## **CRS Report for Congress**

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### Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, S. 2845, S. 2774, H.R. 5024, Administration Proposal, H.R. 10, Current Law

Updated September 28, 2004

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#### Summary

On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) released its bipartisan, unanimous final report containing recommendations for far-reaching and fundamental changes to the United States Intelligence Community (IC). Almost 20 months after its creation by P.L. 107-306, the commission, as mandated by its founding legislation, attempted to present a full and complete accounting of the facts and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to help prevent acts of terrorism.

Several Members of Congress also have proposed legislation to reform the IC. Senators Feinstein (S. 190), Bob Graham (S. 1520), Daschle (S. 6) and Roberts (S. draft bill of August 23, 2004) have introduced or proposed legislation that either directly, or as part of broader security proposals, contain a variety of IC reforms. Representative Harman (H.R. 4104) has introduced comprehensive intelligence reform legislation as did Representative Goss (H.R. 4584), before he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Director of Central Intelligence.

This report, the second of two reports, presents side-by-side comparisons of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and current law and legislation proposed by Senators Collins and Lieberman (S. 2845) and unanimously approved by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on September 22, 2004, as amended; House Speaker Dennis Hastert (H.R. 10); Senators McCain and Lieberman (S. 2774); Representative Pelosi (H.R. 5024); and President Bush.

CRS Report RL32600 presents side-by-side comparisons of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and current law; and legislation proposed by Senators Feinstein, Bob Graham, Daschle, and Roberts; President Bush; and relevant provisions of current law.

This report will be updated.

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# Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, S. 2845, S. 2774, H.R. 5024, Administration Proposal, H.R. 10, Current Law

Side-by-Side Comparison of Selected Intelligence Community Reform Proposals

9/11 Commission	Collins/Lieberman (S. 2845, approved, as amended, by the Senate Government Affs. Committee on 9/22/04.)	McCain/Lieberman (S. 2774)	Pelosi (H.R. 5024)	Bush Administration (submitted Sept. 16, 2004)	Hastert (H.R. 10)	Current Law
National Intelli	gence Director	(NID)				
Replace current position of Director of Central Intelligence with a Presidentially - appointed, Senate- confirmed NID. The NID located in the Executive Office of the President. A separate Director would head the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).	Establishes within the Executive Branch the National Intelligence Authority, which would be headed by a Presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed NID.	Establishes within the Executive Branch the National Intelligence Authority, which would be headed by a Presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed NID.	Establishes within the executive office of the President a presidentially appointed Senate confirmed NID.	Establishes within the executive branch a presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed NID.	Establishes within the executive branch a presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed NID.	Stipulates that there is a <b>Director of</b> <b>Central</b> <b>Intelligence</b> who also heads CIA.

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Cabinet Member				-		
NID should not be cabinet member.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
General NID Respon	nsibilities					
<ul> <li>— Oversee national intelligence centers, on specific subjects of interest, including the proposed National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).</li> <li>— Oversee the Intelligence Community (IC).</li> <li>— President's principal intelligence advisor.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Head IC.</li> <li>President's principal intelligence advisor.</li> <li>Prohibited from serving simultaneously as CIA Director.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Head IC.</li> <li>President's principal intelligence advisor.</li> <li>Prohibited from serving simultaneously as CIA Director.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Head the IC.</li> <li>President's principal intelligence advisor.</li> <li>Oversee national intelligence centers.</li> </ul>	— Head IC. — President's principal intelligence advisor.	<ul> <li>Head IC.</li> <li>President's principal intelligence advisor.</li> <li>Prohibited from serving simultaneously as CIA director.</li> <li>Execute and direct the National Intelligence Program.</li> <li>Individual serving as CIA Director preceding bill's enactment may be named NID.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Head IC.</li> <li>President's principal intelligence advisor.</li> <li>Head CIA.</li> </ul>
Internal Security Re	sponsibilities				·	·
NID should directly oversee intelligence collection inside the United States	Retains current statutory prohibition preventing CIA director from exercising internal security functions.	Retains current statutory prohibition preventing CIA director from exercising internal security functions.	No provision.	No provision	CIA Director shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.	CIA Director shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.

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Budget Respo	nsibilities					
Budget Submission						
NID should <b>submit</b> a unified budget for national intelligence.	NID would <b>determine</b> the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities.	NID would <b>develop</b> an annual IC budget.	No provision.	No provision.	NID would <b>develop</b> an annual IC budget.	DCI <b>facilitates the</b> <b>development</b> of an annual intelligence budget.
Budget Developmen	t					
No recommendation.	NID would provide budget guidance to intelligence elements that receive National Intelligence Program (NIP) funding, and those intelligence elements that do not; participate in the development by the SecDef of annual budgets for military intelligence programs not included in the NIP.	NID would direct, coordinate, prepare, modify and present annual budgets of the elements of the IC within the NIP; and provide guidance for development annual budgets for IC elements not within the NIP.	No provision.	Subject to direction of the President, the NID, after consultation with the Sec. Def., shall ensure the NFIP budgets for IC agencies and organizations within the DoD are adequate. The Sec Def is shall ensure that IC agencies within the DoD satisfy needs of DoD.	NID would provide budget guidance to heads of departments containing IC elements and to the heads of the IC elements. NID would participate in the development by the SecDef for the JMIP and TIARA budgets.	No provision.

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Specific Authority for	or Budget Execution					
No recommendation.	Manage and oversee NIP budget execution, reprogramming, and funds and personnel transfers.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	Ensure effective execution of the budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities.	No provision.
Budget Author	ities					
Budget Approval		1			1	1
NID should approve all IC budgets.	NID would approve budgets of all NIP funded elements and guide annual budget development for non-NIP funded intel. programs, including participating in the development by the SecDef of the annual budget for military intelligence programs. SecDef would "assist the NID in ensuring" DoD IC elements are funded.	NID would <i>determine</i> the annual intelligence budget, including the review, modification, and approval of budgets of IC elements within the NIP, and provide budget guidance for IC elements not within the NIP.	NID should submit annual unified budgets for national intelligence that reflect the priorities of the National Security Council and an appropriate balance among technical and human intelligence collections methods and analysis.	NID would develop and determine an annual consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program budget. The NID would participate in the development by the Sec Def for the President's approval of JMIP and TIARA budget requests.	NID would provide budget guidance to heads of departments containing IC elements and to the heads of the IC elements. NID would participate in the development by the SecDef for the JMIP and TIARA budgets.	DCI approves budgets of all IC elements before incorporation into NFIP. The SecDef, in consultation with the DCI, ensure that DOD IC elements are adequately funded.

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Budget Reprogramm	ning					
NID should have reprogramming authority.	Adheres to current statute — no NID funds may be reprogrammed without NID prior approval, except in accordance with NID-issued procedures. Agency heads must consult with the NID before reprogramming or transferring non- NIP funding between IC elements. NID must consult Agency heads regarding NIP reprogrammings, and report to Congress any non- concurrence on part of agency head.	Adheres to current statute — no NID funds may be reprogrammed without NID prior approval, except in accordance with NID- issued procedures.	The NID may reprogram NIP funds to meet any unforeseen priority.	NID would have authority to transfer or reprogram NFIP funds, as necessary, with OMB approval, and after consultation with affected agency heads and with the Director of Central Intelligence, to the extent CIA is affected. Would monitor and consult with the Sec Def on reprogramming or transfer within, into, or out of JMIP and TIARA.	Adheres to current statute — no NID funds may be reprogrammed without NID prior approval, except in accordance with NID-issued procedures. SecDef would consult with NID before transferring or reprogramming JMIP funds.	No NFIP funds may be reprogrammed without DNI prior approval, <b>except in</b> <b>accordance with</b> <b>DCI-issued</b> <b>procedures.</b>

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Funds and Personne	el Transfer	·		-	-	
No recommendation.	With OMB approval, NID may transfer or reprogram NIP funds; approve or disapprove the transfer or reprogramming of non- NIP fund to the NIP; transfer NIP-funded personnel from one IC element to another; and, in accordance with mutually agreed upon with the affected agency heads, transfer non- NIP funded personnel from one IC element to another IC element.	With OMB approval, NID may transfer funds and personnel within the NIP if the NID can show transfer is to a higher priority intelligence activity, based on unforeseen circumstances and does not involve funds from CIA's Reserve for Contingencies. NID would be able to transfer personnel on open ended basis between both NIP and non-NIP funded intelligence elements.	The NID shall establish education and training standards and facilitate assignments at national intelligence centers and across intelligence agencies.	NID would have authority to transfer or reprogram NFIP funds, as necessary, with OMB approval, and after consultation with affected agency heads and with the Director of Central Intelligence, to the extent CIA is affected. Would monitor and consult with the Sec Def on reprogramming or transfer within, into, or out of JMIP and TIARA.	With OMB approval, NID may transfer NIP funds within the NIP; in accordance with procedures developed with department heads, NID may transfer IC personnel for up to a year, and subject to appropriations act provisions. Fund/personnel transfer must be to a higher priority intelligence activity, based on unforeseen circumstances and does not involve funds from CIA's Reserve for Contingencies; be less than \$1 million; less than 5% of amounts available to agency; and not terminate program.	Requires <b>approval</b> from Director OMB, and could occur for <b>periods</b> <b>up to a year</b> .

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Agency Heads Object	ctions to Fund and Per	rsonnel Transfers				
DNI should be permitted to transfer funds and personnel within the IC over the objection of agency heads.	No provision.	No provision allowing agency head affected by such a NID-initiated fund or personnel transfer to object.	No provision.	No provision.	Transfer may be made without regard to \$1 million and 5% limitations provided NID has concurrence of agency head.	Would allow agency heads to stop DCI-initiated transfers, so long as they state objection in writing to the DCI.
Transfer Procedures	5					
No recommendation.	For personnel transfers taking place within NIP- funded procedures, the NID would develop procedures; for those in non- NIP funded programs, the NID and affected agency heads would develop procedures.	NID required to develop transfer procedures for NIP and non-NIP transfers with the affected agency heads.	No provision.	No provision.	NID required to develop with agency heads personnel transfer procedures governing IC personnel transfers.	Requires the DCI to develop transfer procedures with affected agency heads.

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FBI Funds & Persor	nel Transfers					
NID should be authorized to transfer funds/personnel from the FBI.	NID authorized to transfer funds/personnel to and from the FBI's Office of Intelligence.	NID authorized to transfer funds/personnel to and from the FBI's Office of Intelligence.	No provision.	No provision.	NID authorized to transfer funds/personnel to and from the FBI's Office of Intelligence.	DCI is <b>not</b> authorized to transfer funds/personnel from the FBI.
Direct Approp	riation					
National Intelligence	e Director Receives Di	rect Appropriation				
NID should receive direct appropriation. Currently the Sec Def receives the appropriation and disburses to CIA and national intelligence agencies.	NIP funds would be appropriated to the National Intelligence Authority and be under the NID's direct jurisdiction.	NIP funds would be appropriated to the NID and be under the NID's direct jurisdiction.	NIP appropriations shall be made to the NID. Would be responsible for NFIP appropriations "without regard to the accounts to which appropriated."	NIP funds appropriated directly to NID.	Office of Management and Budget apportion all NIP funding to the NID.	DCI does not receive direct appropriation.

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Budget Disclo	sure					
Overall national intelligence budget and budgets of component agencies should be publicly disclosed.	The President shall publicly disclose after FY2005 the aggregated amount of appropriations requested by the President for the NIP. The Congress shall publicly disclose after FY2005 both the authorized and appropriated NIP funding. Directs the NID to conduct a study to assess the advisability of continued public disclosure of the NIP budget.	The President shall publicly disclose after FY2005 the aggregate requested amount for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and the aggregate amount requested for each element or component of the IC. The Congress shall publicly disclose after FY2005 the aggregate amount for intelligence and intelligence-related activities both authorized and appropriated.	Declassify aggregate appropriated amount for intelligence.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
Hire and Fire A	Authority					
NID should have hire/fireauthority to <b>approve</b> and submit nominations to the President for	Recommendation NID recommends to the President an individual for	<i>Recommendation</i> NID recommends to the President an individual for	NID has hire/fire authority.	Any recommendation for an appointment of head of an IC agency made by the	Recommendation NID recommends to the President individuals for	No DCI hire/fire authority within the IC; However, provision calls for concurrence and

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CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), FBI Intelligence Office, National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and Homeland Security Information Analysis and Infrastructure	nomination to serve as Director of CIA. <i>Concurrence/DoD</i> NID seeks	nomination to fill Deputy NID and Deputy National Intelligence Director or Foreign Intelligence (also serves as Director of CIA) <i>Concurrence/DoD</i> NID seeks		President, shall be accompanied by an NID recommendation. Any appointment by an agency head within his agency, must have NID concurrence. <i>Concurrence/DoD</i> SecDef seeks NID	nomination to serve as Dep NID and CIA Director.	consultation on personnel selections. <i>Concurrence</i> DCI/SecDef
Protection (IAIP).	concurrence of SecDef in recommending nominees for NSA, NRO and NGA. May make recommendation without SecDef concurrence but must note non- concurrence.	concurrence of SecDef in recommending nominees for NSA, NRO and NGA. May make recommendations without SecDef concurrence but must note non- concurrence.		concurrence in appointing or recommending to the President heads of NSA, NRO and NGA. If NID objects, SecDef may not make appointment or proceed with recommendation.		concurrence on heads of NSA, NRO and NGA, but SecDef can override.
	Concurrence/Other Agencies Other agency heads must seek NID concurrence in recommending	Concurrence/Other Agencies Other agency heads must seek NID concurrence in recommending		<i>Consultation</i> Other agency heads must consult with NID in making appointments.		<i>Consultation</i> Dept. Heads consult with DCI on directors of DIA INR, and DOE intelligence units,

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	nominees for other intel. appointments but may make recommendation to the President without NID concurrence, but must note non- concurrence. <i>Termination</i> NID may recommend to the President the termination of any individual covered in this section of the draft bill, but must seek concurrence of department head and report non- concurrence to the President.	nominees for other intelligence appointments but may make recommendation to the President without NIC concurrence, but must note non- concurrence.				but agency head decides. <i>FBI Timely Notice</i> FBI director gives DCI timely notice of FBI intelligence appointments.

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Personnel Policy						
NID should set IC- wide personnel education and training standards and facilitate assignments across agency lines and at national intelligence centers.	NID urged to adopt personnel policies that duplicate within the IC the joint officer management policies established by the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; and that personnel assigned to the NID be promoted at rates equivalent or better than provided by their home agencies.	NID urged to adopt personnel policies that duplicate within the IC the joint officer management policies established by the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; and that personnel assigned to the NID be promoted at rates equivalent or better than provided by their home agencies.	NID shall establish education and training standards and facilitate assignments at national intelligence centers and across national intelligence agencies.	Provide, where appropriate, for rotation of personnel among IC agencies, and to make such rotations a requirement to be considered for promotion.	NID shall facilitate personnel rotation through the IC.	DCI required to consult agency heads in developing IC personnel standards and qualifications. Where appropriate, DCI should consider rotated service in IC elements a factor to consider in senior promotions.
Information Sharing	g Technology Policies				1	
NID should establish information technology standards to maximize info sharing and info security.	The President shall establish an information network and secure information sharing environment among all relevant Federal, State, tribal, and local authorities,	The President shall establish an information network and secure information sharing environment among all relevant Federal, State, tribal, and local authorities, and	NID should establish information technology standards to maximize info sharing and info security.	Establishes information-sharing standards.	NID authorized to ensure maximum availability of and access to IC intelligence information; establish uniform security standards and common	The National Security Council shall develop procedures for effective information sharing.

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	and relevant private sector entities. NID has authority to set information standards throughout the IC.	relevant private sector entities. NID has authority to set information standards throughout the IC.			information technology standards.	
Advisory Council o	n Information Sharing					
No proposal.	OMB shall implement and manage the information sharing network across government. Establishes an Executive Council that shall assist the OMB director in implementing and managing an information sharing network.	OMB shall submit to congress a system design and implementation plan for information sharing. Establishes an Advisory Council on Information Sharing comprised of federal, state, tribal and local governments to advise the President on implementation.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No specific provision.
IC Structure						
National Counterte	rrorism Center (NCTC	 ()				
Should establish NCTC, housed in the Executive	Would establish a counterterrorism center under the	Would establish a counterterrorism center under the	Establishes National Counterterrorism	Establishes a National Counterterrorism	Establishes a National Counterterrorism	No provision.

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Office of the President, and overseen by the NID. Build on existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).	direction a Presidentially nominated, Senate confirmed director. The center would be placed in the National Intelligence Authority, and its director would	direction a Presidentially nominated, Senate confirmed director. The center would be placed in the National Intelligence Authority, and its director would report to the President.	Center, located in the Executive Office of the President and built on the foundation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. Shall be a center for joint operational	Center, whose director shall be appointed by the president. Will conduct strategic operational planning for CT activities and be primary analytic organization.	Center within the Office of the NID; NID shall appoint director, who will report to the NID. Provide strategic guidance and plans for CT operations; prohibited from directing the	
Center for joint operational	report to the President through	to the President.	planning and joint intelligence	organization.	execution of CT operations.	
planning and joint intelligence,	the NSC on counterterrorism		against transnational		Directorate of Intelligence	
staffed by personnel from various agencies.	operational <i>planning</i> , and to the NID on center budgets and		terrorist organizations. Head will be Presidential		established within NCTC; responsible within U.S. government for	
Intelligence Aspects	programs and its Directorates of		nominated, Senate Confirmed.		analyzing terrorism.	
Pool all-source analysis; perform strategic analysis and net assessment.	Intelligence and Operations. NCTC prohibited from assigning operations responsibilities to	<i>TTIC</i> The Terrorist Threat Integration Center would transfer to the			<i>TTIC</i> The Terrorist Threat Integration Center would transfer to	
<i>Operations Aspects</i> Perform joint planning; assign operations to lead	specific Armed Forces elements. NSC would have no direct supervisory authority over	Center.			NCTC.	
agencies (State, CIA, FBI, Defense).	NCTC's joint operational					

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Track plan implementation.	activities. Disagreements over strategic plans between NCTC and agency heads resolved by President, not NSC. <i>TTIC</i> The Terrorist Threat Integration Center would transfer to the Center. <i>Appointment</i> <i>Powers</i> The center director would have concurrence authority in naming heads of CT agencies across government.	Appointment Powers The center director would have concurrence authority in naming heads of CT agencies across government.	Appointment Powers NCTC head shall concur in choices of certain key CT officials across government.			
National Intelligence	e Centers	r				
Should establish centers on Weapons	The NID may establish	The NID may establish intelligence	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.

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of Mass Destruction (WMD), int'l crime and narcotics, China/ East Asia, Middle East, Russia/Eurasia. Overseen by NID.	intelligence centers to address NSC- established intelligence priorities.	centers to address NSC-established intelligence priorities.				
Director of CIA			L			I
CIA director should focus on rebuilding Agency's analytic and human intelligence collection capabilities.	A Presidentially nominated, Senate confirmed Director heads the the Central Intelligence Agency. The director is prohibited from serving simultaneously as the NID.	A Presidentially nominated, Senate confirmed Director heads the the Central Intelligence Agency. The director is prohibited from serving simultaneously as the NID. The Director also serves as Deputy National Intelligence Director for Foreign Intelligence.	CIA director should focus on rebuilding Agency's analytic and human intelligence collection capabilities.	Establishes a Director of the CIA, appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate.	Establishes Presidentially nominated, Senate confirmed CIA director. NID would recommend to the President an individual for nomination.	DCI heads the IC and CIA.
Paramilitary Operat			Γ	Γ	Γ	
DOD should assume from the CIA responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary	No provision.	Sense of Congress that Sec Def should have lead responsibility for directing and executing	DOD should assume from the CIA responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary	No provision.	NID, in consultation with SecDef and CIA Director shall develop joint procedures to deconflict	No provision.

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operations, clandestine or covert.		paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert.	operations, clandestine or covert.		operations involving DoD and CIA.	
Information Sharing		1	1	1	1	
Establish incentives for sharing; restore better balance between security and shared knowledge.	The NID would appoint a Chief Information Officer who would develop an integrated communications network among all elements of the IC, and establish standards for information technology and communications.	The NID would appoint a Chief Information Officer would develop and implement an integrated information technology network and develop an enterprise architecture for the IC.	The President shall determine guidelines for acquiring, accessing, using, and sharing of information about individuals among Federal, State, and local government agencies, and with the private sector, in a way that protects the privacy and civil liberties of those individuals.	The NID shall establish an interoperable information-sharing enterprise.	Establishes a Community Information Technology Officer to ensure intelligence sharing.	No provision, per se, but the National Security Council shall develop procedures for effective information sharing.
Information Revolution	tion					
President should lead effort to bring national security institutions into information revolution.	The President shall establish a decentralized, distributed and coordinated environment that connects existing systems where	The President shall establish an information sharing network to promote the sharing of terrorism information, in a manner consistent	President should lead effort to bring national security institutions into information revolution.	No provision.	Establishes information-sharing standards.	No provision.

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	appropriate, and incorporate strong mechanisms for information security and privacy guideline enforcement.	with national security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties.				
<b>Congressional Over</b>	sight		I	I	I	I
Congress should consider joint intelligence committee, or single committee in each house, combining authorizing and appropriating.	No provision.	Congress shall not adjourn until, it establishes, effective in the 109 <sup>th</sup> Congress, a joint intelligence committee, or single committee in each house, combining authorizing and appropriating.	Congress shall establish either a Joint Committee on Intelligence or a single standing committee in each House that would authorize and appropriate funds for intelligence and counterterrorism and conduct oversight.	No provision.	Sense of House that Rules Committee should act upon recommendations of Select Committee on Homeland Security and other committees of existing jurisdiction regarding jurisdiction over proposed legislation.	No provision. S.Res. 400 — still in effect today — created the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. H.Res. 658 — still in effect today — created the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Homeland Security						
Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight for homeland security. Should be permanent standing	No specific provision on principal congressional point. Would merge the Homeland Security Council into the	Congress shall not adjourn until it establishes, effective in the 109 <sup>th</sup> Congress, a homeland security jurisdiction consolidated in a	The House and Senate shall each determine how to provide a single, principal point of oversight for homeland security.	No provision.	Sense of House that Rules Committee should act upon recommendations of Select Committee on Homeland Security and other	No provision.

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committee with bipartisan staff.	National Security Council and add to the NSC's functions the overseeing and reviewing the Federal Government's homeland security policies.	single committee in each House. Would merge the Homeland Security Council into the National Security Council and add to the NSC's functions the overseeing and reviewing the Federal Government's homeland security policies.			committees of existing jurisdiction regarding jurisdiction over proposed legislation.	
FBI						
The FBI should create a specialized and integrated national security workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.	The FBI Director shall develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national security workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists.	The FBI Director shall develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national security workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists.	Directs Attorney General to establish a specialized and integrated national security workforce at the FBI.	No provision.	FBI Director may establish and train an FBI Investigation Reserve Service.	No provision.
Homeland Defense						
DOD Aspects					1	1
DOD and its	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	Sense of Congress	No provision.

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oversight committees should regularly assess adequacy of Northern Command strategies and planning to defend the U.S. against military threats.					that SecDef should regularly assess adequacy of Northern Command's plans to respond to all military and paramilitary threats within the U.S.	
Dept. of Homeland Se	ecurity Aspects					
The Dept. of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess types of threats to U.S. and determine adequacy of protection plans and response readiness.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	Would establish within Department an Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement headed by a Presidentially nominated, Senate confirmed head.	No provision.
IC Managemer	nt Structure					
NID Deputies						
The NID should have three deputies: foreign intelligence (CIA head); defense intelligence (under	Establishes a Presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed Principal Deputy National	Establishes a Presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed Principal Deputy National	Establishes three deputies: Director of CIA; Under Secretary of Defense for	Establishes a Presidentially- nominated, Senate confirmed Deputy NID. Not more	Establishes a Deputy NID; a Deputy NID for Operations; a Deputy NID for	Establishes Presidentially- nominated, Senate- confirmed Deputy DCI.

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secretary of defense for intelligence);and homeland intelligence (FBI's exec. asst. dir. or under secretary. of homeland security for info. analysis and infrastructure protection).	Intelligence Director.	Intelligence Director.	Intelligence; Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.	than one of the individuals serving as NID or Deputy NID may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, whether active or retired status.	Community Management; and three Associate NIDs for Military Support; Domestic Security; and Diplomatic Affairs.	
Deputy Director of C	entral Intelligence For	Community Management	t			
Recommends eliminating the position.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	There is the position for Deputy Director of <b>Central</b> <b>Intelligence</b> for Community Management.
Deputy DNIs for Ope	rations & Resources					
No recommendation.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	Establishes Deputy NID for Operations.	No provision.
Associate Directors o	f Central Intelligence					
No recommendation.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
Assistant Directors of	f Central Intelligence	1	1	<u>I</u>	1	1
No recommendation	Eliminates the positions of	Eliminates the positions of Assistant	No provision.	No provision.	Eliminates the positions of	No provision.

9/11 Commission	Collins/Lieberman (S. 2845, approved, as amended, by the Senate Government Affs. Committee on 9/22/04.)	McCain/Lieberman (S. 2774)	Pelosi (H.R. 5024)	Bush Administration (submitted Sept. 16, 2004)	Hastert (H.R. 10)	Current Law
	Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence for Collection; Analysis and Production; and Administration.	Directors of Central Intelligence for Collection; Analysis and Production; and Administration.			Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence for Collection; Analysis and Production; and Administration.	
Assistant Directors of	f National Intelligence					
No recommendation	Establishes no more than four Deputy National Intelligence Directors.	Establishes a Deputy NIDs for Foreign intelligence; Defense Intelligence; homeland intelligence.	No provision.	No provision.	Establishes three associate NIDs for Military Support; Domestic Security; and Diplomatic Affairs.	There are assistant directors of <b>central</b> <b>intelligence</b> for collection; analysis and production; administration.
Senior Advisor to the	DNI for Homeland Sec	urity				
No recommendation.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
General Counsel and	Inspector General					
No recommendation.	Establishes a Presidentially appointed, Senate Confirmed General Counsel and Inspector General under the National Intelligence Authority.	Establishes a Presidentially appointed, Senate Confirmed General Counsel and Inspec- tor General under the National Intelligence Authority.	No provision.	No provision.	Establishes General Counsel to the NID.	There is an a General Counsel and Inspector General <b>for the</b> <b>CIA.</b>

9/11 Commission	Collins/Lieberman (S. 2845, approved, as amended, by the Senate Government Affs. Committee on 9/22/04.)	McCain/Lieberman (S. 2774)	Pelosi (H.R. 5024)	Bush Administration (submitted Sept. 16, 2004)	Hastert (H.R. 10)	Current Law
Privacy and Civil Li	berties Oversight Boa	rd/Officer for Civil Rig	hts and Civil Liberti	es/Privacy and Civil I	liberties Officers	
Recommends the establishment of a board within the executive branch to ensure adherence to civil liberties guidelines.	Establishes a civil liberties board; the position of Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to assist the NID in protecting civil rights and liberties; and civil liberties officers in various IC agencies.	Establishes a civil liberties board; the position of Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to assist the NID in protecting civil rights and liberties; and civil liberties officers in various IC agencies.	Recommends the establishment of a board within the executive branch to ensure adherence to civil liberties guidelines.	No provision.	Establishes Civil Liberties Protection Officer to ensure protection of civil liberties.	No provision.
Privacy Officer of th	ne National Intelligenc	e Authority		•	•	•
No recommendation.	Establishes a privacy officer of the NID to assure that use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to use, collection, and disclosure of personal information.	Establishes a privacy officer of the NID to assure that use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to use, collection, and disclosure of personal information.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
Chief Human Capita	al Officer					
No recommendation	Establishes a NID appointed Chief	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.

9/11 Commission	Collins/Lieberman (S. 2845, approved, as amended, by the Senate Government Affs. Committee on 9/22/04.)	McCain/Lieberman (S. 2774)	Pelosi (H.R. 5024)	Bush Administration (submitted Sept. 16, 2004)	Hastert (H.R. 10)	Current Law
	Human Capital Officer to advise with respect to the IC's workforce.					
National Counterin	telligence Executive					
No recommendation.	Establishes the National Counterintelligence Executive as a component of the National Intelligence Authority.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
Ombudsman of the	National Intelligence A	Authority		•		
No recommendation.	Establishes an ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority to serve as an independent, informal, and confidential counselor for those with complaints about politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objective analysis within the Authority.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.

9/11 Commission	Collins/Lieberman (S. 2845, approved, as amended, by the Senate Government Affs. Committee on 9/22/04.)	McCain/Lieberman (S. 2774)	Pelosi (H.R. 5024)	Bush Administration (submitted Sept. 16, 2004)	Hastert (H.R. 10)	Current Law	
National Intelligence	e Council for Alternat	ive Analysis					
No recommendation.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision. Does establish, however, a National Intelligence Council with the NID's office, to produce national intelligence estimates and alternative views held by IC agencies, whenever appropriate.	No provision.	No provision.	
Joint Tasking Organization							
No recommendation.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	

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Joint Intelligence C	Comptroller					
No recommendation.	Establishes an Intelligence Comptroller to assist the NID in budget preparation and execution.	Establishes an Intelligence Comptroller to assist the NID in budget preparation and execution.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
Joint Acquisition O	office					
No recommendation.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
National Intelligence	ce Reserve Corps				·	
No recommendation.	Establishes a National Intelligence Reserve Corps for temporary re-employment on a voluntary basis of former IC employees.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
Joint Military Intel	ligence Program (JMII	P)		•	·	<b></b>
No recommendation.	No provision.	Eliminates the JMIP.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.

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Chief Financial Off	licer					
No recommendation.	Would establish a Chief Financial Officer.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
GAO Report Requi	irement					
No recommendation.	Would require the GAO to issue a progress report on reform two years after enactment.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.
Language				•	•	
CIA Director should build a stronger language program.	CIA Director should develop and maintain an effective language	CIA Director should develop a stronger language program.	CIA Director should develop a stronger language program.	No provision.	Recommends several language reforms.	No provision.
National Intelligence	ce Definition					-
No recommendation.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	No provision.	Revises definition of national intelligence to refer to all intelligence, regardless of source, pertaining to threats to the U.S.; WMD; and any other matter bearing on U.S. security.	No provision.