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## **Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations**

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## Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations

### SUMMARY

With the failure of the Rambouillet peace talks and violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating, on March 24, 1999 NATO began *Operation Allied Force* airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. In all, NATO aircraft flew over 37,000 sorties in the 78-day air campaign. At the end of the campaign about 1,100 aircraft were participating, with the United States contributing about 725. Of the total aircraft, about 535 were strike aircraft, (U.S. 323/Allied 213). Thirteen of NATO's 19 nations contributed aircraft to the operation, with 8 nations' aircraft flying combat missions. The only NATO fatalities in *Operation Allied Force* were two U.S. Apache helicopter pilots killed in a training accident in Albania.

With the air campaign escalating, on June 4, 1999, Yugoslavia accepted a peace proposal devised at a G-8 summit, and on June 8, signed a military-technical agreement with NATO officials providing for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and turning military control of the province over to NATO's peacekeeping forces (KFOR). On June 10, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 endorsed the peace settlement and "an international security presence with substantial NATO participation."

Dubbed *Operation Joint Guardian*, KFOR totals about 37,000 in Kosovo, with about 5,000 support troops in neighboring countries. The United States has about 5,400

troops in Kosovo and 1,000 troops in near-by countries providing support to operations in both Kosovo and Bosnia. This represents about 15% of the total KFOR force. The U.S. has suffered no casualties from hostile action.

Albanian insurgencies in southern Serbia and Macedonia led NATO to permit the re-introduction of the Yugoslav army into the Ground Safety Zone around Kosovo, and increase efforts to seal the Kosovo border. Subsequently the Presavo Valley insurgents signed an amnesty agreement with the Serb government, and have begun to turn over their arms. In Macedonia, the Albanian nationalists and the government have reached an agreement that would grant many of the insurgents' demands for equal political status, pending parliamentary approval. NATO troops have assisted in the voluntary collection the nationalists' arms, and will continue to maintain a small presence (700) to monitor the peace agreement.

Congressional concerns have focused on the impact of Balkan operations on overall military readiness, and whether there has been an equitable distribution of responsibilities among the NATO allies or if the United States needs to participate in KFOR at all. On January 31, 2000 DOD issued a Kosovo/*Operation Allied Force* after-action report to Congress addressing a wide range of issues. Congress has appropriated a total of \$6.7 billion for Kosovo operations through FY2001.

## MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

*DOD submitted an FY2002 budget request of \$2.83 billion for operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The FY2002 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 107-107) authorized the full request, however the FY2002 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 3338) reduced this amount to \$2.13 billion.*

*DOD has scheduled the major unit rotations for KFOR through May 2005, should the deployment last that long. (See, **NATO Allies' Military Participation in Balkan Operations**)*

## BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

### Background

Once an autonomous province of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has a 90% ethnic Albanian population. It nevertheless holds an emotional place in Serbian nationalist tradition. As part of his nationalist program, Yugoslav President Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomous status, putting it under control of the Serbian-dominated Belgrade government. An armed ethnic Albanian resistance movement developed, led by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. The Belgrade government responded in early 1998 with counter-insurgency operations, with Yugoslav military ground units and aircraft destroying villages and executing civilians suspected of supporting the insurgents.

In 1998, NATO political leaders turned their attention to the Kosovo region because of the flow of refugees into Western Europe and Albania (itself destabilized by regional uprisings in 1997), and concerns about the conflict spilling over into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). FYROM, an independent nation bordering Kosovo to the southeast, also has a large Albanian population alienated from its central government.

In May 1998, the North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body, directed accelerated assessment of "a full range of options with the mission of halting or disrupting a systematic campaign of violent repression in Kosovo." Options considered included; 1) preventative deployments in Albania and FYROM to stabilize the borders; 2) declaration of no-fly/no tank zones in Kosovo and enforcement of them with NATO air forces; 3) direct military intervention either through airstrikes or ground troops deployments; and 4) peacekeeping deployments in the event of a political resolution. On June 15, 1998, NATO launched a 6-hour overflight of Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Code-named Determined Falcon, the exercise involved 80 aircraft from 13 NATO air forces (Canada, Luxembourg, and Iceland not participating), and was conducted from 15 airbases in 5 countries. Twenty-seven U.S. land and carrier-based aircraft took part.

On September 24, 1998, NATO defense ministers authorized an "activation warning" for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Kosovo. On October 12, NATO defense ministers authorized an "activation order," placing the necessary forces under the NATO

command. The following day, it was announced that U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke had negotiated an agreement with Serbian leader Milosevic that postponed the threat of airstrikes if the Serbian government 1) would reduce its troops and security forces in Kosovo to “pre-crisis” levels; 2) permit unarmed NATO reconnaissance flights over Kosovo; 3) accede to an international force of 2,000 unarmed civilian monitors to oversee the ceasefire; and 4) begin meaningful negotiations towards Kosovar autonomy.

Meaningful negotiations never took place, owing to recalcitrance on both sides, and sporadic violence continued, with increasing reports of Serbian executions of Albanian civilians. Concerned over escalating violence, and its possible spread to other areas of the Balkans, on January 30, 1999, the NATO allies authorized Secretary-General Solana to order airstrikes anywhere in Yugoslavia, if the warring Serb and Albanian factions had not reached a peace settlement by February 20.

The “Contact Group,” an informal forum of representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia dealing with Balkan crises, devised a framework for a peace settlement. They did not wish to encourage continued fighting for Kosovar independence, but rather sought a settlement that would restore Kosovo’s autonomy within Yugoslavia. However, the Serb government did not agree to the framework, the so-called Rambouillet Agreement, and the talks adjourned.

During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved out of garrison in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and about 20,000 additional Serb troops massed at the northern Kosovo border. With violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating, on March 24, NATO began airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. These airstrikes were the first military offensive action undertaken by NATO without specific U.N. endorsement. U.N. Security Council approval was not sought because both Russia and China, each with veto power on the Council, continue to oppose the use of force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The September 23, 1998 U.N. Security Council resolution, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, did, however, reference the U.N. Charter’s Article VII, which permits military force to maintain international security.

NATO defined five conditions for ending its air campaign:

- Cessation of Serb operations against the Albanians in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo;
- Acceptance of Kosovar democratic self-government;
- Acceptance of a NATO-led peacekeeping force; and
- Return of Kosovar refugees.

On May 6 1999, at the G-8 economic summit, another set of principles for a peace settlement were agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, and Russia. Russian acceptance was regarded as a major step forward in increasing the pressure on Milosevic to accede to NATO demands. These G-8 principles were:

- Immediate end to the violence.
- Withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and other security forces.
- Deployment of UN- endorsed international civil and security presences.

- Interim international administration with U.N. Security Council approval.
- Return of all refugees, and access for aid organizations.
- Substantial self-government for Kosovo.
- Economic development of the region.

On June 4, 1999, the Yugoslav government accepted the provisions of the G-8 peace plan, and on June 9 NATO and Yugoslav military officials signed a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) which provided for the phased withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo by June 20, 1999, and details the authority of the KFOR commander to enforce the peace agreement with all means necessary. On June 10, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (No. 2580), endorsing the peace-keeping mission under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which authorizes the use of force. Also on June 10, NATO suspended the air campaign upon evidence of Yugoslav forces beginning to withdraw from Kosovo.

## Military Operations

### The Air Campaign

On March 24, 1999, NATO began air operations, code-named *Operation Allied Force*, against targets primarily in Serbia and Kosovo. DOD defined the mission as attacking the Yugoslav military infrastructure with the objective of deterring future attacks on Albanian Kosovars and degrading the ability of Yugoslav forces to carry out these operations. Target selection focused on airfields, air defense and communication centers, military barracks, and some equipment production facilities. Attacks then extended to logistical support facilities and lines of resupply, Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo, and the national electrical and television systems. In total, NATO aircraft flew over 35,000 sorties (1 aircraft flight), about one-third of which were strike sorties, launching about 23,000 munitions. Initially, cloudy weather over Kosovo severely hampered attack aircraft equipped with laser-guided munitions, and also reduced the ability to locate and target Yugoslav ground units. In addition to the weather conditions, a strong concern over minimal risk to NATO pilots dictated that low-level flights to attack ground units not be undertaken until Serb air defenses had been sufficiently degraded. The desire to avoid any collateral civilian casualties (Serb or Albanian) also constrained targeting.

NATO HQ acknowledged that the air campaign did not impede the Serb operations to drive the Albanian population from Kosovo. The inability to stop Serb operations brought strong criticism of the decision to launch the air campaign while completely ruling out any use of ground forces. Aside from official NATO and Administration spokesmen, few, if any, observers believed that air power alone could achieve the desired objectives. Press reports indicated that NATO political leaders were cautioned of an air campaign's potential shortfalls, but believed that domestic public opinion would not support a ground invasion of Kosovo. It was then perceived as a choice between "do nothing" or proceed with air strikes. Some also suggested that in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, some advocates have overemphasized the capabilities of air power, encouraging the belief that ground forces are no longer as crucial to achieving military objectives.

There was also criticism that “command by committee” hampered NATO military leaders’ ability to wage an effective, rapidly responsive campaign. Target lists, weapons used, and forces deployed were all subject to prior approval by all NATO governments. This slowed decisionmaking, constrained operations, and sometimes emphasized political over military considerations. However, NATO officials maintain that SACEUR received all resources requested, and emphasized that this consensual process was critical to ensuring the cohesion of the alliance. A more fundamental criticism is that the air campaign’s actual objective from the start was political, not military — i.e., to bring President Milosevic back to the bargaining table. This, in turn, contributed to a constrained, incremental approach to targeting.

After the air operation, Secretary Cohen, SACEUR Gen. Clark, and the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee Gen. Klaus Naumann all recommended that NATO’s decision-making processes for conducting a military campaign be examined and, in some way, streamlined. None, however, offered specific suggestions, noting that any changes made would have to gain and sustain acceptance by all NATO members. NATO’s current structure and procedures were created to deal with homeland defense against invasion. Out-of-area operations like *Allied Force* present different political constraints and military requirements. Some have suggested greater delegation of authority to SACEUR, once the alliance has made the decision to carry out a military operation. However, within an alliance of democracies which maintains full consensus as a fundamental principle, this approach may not achieve acceptance. In addressing this issue, Gen. Clark emphasized that, structural reforms aside, “there has to be a strong political consensus founded on a common perception of military doctrine to overcome the obstacles we hit in the air campaign”. (Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, July 20, 1999)

In responding to the critics of the air campaign, Gen. Naumann has noted that NATO planned for a limited operation from the outset, and made this fact public, while President Milosevic “planned for a war”. Naumann also observed that NATO threatened military action, without having a consensus on how it would be carried out, thereby precluding its military commanders’ use of “overwhelming force from the beginning”. (*Defense News*, July 20, 1999)

In the wake of the Yugoslav acceptance of NATO peace conditions, supporters of reliance upon NATO airpower believe they have been vindicated in their approach. They emphasize that NATO sustained no combat fatalities in the course of the 78-day campaign, and that the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was achieved. The air campaign’ critics, however, point to the fact that it did not prevent the expulsion of almost the entire Albanian population of Kosovo.

The Department of Defense Joint Staff provided the following initial statistical summary of the 78-day air campaign:

Total sorties: 37,200

- U.S.: 23,208 (62%)
- Allies: 13,992 (38%)

Strike sorties: 9,500

- U.S.: 5,035 (53%)
- Allies: 4,465 (47%)

Intelligence/reconnaissance sorties: 1,200

- U.S.: 948 (79%)
- Allies: 252 (21%)

Support sorties: 26,500

- U.S.: 17,225 (65%)
- Allies: 9,275 (35%)

On October 14, 2000, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton provided the Senate Armed Services Committee with DOD's preliminary "lessons learned" observations [<http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/lessons/acw.html>]. The final version *Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report* was issued January 31, 2000 shortly before the FY2001 budget submission. Among the issues addressed, were the following:

- Parallel U.S. and NATO command and control structures complicated operational planning and maintenance of unity of command. Disparities between U.S. capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities impeded U.S. ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with NATO allies.
- DoD needs to develop options for earlier and more efficient use of its reserve forces.
- DoD systems for planning and executing transportation of its forces were strained by the rapidly evolving requirements.
- The heavy commitment of NATO's air defense suppression forces indicates the need to find innovative and affordable ways to exploit our technological skills in electronic combat.
- Success using the latest generation of air-delivered munitions systems in Kosovo validates plans to increase inventories.
- Task Force Hawk (U.S. ground troops in Albania) pointed out the need to regularly experiment with the independent use of key elements of all of our forces without their usual supporting elements.
- Improved unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mission planning, improved processes for interaction between UAV operators and manned aircraft, frequent and realistic training opportunities, and equipment upgrades for individual UAVs all would benefit force effectiveness.
- Humanitarian operations highlighted the importance of such resources as linguists and civil affairs personnel, engineering assets capable of emergency repair of roads and bridges in very austere environments, detailed maps, and prepositioned stocks

On May 8, 2000, *Newsweek* reported obtaining a copy of an unreleased Kosovo bomb damage assessment whose existence had been rumored for some time. The report is the result of an effort ordered by SACEUR Gen. Wes Clark to obtain an accurate account of the damage inflicted on the Serb military in Kosovo. Conducted by the Munitions Effectiveness Assessment Team (MEAT), which was composed primarily of U.S. Air Force personnel, the damage survey was conducted by helicopter and "walking the terrain." While previously released statistics claimed 120 tanks, 220 armored personnel carriers, and up to 450 artillery

pieces destroyed, the MEAT team could confirm only 14 tanks, 12 armored personnel carriers, and 20 artillery pieces killed. Of over 700 successful airstrikes publically claimed, the Air Force inspectors on the ground found evidence to support only 58. No evidence of the surreptitious removal of damaged or destroyed equipment was found. The team did find evidence of very successful Serb use of decoys.. [“ The Kosovo Cover-Up”, *Newsweek*, May 15, 2000, p. 23]

*Newsweek* sources indicated that pressure to define a successful air campaign in terms of numbers led NATO and DOD leaders to order a “re-analysis” using looser evidence criteria, hereby allowing a more positive report for public release. The MEAT report supports the view of Lt. Gen. Michael Short, *Operation Allied Force* Air Commander, that the most effective use of air power against the Milosevic regime was targeting the political and utility infrastructure in Serbia itself. It also appears to confirm that high altitude bombing remains ineffective against mobile ground forces, unless they are massed in the open, and that decoys and “spoofing” remain very effective countermeasures.

The MEAT report notwithstanding, it can be argued that the controversy over “bean-counting” distracts from the fact that the NATO air campaign did force a Serb withdrawal from Kosovo, for whatever reason. With that being the over-arching objective of *Operation Allied Force*, the effort remains a success regardless of the number of “tank kills”.

The Department of Defense responded to the *Newsweek* article in a May 9<sup>th</sup>, 2000 press conference with Air Force Brig. Gen. John Corley who headed the NATO assessment efforts. He defended the accuracy of NATO and DOD’s previously released statistics, and suggested that the report *Newsweek* obtained may have been an “interim” report based solely on ground observation of wreckage. DOD acknowledged in a post-news conference release that only 14 destroyed tanks were found, along with 12 self-propelled artillery pieces. However, Brig. Gen. Corley said that other information sources (e.g. cockpit video, reconnaissance film) provided adequate evidence of additional destroyed vehicles removed by the Serbs. Brig. Gen. Corley and DOD spokesman Ken Bacon both emphasized that no report was ever suppressed.

## **Ground Force Operations — KFOR (*Operation Joint Guardian*)**

Because air operations did not stop Serb operations against Kosovar Albanians, public discussion of NATO ground force intervention was widespread. U.S. and NATO spokesmen continued to maintain there was no intention to introduce ground troops without “a permissive environment.” In the latter weeks of the air campaign, the British government began to push for ground intervention, but was unable to win the support of other alliance members. Though President Clinton and others publically made the point that no option was permanently “off the table”, and NATO HQ re-examined the military requirements for an invasion of Kosovo and even Serbia, at no time did there appear alliance-wide support of offensive ground operations. Indeed, several member governments, particularly Greece, Italy, and Germany were publically adamant in their opposition.

With the Yugoslav acceptance of the peace plan devised by the G-8 and proposed to the Yugoslav government by Finnish President Ahtisaari, the focus turned to *Operation Joint Guardian*, the peace-keeping mission to be undertaken by KFOR. To facilitate this operation, NATO obtained the Yugoslav acceptance of a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA)

prepared by NATO on June 9, 1999. The following day, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/1244) endorsing the peace plan and an “international security presence” in Kosovo for its enforcement. On the same day, June 10, NATO Secretary-General Solana reported that Serb forces were beginning to withdraw from Kosovo and ordered suspension of the air campaign. On June 17, with the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops and police complete, NATO officially terminated the air campaign.

KFOR did not begin deploying into Kosovo until June 12, 1999, reportedly waiting to synchronize its deployment with the withdrawal of Serb forces in order to avoid co-mingling forces. This delay, however, allowed time for a 200-strong contingent of Russian troops to leave their SFOR station in Bosnia and occupy the airport in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital. Reportedly planned by the Russian General Staff, and endorsed by president Yeltsin, to ensure Russia a high-profile role in KFOR. This action occasioned high-level U.S.-Russian negotiations. An agreement reached on June 18, 1999 provides for shared control of Pristina airport operations, with Russian participation in airport ground operations and air operations under KFOR control. In addition, Russia will deploy troops in the U.S., German, and French sectors. Russian troops will be under a unified KFOR command, with a Russian general officer at KFOR HQ. Russia will not have an independent territorial sector as it initially demanded. NATO refused to grant Russia an independent territorial sector, believing that could be the first step toward a permanent partitioning of the province. To date, KFOR commanders have praised the Russian troops for their professionalism.

**Military-Technical Agreement (MTA).** After some initial recalcitrance, Yugoslav military officials signed the MTA on June 9, 1999. The MTA affirms the terms of the peace plan, and provides specific details of its implementation. Some of the main provisions are:

- KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance.
- KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment, and to carry out its mission, the KFOR commander has the right to compel the removal or relocation of forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities that pose a potential threat to KFOR, its mission, or a third party. Failure to comply will result in military action, including the use of necessary force.
- KFOR has the right to monitor and inspect all facilities or activities that may have a police or military capability, or are deemed otherwise relevant to compliance. The KFOR commander is the “final authority” for the interpretation of the MTA.
- Air and Ground Safety Zones will extend 25 and 5 kilometers respectively beyond the borders of Kosovo, and no Yugoslav forces, aside from local police, may enter these zones without KFOR permission. All Yugoslav military, paramilitary, and police forces will conduct a phased withdrawal from Kosovo, to be completed by June 20, 1999.
- Yugoslav forces will mark and remove all mines, booby traps, and obstacles as they withdraw. A subsequent, separate agreement will address the return of “agreed Yugoslav and Serb personnel.”

**KFOR Operations.** KFOR command now rotates every six months, and is currently held by Italian General Carlo Cabigioso. KFOR divided the province into five territorial sectors under the command of British, German, French, Italian, and U.S. contingents. Other

nations' contingents are assigned to one of these sectors. (For current national contingents, see below)

In early 1999, KFOR nations quietly withdrew troops, reducing KFOR standing deployment from close to 50,000 to about 37,000 troops in Kosovo and 5,000 support forces in neighboring countries. . Those nations with notable withdrawals were France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The other large contingents, Germany and the United States, remained relatively constant. With an upsurge in violence and resistance to KFOR troops, and concerns over Kosovar Albanians fostering unrest among Albanians living across the border in Serbia, the issue of the need for reinforcements arose during the summer. France and Italy re-deployed about 1,200 troops, but other nations did not. NATO did undertake *Dynamic Response 2000*, a short-term training exercise in Kosovo during the summer intended to demonstrate reinforcement capability. The exercise involved 1,500 troops from the United States, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Argentina. In anticipation of possible violence during Kosovo's October elections, an additional 2,000 troops were sent from Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece. These four battalions serve as a reserve force for KFOR HQ to be dispatched wherever needed.

A repeated complaint from KFOR commanders has been the slowness of the United Nations efforts to deploy an international police force and establish a functioning judiciary. The U.N. has been hampered by lack of funds and bureaucratic inertia on the part of donor countries. However, a functioning police force and court system are critical elements for increasing stability in Kosovo. On June 20 1999, NATO announced an agreement with the Kosovo Liberation Army for its phased disbanding. The presence of armed KLA guerillas has given KFOR some concerns, and KFOR has disarmed KLA groups that could have presented a threat to security. In the demilitarization agreement, the KLA agreed to:

- Renounce the use of force and comply with KFOR and U.N. Interim Civil Administration directives. Refrain from hostile or provocative acts, including reprisals or detentions.
- Acknowledge KFOR's use of necessary force to ensure compliance.
- Not carry weapons in specified areas.

On August 20, 1999, the KFOR HQ announced that the KLA had complied with the 60-day deadline to canton all heavy weapons and 60% of all small arms. The deadline for full demilitarization was extended for 10 days until September 29, 1999.

In an attempt to involve former KLA personnel in positive activities, NATO and U.N. officials agreed to the creation of the Kosovo Corps. NATO and the U.N. intend the 3,000-strong organization to be a uniformed civilian force to deal with emergency situations such as forest fires, search and rescue, and reconstruction. Some KLA leaders see the Kosovo Corps as the nucleus of a future Kosovo army, a view rejected by NATO and U.N. officials.

## **Albanian Insurgency – Presevo Valley and Macedonia**

The Albanian insurgents in the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia and in eastern Macedonia are presenting a significant threat to the stability of the region. These areas border the U.S. and German sectors in Kosovo, and have large ethnic Albanian populations that are alienated from their central governments.

**Presevo Valley.** The Military Technical Agreement between Yugoslavia and NATO established a 3-mile Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) along the Kosovo-Serbia border within which no Yugoslav armed forces, and only lightly armed Yugoslav police, were allowed. The GSZ is outside of Kosovo, and the Military Technical Agreement has no provision for KFOR to conduct operations in it, though KFOR was to monitor it from the Kosovo border to ensure no re-entry of Yugoslav forces. In 2000, Albanian nationalists from Kosovo took advantage of the security vacuum in the GSZ's Presevo Valley area to train and organize insurgents among the predominately Albanian population. In late 2000, the first indications of insurgency came with attacks by the self-proclaimed Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedya, and Bujanovac (UCPMB) against the Yugoslav police in the region. KFOR HQ and U.S. commanders particularly came under criticism for not interdicting the passage of men and arms across the Kosovo border in their sector. KFOR HQ emphasized that it had no mandate to conduct operations outside of Kosovo proper, and consequently could not intervene against the UCPMB in the Ground Safety Zone. British troops were transferred from their Central Sector to augment U.S. forces, and to conduct foot patrols in an attempt to strengthen border controls. In addition, NATO, citing the fall of Milosevic and the cooperative attitude of the new Kostunica government in Belgrade, negotiated an agreement for the "conditioned, phased" return of Yugoslav armed forces to the Ground Safety Zone to fill the security vacuum. Monitored by European Union representatives and some British military observers, limited numbers of Yugoslav Army personnel are re-entering the GSZ, though they may not bring tanks, armored cars, artillery, or helicopters. The insurgents have signed a short-term truce with the Belgrade government, though given the tensions present and the very loose organization of the insurgents, this agreement may prove tenuous.

**Macedonia.** In Macedonia Albanian insurgents are battling paramilitary police and army troops over several border villages. The Macedonian government has not requested NATO troops to intervene, except to seal the Kosovo border. While the Macedonian government claims the majority of the insurgents are former KLA members who have infiltrated Macedonia from Kosovo, and has strongly criticized German and U.S. KFOR troops for allowing this, the insurgents, while acknowledging KLA assistance, maintain that they are a largely indigenous group that has been preparing this Spring offensive for some time. The insurgents, who appear to still be well-armed and supplied despite KFOR interdiction efforts, have advanced to near the Macedonian capital Skopje. A tenuous ceasefire is in place while Albanian and Macedonian government leaders attempt to negotiate a peace settlement. On June 14, the Macedonian government formally requested NATO troops to assist in disarming Albanian insurgents, if a peace settlement is reached.

Negotiations between the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanian political representatives have overcome the stumbling blocks regarding the official status of the Albanian language and the structure of police forces, and a peace agreement has been reached that would, pending parliamentary approval, address many of the insurgents concerns. In response, the insurgents have voluntarily turned over a substantial amount of their weaponry to NATO troops in *Operation Task Force Harvest*. In total, 3,875 weapons, including four tanks and armored personnel carriers were turned in. NATO has agreed to maintain a contingent of 700 troops in Macedonia to oversee implementation of the peace agreement.

**NATO Reaction.** Despite the lack of immediate progress in the Macedonian-Albanian talks, NATO has responded favorably to the request for assistance. On June 20, NATO's North Atlantic Council reviewed a Concept of Operations for this mission, and directed

NATO military authorities to prepare an Operations Plan on an “urgent basis”. If the Operations Plan is approved, the next step would be a Force Generation Conference in which force requirements and availability would be determined. Preliminary estimates indicate that up to 3,000 troops could be involved. Unofficial comments at NATO HQ suggest that the United Kingdom would command the operation, and that Spain, Turkey, France, Italy, and Greece have indicated a willingness to contribute troops.

NATO officials have stressed that this operation would only take place in a “permissive atmosphere” after a peace settlement which provides for voluntary disarmament by the Albanian insurgents, and NATO would not engage in pursuit or forcible disarmament. NATO HQ does not view this operation as an extended peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation, but rather a short-term peace settlement facilitation lasting at most several weeks. NATO Secretary-General Robertson has emphasized that, contrary to some reports in Macedonia, NATO troops would not be used to police any demarcation lines that a peace settlement may impose.

Though NATO officials have striven to emphasize the peaceful nature of an assistance provided to Macedonia, the recently retired NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Wesley Clark, has stated that NATO should start preparations to intervene militarily if a peace settlement is not achieved. This view reflects the concern that if NATO appears reluctant to take direct action if necessary, it will encourage continued insurgency in the region. Currently, however, there appears to be little political support within NATO for direct military intervention, or even to officially indicate that possibility. This leaves open to question what NATO’s response would be if negotiations break off and armed conflict resumes.

**U.S. Reaction.** Though Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld have stated that no decision regarding U.S. force commitments has been made, press reports indicate that the Administration hopes to limit U.S. participation in any Macedonian operation to providing intelligence and logistical support to other NATO nations’ troops. Currently, there are about 700 U.S. troops deployed near Skopje providing support to KFOR operations in Kosovo.

**Congressional Reaction.** Representative Bereuter has introduced legislation, the Stabilization and Pacification of Southern Serbia Act (H.R. 982), which would prohibit assistance for Kosovo unless there is presidential certification that the Kosovars are not providing assistance to insurgents in Serbia or Macedonia. This legislation has been referred to the Committee on International Relations. During the March 20<sup>th</sup> confirmation hearing for Marc Grossman, nominee for Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, several Senate Foreign Relations Committee members indicated their concern that the Albanian insurgency receive active and adequate consideration by the Administration, and cited the earlier experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo where the international community was slow to respond in the early stages of the crises. On June 13, Senator Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for greater U.S. involvement in the Macedonian crisis, maintaining that “only the United States has the necessary military and political credibility.. to resolve crises in the Balkans.”

## NATO Allies' Military Participation in Balkan Operations

**Table 1** reflects data provided by DOD on the national contingents serving in KFOR. Non-NATO countries are marked with an asterisk.. Of the 42,000 troops stationed in and around Kosovo, the United States is providing about 6,400, or 15%. This includes about 1,000 troops stationed in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy carrying out support functions. The remaining 85% comprise units from 36 other countries.

DOD has scheduled the major unit rotations for KFOR through May 2005, should the deployment last that long. The units involved are: 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (06/01-11/01); 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (11/01-05/02); V Corps, Germany (05/02-11/02 and 11/02-05/03); 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (05/03-11/03); 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division (11/03-05/04); 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division (05/04-11/04), and 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne (11/04-05/05).

**Table 1. Allied Military Participation in KFOR Operations**

<b>Country</b> (*indicates non-NATO)	<b>KFOR Contingent</b>
Argentina*	1 Field Hospital (113)
Austria*	1 support battalion (480)
Azerbaijan*	1 support platoon (34)
Belgium	1 mechanized infantry battalion (700)
Bulgaria*	1 infantry company (50)
Canada	1 infantry company (50)
Czech Republic	1 reconnaissance company (200)
Denmark	1 armored battalion (700)
Estonia*	1 infantry company (50)
Finland*	1 motorized infantry battalion (795)
France	1 reinforced infantry brigade (4,700)
Georgia*	1 supply platoon (34)
Germany	1 armored division (3,900)
Greece	2 mechanized battalions (1,500)
Hungary	1 support battalion (322)

<b>Country</b> (*indicates non-NATO)	<b>KFOR Contingent</b>
Iceland	medical personnel (50)
Ireland*	1 transport company (104)
Italy	1 reinforced armored brigade (4,750)
Jordan*	1 infantry company (100)
Latvia*	1 support platoon (50)
Lithuania*	1 support platoon (50)
Luxembourg	1 support platoon (50)
Morocco	1 field hospital (400)
Netherlands	1 reinforced artillery battalion (550)
Norway	1 motorized battalion (900)
Poland	1 airborne battalion (750)
Portugal	1 infantry battalion (329)
Russia*	1 airborne brigade (3,200)
Slovakia*	1 engineer platoon (40)
Spain	1 mechanized battalion (1,100)
Sweden*	1 mechanized battalion (750)
Switzerland	1 logistics company (134)
Turkey	1 mechanized brigade (948)
Ukraine*	1 helicopter detachment 1 supply company (300)
United Arab Emirates*	1 mechanized brigade (1,100)
United Kingdom	1 reinforced armored brigade (3,300)
United States	1 reinforced mechanized infantry brigade (5,400)

## **Costs of Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian**

Within NATO, each nation participating in *Operation Allied Force* assumed the cost of its own operations. NATO does not provide estimates of the overall cost of the operation or of the cost of each member's contributions. (For individual national cost estimates for Kosovo operations, see CRS Report RL30398, *NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: a Preliminary Report*.) Individual nations also assume the full cost of the deployments in support of on-going KFOR operations.

**106<sup>th</sup> Congress Appropriations.** In April 1999, the Administration submitted a \$6.05 billion emergency supplemental appropriation request to cover military operations in Kosovo and continuing air operations in Southwest Asia during FY1999. On May 18, 1999, the House approved a House-Senate conference agreement on H.R. 1141, providing \$14.9 billion in FY1999 supplemental appropriations. On May 20 1999, the Senate concurred. It was signed into law (P.L. 106-31) on May 21. Of this, only \$10.8 billion was defense-related, and included funds for items other than Kosovo operations such as a military pay raise, military construction, training, and equipment/munitions procurement. The Administration's funding request assumed offensive military operations against Yugoslavia through September 1999. With the campaign ending in June, DOD calculated its actual FY1999 incremental costs to be \$3.0 billion, and the remainder of the appropriated supplemental were re-programmed.

The Administration's FY2000 budget request contained no funds for combat or peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. The House Armed Services Committee expressed its concern that under or unbudgeted contingency operations have diverted funds from "quality of life, readiness, and modernization" programs. Seeing no funds budgeted for Kosovo operations in FY2000, and seeking to ensure that incremental Kosovo-related costs would be dealt with only through specific budgeted accounts or supplemental appropriations, the Committee inserted a provision in DOD's authorizing legislation (H.R. 1401) prohibiting the use of any funds authorized by the legislation for military operations in Yugoslavia. On June 9, during consideration on the House floor, Representative Skelton introduced an amendment removing this provision. Upon receiving written notice from President Clinton stating that if military readiness were to be harmed by on-going operational requirements, he would submit a FY2000 budget amendment request, the House agreed (270-155) to remove the funding prohibition. A \$2 billion supplemental appropriation for Kosovo was subsequently included in the FY2001 Military Construction Act (H.R. 4425;P.L. 106-246). The FY2001 DOD appropriations legislation (H.R. 4576;P.L.106-259) provided \$1.7 billion for Kosovo. Together with the \$3 billion appropriated for FY1999, this totals \$6.7 billion. DOD submitted an FY2002 budget request of \$2.83 billion for operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The FY2002 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 107-107) authorized the full request, however the FY2002 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 3338) reduced this amount to \$2.13 billion.

(For more information, see CRS Report RL30505: Appropriations for FY2001: Defense and CRS Report RL30457: Supplemental Appropriations for FY2000: Plan Colombia, Kosovo, Foreign Debt Relief, Home Energy Assistance, and Other Initiatives.)

## LEGISLATION

### **H.R. 982 (Bereuter)**

To prohibit assistance for Kosovo unless the President determines and certifies to Congress that residents or citizens of Kosovo are not providing assistance to organizations engaging in or otherwise supporting ethnically-motivated violence in southern Serbia or in Macedonia, and for other purposes. Introduced March 13, 2001; referred to the Committee on International Relations.

## FOR ADDITIONAL READING

### **CRS Reports**

CRS Report RL31053, *Kosovo and U.S. Policy*, by Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel.

### **World Wide Web Sites**

The following WWW sites provide additional information:

KFOR Headquarters — [<http://kforonline.com>]

NATO Headquarters — [<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press.htm>]

U.S. European Command — [<http://www.eucom.mil>]

U.S. Air Force — [<http://www.af.mil/current/kosovo/>]