[98]For a discussion of this issue as regarding representation of blacks in leadership roles in the Army, see Moskos, Charles C., and John Sibley Butler. *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way*. New York, Basic Books, 1996.

[99]GAO. *Military Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities*: 13.

[100]GAO. *Naval Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities*: 8; and Bowman, Tom. "Naval Academy Plans to Increase Its Black, Hispanic Enrollment by Half." *Baltimore Sun*, July 14, 1994: B4.

[101]GAO, *Military Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities*: 17-50; *Naval Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities*: 16-52; and *Air Force Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities*: 17-45.

[102]For assertions of this nature regarding women at the academies, see Mitchell, Brian. *Weak Link: The Feminization of the American Military*. Washington, Regnery Gateway: 47-90.

analyze such criticisms in regard to minorities, or indeed in regard to academic problems for any individual cadet/midshipman or group of cadets/midshipmen. Administrators at institutions of higher education, whether military or civilian, are always making decisions to retain or separate ("flunk out") students. Such decisions, especially at smaller liberal arts colleges and universities more analogous to the academies, are often made by weighing disparate factors, not all of which are academic.

There can be no doubt, however, that some of the physical and athletic standards at the academies, as throughout the armed forces, have been modified to accommodate women. Minimum physical training standards have been "normed" to take into account universally recognized differences in athletic ability between men and women, such as those which account for single-sex sports competitions, or those which result in different physical fitness standards based on age.[103] The result, however, has clearly been to require male cadets/midshipmen to meet physical training standards that in absolute terms are more strenuous than those required for females, whatever their relative similarity.[104] Grooming standards for female cadets/midshipmen are not identical to those for men (i.e., hair length and style). The issue has become whether or not establishing such differing norms for men and women at the academies in fact discriminates against men, or in fact provides a "level playing field" regarding the amount of effort a member of either sex requires to achieve a particular level of physical fitness, or military appearance and bearing. Furthermore, some allege that women are not required to meet the same relative standards as men, even when the standards are "gender-normed."[105]

All cadets/midshipmen are prohibited from having any dependents (in the legal and financial sense), whether spouses, children, or aged parents. If a cadet

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[103]*Doctrine of Comparable Training*. Memorandum for [Faculty, Staff, and Corps of Cadets] of the U.S. Military Academy, 8 June 1981, by Colonel D.P. Tillar, Jr., USA, Special Assistant to the Superintendent for Policy and Planning; GAO Beusse Comments.

[104]See *Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. Report to the President*. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., November 15, 1992: 3-14, 51-53, C-3/C-20; Scarborough, Rowan. "Do Women Lower Army Standards: Pentagon Rebuts Historian's Report." *Washington Times*, October 29, 1992: 1, 4; and Mitchell, *Weak Link*: 69-72.

[105]Comments on a draft of this report by Dr. William J. Gregor, Associate Professor, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired; former Military Academy faculty member and graduate, Class of 1969, October 1996; Protzman, Lieutenant Colonel Robert R., M.D., USA, "Physiologic Performance of Women Compared to Men: Observations of Cadets at the United States Military Academy," *American Journal of Sports Medicine*, VII, No. 3, 1979: 191-94; Hawkins, Major Glen R., USA. *Report on Training Changes at West Point Since the Admission of Women*. [Prepared] for the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. 22 September 1992. For a discussion of this issue in the Army generally, see McHugh, Jane. "Study: PT Test Too Easy for Women," *Army Times*, October 28, 1996: 3; and Fuentes, Gidget. "PFT Run: Should Women Get a Break," *Navy Times*, November 11, 1996: 4.

or midshipman becomes pregnant, she can no longer remain at an academy; however, she can be granted at her request a one-year leave of absence, without pay, and return to the academy if upon return she no longer has legal custody of the child. The same would apply for a male cadet/midshipman who fathered and had custodial responsibility for a child.[106] As commissioned officers have no restrictions regarding dependents, a cadet/midshipman might be able to reacquire custody of his or her child immediately after commissioning.[107]

### *Sexual Harassment*

One of the problems the academies have had to deal with since the admission of women to the academies has been sexual harassment. Two GAO surveys, conducted regarding the 1990-1991 and 1993-1994 academic years, indicated that between 50 and 80 percent of women reported experiencing some sort of sexual harassment during those academic years. The rate generally increased between the two surveys. Small percentages of men (usually around 3-4 percent) also reported sexual harassment during these two time periods.[108]

Some have used the issue of sexual harassment to more generally question whether women should have been admitted to the academies. According to this view, the presence of women, by providing "opportunities" for men to sexually harass them, has been prejudicial to good order and discipline, and that if the women were not present, good order and discipline would thereby be improved. Others believe that this argument is invalid. They assert that women have been admitted to the academies, are cadets and midshipmen, and commissioned officers-to-be just like the men, and that their presence is no excuse for objectionable or illegal acts.

A more subtle aspect of the sexual harassment issue focuses on the second word in the phrase. "Harassment," some officers and analysts argue, is an integral part of military training. Cadets and midshipmen who cannot withstand stress cannot be successful officers, because no form of human activity is more stressful than combat. They contend that certain forms of verbal harassment which might have a sexual component, therefore, are a reasonable

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[106]There are no single-parent restrictions on ROTC cadets and midshipmen at civilian colleges and universities. Gregor Comments.

[107]Garrison, Becky. "Academy Eases Pregnancy Policy: Expectant Parents May be Able to Go Back, Finish School," *Navy Times*, September 4, 1995: 8. Until August 1995, Naval Academy midshipmen who became pregnant or acknowledged responsibility for paternity were separated permanently from the Academy. Tentative Naval Academy plans to change that policy called for such separation unless the pregnancy were terminated -- i.e., if an abortion was performed. Protests by both anti-abortion and abortion-rights activists, as well as others, led to the Naval Academy joining the Military and Air Force Academies in the policy described here.

[108]U.S. General Accounting Office. *DOD Service Academies: Update on Extent of Sexual Harassment*. Report nos. B-259415 and GAO/NSIAD-95-58. March 31, 1995: 8. The data presented in this report do not differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual harassment.

vehicle for imposing pressure on female cadets/midshipmen and determining their ability to perform amidst such pressure -- especially because virtually all military occupational specialties except ground combat ones are now open to women. However, others argue that there are myriad ways to test the ability of cadets and midshipmen to perform under stress that do not involve sexual (or racial or ethnic) harassment. Training staff and drill instructors can discipline people, and run them through extraordinarily physically and mentally challenging training regimes, without denigrating their sex, race, or nationality. Some would differentiate between even verbal abuse and "hazing" on the one hand, and stress such things as sleep and food deprivation, requirements for physical strength and endurance, and performing individual and collective tasks under difficult conditions on the other hand. They would argue that the latter are the crucial elements in training, and that the former are not needed, acceptable, or productive.[109]

## Athletics at the Academies

### *Athletics as Military Training*

All of the academies have comprehensive athletic programs. All cadets/midshipmen must participate in intramural and/or intercollegiate athletic competition, as well as maintain a demanding level of physical fitness. The general rationale is that a military career is at least as intensely physical as it is intellectual.[110] Team sports build cohesion and test future officers, as well as provide opportunity for leadership development. Maintaining individual physical fitness buttresses the ability of the individual cadet/midshipman, and later commissioned officer, to perform as part of a team under conditions of great physical and emotional stress. The West Point catalog quotes General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, whose career included a tour of duty as Superintendent of the Military Academy, as follows:[111]

> The training on the athletic field, which produces in a superlative degree the attributes of fortitude, self-control, resolution, courage, mental agility, and, of course, physical development, is one completely fundamental to an efficient soldiery.

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[109]GAO Beusse Comments.

[110]See Goldich, Robert L. *Military Retirement and Personnel Management: Should Active Duty Military Careers be Lengthened?* CRS Report 95-1118 F, November 14, 1995: *passim*, especially 18-26.

[111]United States Military Academy. *West Point: 1994-1995 Catalog*: 115. General MacArthur had another saying inscribed in the Military Academy gym: "On these fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that on other days and other fields will bear the fruits of victory." This statement is also part of the indoctrination of new cadets at the Air Force Academy. Ryan Comments; Comments of Colonel Edward F. Bruner, U.S. Army (Ret.), CRS Specialist in National Defense, USMA Class of 1961, on a draft of this report, October 1996; Comments of Robert Shuey, CRS Specialist in National Defense, USMA Class of 1962, on a draft of this report, October 1996.

Perhaps a broader view might be that because no peacetime activities can duplicate actual combat for the purposes of training officers (and enlisted personnel), the widest possible range of partial substitutes need to be used to prepare military personnel for actual combat. One of these is organized athletic competition, which requires team building and the ability to both take and give orders.[112]

Few if any people have questioned the desirability of this general emphasis on athletics at the academies. It is their specific implementation that has generated a range of policy issues.

### *Is There Too Much Emphasis on Varsity Intercollegiate Sports?*

Almost all of the criticism of academy athletics can be boiled down to criticism of various aspects of academy participation in varsity intercollegiate sports. Among the arguments made by such critics are the following:

- The academies spend too much money on male varsity sports, especially football, in which few cadets/midshipmen actually participate, at the expense of other sports and physical fitness programs -- intercollegiate and intramural -- which would benefit many more students.

- Too many varsity athletes whose academic, leadership, and/or character records would otherwise make them marginal candidates for admission at best are accepted, graduated, and commissioned due to their athletic ability. (This is related, of course, to the above discussion about the academy preparatory schools at pp. 28-31.)

- Varsity athletes in "glamor" sports such as football and basketball receive special treatment and exemption from some of the more onerous aspects of academy life.[113] In addition, there was some controversy in the 1980s about allowing academy graduates drafted by professional football and basketball to not fulfill some of their active duty service obligation (ADSO), or fulfill it in a less-rigorous or limited way.[114] These latter practices appear to have ended.

- If nothing else, critics argue, the academies should stop competing against colleges and universities which are much larger, have much

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[112]Ryan Comments.

[113]"'I Want Excellence Without Arrogance': Larson Moves to Right the Academy," *Navy Times*, September 26 1994: 8.

[114]U.S. General Accounting Office. *Military Personnel: Treatment of Prominent Athletes on Active Duty*. Report nos. GAO/NSIAD-87-224 and B-227540. Washington, September 29, 1987.

larger sports programs (and physically larger athletes), and against which the academies are overmatched.[115]

Those who wish to preserve the status quo regarding academy athletic programs point to the *esprit de corps* and public acclaim and recognition that results from varsity sports competition, particularly football (the annual Army-Navy game is a tradition almost 100 years old). Admiral Charles R. Larson, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, has stated that "Football is part of an institution's reputation, you can see that nationwide. How your people perform on the field, the whole nation sees that,"[116] at the same time he has attempted to rein in various "perks" enjoyed by the football and other varsity sports teams at Annapolis.[117]

Furthermore, it appears that, far from being a financial drain on other athletic programs, varsity football enables the other sports programs to exist.[118] Admiral Larson noted that football is emphasized by the Naval Academy "because it is the moneymaker that finances other sports. We have 29 varsity sports and 28 are financed by football essentially." Others assert that playing high-quality college teams is a very important part of maintaining cadet/midshipman morale. They argue that even if an academy football team has a hard time against a large university team which feeds substantial numbers of players into professional football, it sends a positive message and sustains the self-image of cadets/midshipmen as being physically and mentally tough. One said that "military life is one big mismatch; [dealing with bigger and stronger competitors] teaches great lessons."[119]

The Defense Advisory Committee on Service Academy Athletic Programs (DACSAAP), created in 1991 in response to congressional direction to "appoint an independent board to review all aspects of the athletic programs" at the academies,[120] agreed with all of these assertions. In its final report, it stated that:[121]

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[115]Although this may not always be a problem, given that an institution's varsity athletic record can vary over time. See Wang, Gene. "Service Academies Forces on the Field: Three Schools Combine for 10-2 Start," *Washington Post*, October 10, 1996: B4.

[116]"'I want excellence without arrogance': Larson moves to right the academy." *Navy Times*, September 26, 1994: 8

[117]Ibid.; and "Athletes to lose academy perks." *Navy Times*, August 8, 1994: 2.

[118]Brinkerhoff Comments.

[119]Comments on a draft of this paper by a reserve officer with wide knowledge of all the academies, who taught at his service's academy while on active duty.

[120]Sec. 513, FY1992 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 102-190, December 5, 1991; 105 Stat. 1290 at 1360.

[121]Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). *Report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Service Academy Athletic Programs*. June 1994: 16.

> The Committee recognizes the current difficulty of Service academy participation in Division I-A football. Nevertheless, the national visibility and prestige gained by Division I-A participation is in consonance with the overall Service academy mission to strive for excellence in all endeavors, and to maximize individual and team potential. For instance, all other sports at the Service Academies are at the top Division I level of participation. Anything less than top-level athletic competition would be contrary to this mission. The Committee believes most Americans want the academies to be competitive nationally. Football kicks off the academic year and is the one sport that coalesces the entire student body. When competitive at the Division I-A level, the student body's morale, spirit, and overall performance seem to soar. The Division I-A participation generates enthusiasm and support among the active-duty force, as well as active and retired alumni. Because the academies must recruit nationwide, the football program provides national exposure and enhances national recruitment of the overall student body.

More fundamentally, the academies themselves clearly regard varsity intercollegiate competition as an integral part of their total athletic program.[122] Academy officials and their supporters suggest that the physical and mental strength and determination that sports competition at the varsity level produces are qualities that are very much needed by career military officers. Frequently they assert that the importance of physical fitness and endurance in the military profession means that the better officer will be a more well-rounded person, who may not have the highest possible academic achievement, but who combines solid intellectual ability with high physical proficiency. Intercollegiate athletes, they note, have to meet the same graduation requirements as non-athletes, and therefore have to work much harder than non-athletes, given the time required for practice and competition.[123]

Some proponents deny that academically deficient athletes are "coddled" through the system. Admiral Larson, for instance, stated that midshipmen athletes who are brought before an academic board to determine whether or not they are academically qualified for retention at the Naval Academy are dismissed at a greater rate than academically-deficient non-athletes.[124] However, GAO found that for the Naval Academy classes of 1988-1991, athletes found academically deficient were separated at a lesser rate -- albeit not significantly so -- than non-athletes.[125] Analogous GAO reports for the other two academies did not address the issue, so no clear pattern is visible. The Defense Advisory

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[122]See, for example, *West Point: 1994-1995 Catalog*: 115-19.

[123]*DACSAAP Final Report*: 14-15, 22; Brinkerhoff Comments; Ryan Comments. To be sure, there may be cases of academic or disciplinary leniency toward athletes which are not measurable. However, the academies do not have the academically dubious curricula crafted solely for varsity athletes found at many large civilian institutions.

[124]"'I want excellence without arrogance': Larson moves to right the academy": 8.

[125]GAO, *Naval Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities*: 50-51. GAO Beusse Comments.

Committee noted that graduation rates for intercollegiate athletes were lower--but only slightly so -- than for non-athletes (72 vs. 78 percent).

Finally, the DACSAAP asserts that having the academies compete against lower-level civilian schools would save no money -- the costs of facilities and the like would be the same -- and could cost a great deal in terms of lost alumni contributions.

### *Athletics: Parting Comments*

Almost all criticism of academy athletics appears to be directed at one component of a very broad sports program -- football and basketball, particularly the former.[126] This criticism is not extreme. It seeks to downgrade, to a comparatively modest extent, the resources, effort, and priorities given these two varsity sports. Some of this is already happening at the Naval Academy. There is a question, however, whether the psychological costs of changing existing academy athletic programs would be worth the gains. Military service as an officer is a physical calling, more so than most careers requiring equal levels of education and intellectual ability, so it may be that the academies should indeed devote more resources to athletics across the board. The military is also an intensely symbolic profession, and the symbol of physical competition sends a message to the general public, and the academies themselves.

## Misconduct: Tangible Aspects

The recent moral and ethical problems at the academies can be divided into five broad categories, although some specific actions or cases fall into more than one category:

- Cheating/academic dishonesty.
- Sexual misconduct.
- Illegal drug and/or alcohol use or abuse.
- Involvement in other criminal acts (theft, crimes of violence, etc.).
- Hazing.

These types of misconduct frequently involve violations of academy and service rules and regulations, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and civilian criminal law as well. Such violations of regulations or laws are largely dealt with by academy faculty and staff -- i.e., commissioned officers. Misconduct may also involve violations of each academy's honor code. Honor codes are largely administered, and honor code violations mostly investigated and dealt with by,

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[126]See, for example, Pexton, Patrick. "IG Report: Lynch Fumbled by Boosting Football," *Navy Times*, February 14, 1994: 6.

academy students, although their actions are always subject to faculty and staff -- i.e., officer -- review and approval.[127]

Few of the types of moral failings noted above are completely new to the academies, let alone civilian colleges and universities. Hazing, interestingly, does not appear to have been a problem until the post-Civil War era, and has arisen only intermittently since then.[128] Scandals involving cheating on examinations have arisen periodically since at least the World War II era.[129] Cheating scandals may have taken place before World War II, but were not widely reported or, if so, minimized. It is also possible that the increased enrollment of the post-World War II academies has led to the use of more standardized examinations, which are more susceptible to mass cheating. Also, alcohol abuse is neither new, nor confined to service academy cadets and midshipmen.[130] In contrast, drug abuse first became an academy problem in the late 1960s, at the same time illegal drugs became a major national problem.

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[127]For the distinction between "conduct" and "honor" regulations and violations, see U.S. General Accounting Office. *DOD Service Academies: Comparison of Honor and Conduct Adjudicatory Processes*. Report nos. GAO/NSIAD-95-49 and B-260802. Washington, April 25, 1995: 12-13.

[128]Pappas, *To the Point*: 344-45, 356, 397-99, 412-14; Sweetman and Cutler, *The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History*: 50, 104, 109, 122, and 154-56. Several public laws were enacted in the post-Civil War period to prevent hazing. See Act of June 23, 1874, Chap. 453, 18 Stat. 203; Act of March 2, 1901, Chap. 804, 31 Stat. 910 att 911; Public Law 160, 57th Congress; Act of March 3, 1903, Chap. 1010, 32 Stat. 1177 at 1198; Public Law 87, 59th Congress, Act of April 9, 1906, Chap. 1370, 34 Stat. 104; Public Law 139, 61st Congress; Act of April 19, 1910, Chap. 174, 36 Stat. 312 at 323. See also Congressional Record, April 1, 1910. Debate on the Military Academy Appropriation Bill: 4566-71; and March 16, 1910: 3258-63; U.S. General Accounting Office. *DOD Service Academies: More Changes Needed to Eliminate Hazing*. Report nos. GAO/NSIAD-93-36 and B-240866. Washington, November 16, 1992; Kitfield, James. "Plebe Reprieve," *Government Executive*, December 1992: 25-29; and Peniston, Bradley. "A Kinder Plebe Summer?" *Annapolis Sunday Capitol*, June 30, 1996: 1.

[129]For a discussion of a major 1951 cheating scandal at West Point, see Blackwell, James A. *On Brave Old Army Team, The Cheating Scandal that Rocked the Nation: West Point, 1951*. Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1996. A 1976 West Point cheating scandal resulted in extensive DOD and congressional review of all of the academies. See U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *United States Military Academy Honor Code*. Hearings, 94th Congress, second session. August 25, September 1, 1976. H.A.S.C. 95-3. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977; and U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Honor Codes at the Service Academies*. Hearings, June 21-October 22, 1976. Parts 1 and 2. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976-1977. Reprinted in both the House and Senate hearings were (1) the Report of the Special Commission on the United States Military Academy [known as the "Borman Report" for its chairman, retired Air Force Colonel Frank Borman, President and CEO of Eastern Airlines and former astronaut], 15 December 1976; and (2) the Report of the West Point Study Group, an internal Army study conducted by three general officers, 27 July 1977.

[130]See Anderson, Jon R. "Drinking Mids to Face Tougher Scrutiny," *Navy Times*, September 4, 1995: 8.

Prior to the admission of women to the academies in 1976, there may have been "many women on post, especially on weekends, and homosexuality was always a possibility."[131] However, the arrival of female cadets and midshipmen appears to have greatly expanded the venues available for sexual misconduct on academy grounds. Many individual incidents of misconduct, whether or not they directly involve sexual activity or harassment, appear to stem, one way or another, from relations between the sexes at the academies. These include incidents in which only men were involved, but in which the cause involved male-female relationships. These latter sorts of incidents probably occurred prior to the admission of women to the academies, but were less salient because the women involved were not academy students.[132]

It may well be that, in the 1990s, there is an increased incidence of awareness and sensitivity about problems involving women cadets and midshipmen, due to events such as the Navy's Tailhook controversy (plus other events not occurring within the armed forces). One analyst has also suggested that there may be more male resentment for competitive reasons:[133]

> ...the incidence [of anti-female behavior] may be higher than previously experienced because of a combination of more occupations being opened to women at the same time the services were downsizing. The combination of these two trends served to reduce the opportunities for men more than women and therefore increased the level of competition between men and women for the more limited supply of slots.

Other reasons may relate to perceived inequities regarding expectations placed on male and female personnel.[134]

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[131]Shuey Comments.

[132]Kitfield, "Plebe Reprieve": 26; West, Joe. "Academy Acts to Ease Strife Between Cadets," *Air Force Times*, March 22, 1993; Anton, Genevieve. "'Nontraditional Women': Female Cadets Are High Achievers with a 'Survival Instinct'," *Air Force Times*, April 4, 1994: 13; "Expelled Mid Cites Double Standard," *Navy Times*, August 12, 1996: 2; Anderson, Jon R. "No Silver Lining in Sight: Clouds Still Loom Over Beleaguered USNA," *Navy Times*, September 2, 1996: 9; Thomas, Evan, and Gregory L. Vistica. "A School for Scandal," *Newsweek*, April 29, 1996: 24; Scheets, Gary. "Annapolis Caught in New Scandal," *Washington Times*, April 12, 1996: C6/C7; Lawson, Chris. "Two Mids Who Didn't Graduate: The Accused -- And His Accuser," *Navy Times*, June 17, 1996: 18; Pexton, Patrick. "Larson Lessen's Mid's Rape, Assault Charges," *Navy Times*, October 31, 1994: 8; Pressley, Sue Ann. "Twisted Love in a Small Texas Town," *Washington Post*, September 13, 1996: A1, A21; Barron, James. "West Point Accuses Cadet of Raping Another Cadet," *New York Times*, October 31, 1996: B1; Bruni, Frank. "A Rape Charge Unsettles West Point Pride: Fellow Cadets Cite Embarrassment, Disillusion, Concern," *New York Times*, November 1, 1996: B4.

[133]GAO Beusse Comments.

[134]See, for example, Mersereau, Adam G. "'Diversity' May Prove Deadly on the Battlefield," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 14, 1996: 1, 22.

It may be, too, that the image of academy moral lapses is considerably related to what the public expects of the academies. Arguably, people are not surprised if they learn that some civilian college students -- or some of their fellow civilians generally -- cheat, use drugs, engage in illegal or immoral sexual behavior, or commit crimes. But the public expects more from the armed forces in general, and the service academies in particular, and hence holds the academies to higher standards of conduct. Not only do the academies maintain a more active disciplinary system than most civilian institutions -- actions which civilian colleges would totally ignore are impermissible in a military environment -- the public is likely to hear more about incidents at the academies than incidents at civilian institutions. Cadets/midshipmen, whatever the failings of a few of their number, also receive much more formal training in ethical decisionmaking than their civilian counterparts. "Besides formal leadership courses, most military leadership training places students in ambiguous situations or confronts them with difficult ethical choices. Real decisions in the frat house are more hit and miss in ultimate educational value."[135] Academy staff, faculty, students, and supporters, note that only a small minority of cadets/midshipmen have been involved in these actionable offenses. However, the relative number of such reported incidents appears to have risen in recent years, and the public expectations for the ethical and moral climate at the academies appear to be so high that this increase has generated considerable public concern.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that in the view of some, the academies have generally tightened disciplinary standards over the past several years. There is less leniency and harsher penalties for infractions. This, of course, results in even more incidents of misconduct being identified, prosecuted -- and publicized.[136]

## More Abstract Aspects

### *Moral and Ethical Tones in American Society*

Many who have taken note of an increased incidence of academy moral and ethical problems point to what they regard as a general decline in moral standards, and perhaps a coarsening of values, throughout American society, or throughout industrialized nations in the world generally, over the past several decades. Few would deny this contention across the board -- very few indeed would argue that much greater crime and divorce rates, for instance, are not indicative of major social problems, whatever their solution might be.

On the other hand, some have argued that the 1950s, frequently cited as the standard by which current problems are judged, was an unusually tranquil and conformist time in American social history. Also, while most people

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[135]Bruner Comments.

[136]Ryan Comments.

acknowledge social problems, few also note that social sanctions -- from social ostracism to legal and police action -- appear to have been more certain in past years. That is, there was negative reinforcement to help maintain moral standards as well as positive reinforcement of high standards. It certainly seems likely, therefore, that some of these general social trends are reflected in the incidence of misconduct among academy students, but it is impossible to gauge how much.

### *Educational Policies and Moral Issues*

It has also been suggested that admissions policies have, in recent years, tended to favor academic achievement or potential -- grades or test scores -- over leadership ability and indications of superior character.[137] It is said that this is due to the belief that the emphasis on academic ability was required so as to select cadets/midshipmen who could manage the academies' technical curriculum. It is not clear, however, why an equal amount of academic ability would not be required to produce good work in the humanities and social sciences.[138] Some, however, would argue that the physical and biological sciences and mathematics are more difficult, because more memorization is required, there is less room for ambiguity, and flawed analysis cannot be as easily masked with skilled use of language.

Another variation on this theme is that too much emphasis on technical and engineering courses failed to expose students to the kinds of moral and ethical questions, and answers, that rigorous education in the humanities and social sciences would provide.[139] This, however, ignores the fact that although the academies continue to grant Bachelor of Science degrees, and have a substantial core curriculum in engineering and the sciences, the scope for concentrations and majors in the humanities and social sciences has greatly increased over the past 20 years.

The academies might ask, however, what really constitutes "leadership" in the context of the American high school experience? Is the usual, desirable range of student activities and athletic achievements indicative of leadership ability in the sense of adhering to, and inculcating in others, high moral and

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[137]See Lamborn, G.L. "Academy Selection is a Flawed Process," *Washington Times*, September 12, 1996: C2.

[138]A subset of this argument involves the influence of Admiral Hyman Rickover, for almost 40 years the head of the Navy's very successful nuclear-power program, on the Naval Academy's curriculum. Admiral Rickover was a vigorous supporter of a heavily technical-engineering curriculum at the Naval Academy, and opposed expanding the proportion of humanities and social sciences. Comments of Richard A. Best, CRS Analyst in National Defense, on a draft of this report.

[139]Bowman, Tom. "Has Academy Tradition Yielded to Technical Training," *Baltimore Sun*, February 13, 1994: 1E; and Palm, Major Edward F., USMC, Retired. "Our Mids Reap What Faculty Sows," *Navy Times*, May 27, 1996: 35.

ethical standards? Or is it merely a popularity contest among teenagers? Or, even given these doubts, what else do academy admissions personnel have to work with? Are there other measures of success and leadership which would indicate willingness to stand up to popular pressures, rather than being in receipt of popular accolades from one's teenage peers? Perhaps indications of an orientation toward service, or ethical conduct, are even more important than what is often called "leadership" in the high school context. Certainly the academies take these latter factors into consideration, but maybe they are not assigned enough relative weight.

A number of educators who have studied the academies' curricula and educational methods have argued that periodic cheating scandals result from excessive emphasis on competition in all academy activities -- athletic, other extracurricular, or course work. They argue that the breakneck schedule of cadets/midshipmen's lives, day-to-day, week-to-week, and an excessive number of required academic courses and other activities -- which have no comparison in civilian colleges and universities -- leaves no time for the deep study, reflection, and thought which are essential for a truly first-rate undergraduate education.[140] A GAO analyst said that:[141]

> ...we did have indications in the data and in cadet/midshipman comments that they learned to do only the minimum necessary to get by the next immediate academic hurdle and then they would purge that information from their minds and replace it with what was needed for the next hurdle. They focused on rote memorization rather than conceptual understanding.

This latter mode of operation may also be the norm for many civilian college students. However, it can also be argued that it is not the norm for the highly competitive civilian institutions with which the academies are often compared -- and which share similar average grade point averages and SAT scores with the academies.[142]

In addition, some suggest that the nature of the schedule and of the incentive system at the academies breeds future officers who are used to "beating the system," and have an antagonistic rather than fundamentally respectful

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[140]Ibid.

[141]GAO Beusse Comments.

[142]For an interesting comparison of the Military Academy and Harvard along these lines, see Hoy, Pat C., II. "Soldiers and Scholars," *Harvard Magazine*, May-June 1996: 64-70. Colonel Hoy was commissioned from the Military Academy in 1961 in Field Artillery, served in Vietnam, and received a Ph.D. in literature from the University of Pennsylvania. He spent the last 14 years of his military career in the English faculty at West Point, and has taught literature and creative writing at Harvard and New York University since his retirement. *1995 Register of Graduates and Former Cadets, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York*: 483.

attitude toward authority beneath a superficial veneer of deference and military discipline, *i.e.*:[143]

> meeting superficial demands without achieving the excellence that is touted. Also, in the service, one can be an "officer and a gentleman" when on display, but down and dirty when out of the public eye. Such attitudes can lead to general cynicism.

On the other hand, military operations -- especially, but not only, those in war -- involve a "breakneck schedule, day-to-day, week-to-week," and an huge load of required tasks which have to be performed regardless of time available.[144] If cadets/midshipmen cannot handle the pressure in college, how can they handle it when on active duty as an officer? Here, comparison with civilian colleges and universities may not be relevant, because it is arguably based on the an assumption that civilian institutions are similar to military ones.

### *The Academies' Honor Systems*

Each of the three DOD service academies has an honor system and a largely -- but not completely -- cadet/midshipman-controlled hierarchy to administer and police it. The Military Academy's "honor code" says: "A cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do." The Air Force Academy's "honor oath" includes virtually identical wording: "We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us those who do." The Naval Academy "honor concept" included, until 1994, the words "Midshipmen are persons of integrity: They do not lie, cheat, or steal." In 1994 it was changed to say "Midshipmen are persons of integrity: They stand for that which is right."[145]

Until recently, there was one very significant difference between the honor system of the Naval Academy and that of the other two academies. The Military and Air Force Academies had a "non-toleration" component of their honor systems, making "it an honor offense to allow an honor violation to go unreported" to higher authority. The Naval Academy did not.[146] However, in 1994 the Naval Academy began to incorporate elements of the non-toleration

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[143]Quotation from Shuey Comments; see also Barry, James. "Academy System is 'Ethically Corrupt,'" *Navy Times*, April 15, 1996: 34-35; discussions with a former civilian official of one of the military services with a great deal of experience in undergraduate and graduate education, military and civilian, summer 1996.

[144]Brinkerhoff Comments; or, as one reviewer of this paper in draft said, "Welcome to military life!" Ryan Comments.

[145]GAO, *DOD Service Academies: Comparison of Honor and Conduct Adjudicatory Processes*: 19-21.

[146]GAO, *DOD Service Academies: Comparison of Honor and Conduct Adjudicatory Processes*: 23.

concept into its honor system.[147] This may have future significance for the vitality of the honor system at Annapolis. As one Military Academy graduate stated:[148]

> The [academy] graduates with whom I have discussed the honor codes agree that the essential feature is the part that requires reporting of others who do lie, cheat, or steal. It is not enough merely to be honest by oneself, it is necessary not to tolerate others who are dishonest. This is the only way to provide units and organizations that operate with complete integrity.

Much has been written about the honor codes and their consequences.[149] These discussions have generally been of two kinds. One analyzes the collision of the moral certainty and rectitude of the codes with the perceived moral flexibility and decay of modern American life, and sometimes suggests that the violations of the code indicate things are no better in the academies than elsewhere. This, however, does not consider the honor systems themselves, and their consequences, but instead views the codes, and their violations by cadets/midshipmen, as examples of broader moral and ethical problems in American society.

The second suggests that the rigidity of the codes leads to too much student policing of the honor systems, sometimes with disastrous effects on a cadet/midshipman's entire career and life, by immature young men and women who are incapable of distinguishing between the letter of the law and more substantive ethical and moral concerns.[150] Thus, there are bitter accounts of severe punishments being meted out to cadets or midshipmen who participated in or knew of misconduct and later -- in obedience to the code -- told the truth about their participation or knowledge. They were punished more severely than students who violated the code by lying -- and, therefore, never had their involvement in the same incident come to light.[151] A GAO investigation of the details of the honor systems at each of the three DOD academies found that all of them lack due process protections for the accused in a variety of ways.[152]

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[147]Ibid.

[148]Brinkerhoff Comments.

[149]Ibid. provides a concise summary of the honor codes' operation. For more in-depth discussions, see the House and Senate hearings and DOD reports cited above in note 129; U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *Service Academies' Honor Code.* Hearings, October 5-6, 1977-August 1, 1978. H.A.S.C. 95-79. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977; and U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Honor Systems and Sexual Harassment at the Service Academies.* Hearing, 103rd Congress, second session. February 3, 1994. S. Hrg. 103-550. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994.

[150]GAO, *DOD Service Academies: Comparison of Honor and Conduct Adjudicatory Processes*: 40-41.

[151]See, for example, Thomas and Vistica, "A School for Scandal": 24.

[152]GAO, *DOD Service Academies: Comparison of Honor and Conduct Adjudicatory Processes*: 29-38.

However, the honor systems all provide for academy staff and faculty monitoring and review. The same GAO investigations found that cadets/midshipmen also perceived the honor systems as generally fair, and, indeed, perceived that not all honor situations were "black and white." In particular, according to GAO, students felt that "the individual's intent is the key determining factor" in whether or not someone should be reported or penalized for an honor code violation -- a view of sophistication and discrimination.[153] Regarding due process, the honor code is not in fact law, and there are a host of public and private rules and regulations which govern all aspects of organizational life, civilian and military, which are not held to due process standards of the judicial system.[154] Finally, the honor systems, as with all codes of conduct and their supporting enforcement mechanisms, set standards to be met, and targets to strive for. Human frailties will inevitably result in the need for the enforcement mechanisms to be used, but that does not necessarily cheapen, nor make irrelevant, the codes themselves.

# Options for Congress

## A Range of Options

The following options are among those the Congress might consider regarding some of the issues and problems of the academies and precommissioning education generally. Some of these appear to bear little relationship to a number of the academies' problems noted above. With others, the relationship is obvious. Some are not mutually exclusive; all or parts of them could be carried out at the same time.

- Do nothing.
- Keep the academies' structures as they are with only minor fixes.
- Keep the academies as they are but cut enrollment further, or increase enrollments to capacity.
- Radically restructure the academies to provide military training and education to civilian college graduates.
- Add graduate education to the academies' curricula.
- Get rid of the academies.

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[153]Ibid.: 57-58.

[154]Ryan Comments.

## Do Nothing

It can be argued that the problems the academies are having now are simply minor bumps in a road that is generally smooth. If there are some problems, they are in the process of being fixed or fixable by administrative action only. The Congress may decide to maintain close oversight of administrative efforts and to forego direct action at this time. In addition, it may be that many of the academies' problems related to moral, social, and ethical issues flow from similar problems throughout American society, and are manifested -- but to a much lesser extent -- at the academies. If this is the case, the ability of the academies to do much about these broader social issues may be very limited.

## Minor Fixes Only

This option would not materially change the appointment system, qualifications, or academic and military courses of instruction of the academies. Minor changes would fix some of the problems that have been noted lately. Avoiding major structural changes in the academies would, arguably, preserve the overwhelmingly favorable aspects of the academies' tradition and mystique, while fixing that which needs to be fixed, and making the academies more relevant to the modern era. There is no evidence, it might be argued, that the academies are suffering from structural or philosophical flaws so severe that they need radical restructuring.

Possible minor fixes include, but are not limited to, the following (some of which may contradict each other):

### *Fix Athletic Problems*

This would involve deemphasizing varsity intercollegiate competition in "glamor" sports, especially football. It might also include careful examination of the role of the academy preparatory schools. The outcome could diminish the extent to which cadets/midshipmen with marginal academic or leadership potential are recruited because of their athletic ability, and to diminish the special privileges given some athletes at the academies. Some of these things are happening, or have happened, already, at least to some degree.

Such action would indicate the importance of academic quality at the academies, and probably insure that some students who are not officer material would not be admitted (and graduated). It need not result in a decreased level of physical fitness among cadets/midshipmen. It might, however, cause a drop in the degree of public awareness of the academies, as well as send a message -- arguably misleading -- that the military profession was increasingly becoming an intellectual endeavor at the expense of, or to the exclusion of, physical fitness and endurance.

### *Decrease Academic Pressure and Increase Academic Rigor*

Outside analyses of the academy experience repeatedly refer to the extent to which cadets/midshipmen simply have too little time to study and reflect on any academic subjects -- the demands of study, physical education, organized athletics, and military subjects are too great. Reducing the number of courses, and some of the non-academic subjects, while simultaneously expecting more from students in terms of in-depth study, could make an academy experience more, not less, challenging.

Some, however, argue that coping with the relentless, day-after-day pressure prepares young people for the kind of stress they will experience as active duty officers. Furthermore, there has already been a considerable reduction in the number of obligatory activities, military and academic, compared to what they were 20 or 30 years ago.[155] If one of the essentials of a military educational institution is simulated pressure to prepare military personnel for the stresses of actual operations and war, how far can liberalization proceed? Also, the success rate is high -- most do not fail, and meaningful success requires substantial challenge.

### *Checking the Character of Applicants Better*

Academic achievement (whether measured by high school grades or standardized test scores) is easier to measure than character, and the temptation to rely on it more is thus greater. The character and moral standards of individuals are not quantifiable, and hence more difficult, to assess, but the rewards for the academies could be great. Perhaps greater reliance on detailed letters of recommendation and/or telephonic followup with references could supplement with more objective information that which is provided by high school transcripts, test scores, and application forms filled out by the candidates (and/or their parents).

If American morals and ethics have steadily deteriorated, then it seems doubtful that four years of the academy experience, or special "ethics courses,"[156] or anything else can make up for the deficient characters of young men and women who are 18.[157] Contradictions between what is acceptable at a civilian university or college and the academies may simply continue to be a source of tension leading to disciplinary problems -- part of the "cost of doing business." On the other hand, many observers would disagree that moral and ethical standards have degenerated in recent times. They would point to the much greater awareness of such lapses, given the wide impact of modern

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[155]Gregor Comments.

[156]Argetsinger, Amy. "Naval Academy Charts New Moral Course," *Washington Post*, April 14, 1996: B1.

[157]See Hutcheson, *The United States Air Force Academy: Time to Close the Doors*: 12-14.

communications and mass media. Others would argue that the success of military training regimens throughout history, and of other socialization processes to which adolescents and young adults are subjected, suggests that most young people are indeed malleable in such ways. For instance, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak, would appear to agree with this proposition. He has recently instituted major institutional changes in Marine Corps recruit training -- "boot camp" -- designed not just to increase recruits' technical and military skills and fitness, but to raise the fundamental moral and ethical attitudes of new Marines in light of the perceived inability of American society to inculcate a sufficiency of such qualities in the Corps' recruiting base of young people.[158]

There are limits, of course, on what the Congress can do through legislation about ethical and moral problems at the academies. However, academy curricula and admissions policies might be modified -- with or without direct congressional intervention -- to identify individuals whose ethics and character are more in accord with the concept of a military career. Such modifications could conceivably involve changes in the application and review process. One practical change would be much more intrusive background investigations of prospective cadets and midshipmen before they are actually sworn in as members of the armed forces. Current federal law, for instance, only allows the academies to *request* criminal records from states for prospective cadets/midshipmen.[159] DOD is apparently planning, as part of its FY1998 legislative program, to ask the Congress for legislation that would *require* states to furnish such information.[160]

Another step in the direction toward preventing "bad apples" from arriving at the academies in the first place could be an intensive investigation of current academy admission standards and processes, to see if there have been any changes in recent years that could have allowed some young people with less acceptable ethical standards to enter the academies. Another would be to analyze if any of the students involved in recent episodes of misbehavior would have been denied entry through alternative screening criteria.

### *Make the Academies Less CIVILIAN*

A variety of factors, some argue, has worked to decrease the military character of the academies. They cite the emphasis on technology in student admissions, the move toward more civilian faculty at the Military and Air Force Academies, the removal of automatic regular commissions for academy graduates, and less rigid military discipline and formality on a day-to-day basis.

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[158]Fuentes, Gidget. "Krulak Turns Boot Camp on its Head," *Navy Times*, July 29, 1996: 4.

[159]10 USC 520a.

[160]Compart, Andrew. "New Housing Allowance Coming in '98," *Army Times*, November 18, 1996: 2. The article treats issues other than that noted in the title.

Looking more for leadership qualities among applications, keeping military faculties (and perhaps decreasing the 50 percent civilian faculty of the Naval Academy), emphasizing the high standards and service orientation of the academies by guaranteeing their graduates regular commissions, and making the military atmosphere and discipline of the academies more rigorous, could all help drive home the point that the academies are not civilian institutions run in accordance with civilian standards.[161]

In addition, the academies have already progressively liberalized both their academic curricula and some of their military requirements over the past 25-30 years. This view questions how much farther this can go without significantly affecting the required military rigor of the schools.[162] These include the decreased requirements for scientific and technical education -- modern warfare is nothing if it is not scientific and technical -- and ending the system of periodically ranking all cadets based on their academic and military performance.[163]

### *Make the Academies Less MILITARY*

Some argue that the unavoidably regimented nature of the academies as military institutions has contributed to some of their problems. Emphasis on rigid, formal responses to academic questions leads to lack of academic rigor; too many military faculty prevents having civilians around who ask the kind of probing intellectual and ethical questions that help curtail unthinking responses to moral issues. People who hold this view wonder if too much reflexive obedience, rather than critical examination, has led to the moral and ethical lapses seen at the academies.[164]

One analyst has raised the issue as follows:[165]

> Compare....this to the life style of an ROTC or OTS cadet who attends a civilian university. These cadets, generally, hold jobs to help pay for their education and some even have families to support. They must decide on their own whether or not to stay up late, go to class, stay in shape, etc. It is

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[161]See, for example, Argetsinger, Amy. "Naval Academy Reduces Midshipmen's Privileges," *Washington Post*, April 25, 1996: B1; Bowman, Tom. "It's a Gentler Academy for 1993 Plebes," *Baltimore Sun*, August 8, 1993: 1B; and Lawson, Chris, and Ernest Blazar. "Academy Imposes More New Rules on Mids," *Navy Times*, May 6, 1996: 7.

[162]Bruner Comments; Galloway, Brigadier General Gerald E., Jr., USA, "The USMA Curriculum: Unique, Yes; Unchanged, No," *Assembly* [Magazine of the USMA Association of Graduates], September 1993: 58-59.

[163]Brinkerhoff Comments.

[164]Anton, Genevieve. "No More Yelling at Academy Cadets," *Air Force Times*, March 1, 1993: 27.

[165]Hutcheson, *The United States Air Force Academy: Time to Close the Doors*: 12.

> incumbent upon them to discipline themselves and structure their environment in order to reach their goal of graduation. The Academy's system of institutionalized stress may develop some degree of discipline, but it is not **self- discipline** that is taught. Self-discipline is the training of oneself for improvement. Academy cadets have most of their decisions made for them. Conversely, students, prior to attending OTS, and cadets at ROTC live a less regimented lifestyle [and] are the ones who must *truly* develop self-discipline. To them it is a matter of necessity. The Academy may produce a more regimented officer, but not necessarily a more self-disciplined one.

### *Increase the Jointness of the Academies*

One reform proposal that has been suggested is to make the academy experience part of the enormous effort the military services are undertaking to improve joint operations. It has been argued that, because the academies do produce a disproportionate share of the services' uniformed leadership, and do provide "role models" for the officer corps as a whole, it is best to start inculcating appreciation for what the other services can do at each academy. The academies, for many years, have had exchange programs, where cadets/midshipmen spend a semester at another academy. Suggestions to expand this concept include creating a new, joint academy, accepting either civilians or cadets/midshipmen who had already spent two years at one of the existing academies, or simply requiring all cadets/midshipmen to spend a semester or year at another academy.[166]

Jointness, however, is arguably something which follows gaining a thorough knowledge of the doctrines, capabilities, policies, and procedures of an officer's own service. Cadets/midshipmen may have enough to do to learn the rudiments of officership in their own services, without getting what would amount to a smattering of another service's culture at the junior level which is not relevant to real joint education, knowledge, and operations later in an officer's career.[167]

### *Revitalize the Boards of Visitors*[168]

The Boards of Visitors of the academies could possibly provide more active oversight of the academies if they were given enough time and money to accomplish more than *pro forma* reviews. Perhaps the boards could be given cadres of permanent staff, composed of both military and civilian personnel familiar with the armed forces generally and the academies in particular.

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[166]Foster, Gregory D. "For a Unified Service Academy," *New York Times*, February 1, 1986: 27; Robinson, John. "JCS Vice Chair Should Testify as Part of Budget Process--Owens," *Defense Daily*, March 1, 1996: 312.

[167]Ryan Comments.

[168]I am indebted to my CRS colleague Richard A. Best for pointing this alternative out.

Alternatively, temporary staff for each board could be constituted several months in advance of the board's actual visit or visits to each academy. The existing requirement for Members of Congress to serve on the boards would add political clout -- and political and popular context -- to their recommendations, to insure that those recommendations were not too insular.

## Keep the Academies but Cut or Increase Enrollment

### *Cut Enrollment Further*

As noted above, each DOD academy's enrollment has already been cut as part of the post-Cold War downsizing of the armed forces. However, the proportion of new officers coming from the academies steadily rose from approximately 10 percent in the early 1980s to 15-16 percent in the mid-1990s.[169]

Some have argued that further cuts in the student body of each academy should be made (such cuts, of course, could be made in addition to, rather than to the exclusion of, various other changes enumerated in this report). They feel that the ratio of academy graduates to the total number of new officers should be kept at roughly the same level it was during the Cold War, so as to prevent academy domination of the officer corps. Such a domination, they fear, would create a more insular officer corps, one less aware of civilian concerns, mores, and attitudes, and possibly one less responsive to civilian authority. One of the ways to prevent this would be keeping the proportion of officers commissioned from ROTC and officer candidate schools from dropping. This course of action would continue to make use of the physical plant of the academies, continue the tradition and mystique of the academies as the repository of institutional norms of conduct for new officers, and would thereby facilitate recruiting.

Others respond that there is no real evidence that academy graduates are any more insular, or less responsive to civilian control and civilian values, than non-academy graduates -- that no military officers live in enough isolation from civilian society to create problems of insufficient regard for civilian supremacy over the military. They note the virtually total absence of such challenges to civilian supremacy throughout the history of the academies and, for that matter, of the United States itself.

Practical concerns, however, may place some limits on reducing the size of the academy student bodies. Beyond a certain point, keeping the physical plant of each academy open for a smaller number of cadets or midshipmen would be highly inefficient, given the fixed costs of buildings, grounds, maintenance, utilities, and administrative staff. Where this point would be is not clear, and would depend on a detailed analysis of the practical aspects of academy operations.

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[169]FMP Comments.

### *Increase Enrollment*

There are military and social arguments for keeping academy enrollment high, and having an even higher proportion of the officer corps come from the academies. The argument that such a proportion threatens civilian control of the military is arguably refuted by historical evidence -- there was not a hint of such threat during the period from the Civil War through World War II, when academy graduates dominated the officer corps of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to an extent not seen before or since. From this point of view, the more detached, isolated, austere environment of the academies is needed to produce an officer corps that is not adversely affected by a society ever more permissive and dismissive of absolutes, and where the status of the United States as the world's only superpower engenders complacency.[170] One analyst has framed this argument as follows:[171]

> ...it could be argued that a greater proportion of officers coming from the academies would increase professionalism. In fact, a more insular environment would allow officers to concentrate on their military skills rather than their political polish.

## Make the Academies more Exclusively Military Institutions

One type of radical restructuring of the academies advocated by various observers for many years would be to eliminate their role as undergraduate colleges granting a bachelor's degree. Each academy would provide purely military instruction (perhaps including some academic subjects with a military slant such as military history, military geography, weapons technology, and so on) to graduates of civilian colleges and universities.[172] The academy course would last from several months to perhaps two years, depending on how the academy program fit in with the rest of each service's program for training new officers. This regime is similar to that at the British Army's Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.[173]

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[170]This was the fundamental thesis of what many academics have called one of the two most significant works written on civil-military relations in the United States in the 20th Century -- Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.

[171]Comments on a draft of this report by my CRS colleague David F. Burrelli, Specialist in National Defense, October 1996.

[172]See, for example, Beaumont, Roger A., and William P. Snyder. "A Fusion Strategy for Pre-Commissioning Training," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Fall 1977: 259-77.

[173]Sandhurst accepts both college graduates and young men and women who have the rough equivalent of an academically rigorous high school education, or one year of college (differences between British and American secondary and higher education make precise comparisons difficult).

It is argued that dropping the broad, more general academic roles of the academies would play to the strength of the academies' military environment -- military instruction. It would simultaneously leave a liberal arts education to those institutions best equipped to provide it -- civilian colleges and universities. It could, at least for the peacetime services, provide every new officer with an academy experience, due to the shortening of the courses and consequent increased capacity of the academies' physical plant. It would, in short, maintain the existing ideal of the academies as, among other things, the inculcators of, or exemplars for, military ideals and ethics of the entire officer corps, but in a different manner.

The arguments against making the academies exclusively military are equally formidable. First, it is likely that there simply is not enough room, either in buildings or in open ground, for many practical types of military training with modern weapons and equipment. Second, it is not clear that the academy environment is unsuited to a liberal arts education. Those who feel that the current academy situation clashes with the idea of a liberal education tend to argue that certain adjustments in curriculum and course load could fix the problems. Third, there are few topics other than technical training which are "purely military" in character.[174] In broader terms, the academies have been operating as extremely competitive liberal arts colleges, subject to the same rigorous accreditation process as civilian institutions, since World War II. What, it can be asked, really needs fixing that much? Finally, the costs of adapting the academies to their new role, and transferring functions now performed at other training installations around the country to the academies, could be large.

## Add Graduate Education to the Academies

Some have suggested that the academies should offer various types of education above the bachelor's degree level. This might be made feasible, in practical terms, by using space and facilities made available by downsizing of the academies" undergraduate student bodies, or changing the academies' mission to that of providing purely military instruction to officer candidates who already have completed their undergraduate education.

The range of alternatives includes (1) general academic graduate education; (2) graduate education that focuses specifically on military matters (for example, military history, or political science with a specialization in national security policy); and (3) professional military education for officers now performed elsewhere (such as the intermediate service school, or "staff college" level, for majors and Navy lieutenant commanders; and the senior service school, or "war college" level, for lieutenant colonels and colonels, Navy commanders and

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[174]Shuey Comments.

captains).[175] Conceivably, such a change could involve moving some existing service graduate institutions, such as the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, or the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to their services' academies.

There are strong arguments on both sides of this issue. Proponents will argue that introducing graduate programs at the academies would increase their educational rigor. It also might raise the general intellectual standing of the study of military matters, by having accredited graduate programs at the master's and/or doctoral level in military-related subjects or military aspects of general academic subjects. It would allow continued maximal use of the academies' physical plant if their undergraduate student bodies were downsized.

The most positive aspects of academy graduate programs, however, could conceivably be to continue the academy mystique both among the services and the American public, while establishing a more mature tone for the academies. Simply put, having older graduate students (no matter what the type of curriculum) at the academies might create a more adult atmosphere, raising both the intellectual quality of the instruction and minimizing more youthful kinds of "hi-jinks" -- as well as more serious kinds of misconduct.

On the other hand, instituting graduate programs at the academies could lead to a loss of focus on the training of young cadets, weakening their experience. Also, the costs could be considerable to set up new programs, close out old ones (what would happen to existing facilities which moved to the academies, for instance), and acquire faculty who could provide graduate instruction.

Perhaps the most significant argument against academy graduate programs for study in regular academic subjects is one of duplication. Why should the academies, or DOD in general, offer such degrees when the United States has, by consensus, the world's most outstanding establishment of graduate education? Most officers already have an opportunity to study toward advanced degrees at civilian universities and advanced military subjects at existing professional military schools. Furthermore, graduate education at the academies could be too narrowly-focused on military matters, ultimately depriving the officers -- and, therefore, the services -- of the breadth of view they would obtain by completing graduate programs at civilian universities.

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[175]One example of a program of graduate education at the academies which would combine several of these features was described as follows: "How about a master's program under which civilian college graduates could obtain a commission and a graduate degree from a year's study at one of the academies? The academic year could be sandwiches between two summers....for some practical exposure to military life and training. The course of study would include both military subjects and appropriate graduate-level courses in the sciences or other pertinent areas." Lieutenant Commander Eugene R. Fidell, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. "Nobody asked me either, but..." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1989: 88. See also Carhart, Tom. "West Point and the Army: Performing the Mission," *Army*, December 1994: 6-10.

## Get rid of the Academies

There have been calls to abolish the academies since West Point was founded in 1802. During the 19th century, such calls were often linked to a radical egalitarianism and opposition to virtually any kind of standing armed force in peacetime. Post-World War II suggestions to do away with the academies have been based more on the positive records, particularly in terms of economic efficiency, of other officer training methods -- ROTC and OCS -- in turning out large numbers of high-quality officers.

### *Arguments in Favor of Getting Rid of the Academies*

It has been argued that the academies, while serving nobly during all of American history to the present day, are no longer needed. The United States is no longer a frontier society, with only a minuscule number of institutions of higher education and equally minuscule armed forces, as it was in 1802, when West Point was founded, and 1845, when the Naval Academy was established. Over 2,000 colleges and universities exist from which the services can acquire officer candidates with a college education.[176] The U.S. Armed Forces total 1.5 million active duty and 1 million Selected Reserve personnel, and are deployed worldwide.

Further, the rise of non-academy graduates to the highest ranks of general and flag officers, including numerous service chiefs, commanders-in-chiefs of the unified commands, and chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have shown that the United States can obtain outstanding military leaders from institutions other than the academies. The academies also cost a good deal -- close to $1 billion a year -- and produce officers whose education costs anywhere from about three to almost 13 times as much as ROTC or OCS graduates.[177]

Some current observers are concerned that recent events have cast into doubt the ability of the academies to provide moral and ethical role models for the officer corps in general. It is not that the academies are perceived as worse than, or even as bad as, civilian colleges and universities -- it is that some are starting to think they may not be significantly enough better. Does the isolation of the academies from civilian society, together with the self-perception of cadets and midshipmen that they are members of a meritocratic elite, result in a propensity to "push the edge of the envelope" in matters of ethics and morality? Does the sense of corporate identity among cadets and midshipmen lead to a closing of ranks against outsiders, and an unwillingness to condemn

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[176]See Hutcheson, *The United States Air Force Academy: Time to Close the Doors*: 16-18, for an example of how officer training would be shifted primarily to ROTC, secondarily to OCS.

[177]FY1990 figures. See above, pp. 9-10. See also Hutcheson, *The United States Air Force Academy: Time to Close the Doors*: 25.

and discipline their own "bad apples"? Does the frantic schedule teach academy students to "game the system" and become proficient in bureaucratic manipulation and survival, to the exclusion of more fundamental ethical concerns?

### *Arguments Against Getting Rid of the Academies*

The arguments against getting rid of the academies are at least equally compelling. First, closing the academies -- as with closing other military installations and bases -- might not save much money, or might not save any at all, if ROTC and OCS had to be expanded to make up the difference. Furthermore, what would happen to the massive investment in physical plant that has already been made at the academies?

Second, what kind of message would the services send to the nation at large if they were to close institutions that have stood for close to 200 years? Arguably, it would imply two things: first, that the academies had so deteriorated that they were beyond fixing (an assertion difficult to support), and second, that the services "weren't hiring" -- that they did not need the kind of officers the three academies had been turning out for so long, and which had provided such high-quality leadership. The ethical "problems" at the academies could be taken as a sign of "moral health," in that the academies, often in contrast to civilian institutions, hold their students to high moral standards and discipline them if they do not meet those standards -- how many civilian institutions regard lying, by itself, as scandalous and punishable?

Third, some of the "problems" at the academies may be more indicative of success and institutional vigor. High standards may result in high failure rates. However, success and achievement may be based on initial failure and later learning, as long as the process is handled properly and standards are not compromised.[178]

Fourth, the academies have been so central to the institutional life of the armed forces, and have such a positive image in the eyes of the American people, that the question of whether or not to keep them is not a purely military one. The academies, it can be argued, provide a certain type of educational environment for young men and women who seek something more Spartan than that of conventional civilian colleges and universities. As such, their existence, as well as providing career-minded officers and buttressing the instititutional values of the military, increases the diversity of educational opportunity available to American youth.

Finally, the real issue may not be what would be a cost- and symbolically-effective officer commissioning system if it were designed from scratch. Rather, it is whether the benefits to be obtained from getting rid of the academies in the context of the current officer procurement system would outweigh the massive

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[178]Ryan Comments.

tangible and intangible effects of abolishing them. The onus of demonstrating the worth of such a radical change -- and an alternative paradigm for precommissioning education -- may, therefore, lie with its proponents, rather than requiring defenders of the status quo to justify the existing situation.

# APPENDIX A.
# The S.S. Coast Guard Academy and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy

The U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA) and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA) differ in some ways from the DOD academies. They both offer B.S. degrees and a four-year undergraduate curriculum, enrolling both men and women, in a military environment; however, USMMA cadets are not members of the armed forces. USCGA graduates are commissioned as ensigns in the Coast Guard. USMMA graduates receive a federal license as a third mate or third assistant engineer in the merchant marine, and a commission as an ensign in the Coast Guard Reserve or Naval Reserve. USCGA graduates have an active duty service obligation similar to that of the DOD academies. USMMA graduates have an obligation to serve at least five years in the U.S. maritime industry (in which case they incur an eight-year military reserve obligation) or on active duty in the armed forces (in which case, as with DOD academy graduates, a total eight-year obligation is also incurred, any part of which not spent on active duty must be spent in the reserves).

There is no tuition; however, USCGA cadets, as members of the armed forces, do receive pay and military health care benefits, while USMMA cadets receive neither. Both academies have an enrollment of about 900 cadets and graduate slightly less than one-fourth of that amount each year.[179] There has been some criticism that the Merchant Marine Academy is no longer needed due to the great decline in the U.S. merchant marine, although nobody appears to question the caliber of the institution itself or its cadets and graduates. Some have suggested closing the USMMA; the 1993 National Performance Review of the Clinton Administration suggested cutting funding for the USMMA by 50 percent and allowing the academy to charge tuition.[180] In response, the Congress in 1994 prohibited the charging of tuition, room, or board at all five academies.[181]

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[179]*Congressional Guide for Admission to the United States Service Academies*. Annapolis, MD, U.S. Naval Academy Public Affairs Office, Publications Branch, 1994: 35-42.

[180]See, for example, McAllister, Bill. "Preparing Students for a Sinking Industry: Merchant Marine Academy Remains Afloat in Sea of Federal Red Ink," *Washington Post*, November 27, 1995: A1, A10; and *From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less. Report of the National Performance Review*. Vice President Al Gore. September 7, 1993: 150.

[181]Sec. 553, FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 103-337, October 5, 1994; 108 Stat. 2663 at 2772.

# APPENDIX B.
# Commissioned Officers Serving, by Source of Commission, as ofFY1995 [Numbers and (percentage of total)][182]

| Grade | Army | Navy | Marine Corps | Air Force | DOD Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **0-1 Total** | **9,610 (100)** | **6,383 (100)** | **2,044 (100)** | **7,469 (100)** | **25,506 (100)** |
| Academies[183] | 2,086 (22) | 1,547 (24) | 314 (15) | 1,967 (26) | 5,914 (23) |
| ROTC | 5,908 (61) | 1,944 (31) | 362 (18) | 3,041 (41) | 11,255 (44) |
| OCS | 863 (9) | 1,161 (18) | 859 (42) | 1,532 (21) | 4,415 (17) |
| Other[184] | 744 (8) | 1,716 (27) | 509 (25) | 929 (12) | 3,898 (15) |
| Unknown | 9 (0.1) | 15 (0.2) | 0 | 0 | 24 (0.1) |
| **0-2 Total** | **8,362 (100)** | **7,168 (100)** | **2,859 (100)** | **7,551 (100)** | **25,940 (100)** |
| Academies | 1,793 (21) | 1,641 (23) | 359 (13) | 1,969 (26) | 5,762 (22) |
| ROTC | 5,083 (61) | 2,372 (33) | 596 (21) | 3,889 (52) | 11,940 (46) |
| OCS | 616 (7) | 1,279 (18) | 1,697 (59) | 696 (9) | 4,288 (17) |
| Other | 851 (10) | 1,870 (26) | 207 (7) | 997 (13) | 3,925 (15) |
| Unknown | 19 (0.2) | 6 (0.1) | 0 | 0 | 25 (0.1) |

[182]Adapted from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), November-December 1996. Does not include warrant officers. "OCS" includes Army Officer Candidate School and Army National Guard State Officer Candidate Schools; Navy Officer Candidate School, Navy Aviation Officer and Naval Flight Officer Candidate programs, and Navy Aviation Cadet program; Marine Corps Officer Candidate Course and Platoon Leaders Class programs; and Air Force Officer Training School and Air National Guard Academy of Military Sciences. **Figures may not add due to rounding.**

[183]Includes all officers in that particular grade, in that particular service, who graduated from any service academy (including the Coast Guard and Merchant Marine Academies), not just those who graduated from their own service's academy. For example, out of the 2,086 Army officers commissioned from academies in grade 0-1 (second lieutenant) in FY1995, 2,063 graduated from the Military Academy, 7 from the Naval Academy, 14 from the Air Force Academy, and 2 from the Merchant Marine Academy. Public law (10 USC 541) provides for such appointments, subject to limitations.

[184]"Other" includes direct appointment (mostly physicians and allied health professionals, lawyers, and chaplains), Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship program members, and a wide range of other programs, almost all of which involve commissioning of enlisted personnel.

| Grade | Army | Navy | Marine Corps | Air Force | DOD Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **0-3 Total** | **25,088 (100)** | **21,056 (100)** | **5,457 (100)** | **32,817 (100)** | **84,418 (100)** |
| Academies | 3,195 (13) | 3,472 (16) | 657 (12) | 6,015 (18) | 13,339 (16) |
| ROTC | 15,408 (61) | 5,278 (25) | 1,273 (23) | 13,849 (42) | 35,808 (42) |
| OCS | 2,254 (9) | 4,340 (21) | 2,786 (51) | 6,990 (21) | 16,370 (19) |
| Other | 4,176 (17) | 7,838 (37) | 741 (14) | 5,963 (18) | 18,718 (22) |
| Unknown | 55 (0.2) | 128 (0.6) | 0 | 0 | 187 (0.2) |
| **0-4 Total** | **14,190 (100)** | **11,189 (100)** | **3,161 (100)** | **15,516 (100)** | **44,056 (100)** |
| Academies | 2,087 (15) | 1,688 (15) | 324 (10) | 2,008 (13) | 6,107 (14) |
| ROTC | 7,444 (53) | 1,485 (13) | 525 (17) | 5,362 (35) | 14,816 (34) |
| OCS | 1,460 (10) | 2,926 (26) | 1,953 (62) | 4,758 (31) | 11,097 (25) |
| Other | 3,170 (22) | 4,648 (42) | 359 (11) | 3,388 (22) | 11,565 (26) |
| Unknown | 29 (0.2) | 442 (4) | 0 | 0 | 471 (1) |
| **0-5 Total** | **9,421 (100)** | **7,084 (100)** | **1,637 (100)** | **10,757 (100)** | **28,801 (100)** |
| Academies | 1,598 (17) | 1,411 (20) | 131 (8) | 1,820 (17) | 4,960 (17) |
| ROTC | 5,035 (53) | 1,317 (19) | 203 (12) | 4,813 (45) | 11,368 (39) |
| OCS | 680 (7) | 1,464 (21) | 1,177 (72) | 2,119 (20) | 5,440 (19) |
| Other | 2,086 (22) | 2,677 (38) | 126 (7) | 2,005 (9) | 6,894 (24) |
| Unknown | 20 (0.2) | 215 (3) | 0 | 0 | 235 (0.8) |
| **0-6 Total** | **3,751 (100)** | **3,314 (100)** | **626 (100)** | **4,158 (100)** | **11,849 (100)** |
| Academies | 494 (13) | 767 (23) | 59 (9) | 730 (18) | 2,050 (17) |
| ROTC | 1,700 (45) | 491 (15) | 55 (9) | 1,700 (41) | 3,946 (33) |
| OCS | 491 (13) | 668 (20) | 446 (71) | 928 (22) | 2,533 (21) |
| Other | 1,060 (28) | 1,269 (38) | 66 (11) | 800 (19) | 3,195 (27) |
| Unknown | 6 (0.2) | 119 (4) | 0 | 0 | 125 (1) |
| **0-7 Total** | **151 (100)** | **106 (100)** | **34 (100)** | **140 (100)** | **431 (100)** |
| Academies | 31 (21) | 53 (50) | 8 (24) | 39 (28) | 131 (30) |
| ROTC | 66 (44) | 16 (15) | 3 (9) | 71 (51) | 156 (36) |
| OCS | 38 (25) | 17 (16) | 21 (62) | 23 (16) | 99 (23) |
| Other | 14 (9) | 18 (17) | 2 (6) | 7 (5) | 41 (10) |
| Unknown | 2 (1) | 2 (2) | 0 | 0 | 4 (1) |

| Grade | Army | Navy | Marine Corps | Air Force | DOD Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **0-8 Total** | **97 (100)** | **74 (100)** | **22 (100)** | **90 (100)** | **283 (100)** |
| Academies | 39 (40) | 36 (47) | 4 (18) | 21 (23) | 100 (35) |
| ROTC | 39 (40) | 13 (18) | 2 (9) | 48 (53) | 102 (36) |
| OCS | 12 (12) | 12 (16) | 14 (64) | 18 (20) | 56 (20) |
| Other | 5 (5) | 13 (18) | 2 (9) | 3 (3) | 28 (8) |
| Unknown | 2 (2) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 (1) |
| **0-9 Total** | **39 (100)** | **21 (100)** | **9 (100)** | **34 (100)** | **103 (100)** |
| Academies | 9 (23) | 10 (48) | 0 | 13 (38) | 32 (31) |
| ROTC | 24 (62) | 6 (29) | 3 (30) | 14 (41) | 47 (46) |
| OCS | 4 (10) | 3 (14) | 6 (70) | 6 (18) | 19 (18) |
| Other | 2 (5) | 2 (10) | 0 | 1 (3) | 5 (5) |
| Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **0-10 Total** | **11 (100)** | **11 (100)** | **3 (100)** | **10 (100)** | **35 (100)** |
| Academies | 4 (36) | 7 (64) | 1 (33) | 5 (50) | 17 (49) |
| ROTC | 5 (45) | 1 (9) | 0 | 5 (50) | 11 (31) |
| OCS | 2 (18) | 1 (9) | 1 (33) | 0 | 4 (11) |
| Other | 0 | 2 (18) | 1 (33) | 0 | 3 (9) |
| Unknown | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **General/ Flag Officer Total** | **298 (100)** | **212 (100)** | **68 (100)** | **274 (100)** | **852 (100)** |
| Academies | 83 (28) | 106 (50) | 13 (19) | 78 (28) | 280 (33) |
| ROTC | 134 (45) | 36 (17) | 8 (12) | 138 (50) | 316 (37) |
| OCS | 56 (19) | 33 (16) | 42 (62) | 47 (17) | 178 (21) |
| Other | 21 (7) | 35 (17) | 5 (7) | 11 (4) | 72 (8) |
| Unknown | 4 (1) | 2 (1) | 0 | 0 | 6 (0.1) |

| Grade | Army | Navy | Marine Corps | Air Force | DOD Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **All Officers/ Grand Total** | **70,814 (100)** | **56,408 (100)** | **15,852 (100)** | **77,724 (100)** | **220,798 (100)** |
| Academies | 11,338 (16) | 10,626 (19) | 1,857 (12) | 14,587 (19) | 38,408 (17) |
| ROTC | 40,712 (57) | 12,923 (23) | 3,022 (19) | 32,792 (42) | 89,449 (41) |
| OCS | 6,420 (9) | 11,871 (21) | 8,960 (57) | 17,072 (22) | 44,323 (20) |
| Other | 12,045 (17) | 20,061 (36) | 2,013 (13) | 13,273 (17) | 47,392 (21) |
| Unknown | 299 (0.4) | 927 (2) | 0 | 0 | 1,226 (1) |