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Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

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Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

SUMMARY

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics and established diplomatic relations with each by mid-March 1992. The United States also supported their admission to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support in countering Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, and approved the Freedom Support Act and other legislation for this purpose.

The former Clinton Administration emphasized forging closer U.S. relations with the Central Asian states. U.S. policy goals included fostering stability, democratization, free market economies, free trade and transport throughout the Eurasian corridor, denuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to international human rights standards. An over-arching U.S. priority was to discourage attempts by radical regimes and groups to block or subvert progress toward these goals. Clinton Administration policy also aimed to integrate these states into the international community so that they followed responsible security and other policies, and to discourage xenophobic and anti-Western orientations that threatened regional and international peace and stability. The former Clinton Administration's policy goals in Central Asia reflected the different characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan included promoting the removal of strategic nuclear weapons located on its territory (the last were removed in 1995) and the security of other nuclear materials. The United States pursued some economic and business interests in Central Asia, particularly in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The United States initially forged expanded ties with Kyrgyzstan because it appeared committed to democratization. The Clinton Administration was concerned about human rights and civil liberties problems in all the states. In Tajikistan, U.S. humanitarian aid focused on alleviating the effects of civil war and on other urgent needs. For FY2001, the Administration emphasized security assistance for counter-narcotics, non-proliferation, border and customs, and defense programs.

Some observers call for different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement in Central Asia. Some have called for strengthening conditions linking aid to progress in improving human rights or in making adequate progress in democratization and the creation of free markets. Some dispute the importance of energy and other resources to U.S. national security interests. Others point to civil and ethnic tensions in the region as possibly endangering U.S. lives and investments. Heightened congressional interest in Central Asia was reflected in passage of "Silk Road" language in late 1999 (Consolidated Appropriations; P.L.106-113) authorizing enhanced U.S. policy attention and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport (including energy pipelines) and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasian and Central Asian states.

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

As part of Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to establish a rapid reaction military presence in Central Asia, visiting Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov reportedly agreed with Putin on April 22, 2001, on the establishment of a 3,000-man tactical air base in Tajikistan, marking the reintroduction of such forces absent since the Soviet period. Russia also announced that it would bolster its border troops along the Tajik-Afghan border. Putin and visiting Uzbek President Islam Karimov agreed in early May on stepped-up Russian arms sales. The sanctioning of the rapid reaction forces will be discussed at a late May 2001 summit of the members of the Collective Security Treaty. Uzbek and Kyrgyz officials have been increasingly concerned about alleged imminent attacks by terrorist groups based in Afghanistan (and, reportedly, in the mountains of Tajikistan).

Visiting U.S. Central Command Commander-in-Chief Tommy Franks on May 16, 2001, announced that Tajikistan had been admitted into NATO's Partnership for Peace. General Franks reportedly offered officer training with NATO and invited the "strategically important" Tajikistan to observe upcoming NATO exercises in Germany. He visited Kyrgyzstan the next day to discuss U.S. military assistance.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Historical Background

Central Asia: Basic Facts

Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. mi.; Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.

Population: 55.7 million (1999 est., *World Bank*), somewhat less than France; Kazakhstan: 15.4 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 4.7 m.; Tajikistan: 6.2 m.; Turkmenistan: 4.8 m.; Uzbekistan: 24.6 m.

Gross Domestic Product: $38.5 billion in 1999 (*World Bank*); Kazakhstan: $15.6 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $1.6 b.; Tajikistan: $1.8 b.; Turkmenistan: $2.7 b.; Uzbekistan: $16.8 b.

Central Asia consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language), and most are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are closely related historically and culturally. By the late 19th century, Russian Tsars had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of Central Asia. After the breakup of the Tsarist empire, Central Asia was at first included within Soviet Russia, but by 1936 five "union republics" had been delineated. Soviet communist rule resulted in massive loss of life from collectivization and purges, though economic development occurred. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the five republics gained worldwide diplomatic recognition. (For overviews, see CRS Report 97-1058, *Kazakhstan*; CRS Report 97-690, *Kyrgyzstan*; CRS Report 98-594, *Tajikistan*; CRS Report 97-1055, *Turkmenistan*; and CRS Report 97-1060, *Uzbekistan*, updated regularly.)

Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns

The major goals of former Clinton Administration policy toward the NIS, including Central Asia, entailed fostering stability, democratization, free market economies and trade, denuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to international human rights standards. These positive policy goals were supported by another priority — to discourage attempts by radical regimes and groups to block or subvert progress toward these goals or otherwise threaten regional peace and stability. While a consensus appears to exist among most U.S. policymakers and others on the general desirability of these goals, there are various views on the types and levels of U.S. involvement. Many of those who endorse continued or enhanced U.S. support for Central Asia argue that political instability in Central Asia can produce spillover effects in important nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey. They also argue that the United States has a major interest in preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring nuclear weapons-related materials and technology in the region. They maintain that U.S. interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as a superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights. They stress that U.S. leadership in world efforts to provide humanitarian and economic reform aid will help alleviate the high levels of social distress that are exploited by anti-Western Islamic extremist groups seeking new members. Although many U.S. policymakers acknowledge a role for a democratizing Russia in the region, they stress that U.S. and other Western aid and investment strengthen the independence of the states and forestall Russian attempts to re-subjugate the region.

Those who have objected to aspects of past policy toward Central Asia argue that the United States has historically had few interests in this region and that developments there remain marginal to U.S. interests. They advocate limited U.S. contacts undertaken with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure U.S. interests. Many discount fears that an anti-Western Islamic extremism, such as that fostered by Iran or Afghanistan's Taliban group, will make headway, or that Russia will seek or be able to re-subjugate the region. They question whether the oil and other natural resources in these new states are vital to U.S. security and point out that oil resources are, in any event, unlikely to be fully available to Western markets for many years. Some also criticize aid for democratization among cultures they view as historically attuned to authoritarianism. Others urge reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive governments that widely violate human rights, arguing that such aid provides tacit support for these regimes, and may even unwittingly encourage the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative channel of dissent. Some point to lingering instability in Tajikistan and elsewhere in the region as another reason for the United States to eschew major involvement that might place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.

U.S. Policy after the Soviet Collapse

After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics and offered diplomatic relations to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which were viewed as following responsible security and democratic policies. Citing the dangers the Central Asian states faced from Iranian-sponsored

Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. diplomatic relations were quickly established with the remainder by mid-March 1992. Faced with calls in Congress and elsewhere that the Administration devise a policy on aiding the NIS, former President Bush sent the Freedom Support Act to Congress, which was signed into law on October 24, 1992 (P.L. 102-511). The incoming Clinton Administration in 1993 soon pledged to focus on close ties with the NIS as a top foreign policy priority. (For details on aid, see CRS Report RL30148, *U.S. Assistance to the Soviet Union and its Successor States 1991-1998*).

In congressional testimony on March 17, 1999, then-Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States Steve Sestanovich stated that the over-arching goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia was to secure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the states. This goal was being pursued by advocating democratization (because it is "the long-term guarantor of stability and prosperity"), free markets, cooperation within the region (including on building east-west pipelines and on defense) and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, and responsible security policies (including nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics). Although the states were making halting progress in some areas, he stated, the Administration was committed to continue working with them. In testimony in April 1998, then-Ambassador Sestanovich stated that the United States had a "big stake" in assisting the peaceful and historic integration of Central Asia and the South Caucasus into the world community, interests that were seen as "strategic" and "vital."

U.S. diplomatic and other ties have greatly increased in all the Central Asian states , and the embassies are being upgraded (except in Tajikistan, see below). A U.S.-Kazakh Joint Commission held its first meeting in November 1994, chaired by Vice President Gore and President Nazarbayev. A U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint Commission, highlighting the Administration's view that "in geopolitical terms [and] commercially, [Uzbekistan] is a very important country for the United States," held its first meeting in February 1998. Although these commissions are not being retained by the Bush Administration, some of their working groups and other forums will continue to address bilateral issues of concern.

Fostering Pro-Western Orientations

The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the international community, and supported their admission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO bodies, and other Western organizations. The Clinton Administration supported these integrative goals through bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such as Turkey. The former Administration used these and other means to discourage radical regimes, groups, and Islamic fundamentalists — who used repression or violence to oppose democratization — from attempts to gain influence. Upon independence, all the Central Asian states professed desires for good relations with both East and West as a means of demonstrating independence, and a certain opportunism has been evident in the quest for relations with aid donors. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embraced Islam, but display hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established some trade and aid ties with Iran. While they have had greater success in attracting development aid from the West than from the East, many observers argue that, in the long run, their foreign policies will probably not be anti-Western, but may be more oriented toward Islamic states and interests. (See also CRS Report RL30294, *Central Asia's Security*.)

Russia's Role. The former Clinton Administration generally viewed a democratizing Russia as able to play a stabilizing role in Central Asia, though there was increasing emphasis by the late 1990s that Russia should not seek to dominate the region or exclude Western and other involvement. Some observers warn that Russia might soon reabsorb Central Asia into a new empire. Others, however, discount such capabilities because of what they view as Russia's deep economic, political, ethnic, and military disorder, but nonetheless endorse monitoring Russian actions that might infringe on the independence of the NIS.

Russian officials have variously emphasized interests in strategic security and economic ties with Central Asia, and concerns over the treatment of ethnic Russians. Strategic concerns have focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and the region's role as a buffer to Islamic extremism. Russia endeavors to meet its strategic concerns by concluding bilateral military arms, training, basing, and border security agreements, as well as multilateral agreements among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), such as on Collective Security. By the late 1990s, Russia's economic decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce its security presence. Russian border troops still defend "CIS borders" in Tajikistan, but were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 (some 100 Russian "advisors" remain, many deployed along the Kyrgyz-Chinese border). In late 1999, the last group of Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan. In 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty, citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness, though Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan reaffirmed membership. Russia has justified its military base accord with Tajikistan by citing the Islamic extremist threat to the CIS.

In an apparent shift toward a more activist Russian role in Central Asia, in January 2000, then-Acting President Putin approved a "national security concept" that termed foreign efforts to "weaken" Russia's "position" in Central Asia as a security threat. Among recent Russian activism, in early 2000, Russia supplied Kazakhstan with Suvorov jet fighters and trainers and promised to soon deliver an S-300 anti-missile complex and Tupolev bombers; in March 2000, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan joined Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in coordinating air defenses with Russian Air Defense Forces; and in May 2001, Russia agreed on arms sales to Uzbekistan. Russia reportedly has linked recent military aid to Kyrgyzstan to profitable concessions on uranium, gold, and rare-earth minerals mining and processing.

At CIS summits in 2000, Russia called for setting up antiterrorism centers to allow Russia's security, police, and military forces to rapidly deploy to CIS territory. Some CIS leaders have been concerned about Russia's intentions in setting up what they view as threats to sovereignty and have insisted on prior consultations on such deployments and otherwise tried to limit the powers of the centers. Russian Valeriy Nikolayenko, head of the CIS Collective Security Council, announced that meetings would be held in April-May 2001 to work out details to forming a Central Asia-based rapid-reaction military unit composed of Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik troops, aimed to counter Islamic extremism but also apparently aimed to counter U.S. and NATO security influence.

Economically, Russia seeks to counter Western business interests and gain substantial influence over oil and gas resources in the region through participation in joint ventures and by insisting that pipeline routes transit Russian territory. At the same time, Russia has avoided large economic subsidies to the region. Russia's stance was illustrated in September 1999 when Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated that U.S. proposals for an east-west Caspian pipeline by-passing Russia were "detrimental to Russia, and consequently

unacceptable to us," and amounted to "playing anti-Russian cards in the Caspian" (see below, *Trade*). A foreign policy concept approved by Putin in February 2000 and a foreign policy speech he made in February 2001 highlight Russia's concerns about the treatment of the twenty million Russians residing in the "near abroad" former Soviet republics.

The safety of ethnic Russians (or more broadly, "Russian-speakers") in Central Asia has been of popular concern in Russia but has mainly served as a political stalking horse for those in Russia advocating the "reintegration" of former "Russian lands." According to the 1989 Soviet census, nearly ten million ethnic Russians resided in Central Asia, constituting about 40% of all ethnic Russians then residing outside of Russia (25.3 million). Six of the ten million resided mainly in northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan, and many Kazakhs fear potential separatism in these regions. Ethnic Russian fears are raised by employment, language, electoral, and other policies or practices they deem discriminatory. These and other factors contributed to the decline of Russians to 6.6 million by 2001, about 12% of the population of Central Asia, according to the CIS Statistics Agency. Russians remaining tend to be elderly or low-skilled. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs have again become a majority.

While seeking ties with Russia to provide for security and economic needs, at least in the short term, the Central Asian states have tried to resist or modify Russian policies viewed as diluting their sovereignty. Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev have been harsh critics of what they have viewed as traditional Russian tendencies to treat Central Asia as an "unequal partner." Some observers argue that a heavy-handed approach by Russia in pursuing interests in Central Asia, as well as damaging its ties with the West, will backfire among increasingly nationalistic populations and elites and harm its long term ties with these states.

Russia and Iran have found some common grounds for cooperation in countering what they view as adverse Western influences in Central Asia. Similarly, Russia has increased efforts to forge a "partnership" with China on Central Asia issues. China has shown increased interest in ethnic issues and with energy and other trade with the region, and in border and other security through the "Shanghai Forum" group of China and NIS bordering states. Some observers warn that this growing similarity of interests among Russia, Iran, and China in countering the West and attempting to increase their own influence could heighten threats to the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian states. Others discount the near-term threats to the region posed by cooperation among the three states, stressing their limited economies, their diverging interests, and Russia's weakened regional influence.

Obstacles to Peace and Independence

The former Clinton Administration endeavored to foster stability necessary for the NIS to successfully implement pro-Western reforms. Then-Deputy Secretary Talbott stated in July 1997 that U.S. support for peace settlements aims at preventing the region from becoming a hotbed of terrorism, religious and political extremism, and wider conflict. He also noted that there are substantial oil resources in the region, "yet another reason why conflict resolution must be job one for U.S. policy." However, conflict mediation and the evaluation of other threats to stability in Central Asia have not been a primary responsibility of the State Department's Special Negotiator for Nagorno Karabakh and New Independent States

Regional Conflicts, though U.S. diplomacy did play a role in U.N. and OSCE mediation efforts in Tajikistan.

All the Central Asian states, except Tajikistan, have appeared largely stable politically since independence, unlike many other NIS. The presidents have remained in place by orchestrating extensions of their terms and by limiting political freedoms. U.S. policymakers have warned, however, that political repression ultimately harms stability. The lack of obvious successors to the present leaders raises concern among many observers, though all the current leaders are sixty-two or younger. Kyrgyzstan's Constitutional Court in 1999 ruled that President Askar Akayev could run for a third term as president, although the constitution set a two-term limit, and Niyazov orchestrated a constitutional change in late 1999 naming him president for life. Nazarbayev too in 2000 gained some official powers for life. Belying this appearance of stability, Uzbekistan's capital of Tashkent was shaken in February 1999 by explosions that Karimov denounced as a coup attempt (*see below*), and even Niyazov's repressive regime faced popular protests in early 2001.

Regional Tensions and Conflicts. The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and vague national identities pose serious problems to stability in all the Central Asian states. During the Soviet period, an overarching "Soviet" identity was stressed, but more significant was the spur, given by the delineation of republics in the 1920s-1930s, to the growth of national identities. With the Soviet collapse, most in Central Asia support these national identities, but also are emphasizing identifications with clan, family, region, and Islam. Among the four Turkic-language states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), some promote a pan-Turkic identity. Most analysts conclude, however, that in the foreseeable future the term Central Asia will denote a geographic area more than a region of shared identities and aspirations.

Central Asia's borders, described as among the world's most convoluted, fail to accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to potential instability. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and a million or more in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China's Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley was divided by Stalin among Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, leaving large numbers of people outside their new "national" borders. Criss-crossing mountains thwart Tajikistan's integrity. In early 2001, Akayev faced widespread popular criticism for agreements with both Uzbekistan and China ceding border territories. The Kyrgyz government quickly repudiated a February 2001 memorandum with Uzbekistan ceding access to Uzbekistan's Sokh enclave. The Kyrgyz-China border delimitation agreement of 1999, recently submitted to the legislature for ratification, set forth an exchange of some territory. Some Kyrgyz legislators have called for Akayev's impeachment.

In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the "Shanghai treaty" with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet border with China. China has used the treaty to pressure Central Asia to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China's Xinjiang province. China and Russia appear recently to be converting the grouping, renamed the Shanghai Forum, into a security conclave

to combat Islamic extremism and oppose U.S. influence, according to some observers. Karimov indicated interest in May 2001 in joining the Forum.

The Bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. After the February 16, 1999, explosions, which by various reports killed 16-28 and wounded 100-351, Uzbek officials detained dozens of suspects, including political dissidents. Karimov in April 1999 accused Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding the plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (former leader of the banned Uzbek Adolat social movement) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June 1999 resulted in six receiving the death sentence. The suspects were described in court proceedings as Islamic terrorists who received training in Afghanistan (by the Taliban), Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia (by the terrorist Khattab in Chechnya), and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev, and Jama Namanganiy. Testimony alleged that Solikh had joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), led by Yuldashev and Namanganiy, in mid-1997, and that Solikh, Yuldashev, Namanganiy, and others had agreed that Solikh would be president and Yuldashev defense minister after Karimov was overthrown and a caliphate established. According to an Uzbek media report in July 1999, the coup plot included a planned attack on Uzbekistan by Namanganiy and United Tajik Opposition (UTO) allies transiting through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (*see below*).

Another secret trial in August 1999 of six suspects in the bombings (brothers of Solikh or members of his Erk Party) resulted in sentences ranging from 8 to 15 years. In November 2000, the Uzbek Supreme Court convicted twelve persons of terrorism, nine of whom were tried in absentia. The absent Yuldashev and Namangoniy were given death sentences and the absent Solikh, 15.5 years in prison. U.S. officials criticized the apparent lack of due process during the trial. Solikh has rejected accusations of involvement in the bombings or membership in the IMU. Yuldsashev too has eschewed responsibility for the bombings but warned that more might occur if Karimov does not step down.

In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU, led by Yuldashev, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, stating that the IMU resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The "main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan," it warned, linking the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. The IMU is being aided by Afghanistan's Taliban and by terrorist bin Laden, according to the State Department, and it stressed that the "United States supports the right of Uzbekistan to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity from the violent actions of the IMU." The former Clinton Administration supported Uzbekistan's efforts to combat terrorism but stressed that such efforts should not include human rights abuses. Some observers stressed that Uzbek officials who were once in charge of repressing dissent and religion during the Soviet era largely continued to carry out their functions, creating increasing popular alienation. Reportedly, besides the IMU, nearly a dozen Islamic extremist groups are attracting increasing popular support.

The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan. Several hundred Islamic extremists and others first invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. With Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz forces finally forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. Karimov heavily criticized Akayev for supposed laxity in suppressing the guerrillas. According to some

observers, the incursion indicated both links among terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia (Chechnya), and elsewhere and the weakness of Kyrgyzstan's security forces. Analysts disagree on the degree to which this terrorism was related to Islamic fundamentalism or to control over increasingly lucrative drug trafficking. Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000, in Kyrgyzstan taking foreigners hostage and leading to thousands of Kyrgyz fleeing the area. Uzbekistan provided air and some other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000, reporting the loss of 30 Kyrgyz troops.

Civil War in Tajikistan. State Department officials served as observers at the U.N.-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks and pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild after a peace settlement, indications of the Administration's efforts to ease ethnic and civil tensions in the NIS. The United States has been the major humanitarian donor to alleviate the effects of the Tajik civil war. The United States supported the presence of U.N. observers in Tajikistan, and urged Russian-CIS "peacekeeping" forces to cooperate fully with them and to abide by international law. U.S. programs in Tajikistan have been complicated by the U.S. closure of its embassy in Dushanbe in 1998, and relocation of personnel to Kazakhstan, because of inadequate security. Beginning in 2000, some diplomatic personnel have traveled back and forth to Dushanbe. A site will be identified where a secure chancery can be built. Then-Ambassador-at-Large Sestanovich warned in March 1999 that the truncated diplomatic presence might allow Iran to increase its influence.

Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and movements – largely consisting of members of Pamiri and Garmi regional elites who had long been excluded from political power – tried to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. In 1993, the CIS authorized "peacekeeping" in Tajikistan, consisting of Russia's 201st Rifle Division, based in Tajikistan, and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops (the Kyrgyz and Uzbek troops pulled out in 1998-1999).

After the Tajik government and opposition agreed to a cease-fire in September 1994, the U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994 with a mandate to monitor the cease-fire, later expanded to investigate cease-fire violations, monitor the demobilization of UTO fighters, assist ex-combatants to integrate into society, and offer advice for holding elections. In December 1996, the two sides agreed to set up a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), an executive body composed equally of government and opposition members. On June 27, 1997, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and UTO leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed the *comprehensive peace agreement*, under which Rakhmanov remained president but 30% of ministerial posts were allotted to the opposition. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely met, including the return of refugees, demilitarization of rebel forces, legalization of rebel parties, and the holding of elections. In March 2000, the NRC disbanded, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. The CIS declared its peacekeeping mandate fulfilled in June 2000, but Russian troops remain under a 25-year basing agreement. Stability in Tajikistan remains fragile. An unsuccessful insurrection in northern Tajikistan in late 1998 highlights concerns

by some observers about secessionist tendencies in the Soghd (formerly Leninabad) region and about ethnic tensions between ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks in Tajikistan.

Democratization and Human Rights

A major concern of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights. U.S. democratization support has been provided for political parties, voter education and electoral laws, legal and constitutional reform, media, structuring the division and balance of governmental powers, and parliamentary and educational exchanges. At the same time, the United States has worked with the ex-Communist party officials who have led in four of the five states (except Tajikistan) since before independence, recognizing that they may continue to hold power for some time. In testimony before the Congressional Helsinki Commission in May 1999, State Department official Ross Wilson stressed that the Administration had "serious reservations" about calls to link U.S. aid mainly to progress in democratization. He stressed that other salient U.S. policy goals included halting proliferation and fostering free market reforms, energy development, U.S. business, and regional cooperation. In testimony in March 2000, John Beyrle, then-Deputy Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the NIS, similarly argued that U.S. policy toward Turkmenistan weighed its human rights abuses against continued engagement on regional energy development, nonproliferation, and anti-narcotics goals, with the hope that Turkmen someday might embrace democracy.

Scenarios of political development in Central Asia include continued rule in most of the states by former Soviet and ex-Communist party elites, gradual transitions to more nationalistic elites who are at least somewhat democratic and Western-oriented, or large-scale and perhaps violent transitions to Islamic fundamentalist or xenophobic rule. All the Central Asian governments gave assurances in 1992 to the United States that they would pursue democratization. During Nazarbayev's 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan's commitments to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform. However, the State Department's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000* concludes that presidential power in all the Central Asian states overshadows legislative and judicial power, and that they have lost ground in democratization and respect for human rights.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights official Hrair Balian has termed elections in Central Asia during 2000 as regressive. Such races increase political alienation and frustration among the populations of the states, according to some observers, and contribute to the formation of clandestine groups seeking to overthrow the regimes. Among recent regional elections that indicate halting or negligible democratization, the OSCE and other international observers reported instances of bribery of voters, governmental intimidation of voters, media bias, ballot box-stuffing, and manipulation of tabulations during Kyrgyzstan's October 29, 2000, presidential election. The OSCE concluded that the vote represented a setback to democratization, though it hailed the democratic sentiments of many election officials and voters as promising for the future.

Security and Arms Control

Besides diplomatic efforts and humanitarian and reform aid, some U.S. security assistance has been provided to the region. Except for CTR aid, amounts have been modest, but funding increased in FY2000-FY2001. Indicating growing Congressional interest, H.R. 4919 (P.L.106-280; signed into law on October 6, 2000) authorizes aid to combat nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and conventional weapons proliferation in the NIS, and $45.5 million in FY2001-FY2002 to assist GUUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) and Armenia to carry out provisions of the Silk Road Act to strengthen national control of borders and to promote independence and sovereignty.

Among U.S. accords on security, during Nazarbayev's 1994 U.S. visit, the two sides signed a defense cooperation memorandum, to include talks on defense doctrine, training, and budgets, and in 1997, they signed a military cooperation accord pledging U.S. training, nuclear materials security, and conversion aid. Similar military accords have been signed with Uzbekistan. In February 2000, the United States transferred sixteen military transport vehicles to the Uzbek military to enhance interoperability with NATO forces, the first sizeable military equipment to be provided under the Foreign Military Financing program to Central Asia. Coast guard vessels are being transferred to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. U.S. Central Command in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military engagement activities, planning, and operations in Central Asia. USCENTCOM states that its strategy focuses on PFP, Marshall Center (the defense educational coordinator for PFP), and IMET programs to foster "apolitical, professional militaries capable of responding to regional peacekeeping and humanitarian needs" in the region.

Efforts to foster military cooperation were furthered when all the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO's PFP by mid-1994. Central Asian officers and troops have participated in PFP exercises in the United States since 1995. Troops from Centrazbat (the Central Asian Battalion; composed of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan under U.N. auspices for potential peacekeeping) took part in "PFP-style" exercises in 1997 in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan along with 500 U.S. troops who flew directly from the United States. In 1998, Centrazbat forces took part in PFP-sponsored exercises in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and in September 2000, U.S. troops took part in Centrazbat exercises in Kazakhstan. Many in Central Asia view these exercises as "sending a message" to Islamic extremists and others in Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere against fostering regional instability. Centrazbat, however, has suffered from wrangling among its members and its future is clouded. Former U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Jeffrey Starr met with Tajik

Cumulative Obligations FY1992-FY2000 for Central Asian Security Programs (Freedom Support Act and Other Funds)
(*million dollars*)

State Dept. Anti-Crime Training	15.47
State Dept. Science Centers	15.74
Defense Dept./Customs & Border Security	1.12
Defense Dept/FBI Counterproliferation	2.3
State Dept. Export Controls (NADR)	2.02
State Dept. Nonproliferation & Disarmament	2.97
State Dept. Antiterrorism	2.35
International Military Education & Training	8.11
Partnership for Peace (PFP)	3.45
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	19.85
Comprehensive Threat Reduction (CTR)	169.07
Dept. of Energy Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Materials Protection	37.08
National Science Foundation Civilian Res.	1.04
Total	280.57

Source: State Department

Defense Minister Sherali Khayrulloyev and border guard officers in January 2001 to discuss military cooperation, including urging Tajikistan to join PFP. The two sides discussed regional security and the conflict in Afghanistan, with Starr reportedly stating that Tajikistan was a key to stability in Central Asia.

Weapons of Mass Destruction. Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. In March 1999, then-Ambassador Sestanovich warned that Iran is targeting these countries, and that U.S. aid aims to bolster their export and physical controls over nuclear technology and materials. After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper one of world's major nuclear weapons powers (in reality Russia controlled these weapons). Though some in Kazakhstan urged "retaining" the weapons, it pledged to become a non-nuclear weapons state. All bombers and their air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from the SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994 and silos were blown up in 1995-1996. Then-Vice President Gore and Nazarbayev in December 1993 signed a U.S.-Kazakh Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella agreement for the "safe and secure" dismantling of approximately 104 SS-18s, the destruction of their silos, and related purposes.

Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines, and milling facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that pose proliferation concerns. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world's uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world's top producers of low enriched uranium. Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau, the world's only nuclear desalinization facility. Shut down in April 1999, it has nearly 300 metric tons of enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel in storage pools. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan report that their mining and milling activities have resulted in massive and hazardous waste dumps. Concerns that Iran or other terrorist states or groups might illicitly obtain nuclear materials led the United States and Kazakhstan to cooperate in 1994 to remove about 600 kg of highly enriched uranium from a Kazakh warehouse and to ship it to the United States. In 1997 and 1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on safeguarding and mothballing the Aktau reactor and eventually removing its weapons-grade plutonium. U.S. interest in nonproliferation in Central Asia was highlighted following Uzbekistan's successful interdiction (reportedly with U.S.-supplied detectors) in March 2000 of radioactive materials entering from Kazakhstan and bound for an area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department funds are being used to eliminate infrastructure at a former biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, and for retraining scientists. At the U.S.-Uzbek Joint Commission meeting in May 1999, the two sides signed a CTR agreement on securing, dismantling, and decontaminating the Soviet-era Nukus chemical research facility. Other aid will help keep Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research. U.S. scientists are also examining hazards at a Soviet-era CBW testing site on an island in the Aral Sea belonging to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Western media in mid-1999 reported the discovery of live anthrax spores at the site. Uzbekistan has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans

signatories from developing, producing, stockpiling, and using chemical weapons and pledges them to destroy such weapons and production sites.

Support for Economic Reforms

Support for private sector development has been a major component of U.S. aid efforts in the NIS. Technical assistance and training programs supporting the creation of market economies have included those dealing with entrepreneurship, agribusiness, small business development, telecommunications, banking, defense conversion, tax policy, bankruptcy, and labor management. A Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund (CAAEF) was set up in 1994, with Congressional authorization to lend up to $150 million. The Fund's regional offices have obligated $111 million in loans to over 400 small- and medium-size private enterprises as of September 30, 1999. CAAEF reports a difficult small-business climate and has written off losses of about $30.5 million. A memorandum on U.S. advice for Kazakh defense industrial conversion was signed during Nazarbayev's 1994 U.S. visit. Joint committees for defense conversion set up with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan plan U.S. aid in converting state enterprises to privately held, non-defense firms. Peace Corps volunteers, teaching small business development and English language, serve in all of the Central Asian states except Tajikistan.

The Central Asian states, the poorest part of the former Soviet Union, witnessed steep declines in gross domestic product (GDP) after they gained independence. Average per capita income in the region was less than $800 in 1999 (*World Bank*), with Tajikistan described by the Asian Development Bank as one of the poorest countries in the world. The declines in GDP appeared to reverse in the late 1990s in all the states but their economies remain fragile. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are dependent on energy exports; if export revenues decline, the regimes may collapse, according to some observers. Economic growth is increasingly threatened by corruption, the deteriorating health of the populations, and crime, including that linked to drug trafficking and production. Except for Kazakhstan, the Central Asian states are unlikely soon to gain substantial revenues from oil, gas, or other development, suggesting that they may be vulnerable to popular discontent and instability for several years. Lagging economic reform in Uzbekistan led the IMF to suspend lending to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and the EBRD is contemplating more conditions on or ending most of its economic reform lending to Turkmenistan.

The U.N. World Food Program reported in February 2001 that it was hard-pressed to meet urgent food needs by up to three million or more people in drought-stricken Tajikistan. Uzbekistan again appealed to the U.N. in January for urgent food aid for up to one million people because of drought in its Karakalpakstan and Khorezm regions (a U.N. mission in December 2000 assessed urgent food needs for 45,000 people). Responding to Uzbekistan's food needs, the U.S. Department of Agriculture in early 2001 announced a $20 million Food for Progress concessional sale of soybeans, rice, and other grains.

Regional economic cooperation has proven elusive. A customs union was formed between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1994 (which Kyrgyzstan joined soon after and Tajikistan joined in 1999). Renamed the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) in 1998, it consists of an Interstate Council of heads of state and government, a Council of Foreign Ministers, Centrazbat, and a Central Asian Bank. The bank is undercapitalized, but

Centrazbat has met with some success. Despite this CAEC, economic disputes have included Kazakh and Uzbek restrictions on imports from Kyrgyzstan, the imposition of a January 2001 visa regime by Uzbekistan on Tajikistan, Kazakhstan's opening of border posts at the Kyrgyz border, and the repeated Uzbek cut off of natural gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan because of payment arrears. Uzbekistan's tightening of border controls with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, including minefields and the alleged establishment of "no-man's lands" by razing villages, stymies trade and travel and increases tensions among the states. At a session of the CAEC in January 2001, Karimov argued that the CAEC appeared to be failing as a trade group, and proposed that it be transformed into a discussion forum on regional problems.

Trade and Investment

The former Clinton Administration and others stressed that U.S. support for free market reforms directly served U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services, and sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other NIS except Azerbaijan, although the region is relatively isolated and the states lag behind Russia in accommodating commercial ties. U.S. energy companies have committed to invest billions of dollars in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states. Duty-free access to U.S. markets under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is in effect for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan has received normal trade relations status and Jackson-Vanik trade provisions calling for presidential reports and waivers no longer apply.

The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds for short-term insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment and bulk agricultural commodities to all the states except Tajikistan. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central Asian states on insuring U.S. private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for financing or insurance in all the states except Tajikistan. The U.S. Commerce Department has set up a Business Development Committee with Kazakhstan to facilitate official discussions on trade and economic issues. The Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) opened offices in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1993, and co-located American Business Centers were opened in 1994.

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have large oil and natural gas reserves, and the other states of the region possess potential sources of export earnings, but major investments are needed to revamp, develop, or market these resources in most cases. Uzbekistan's cotton and gold production rank among the highest in the world and much is exported. It also has moderate oil and gas reserves. Kyrgyzstan owns major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, and is a major wool producer. Tajikistan has one of the world's largest aluminum processing plants (exporting over $300 million worth in 1999) and is a major cotton grower.

Energy Resources. U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S. private investment, breaking Russia's monopoly over oil and gas transport routes by encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia, promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that transit "energy competitor" Iran or otherwise give it

undue influence over the region. To carry out these goals, the Clinton Administration endorsed building trans-Caucasus oil and gas pipelines to Turkey, with trans-Caspian links to Central Asia, as part of a "Eurasian Transport Corridor" plan given impetus in 1997. In 1998, a Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy was appointed to coordinate TDA, OPIC, Eximbank and other agency programs to ensure the "development of the Caspian and open commercial access to its energy" (this post was apparently retained in the new Bush Administration). In 1999, TDA, OPIC, and Eximbank opened a Caspian Finance Center in Turkey.

The policy of the Bush Administration regarding Caspian energy development was explicated by Ambassador Elizabeth Jones, Senior Advisor on Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, in a State Department televised interview with residents of the region on April 12, 2001. She stated that the United States would continue to support the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and other approaches of the previous Administration. She also stated that the United States would not intervene with force to halt incursions by Islamic terrorists into the region but would help regional states to defend themselves through NATO's Partnership for Peace and by providing counter-terrorism aid.

The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing pipelines to export markets. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reports estimates of 10-17.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 53-83 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Kazakhstan, and 98-155 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves in Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil field began to be exploited by Chevron and Kazakhstan in a joint venture during 1993 (U.S. Mobil Oil and Russia's LUKoil later joined). In April 2001, the joint venture announced that Tengiz reserves were much higher than previously thought. Kazakhstan announced in May 2000 that a consortium (including U.S. firms Exxon-Mobil and Phillips Petroleum) had found "big deposits of oil" in the Kashagan field in the north Caspian Sea (another successful test well in early 2001 strengthened prospects of a major oil find).

The Clinton Administration viewed the oil find as "a tremendously important boost" to plans for a pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan to Ceyhan, Turkey, though some experts questioned whether it would be economical to barge this oil to Baku or build a connecting pipeline. Russia's restrictions on Tengiz oil exports to Europe were eased slightly in 1996 after the consortium admitted LUKoil, and after Gazprom was admitted to another consortium (in October 2000, however, Russia easily agreed to Kazakhstan's requested oil transit quotas for 2001, in order to persuade it that the planned Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is not needed). The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC; formed in 1992 but restructured in 1996) protocol grants Russian interests the largest share, 44%, with the remainder held by U.S., other Western, and Omani partners. Initial construction was completed in November 2000 on a 930-mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, to initially carry up to one million barrels per day when fully operational in late 2001. This is the region's first new large-capacity pipeline.

Russia's influence over pipeline routes and regional energy development may have increased with LUKoil's March 2000 announcement that a test well in the north Caspian Sea had found an oil deposit that may yield over two billion barrels. Russian President Putin in April 2000 asserted that the West was unduly active in the region and later named former Fuel Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny to this post. At about the same time, a Foreign Ministry envoy,

Andrey Urnov, became active. During a May 2000 U.S. visit, Urnov stated that Russia would not assert a "Monroe doctrine" for the region, though he faulted "outside forces" he alleged were trying to push Russia out. He asserted that Russia must be involved in all matters affecting the CIS and dismissed the need for non-Russian pipelines.

In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world's fourth largest natural gas producer. It is now largely dependent on Russian export routes. In 1993, Russia had halted Turkmen gas exports to Western markets through its pipelines, diverting Turkmen gas to other NIS who had trouble paying for the gas. In 1997, Russia cut off these shipments because of transit fee arrears and other problems. Turkmenistan called for Russia to lower transit fees and to permit gas shipments to Europe, but Russian officials and the Gazprom natural gas firm refused. In late 1998, Turkmenistan and Ukraine acceded to Gazprom's pricing demands for piping gas to Ukraine. This arrangement ended due to payment arrears, but in late 1999, Turkmenistan again conceded to export 20 billion cubic meters of its gas at concessionary rates to Russia in 2000 under an accord with Gazprom (since raised to 30 bcm). Seeking alternatives to Russian pipeline routes, Turkmenistan in December 1997 opened the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline linkage to Iran's pipeline system to export gas to northern Iran. As per a 1996 Turkey-Iran gas purchase agreement, Iran is building a section of an Iran-Turkey gas pipeline (with a possible future link to Turkmenistan).

In November 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan signed the "Istanbul Protocol" (Uzbekistan observed and voiced support) on construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline (proposed to be completed in 2004 with a capacity of one million barrels per day), to boost chances for international financing. Also, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey signed a framework accord on a trans-Caspian gas pipeline (TCGP) to Turkey (proposed for completion in 2002 with an eventual capacity of sixteen billion cubic meters per year). Attending the signings, then-President Clinton hailed the accords as "advanc[ing] the prosperity and security of [these states] critical to the future of the entire world." The TCGP project has floundered over Turkmenistan's demands, disputes with Azerbaijan, and Niyazov's desires for quick revenues. Despite past problems with Russia's Gazprom, Turkmenistan agreed to ship 30 billion cubic meters of gas to Russia in 2000 at concessionary prices, allegedly following Russian threats to cut off shipments otherwise. It also agreed in late 2000 to restart concessionary sales to Ukraine through Gazprom's Itera subsidiary. In January 2001, Niyazov halted planned shipments of 30 billion cubic meters of gas to Russia in 2001, because Russia would not agree to his request for higher prices, but soon backed down, though in February 2001 he negotiated a somewhat better barter and cash arrangement for an added shipment of 10bcm.

Aid Overview

For FY1998, the Clinton Administration called for added civil society assistance for the NIS, particularly for Russia and Central Asia. However, Congressional earmarks fenced off much of the NIS aid, so Central Asia benefitted little. Increased appropriations in FY1999 permitted a 26% increase for Central Asia to $136.9 million, but in FY2000, earmarks and priorities led to an allocation of $112 million. Estimated spending in FY2001 was $115.95 million. For FY2002, the Administration requested slightly less for Central Asia, $110 million, as part of its $808 million NIS request.

Among the NIS, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia ranked highest in cumulative U.S. government aid obligated as of September 30, 2000, with most Central Asian states receiving much less (including food, medical, and technical aid, and aid for nuclear weapons disarmament and safeguards for Kazakhstan). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were exceptions, with Kazakhstan ranked fifth ($684.22 million, slightly less than aid to Georgia) and Kyrgyzstan sixth ($484.23 million). In per capita terms, Kyrgyzstan has ranked in the top five aid recipients among the NIS. Humanitarian and health care aid for Tajikistan has been a special concern since FY1994, but Tajiks have said that the U.S. government has failed to provide aid promised for rebuilding after the Tajik civil war. The World Bank held a third consultative group meeting of international donors in Tokyo, Japan, on May 15, 2001, to focus on rebuilding assistance for post-war Tajikistan for 2001-2002. Six countries, including Japan and Switzerland, and international lenders pledged $430 million in aid. The United States, an observer of the Tajik peace process, pledged no added aid.

The value of Defense Department excess commodities and privately donated aid transported at U.S. expense are not included in the cumulative obligations in the table but were $166.54 million for Kazakhstan, $121.47 million for Kyrgyzstan, $38.25 million for Tajikistan, $39.94 million for Turkmenistan, and $114.46 million for Uzbekistan. Consolidated Appropriations for FY2000 (P.L. 106-113) include "Silk Road Strategy Act" authorizing language calling for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations that aid Central Asia. Policy issues regarding U.S. aid include whether the states are properly using it, what it should be used for, and who should receive it. (For details, see CRS Issue Brief IB95077, *The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance*.)

Table 1. Cumulative Obligations as of September 30, 2000, the FY2001 Estimate, and the FY2002 Request

(in millions of dollars)

Central Asian Country	1992-2000 Cumulative Obligations*	FY2001 Estimate**	FY2002 Request**
Kazakhstan	684.22	44.596	44.0
Kyrgyzstan	484.23	30.355	28.0
Tajikistan	287.3	11.23	11.0
Turkmenistan	181.65	6.2	5.5
Uzbekistan	218.32	23.565	22.0
Total	1,885.72	115.946	110.5

Sources: USAID and State Department.

*Includes Freedom Support Act (FSA) and non-FSA aid such as Cooperative Threat Reduction aid. Excludes the value of private donations transported at U.S. expense and Defense Department excess commodities. Some regional assistance was also spent in Central Asia.

**FSA and other Function 150 resources.