Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
June S. Beittel
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
September 10, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32724
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States and Mexico have a close and complex bilateral relationship, with extensive
economic linkages as neighbors and partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). Bilateral relations are close, and characterized by extensive commercial and cultural
ties and cooperation on a range of bilateral and international issues. Since the two economies are
closely linked, the U.S. recession has had a significant negative effect on Mexico, where
economic growth may contract by 7% this year. A current bilateral dispute involves the
implementation of NAFTA trucking provisions. In March 2009, Congress terminated a pilot-
project for Mexican-registered trucks to operate beyond the border commercial zone, and Mexico
responded by imposing import tariffs on more than 90 U.S. agricultural and industrial products.
Drug trafficking issues are prominent in relations since Mexico is the leading transit country for
cocaine, a leading supplier of methamphetamine and heroin, and the leading foreign supplier of
marijuana to the U.S. market. Shortly after taking office in December 2006, President Felipe
Calderón sent thousands of soldiers and federal police to drug trafficking “hot-spots,” and is
contending with a significant escalation of drug violence, particularly in several border states.
U.S.-Mexican cooperation on drug trafficking has intensified in recent years. In October 2007,
both countries announced the Mérida Initiative to combat drug trafficking and organized crime.
To date, Congress has appropriated a total of $1.1 billion for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative
in P.L. 110-252, P.L. 111-8, and P.L. 111-32. For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested
$450 million for Mexico under Mérida. The House-passed version of the FY2010 State-Foreign
Operations Appropriations measure, H.R. 3081, would provide $235.8 million in Mérida-related
aid accounts to Mexico, while the Senate version of the bill, S. 1434, would provide $115 million.
President Barack Obama and several members of his Administration have visited Mexico this
year. President Obama met with President Calderón in Mexico on April 16-17, 2009, to discuss
counterdrug cooperation, immigration reform, and clean energy and climate change. His visit had
been preceded by visits in March by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who discussed a range of
bilateral issues, including the Mérida Initiative, and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano and Attorney General Eric Holder, who emphasized new anti-crime efforts.
On August 9-10, 2009, President Obama traveled to Mexico for a second time to participate in the
North American Leaders Summit with President Calderón and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen
Harper. The leaders discussed developing coordinated responses to the global economic crisis,
climate change, and security issues. They pointed to North America’s successful response to the
spring H1N1 “swine flu” outbreak as a model for future collaboration.
The 111th Congress is maintaining an active interest in Mexico with counternarcotics, border, and
trade issues dominating the agenda. Comprehensive immigration reform efforts could also be
considered in the 111th Congress. For more information, see CRS Report R40135, Mérida
Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues; CRS Report R40582,
Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence; CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations:
Trends, Issues, and Implications; CRS Report R40588, The 2009 Influenza Pandemic: U.S.
Responses to Global Human Cases ; and CRS Report RL31738, North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the
Mexican Border.
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Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
Background on Mexico ............................................................................................................... 4
Political Developments ......................................................................................................... 4
Drug Trafficking and Heightened Violence and Crime in Mexico .......................................... 5
Economic Conditions and the Effects of the Global Financial Crisis ...................................... 7
2009 H1N1 “Swine Flu” Outbreak ........................................................................................ 9
Foreign Policy Challenges................................................................................................... 11
Mexican-U.S. Relations ............................................................................................................ 12
Background ........................................................................................................................ 12
Obama Administration ........................................................................................................ 13
U.S. Assistance to Mexico................................................................................................... 14
Bilateral Cooperation on Counternarcotics and Security Efforts........................................... 15
Mérida Initiative ........................................................................................................... 16
Beyond the Mérida Initiative ......................................................................................... 19
Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling............................................................... 20
Precursor Chemicals ..................................................................................................... 21
Weapons Trafficking ..................................................................................................... 21
Human Smuggling ........................................................................................................ 23
Human Rights Issues........................................................................................................... 23
Compliance with Human Rights Conditions in the Mérida Initiative.............................. 24
Accountability for Abuses Committed During the “Dirty War” Period ........................... 25
Migration............................................................................................................................ 26
Trade Issues ........................................................................................................................ 27
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions ............................................................................... 28
Trade Disputes .............................................................................................................. 28
North American Cooperation on Security and Economic Issues ........................................... 30
Legislation in the 111th Congress ............................................................................................... 31
Enacted and Considered Legislation.................................................................................... 31
Additional Legislative Initiatives......................................................................................... 32
Enacted Legislation in the 110th Congress.................................................................................. 34
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Mexico, Including States and Border Cities ...................................................... 3
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2010............................................. 15
Table 2. FY2008-FY2010 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account ..................................... 18
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Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 36
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Recent Developments
On September 10, 2009, President Calderón’s sent his proposed FY2010 budget to the Mexican
Congress for consideration. The budget calls for an increase in income taxes for the country’s top
income bracket, a 2% sales tax on all goods and services, and gradual gasoline price increases to
boost government revenue. It also proposes roughly $16.5 billion dollars in spending cuts.
On September 7, 2009, President Calderón accepted the resignation of Attorney General Eduardo
Medina-Mora, who has been a leading figure in implementing Mexico’s counterdrug strategy.
On September 2, 2009, President Calderón gave his third state of the union address. In his speech,
Calderón outlined the steps his government has taken to address the challenges that Mexico has
faced in the last year, including, but not limited to, drug trafficking and related violence,
economic crisis, declining oil production, and H1N1 swine flu. He vowed to continue fighting
drug traffickers and other organized criminal groups, and to launch new initiatives aimed at
reducing poverty, extending healthcare benefits, and reforming the country’s monopolistic
telecommunications and energy sectors.
On August 21, 2009, a series of reforms to Mexico’s Federal Penal Code, General Health Act, and
Federal Code of Criminal Procedures entered into force that, among other things, eliminate
required jail time for individuals arrested for possessing certain “small amounts” of illicit drugs
for personal use, increase penalties for small-scale drug dealers, and make prosecution of drug
trafficking a local, state, and federal responsibility.
On August 20, 2009, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced indictments against 43
Mexican drug dealers accused of exporting narcotics into the United States and distributing them
in U.S. cities. He praised Mexico-U.S. cooperation in the investigations that led to those
indictments.
On August 16, 2009, the Mexican government replaced all of the customs inspectors posted at the
country’s airports and border crossings with 1,454 new, better-trained inspectors.
On August 13, 2009, the U.S. State Department submitted its human rights progress report for
Mexico to Congress, thereby meeting the statutory requirements for FY2008 supplemental and
FY2009 regular funds for the Mérida Initiative that had been on hold to be released.
On August 9-10, 2009, President Obama traveled to Guadalajara, Mexico to participate in the
North American Leaders’ Summit with Mexican President Felipe Calderón and Canadian Prime
Minister Stephen Harper. The leaders discussed how to respond to the global economic crisis,
climate change, and shared security challenges. They pointed to North America’s successful
response to the H1N1 swine flu outbreak as a model for future collaboration. They agreed to meet
again in Canada in 2010.
On August 9, 2009, Mexico’s Supreme Court rejected an appeal by a human rights organization
challenging the Mexican military’s assertion of jurisdiction in cases involving allegations of
human rights abuses committed by soldiers against civilians.
On July 20, 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department designated four drug cartel leaders of the Gulf
Cartel and Los Zetas as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act), thereby imposing U.S. economic sanctions on
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those individuals. The State Department also announced rewards of up to $5 million each for
information leading to the capture or conviction of 10 leaders of the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas.
On July 16, 2009, President Calderón ordered 5,500 additional federal police and military
members to the state of Michoacán in response to a series of retaliatory attacks by La Familia
cartel that resulted in the deaths of 12 Mexican federal police officers.
On July 30, 2009, the House passed its version of the FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act, H.R.
3326, which includes a provision that would reportedly provide $160 million worth of first
responder radios to Mexican police.1
On July 9, 2009, the House passed H.R. 3081, the FY2010 State Department-Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, which would provide $235.8 million in counterdrug and related assistance for
Mexico in the accounts that formerly constituted the “Mérida Initiative.” Also on July 9, the
Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2010 State-Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill, S. 1434, which would provide $115 million in assistance for Mexico under
the existing Mérida framework. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee reports
(H.Rept. 111-87 and S.Rept. 111-44) state that a significant portion of the Administration’s $450
million FY2010 request was “forward-funded” in the FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32).
On July 7, 2009, drug gangs abducted and shot two American Mormons living in Sinaloa,
reportedly in retaliation for their efforts to get state and local authorities to take more action
against organized crime.
On July 5, 2009, Mexico held mid-term elections to fill all 500 seats of the lower house of
Congress as well as six governorships and hundreds of mayors. The main opposition party, the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), captured 237 seats and five governorships, resulting in a
political setback to President Calderón and his National Action Party (PAN).
On June 24, 2009, President Obama signed into law the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations
Act (P.L. 111-32, H.R. 2346). The measure includes $160 million in International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance and $260 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for
Mexico, $354 million more than the Administration’s request. INCLE funds will provide
equipment for the Mexican federal police, including the Blackhawk helicopters requested by the
Administration. FMF funds will provide aviation assistance for the Mexican Navy (SEMAR).
On June 18, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report identifying
problems that exist in the information-gathering and coordination efforts of U.S. agencies charged
with combating arms trafficking to Mexico.2
On April 24, 2009, Mexico’s Health Ministry announced the outbreak of a new influenza strain,
subsequently dubbed H1N1. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a
travel health warning on April 27 advising U.S. citizens to avoid all nonessential travel to Mexico
because of the outbreak, but this was subsequently downgraded to a travel health precaution on
May 15 that removed the recommendation that travel to Mexico be avoided.
1 Carol D. Leoning, “Murtha, 12 Colleagues Back a Murky $160 Million Request,” Washington Post, July 23, 2009.
2 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico: Face Planning
and Coordination Challenges, GAO-09-709, June 2009.
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Figure 1. Map of Mexico, Including States and Border Cities
Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS.
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Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
Background on Mexico
Political Developments
Mexico has become a more vibrant, multi-party democracy over the past decade. In 2000, the
country effectively ended 71 years of one-party rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) when Vicente Fox of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) was elected President.
PAN candidate Felipe Calderón won the July 2006 presidential election in an extremely tight
race, defeating Andrés López Obrador of the leftist Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) by less
than 234,000 votes. The presidential race was so close that final results were not announced until
early September 2006, when the Federal Electoral Tribunal completed adjudication of all the
challenges to those results.3 Calderón was sworn in to a six-year term on December 1, 2006.
While the PAN made significant gains in the 2006 congressional elections, becoming the largest
block in the 128-member Senate and 500-member Chamber of Deputies, it failed to capture a
majority in either house.4 In the first half of his term, President Calderón had some success in
turning to the PRI for help in advancing his legislative agenda. In 2007, he secured passage of
long-awaited fiscal and pension reforms that had stalled under the Fox Administration. In June
2008, President Calderón signed a judicial reform decree after securing the approval of Congress
and Mexico’s states for an amendment to Mexico’s Constitution. Under the reform, Mexico will
have eight years to move from a closed door process based on written arguments to a public trial
system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence.
In October 2008, the government secured approval of an energy sector reform intended to
modernize the state-oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), and boost declining
production. The enacted reform, which ultimately was supported by a wide majority in Congress,
was a watered down version of a reform measure proposed in April 2008 that had met with
significant opposition by PRD supporters of Andrés López Obrador. As approved, the reform
strives to improve the transparency and management flexibility of PEMEX. Some critics maintain
that it will not do enough to encourage new exploration.
Since Calderón’s election, however, the PRI has fared well in state and municipal elections
around the country and polls predicted that the party would do well in the July 5, 2009, midterm
elections. The PRI performed even better than those polls had suggested, capturing 237 of 500
seats in the Chamber of Deputies, five of six governorships, and several municipalities. Analysts
have attributed the PRI’s strong performance to growing popular concern about the current
economic downturn, as well as the party’s effective use of its still formidable national machinery.
Although President Calderón is still popular, the PAN lost seats in the Chamber (from 206 to 147)
and two key governorships, with voters expressing frustration with the party’s failure to
distinguish itself from the PRI. (The PAN still controls the Senate, however.) The PRD fared even
worse than the PAN in the mid-term elections, winning just 72 seats in the Chamber, as internal
3 For more information, see CRS Report RS22462, Mexico’s 2006 Elections, by Colleen W. Cook.
4 In the 2006 legislative elections, the PRD also made significant gains, becoming the second-largest block of members
in the Chamber of Deputies and third in the Senate. For the first time in history, the long-ruling PRI lost its plurality of
seats in Congress, although it remained the second-largest voting block in the Senate and the third-largest in the
Chamber of Deputies. Ibid.
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divisions within the party led Andrés Lopez Obrador to throw his support behind left-leaning
candidates from smaller parties, many of whom won.5
The composition of the new Congress, which was sworn in on September 1, 2009, could
complicate President Calderón’s agenda in the second half of his term. The PRI, which, combined
with the support of the allied Green Ecological Party (PVEM) party, now controls a majority in
the Chamber, is likely to try to use its position to gear up for the 2012 elections. Although the PRI
may object to large-scale structural reforms or certain budgetary priorities, many observers
maintain that, given the severity of the drug violence and economic challenges that Mexico is
facing, the party is unlikely to block any security or economic stimulus initiatives. The PRI is also
expected to be more cooperative now than it was after winning a majority in the 2003 elections,
for fear of being dismissed by voters in 2012 as obstructionist (as it was in 2006).6
Drug Trafficking and Heightened Violence and Crime in Mexico7
Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and
marijuana and the major transit country for as much as 90% of the cocaine sold in the United
States. A small number of Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), often referred to as
“drug cartels,”8 control the most significant drug distribution operations along the Southwest
border. The criminal activities of these Mexican DTOs reach well beyond the towns and cities of
the border, extending along drug trafficking routes into cities across the United States.9 In the past
few years, the violence and brutality of the Mexican DTOs has escalated as an increasing number
of groups have battled each other for control of lucrative drug trafficking routes into the United
States.
Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderón has made combating drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) and drug violence a top priority of his administration. He has called
increasing drug violence in Mexico a threat to the Mexican state and has sent thousands of
soldiers and police to drug trafficking “hot-spots” in at least 16 states throughout Mexico. Joint
deployments of federal military and police officials are just one part of the Calderón
government’s strategy against the DTOs. That strategy involves (1) deploying the military to
restore law and order, (2) law enforcement operations, (3) institutional reform, (4) recovering
5 Andrew Selee and Katie Putnam, “Mexico’s 2009 Midterm Elections: Winners and Losers,” Woodrow Wilson
Center, July 2009; George W. Grayson, “The PRI Makes a Comeback in Mexico,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
July 2009.
6 “Country Report: Mexico.” Economist Intelligence Unit,” September 2009.
7 For more on DTOs and drug-related violence in Mexico, see CRS Report R40582, Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence ,
by June S. Beittel.
8 The term drug cartel remains the term used colloquially and in the press, but some experts disagree with this because
“cartel” often refers to price-setting groups and it is not clear that Mexican drug cartels are setting illicit drug prices.
9 The U.S. Justice Department’s National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, published in December 2008, identified
Mexican DTOs as the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States. The current dominance of the Mexican
DTOs over the U.S. drug market arose with the closing of the Caribbean route through which drugs, and particularly
cocaine from Colombia, was channeled into the United States. With increased U.S. efforts to interdict narcotic
smugglers in the Caribbean and Florida in the late 1980s and 1990s, the Colombian drug cartels began subcontracting
with Mexican DTOs to smuggle cocaine into the United States across the Southwest border. By the late 1990s,
Mexican DTOs had pushed aside the Colombians and gained greater control and market share of cocaine trafficking
into the United States.
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social cohesion and trust, and (5) building up international partnerships against drugs and crime
(like the Mérida Initiative).10
In 2008, the government’s crackdown and rivalries and turf wars among Mexico’s DTOs fueled
an escalation in violence throughout the country, including in northern Mexico near the U.S.-
Mexico border. In an effort to control the most lucrative drug smuggling routes in Mexico, rival
DTOs have been launching attacks on each other, as well as on Mexican military and police.
Between the beginning of 2008 and May 2009, some 7,500 Mexicans died in drug-related
violence, including hundreds of police and military officers.11 During this period, there has also
been a rise in assassinations of high-level law enforcement officials, gruesome murders including
beheadings, and at least one incident involving the indiscriminate killing of civilians.12
Kidnapping for money has also increased significantly. In 2008, 1,028 persons were kidnapped,
31% concentrated in the Federal District and the state of Mexico. Reportedly at least 69 of those
abducted were murdered.13
The growth and dramatic character of the violence has led some observers to question the
strength of the Mexican government, even characterizing it as potentially a “failing” state. A
report released in December 2008 by the U.S. Joint Forces Command argued that Mexico
potentially could face rapid and sudden collapse in the future because the government, its
politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are under sustained assault by criminal gangs and
drug cartels.14 In late March 2009, however, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair
asserted to reporters that “Mexico is no danger of becoming a failed state.”15 Moreover, during
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s trip to Mexico in March 2009, the Secretary said that the
Mexican government was making “great progress” against the drug cartels, and asserted that she
does not believe “that there are any ungovernable territories in Mexico.”16
Mexican officials have strongly contested the claim that Mexico is a failed or failing state.
Indeed, Mexican officials claim the heightened violence may be a sign that the cartels are losing
ground and turning on each other as their markets shrink.17 The Mexican government
acknowledges that the country does face a significant challenge from well-financed criminal
gangs through violence and corruption, but asserts that the description of Mexico as a failed or
failing state “grossly distorts the facts on the ground.”18 In his third state of the union address
delivered on September 2, 2009, President Calderón highlighted the fact that some 80,000 drug
10 Embassy of Mexico, Washington, DC. “Mexico and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime:
Setting the Record Straight,” June 2009, p. ii.
11 U.S. Department of State, “Mexico: Merida Initiative Report,” August 2009.
12 A grenade attack in Morelia, Michoacan on Mexican’s Independence Day in September 2008, which took place in a
crowded public square and resulted in 8 deaths and more than 100 injuries, was allegedly the work of the Mexican
DTOs. See Stratfor, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence, December 11, 2008.
13 Benito Jiménez y Verónica Sánchez, “Aumentan secuestros,” Reforma (Mexico), April 5, 2009.
14 United States Joint Forces Command, “The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the
Future Joint Force,” December 2008.
15 Ken Ellingwood, “Clinton: U.S. Shares Blame for Mexico Ills,” Los Angeles Times, March 26, 2009; and “Mexico
Will Not Become ‘Failed State’: U.S. Spy Chief,” Agence France Presse, March 26, 2009.
16 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary
Patricia Espinosa After Their Meeting,” Mexico City, Mexico, March 25, 2009.
17 “On the trail of the traffickers,” The Economist, March 7, 2009.
18 Embassy of Mexico, Washington, DC. “Mexico and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime:
Setting the Record Straight,” June 2009.
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suspects have been arrested—including 70 DTO leaders arrested in the past year alone—as
evidence that his security strategy is working.19
Economic Conditions and the Effects of the Global Financial
Crisis20
Mexico’s economy is strongly dependent on economic conditions in the United States because a
majority of its exports are destined for the U.S. market and the United States is its primary source
of tourism revenues and foreign investment. The Mexican economy grew 3.3% in 2007, the first
year of the Calderón government. Slower growth of 2.3 % was already anticipated for 2008 due
to decreasing demand in the United States, declining Mexican oil production, and slow growth in
remittances sent by Mexicans abroad. The global financial crisis, which caused a run on the
Mexican peso, further reduced GDP growth in 2008 to just 1.4%. For 2009, the outlook is worse,
with the Mexican economy now forecast to contract by 7% or more, the worst decline in six
decades. 21
The Calderón government has been struggling to cope with the combined effects of the U.S. and
global recessions, a nationwide outbreak of swine flu, and declining oil production. The U.S.
recession has resulted in steep declines in demand for Mexican exports, particularly in the
manufacturing sector. Some 400,000 Mexicans lost their jobs in the first quarter of 2009 alone.22
Economic decline in the United States and elsewhere has also resulted in declining remittances
sent from Mexicans living abroad. In 2008, remittances to Mexico fell to an estimated $25 billion,
the lowest level since 2005. They may decline by as much as 15% this year.23 The outbreak of
swine flu in April 2009 resulted in billions of dollars worth of losses in Mexico’s tourism sector.
Declining oil prices and production have also been major economic setbacks for Mexico, which
depends on oil proceeds for over one-third of government revenue. Mexico’s Finance Minister
has recently acknowledged that the country’s oil production has decreased by some 25% since
President Calderón took office in December 2006.24
The Calderón government has taken a number of measures to attempt to cushion the Mexican
economy from the fallout of the global economic crisis and the U.S. recession. The government
has used billions in its international reserves to shore up the peso, and the Mexican central bank
established a temporary reciprocal currency sway line with the U.S. Federal Reserve for up to $30
billion. The government also announced that it has hedged its oil exports for 2009 at a price of
$70 a barrel in an effort to protect the economy from the decline in oil prices. In an effort to
jump-start the economy, in mid-November 2008, Mexico’s Congress approved President
19 Presidente Constitucional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa, “El Resumen
Ejecutivo del Tercer Informe de Gobierno, September 1, 2009, available at: http://www.informe.gob.mx/descargas/
20 For background on the Mexican economy and U.S.-Mexican economic relations, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-
Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal; for information on the effect
of the financial crisis on Mexico, see CRS Report RL34742, The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy
Implications, coordinated by Dick K. Nanto.
21 “Mexico: Riskier Business” EIU – Business Latin America, September 7, 2009.
22 Sara Llana Miller and Jonathan Roeder, “As U.S. Economy Struggles, Mexico Feels the Pressure,” Christian Science
Monitor, June 28, 2009.
23 International Monetary Fund, Global Markets Monitor, June 16, 2009.
24 “Mexico: Where Next?” Latin American Economy & Business, August 2009.
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Calderón’s request to increase the 2009 budget by 13%. Spending in some areas was cut back,
while funding for education, infrastructure, agriculture, and security was increased.25 The price of
cooking gas has been reduced through government subsidies, and petroleum prices in the
domestic market have been frozen. Programs to support small and medium-sized businesses, job
training programs, and employment generation have been maintained and expanded in some
cases.26 These policies, though arguably necessary to prevent the country from falling into an
even deeper recession, have put a severe strain on Mexico’s finances. As a result, President
Calderón’s proposed FY2010 budget calls for an increase in income taxes for the wealthy, a 2%
sales tax on all goods and services, and gasoline price increases to boost government revenue.27
In late October 2008, the IMF announced that it would be creating a short-term lending facility
for emerging markets like Mexico that have a strong economic policy track record and need
assistance from the fallout of the global economic crisis. In late March 2009, the IMF officially
created the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), and Mexico announced that it would seek as much as $40
billion from the new fund in order to shore up its declining foreign reserves.28
As elsewhere in Latin America, there are concerns that the economic downturn in Mexico could
affect the country’s recent progress in reducing poverty. Mexico, with a population of almost 110
million, is classified by the World Bank as an upper middle income developing country, with a
per capita income level of $8,340 (2007).29 According to the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), nearly 32% of Mexicans lived in
poverty in 2006 and just under 9% of Mexicans lived in extreme poverty or indigence. This
represents a significant improvement from 2000, when 41% of Mexicans lived in poverty and
15% were indigent.30
Mexico’s main poverty reduction program is Oportunidades (Opportunities). The program,
formerly known as Progresa (Progress), began under President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and
has since expanded to benefit 5 million Mexican families (25 million individuals). The program
seeks to not only alleviate the immediate effects of poverty through cash and in-kind transfers,
but to break the cycle of poverty by improving nutrition, health standards, and educational
attainment. It provides cash transfers to families in poverty who demonstrate that they regularly
attend medical appointments and can certify that children are attending school. While some have
praised Oportunidades for its positive effects on educational and nutrition outcomes, others have
criticized it for creating dependency on government handouts.31 On April 9, 2009, the World
Bank approved a $1.5 billion loan to Mexico to expand the Oportunidades program in an effort to
relieve the social impact of the economic downturn.
25 Alexandra Olson, “Mexican Congress Approves 13 Percent Spending Increase for 2009 in Bid to Spur Economy,
Jobs,” Associated Press Newswires, November 13, 2008.
26 Presidente Constitucional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa, “El Resumen
Ejecutivo del Tercer Informe de Gobierno, September 1, 2009.
27 “Mexico: Where Next?” Latin American Economy & Business, August 2009; “Mexico: Calderón Seeks Government
Relaunch,” Oxford Analytica, September 10, 2009.
28 “Mexico to Take IMF Credit Line,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2009; and “Mexico Seeks $47 Billion Credit Line
from IMF,” IMF Survey Magazine, April 1, 2009.
29 World Bank, World Development Report 2009, November 2008.
30 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the
Caribbean 2008.
31 Santiago Levy, Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes – Social Policy, Informality and Economic Growth in Mexico.
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, April 2008.
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2009 H1N1 “Swine Flu” Outbreak32
On April 24, 2009, Mexico’s Health Ministry announced that a new strain of influenza—
subsequently dubbed pandemic H1N1 by the World Health Organization (WHO)—was affecting
the country with just over 1,000 suspected cases and 20 deaths.33 The Mexican government also
announced that it was closing schools and canceling public gatherings in Mexico City and the
surrounding state of Mexico through May 6, 2009. This was subsequently extended to all schools
throughout the country. By May 6, the Mexican government was reporting that the outbreak was
easing in the country, and a number of restrictions on public activities were lifted. According to
the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), as of August 21, 2009, Mexico had reported
19,634 confirmed cases of infection, including 164 deaths.34
During the early days of the outbreak, there had been some criticism about conflicting statistics
on flu cases and deaths released by the Mexican government.35 At various times, the Mexican
government was reporting the number of suspected, but not confirmed, deaths related to the virus,
as well as cases of acute respiratory infection suspected of being caused by the virus. There also
had been some criticism of the government’s initial slowness in reporting the outbreak, although
others lauded the government’s quick action that provided a warning to other countries and has
allowed them to screen for the virus.36
Moreover, the Calderón government took considerable measures to combat the outbreak in
Mexico. This included an extensive media campaign, spearheaded by President Calderón and
Health Minister José Ángel Córdova Villalobos who has been praised by global health experts for
the country’s swift and transparent response.37 In addition to closing all schools and public events
through May 6, 2009 (including traditional Cinco de Mayo festivities), the government also
ordered a May 1-5 work-stoppage around the country, with the exception of banks, hotels,
supermarkets, and the government’s emergency services. According to the Mexican government,
the Ministry of Health used preventive and therapeutic resources and existing medical and social
assistance resources to combat the outbreak, and acquired additional resources such as medical
and laboratory equipment, surgical and dressing materials, and cleansing products. The Mexican
army reportedly distributed some 6 million mouth masks.38
In response to the outbreak in Mexico, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
issued a travel health warning, the agency’s highest advisory level, on April 27, 2009
recommending that U.S. citizens avoid all nonessential travel to Mexico. By May 15, however,
the CDC downgraded the advisor to a travel health precaution that removed the recommendation
32 For more information, see CRS Report R40554, The 2009 Influenza Pandemic: An Overview, by Sarah A. Lister and
C. Stephen Redhead and CRS Report R40588, The 2009 Influenza Pandemic: U.S. Responses to Global Human Cases ,
by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.
33 Secretaría de Salud (Mexico), “Conferencia de prensa,” Número 2009-133c, April 24, 2009.
34 The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) is the regional office for the Americas of the World Health
Organization. For this data, see “Regional Update: Pandemic (H1N1) 2009,” August 21, 2009.
35 For example, see Jonathan Roeder, “In Mexico City, A Second ‘Pandemic’: Rumors,” Christian Science Monitor,
April 30, 2009.
36 For example, see “Calderón Takes the Lead on Swine Flu,” Latin American Weekly Report, April 30, 2009; and Julio
Frenk, “Mexico’s Fast Diagnosis,” New York Times, May 1, 2009.
37 William Booth and Joshua Partlow, “Mexico’s Health Chief Receives Plaudits,” Washington Post, May 11, 2009.
38 Embassy of Mexico, Washington, D.C. “Mexico’s Response to the Influenza Outbreak,” April 2009.
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that travel to Mexico be avoided.39 Citing the CDC’s earlier travel health warning, the State
Department had issued a travel alert for U.S. citizens on April 28, 2009, but this alert was
subsequently lifted on May 15 when the CDC downgraded its advisory.
In response to the influenza outbreak, the United States has provided at least $16 million in
assistance to Mexico, including a $5 million donation to the WHO and PAHO. On April 29, 2009,
Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius announced that her department had
begun to move 400,000 antiviral drug treatment courses to Mexico—valued at $10 million—to
help slow the spread of the virus.40 On May 2, 2009, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) provided about $1 million in emergency relief supplies to the government
of Mexico. These supplies were in addition to a previous donation of $1 million in emergency
supplies provided by the U.S. military.41 With international help from the CDC and others,
Mexico was able to build a laboratory within record time that was able to process hundreds of
tests for H1N1 daily.42
Some observers, and some Members of Congress, had called for the Obama Administration to
consider restricting cross-border traffic and some had called for the Administration to prepare a
plan to close the U.S.-Mexico border if needed.43 The WHO did not advise any closure of
borders, and CDC officials maintained that that there would be no public health merit to closing
the border.44 During congressional testimony, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano
said that “the strain of virus first detected in Mexico is already present throughout the United
States,” and that “there is no realistic opportunity to contain the virus through border closures.”45
The H1NI influenza has had a significant effect on the Mexican economy, which had already
been experiencing a severe downturn because of the global financial crisis and U.S. recession.
The tourism industry, Mexico’s third largest foreign exchange earner, was hard hit by the virus,
with a 50% drop in income earned by foreign visitors in May and a 29% drop in June as
compared to the year before. The Mexican government has predicted that the country’s tourism
revenues could fall by some $4 billion this year.46
39 Information on the CDC travel health precaution is available at http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/
contentSwineFluMexico.aspx.
40 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “HHS Deploys SNS Antivirals to Mexico, and Buys More,” Press
Release, April 29, 2009.
41 Email from the U.S. Agency for International Development Mission in Mexico, August 28, 2009.
42 William Booth and Joshua Partlow, “Mexico Raced to Build Flu Testing Laboratory; Lack of Tools Hindered Initial
Response,” Washington Post, May 8, 2009.
43 For example, see “Federal Swine Flu Response Demands Cross-border Restrictions,” May 1, 2009; Jim Landers, and
“As Senators Urge Homeland Security to Tighten Border,” CongressDaily PM (National Journal Group), April 30,
2009.
44 See “Pressure Rises to Enhance Border Checks But CDC Officials Say There’s No Medical Need to Close
Crossing,” Dallas Morning News, April 30, 2009; “No Need to Contemplate Closing U.S.-Mexico-Border, Says CDC
and DHS Officials,” CQ Today, April 30, 2009; and “Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Hold
Hearing on the Federal Government Response to Swine Flu,” Congressional Transcripts, April 29, 2009.
45 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, written testimony of Secretary of
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano at hearing on “Swine Flu: Coordinating the Federal Response,” April 29, 2009.
46 “Mexico Foreign Tourism Income Sinks 29% in June,” Reuters, August 10, 2009.
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Foreign Policy Challenges
While the bilateral relationship with the United States has continued to dominate Mexican foreign
policy, former President Fox (2000-2006) and current President Calderón have pursued more
diversified foreign policies than their recent predecessors. The Fox Administration pursued other
policy initiatives after the September 2001 terrorist attacks turned U.S. attention away from
Mexico and toward the Middle East. Mexico held a temporary seat on the U.N. Security Council
in 2002 and 2003 and voted against the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which disappointed the Bush
Administration. Fox promoted Plan Puebla-Panama, now called the Mesoamerican Plan, a series
of energy, infrastructure, and regional connectivity initiatives with Central America. He attempted
to revive the G-3 group trade preferences (Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico); however,
Venezuela formally withdrew from the group in November 2006. Fox also sought better ties with
countries in South America. He attempted to expand trade with the European Union under the
EU-Mexico free trade agreement (FTA) that went into effect in July 2000, and with Japan under
the Mexico-Japan FTA that entered into force in April 2005.47
President Calderón has sought to pursue an independent foreign policy with even closer ties to
Latin America. Calderón has regularly met with President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia, with whom
he has formed a partnership, along with the leaders of Guatemala and Panama, to combat drug
trafficking and organized crime. The Colombian government has offered to share training,
intelligence, and “best practices” with Mexico that it has gathered through many years of
counterdrug operations. In mid-August 2009, President Calderón visited Brazil to discuss the
possibility of forming a Brazil-Mexico FTA, as well as developing greater energy cooperation
between PEMEX and Petrobras, Brazil’s state-owned oil company. Security cooperation between
Mexico and the Central American Integration System (SICA) has also expanded under President
Calderón. Progress has also continued to advance, albeit slowly, on the Mesoamerican Project
mentioned above. President Calderón has offered his full support for restoring ousted Honduran
President Manuel Zelaya.48
President Calderón has also tried to mend relations with Cuba and Venezuela, which had become
tense during the Fox Administration. In September 2007, Mexican and Venezuelan ambassadors
presented credentials to the respective governments, restoring full relations for the first time since
November 2005. In May 2004, President Fox recalled Mexico’s ambassador to Cuba;
ambassadors were later restored, but relations between the two countries remained tense through
the remainder of the Fox administration. A Cuban ambassador to Mexico also presented his
credentials to President Calderón in September 2007. In November 2008, a new Mexico-Cuba
agreement intended to help slow the trafficking of undocumented Cubans passing through
Mexico to the United States took effect.49
47 For more information, see CRS Report R40784, Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
48 “Se Consolida Alianza Antidrogas Entre Mexico y Colombia,” Millenio, August 13, 2009; “Country Report:
Mexico,” EIU, September 2009; “President Calderón Participates in 11th Summit of Heads of State and Government of
Tuxtla Mechanism of Dialogue and Agreement,” States News Service, July 29, 2009.
49 “Cuban Envoy to Mexico Says Migration Agreement to Halt People Trafficking,” BBC Monitoring Americas,
November 20, 2008.
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Mexican-U.S. Relations
Background
Until the early 1980s, Mexico had a closed and statist economy and its independent foreign policy
was often at odds with the United States. Those policies began to shift, however, under President
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), and changed even more dramatically under President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). Presidents Salinas
opened Mexico’s economy to trade and investment, while President Zedillo adopted electoral
reforms that leveled the playing field for opposition parties and increased cooperation with the
United States on drug control and border issues. Cooperation under NAFTA and the annual
cabinet-level meetings of the Binational Commission reflected the close and increasing
relationships between the countries.
President Fox (2000-2006) encouraged strong relations with the United States, and called for
greater cooperation under NAFTA and for a bilateral migration agreement that would regularize
the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United States. In the aftermath of the September
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the focus of relations shifted to border security issues
as the United States became increasingly concerned about homeland security. Relations became
strained during the debate on immigration reform in the United States. After President Bush
approved the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Mexico, with the support of 27 other nations, denounced
the proposed border fence at the Organization of American States.
Under the Calderón government, U.S.-Mexican relations have continued to be close, with drug
trafficking and violence, border security, and immigration continuing to define the bilateral
relationship. Felipe Calderón made his first official visit to the United States as President-elect in
early November 2006, after first visiting Canada and several Latin American countries. During
his visit, Calderón criticized the authorization of 700 miles of fencing along the U.S.-Mexico
border and noted that it complicated U.S.-Mexico relations. He asserted that job-creation and
increased investment in Mexico would be more effective in reducing illegal migration from
Mexico than a border fence. Calderón signaled a shift in Mexican foreign policy when he noted
that while immigration is an important issue in the bilateral relationship, it is not the only issue, as
trade and economic development are also important.
President Calderón reiterated these concerns during President Bush’s March 2007 visit to Mexico.
During the visit, President Calderón also called for U.S. assistance in combating drug and
weapons trafficking. Specifically, Calderón promised to continue his efforts to combat drug
trafficking and called for U.S. efforts to reduced the demand for drugs, stating, “while there is no
reduction for demand in your territory, it will be very difficult to reduce the supply in ours.”50
Calderón has displayed an unprecedented willingness to increase narcotics cooperation with the
United States. This willingness led to the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year $1.4 billion U.S.
assistance effort announced in October 2007 to help Mexico and Central America combat drug
trafficking and organized crime.
50 “Bush Reassures Skeptical Mexico on Immigration,” Reuters, March 13, 2007.
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Obama Administration
U.S.-Mexican relations have continued to be close under the Obama Administration, largely
focusing on cooperation in combating organized crime and drug trafficking. In mid-January 2009,
President Calderón visited then President-elect Obama in Washington D.C. That pre-inaugural
meeting, which has become somewhat of a tradition for recent U.S. presidents, demonstrated the
importance of strong relations with Mexico.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Mexico City and Monterrey, Mexico, on March 25-
26, 2009, to discuss a broad range of bilateral issues, including cooperation under the Mérida
Initiative. The Secretary asserted that the U.S. relationship with Mexico “is one of the most
important relationships between any two countries in the world” and that both countries “need a
strong and sustained partnership, one based on comprehensive engagement, greater balance,
shared responsibility, and joint efforts to address hemispheric and global issues.”51 Perhaps most
significantly, Secretary Clinton criticized the failure of U.S. antidrug policy and acknowledged
that an “insatiable demand for illegal drugs” in the United States “fuels the drug trade.”52
During her visit, Secretary Clinton and Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa announced
the creation of a new bilateral implementation office in Mexico where Mexican and U.S. officials
will work together on efforts to combat drug traffickers and associated violence. Secretary
Clinton also announced that the Obama Administration intended to work with Congress to
provide additional funding for Blackhawk helicopters for Mexican law enforcement.
Subsequently, on April 9, 2009, the Administration requested $66 million in FY2009
supplemental assistance for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative to acquire three Blackhawk
helicopters. Congress included $420 million for Mexico in the FY2009 Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32), including funding for the Blackhawk helicopters.
Clinton’s visit to Mexico was followed up in early April 2009 with trips by Homeland Security
Secretary Napolitano and Attorney General Holder where they met with Mexican officials and
attended an arms trafficking conference. Both officials emphasized new efforts by their agencies
to combat the drug cartels, including the deployment of additional personnel and resources to
support anti-gun trafficking and interdiction efforts and law enforcement cooperation.
On April 16-17, 2009, ahead of his attendance at the fifth Summit of the Americas held in
Trinidad and Tobago, President Barack Obama traveled to Mexico to meet with President
Calderón. The two presidents discussed cooperation in the fight against drug-related violence,
immigration reform, and a new bilateral framework on clean energy and climate change. During
the visit, President Obama acknowledged the U.S. demand for drugs was helping to keep the
Mexican drugs cartels in business, and that “more than 90% of the guns recovered in Mexico
come from the United States.”53
51 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary
Patricia Espinosa After Their Meeting,” Mexico City, Mexico, March 25, 2009.
52 Mary Beth Sheridan, “On Mexico Trip, Clinton Criticizes U.S. Drug Policy,” Washington Post, March 26, 2009; and
Mark Lander, “Clinton Says Demand for Illegal Drugs in the U.S. ‘Fuels the Drug Trade’ in Mexico,” New York Times,
March 26, 2009.
53 “President Obama and Mexican President Felipe Calderón Hold News Conference,” CQ Newsmaker Transcripts,
April 16, 2009.
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At the North American Leaders’ Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico, President Obama praised
Mexico’s response to the H1N1 swine flu outbreak and gave his full support for President
Calderón’s struggle against the drug cartels. Obama stated that he has “great confidence in
President Calderón’s administration applying the law enforcement techniques that are necessary
to curb the power of the cartels, but doing so in a way that’s consistent with human rights.”54
During the summit, President Obama, President Calderón, and Canadian Prime Minister Harper
pledged to work together to restore economic growth in North America, combat climate change,
and prepare for the fall flu season.
U.S. Assistance to Mexico
Mexico, a middle income country, traditionally has not been a major recipient of U.S. foreign
assistance, but this changed in FY2008 with congressional approval of the Administration’s
request for funding to support the Mérida Initiative. Because of the Mérida Initiative funding,
U.S. assistance to Mexico rose from $65 million in FY2007 to almost $406 million in FY2008.
As shown in Table 1, the FY2008 assistance estimate includes $352 million in FY2008
supplemental funding (P.L. 110-252) for the Mérida Initiative.
For FY2009, Congress has appropriated an estimated $786.78 million for Mexico. This includes
$768 million provided for the Mérida Initiative (with $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund
supplemental assistance provided in the FY2008 supplemental appropriations measure, P.L. 110-
252, $300 million provided in the FY2009 omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 111-8, and $420
million in the FY2009 supplemental measure, P.L. 111-32). The remainder is for additional
development assistance and other projects outside of the Mérida Initiative. (Also see “Mérida
Initiative” below for additional details on the assistance.)
For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested almost $502 million in assistance for Mexico,
with $450 million in INCLE assistance requested for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative. The
House-passed version of the FY2010 State-Foreign Operations Appropriations measure, H.R.
3081, would provide roughly $246.9 in total assistance to Mexico, while the Senate version of the
bill, S. 1434, would provide $125 million. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee
reports (H.Rept. 111-187 and S.Rept. 111-44) state that a significant portion of the
Administration’s $450 million FY2010 request was “forward-funded” in the FY2009
supplemental.
54 U.S. Department of State, “Press Release: North American Leaders Discuss Trade, H1N1 Flu, Climate Change,”
August 10, 2009.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2010
U.S. $ millions
FY2009
Regular
FY2009
FY2009
FY2010
Account FY2007 FY2008a
(Est.)a
Supp.
Total
Request
H.R. 3081
S. 1434
CSHb
3.72
2.68
2.90 — 2.90 3.20 0.00 0.00
DA
12.28
8.22 11.20 — 11.20 17.30 10.00 10.00
ESF
11.35 34.70 15.00 — 15.00
3.00
20.00 10.00
FMF
0.00 116.50 39.00 260.00 299.00 10.50 10.50
0.00
IMET
0.06 0.36 0.83 — 0.83 1.10 1.10
n/a
INCLE
36.68
242.05
294.00
160.00
454.00 459.33 205.33 105.00
NADR
1.30 1.35 3.85 — 3.85 7.08 6.63c n/a
TOTAL 65.39 405.86 366.7878 420.00 786.78 501.51 253.56
125.0
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2010;
House Report to H.R. 3081, the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2010 , H.Rept. 111-187; and
Senate Report to S. 1434, S.Rept. 111-44.
Notes: CSH= Child Survival and Health; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund;
FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs.
a. FY2008 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252). FY2009
assistance includes FY2009 bridge funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252).
b. Beginning with the FY2010 request, the Child Survival and Health Account became known as Global Health
and Child Survival—USAID.
c. This estimated total was provided by an email from House Appropriations Committee to CRS received on
June 30, 2009.
Bilateral Cooperation on Counternarcotics and Security Efforts
In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S.-Mexican counternarcotics efforts were often marked by mistrust.
Beginning in 1986, when the U.S. President was required to certify whether drug-producing
countries and drug-transit countries were cooperating fully with the United States, Mexico often
was criticized for its lack of efforts, which in turn led to Mexican government criticism of the
U.S. assessment. Reforms to the U.S. drug certification process enacted in September 2002 (P.L.
107-228) essentially eliminated the annual drug certification requirement, and instead required
the President to designate and withhold assistance from countries that had “failed demonstrably”
to make substantial counternarcotics efforts.55 In the aftermath of these reforms, U.S. bilateral
cooperation with Mexico on counternarcotics efforts improved considerably during the Fox
administration (2000-2006), and as described above, combating DTOs has become a priority of
the current Calderón administration.
Until 2006, Mexico refused to extradite criminals facing the possibility of life without parole to
the United States. However, two decisions by the Mexican Supreme Court facilitated extraditions
55 See CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-2002, by K. Larry
Storrs.
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to the United States. In November 2005, in a partial reversal of its October 2001 ruling, the Court
found that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is not cruel and unusual
punishment. Then the Court ruled in January 2006 that U.S. extradition requests only need to
meet the requirements of the 1978 bilateral extradition treaty, not Mexico’s general law on
international extradition that was promulgated in 1975.56 That decision made the extradition
process easier. President Calderón has used extradition as a major tool to combat drug traffickers.
Extraditions from Mexico rose from 41 in 2005 to a record 95 in 2008.57
The State Department’s 2009 INCSR maintains that the degree of U.S.-Mexican cooperation on
counternarcotics and law enforcement under the Calderón Administration is unprecedented, and
characterizes President Calderón’s efforts to deal with increased violence stemming from the drug
cartels as courageous. In 2008, Mexican law enforcement seized over 19 metric tons (mt) of
cocaine, down from 48 mt in 2007, while seizures of cannabis, and heroin were also down
significantly. In the report, U.S. law enforcement agencies attribute the recent reductions in
seizures to better Mexican enforcement, which has forced traffickers to seek alternative routes.
The decline in methamphetamine seizures is attributed to the government’s actions to restrict the
importation of precursor chemicals used for the production of the drug.
Mérida Initiative58
The United States and Mexico issued a joint statement on October 22, 2007, announcing a multi-
year plan for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America to combat drug
trafficking and other criminal organizations. The Mérida Initiative, named for the location of a
March 2007 meeting between Presidents Bush and Calderón, expands bilateral and regional
cooperation to combat organized crime, DTOs, and criminal gangs. The stated objective of the
Mérida Initiative, according to the U.S. and Mexican government joint statement, is to maximize
the effectiveness of efforts against drug, human, and weapons trafficking.59 The Bush
Administration first requested funds for Mérida, $500 million for Mexico and $50 million for
Central America, in its FY2008 supplemental appropriations request.60 Due to the grave security
situation in Mexico, Administration officials justified the Mérida request in an emergency
supplemental request rather than the FY2009 regular foreign aid budget request.
To date, Congress has appropriated a total of $1.1 billion for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative.
Legislative action on Mérida appropriations has included the following:
56 Jesus Aranda, “Allana la Corte el Camino para Extraditar a Connacionales a EU,” La Jornada, February 1, 2006;
“Mexico: Court Clears Way for Faster Extraditions to U.S.,” Latin American Weekly Report, February 7, 2006; and,
U.S. Department of State, INCSR 2006.
57 U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, “U.S.-Mexico At a Glance: Extraditions,” February 2009.
58 For more information, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for
Mexico and Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
59 The joint statement highlights counterdrug and anticrime efforts of both countries, including Mexico’s 24% increase
in security spending in 2007 under President Felipe Calderón and U.S. efforts to reduce weapons, human, and drug
trafficking along the Mexican border. Although the statement did not announce additional funding for U.S. domestic
efforts, it cited several examples of such efforts to combat drugs and crime that are already in place. Those examples
included the 2007 Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy and the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy. See U.S.
Department of State and Government of Mexico, “Joint Statement on the Mérida Initiative,” October 22, 2007.
60 For a detailed description of the Bush Administration’s FY2008 supplemental assistance proposal for the Mérida
Initiative, see CRS Report RS22837, Mérida Initiative: U.S. Anticrime and Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and
Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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• In June 2008, the 110th Congress appropriated $352 million in FY2008
supplemental assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge fund supplemental
assistance for Mexico in P.L. 110-252, the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations
Act. In contrast to the Bush Administration, which requested all Mérida funding
in the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account,
Congress divided the funding for Mexico in P.L. 110-252 between the INCLE,
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid
accounts. Congress limited the amount of FMF and INCLE available to provide
equipment to the Mexican Army/Air Force and Navy and made 15% of FMF and
IMET contingent on meeting certain human rights conditions.61 Congress also
earmarked $73.5 million for judicial reform, institution building, rule of law, and
anti-corruption activities.
• In March 2009, the 111th Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Act, (P.L.
111-8) providing $300 million for Mexico within the INCLE, ESF, and FMF
accounts with not less than $75 million for judicial reform, institution building,
anti-corruption, and rule of law activities. The measure continues the same
human rights conditions originally set forth in P.L. 110-252.62
• In June 2009, the 111th Congress passed the FY2009 supplemental appropriations
measure, P.L. 111-32, which includes $160 million in INCLE assistance and $260
million in FMF for Mexico, $354 million more than the Administration’s request.
The $160 million in INCLE funds can be used to supply the Mexican federal
police with items such as forensics and nonintrusive inspection equipment,
computers, training, and fixed and rotary wing aircraft (including the requested
Blackhawk helicopters). The $260 million in FMF funding is for expedited
aviation assistance to the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) to enhance air transport
ability and aerial surveillance. While the INCLE funds provided by P.L. 111-32
are subject to the same human rights conditions as in P.L. 111-8, the FMF funds
provided are not subject to human rights conditions.
For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $450 million for Mexico under Mérida. On
July 9, 2009, the House passed H.R. 3081, the FY2010 State Department-Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, which would provide $235.8 million in security-related assistance for
Mexico in the accounts that formerly constituted the “Mérida Initiative.” Also on July 9, the
Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2010 State-Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill, S. 1434, which would provide $115 million in assistance for Mexico under
the existing Mérida framework. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee reports
61 Human rights conditions for Mexico in P.L. 110-252 include (1) improving transparency and accountability of
federal police forces; (2) establishing a mechanism to conduct regular consultations among relevant Mexican
government authorities, Mexican human rights organizations, and other relevant Mexican civil society organizations, to
make consultations concerning implementation of the Mérida Initiative in accordance with Mexican and international
law; (3) ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and prosecuting, in accordance with
Mexican and international law, members of the federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to
have committed violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces are fully cooperating with the
investigations; and (4) enforcing the prohibition, in accordance with Mexican and international law, on the use of
testimony obtained through torture or other ill-treatment.
62 P.L. 111-8 also has a provision requiring that prior to the procurement or lease of aircraft, that the Director of the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Committees on
Appropriations an analysis of alternatives for the acquisition of all aircraft for the Merida Initiative.
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(H.Rept. 111-187 and S.Rept. 111-44) state that a significant portion of the Administration’s $450
million FY2010 request was “forward-funded” in the FY2009 supplemental.
Table 2. FY2008-FY2010 Mérida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account
($ in millions)
FY2008
FY2009
Supp.
Bridge
FY2009
FY2009
FY2010
FY2010
Funds
Funds
Omnibus
Supp.
House-
Senate
(P.L. 110-
(P.L. 110-
(P.L. 111-
(P.L. 111-
FY2010
passed
Approps.
Account
252)
252)
8)
32)
Request
H.R. 3081
S. 1434
ESF
20.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 0 20.0 10.0
INCLE 215.5 48.0 246.0 160.0 450.0 205.3 105.0
FMF 116.5
0.0
39.0
260.0
0.0
10.5
0
Total
352.0 48.0 300.0 420.0 450.0 235.8 115.0
Sources: U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan and FY2009
Appropriations Spending Plan; FY2009 Supplemental Justification, Department of State & U.S. Agency for
International Development; Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2346, House Report 111-151; U.S.
Department of State, “Summary and Highlights, International Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2010;” House
Report to H.R. 3081, the State-Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2010 , House Report 111-187; and
Senate Report to S.1434, Senate Report 111-044.
Mérida implementation is still in its initial stages. As of late July 2009, roughly $328 million of
the $340.2 million in FY2008 funds available at that time had been obligated. 63 INCLE funds had
supported a bilateral arms trafficking workshop held in Mexico in April 2009, the opening of
three new immigration control sites along the Mexico-Guatemala border, the creation of an anti-
human trafficking system for the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, and the implementation of a
train-the-trainer program for Mexican federal prison officers.64 FMF funds had enabled the
Department of Defense to sign a contract for five Bell 412 helicopters that may begin arriving in
Mexico in late 2009. Ion scanners and a CASA surveillance aircraft, which is in the process of
being ordered, will also be purchased with FY2008 supplemental funding. ESF funds had enabled
USAID to sponsor workshops and study tours for Mexican legal professionals and to co-host a
forum on citizen participation councils and public security. USAID also formed four new
university partnerships to support Mexico’s judicial modernization efforts.65
The mid-August submission of the State Department’s human rights progress report for Mexico
meets the statutory requirement for the release of the FY2008 supplemental and FY2009 regular
FMF and IMET funds that had been on hold. Those funds total roughly $88.5 million. Some $2.8
million in FY2008 funding is still on hold, however, until Congress is certain that the Mexican
Attorney General is thoroughly investigating the murder of Bradley Will, an American journalist
killed while covering a protest in Oaxaca in 2006.
63 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet provided to CRS, July 22, 2009;
64 David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, “The Merida Initiative: A New Security Cooperation Partnership,” National Strategy Forum, Fall
2009.
65 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Merida Status Update for CRS,” July 22, 2009.
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Beyond the Mérida Initiative
In March 2009 congressional testimony, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano noted
that the United States has a significant security stake in helping Mexico in its efforts against the
drug cartels and organized crime. She outlined three major roles for the U.S. government to play:
(1) providing assistance to Mexico to defeat the cartels and suppress the flare-up of violence in
Mexico; (2) taking action on the U.S. side of the border to cripple smuggling enterprises; and (3)
guarding against and preparing for the possible spillover of violence into the United States.
Secretary Napolitano noted that there already has been a limited increase in drug-related violence
in the United States (such as a rise in kidnappings and weapons violations in cities close to the
border such as Phoenix), but maintained that the increase is not the same kind or nearly the same
scale as in Mexico.66
In a speech on August 11, 2009, Secretary Napolitano said that the “valiant campaign by Mexico
to confront the power of drug cartels in that country ... has resulted in more than 12,000 deaths
[since 2006].” She asserted, however, “We haven’t seen anything near this order of violence in
the United States. Our progress over the past few months to bolster enforcement efforts at the
border and support Mexico has already prevented this type of violence from entering the United
States.”67
Beyond the various programs and projects under the Mérida Initiative, the United States is
providing significant additional efforts through several agencies to combat Mexican drug cartels
and bolster border security.
Apart from the Mérida Initiative, the Department of Defense provided a $13 million
counterterrorism training and equipment package to the Mexican military in FY2008.68 In
addition, while DOD provided only some $3.1 million in CN training assistance to Mexico in
FY2008, DOD assistance expanded to roughly $28.2 million in FY2009 in order to complement
Mérida programs.69 On July 30, 2009, the House passed its version of the FY2010 Defense
Appropriations Act, H.R. 3326, which includes a provision that would reportedly provide $160
million worth of first responder radios to Mexican police.70
Components of the Department of Homeland Security are also providing significant assistance.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has created a dozen Border Enforcement Security
Taskforces (BESTs) since 2006, including eight on the U.S. southwest border. The taskforces
66 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Testimony of Secretary of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano, hearing on “Southern Border Violence: Homeland Security Threats, Vulnerabilities, and
Responsibilities,” March 25, 2009.
67 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, Remarks to Border Security Conference, El
Paso, Texas, August 11, 2009.
68 In the FY2006-FY2008 annual Department of Defense (DOD) authorization bills, Congress provided DOD with
authority to train and equip foreign military forces to perform counterterrorism operations. This “Section 1206”
authority, as it is known, enables DOD to use defense funds to conduct or support train and equip programs such as
those usually provided under State Department security assistance authorities and budgets. U.S. Department of
Defense, “Section 1206 Programs Fact Sheet.” July 29, 2009.
69 Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) extends Section
1033(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 to make available train and equip authorities to
Mexico. Estimates of DOD CN support to Mexico for FY2008 and FY2009 are from U.S. Department of Defense,
“Fact Sheet: Current DOD CN Support to Mexico,” July 2009.
70 Carol D. Leoning, “Murtha, 12 Colleagues Back a Murky $160 Million Request,” Washington Post, July 23, 2009.
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serve as platforms for cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies as well as a point of
cooperation with Mexico’s Secretary of Public Security (SSP).71 ICE has also coordinated the
establishment of Special Investigative Units in Mexico that work with ICE special agents
assigned in Mexico on criminal investigations and prosecutions in such areas as money
laundering and alien trafficking and smuggling. DHS components such as ICE, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard have long standing relationships with their
Mexican counterparts to jointly disrupt the activities of drug trafficking organizations. As
discussed below, various DHS components are involved in efforts to deter money laundering and
bulk cash smuggling, weapons trafficking, and human smuggling.72
In late March 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced increased efforts to combat
Mexican drug cartels in the United States and to help Mexican law enforcement battle the cartels
in their own country. Deputy Attorney General David Ogden is leading a Mexican Cartel Strategy
that uses federal prosecutor-led task forces that bring together all law enforcement components to
identify and dismantle the cartels through investigation, prosecution, and extradition of their key
leaders and facilitators. Department of Justice components involved in the increased efforts
include the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), U.S. Marshals Service (USM), and the Department’s Criminal
Division and the Office of Justice Programs.73
ATF has begun a new intelligence-driven effort known as Gunrunner Impact Teams (GRITs) and
also is beefing up its Project Gunrunner program along with eTrace to stop the flow of guns to
Mexico. (For more see “Weapons Trafficking” section below.)
DEA has worked with the Mexican government for decades and has 11 offices in the country. The
agency is increasing its agents allocated to the Southwest border field divisions and is forming
mobile teams to target Mexican methamphetamine trafficking operations. DEA’s cooperation with
Mexico has included Project Reckoning targeting the Gulf Cartel and Operation Xcellerator
targeting the Sinaloa Cartel. DEA also is the lead agency at the El Paso Intelligence Center
(EPIC), a national tactical intelligence center that emphasizes law enforcement efforts on the
Southwest border.
Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling
Interrupting the flow of money from drug sales in the United States to Mexico, estimated to range
from $15 billion to $25 billion annually,74 may be one of the most effective ways to disrupt the
activities of the Mexican DTOs. A portion of this money is used to buy weapons in the United
States to arm the DTOs and their drug enforcers. Other drug proceeds are used to corrupt law
enforcement and public officials, enabling the DTOs to continue to operate with impunity. Some
71 For more information, see http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080226best_fact_sheet.htm.
72 Ibid; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement of Mark Koumans, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office
of International Affairs,” before House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, March 10,
2009.
73 U.S. Department of Justice, “Department of Justice Announces Resources for Fight against Mexican Drug Cartels,”
Fact Sheet, March 24, 2009; and “Fact Sheet: Department of Justice Efforts to Combat Mexican Drug Cartels,” US Fed
News, April 4, 2009.
74 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute, The United States and Mexico: Towards a
Strategic Partnership, January 2009.
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analysts suggest that the U.S. Treasury is doing a good job of making it difficult to launder money
within financial institutions. Therefore, the preferred mode to transfer drug proceeds by the
Mexican DTOs is through shipments of bulk cash.75
In order to address the problem of bulk cash smuggling, the DEA has carried out bulk cash
seizures with the FBI, ICE, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In 2005, ICE and CBP
launched a program known as “Operation Firewall,” which resulted in increased operations
against bulk cash smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border region. Since 2005, Operation Firewall
has resulted in 452 arrests and the seizure of more than $195 million.76 Many operations have
been carried out in coordination with Mexican customs and the Mexican money laundering vetted
unit. In 2008, ICE created a Trade Transparency Unit (TTU) in Mexico. Mexican TTU
representatives are receiving training and technical support from ICE officials in how to identify
cross-border trade anomalies that could be indicative of bulk cash smuggling.
Precursor Chemicals
Reducing the trafficking of chemicals necessary for drug manufacture is addressed in the Mérida
Initiative joint statement. The recent NDIC report of the U.S. Department of Justice credits
Mexico’s recently established import restrictions on products containing methamphetamine
precursors with reducing Mexican methamphetamine shipments to the United States in 2007 and
2008.77 Strong bilateral cooperation between the United States and Mexico has resulted in large
drug seizures including the shutting down of five “super” methamphetamine laboratories in
Mexico in 2008 according to the Department of State’s 2009 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report released in February 2009.
Weapons Trafficking78
The ATF estimates that 90% of the firearms recovered from crime scenes in Mexico originated in
the United States.79 Mexican drug cartels and enforcer gangs are relying on more powerful
weapons, and reportedly are buying semiautomatic versions of the AK-47 and AR-15 style
assault rifles, and other military-style firearms in the United States. The cartels often obtain their
weapons through “straw purchases,” whereby people who are legally qualified buy the weapons
from licensed gun dealers or at gun shows in border states and sell them to smugglers who take
them across the border. In November 2008, the Mexican government made the largest seizure of
75 Testimony of Andrew Selee, Director of the Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center before the House
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
March 12, 2009.
76 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Statement of John T. Morton, Assistant Secretary, ICE, before the House
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, June 11, 2009.
77 National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, U.S. Department of Justice, Product
2008-Q0317-005, December 2008.
78 For more information, see CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and
William J. Krouse.
79 U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, “U.S.-Mexico at a Glance: Combating Illicit Firearms,” February 2009. The
90% figure is disputed because it only covers guns that are recovered and turned over to the U.S. government for
tracing. An underdetermined fraction of the weapons recovered from crimes by the Mexican government are not turned
over to the United States for tracing.
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drug-cartel weapons in Mexican history when it found a cache of 540 rifles, 15 grenades, 500,000
rounds of ammunition, and 14 sticks of TNT at a house in the border town of Reynosa, Mexico.80
The ATF began a Southwest border initiative dubbed Project Gunrunner in FY2004 that aims to
deny firearms to criminal organizations in Mexico, and to combat firearms-related violence
affecting communities on both sides of the border. 81 The number of ATF personnel dedicated to
Project Gunrunner has increased from around 100 special agents and 25 industry operations
investigators in FY2007, to some 148 special agents and 59 industry operations investigators in
March 2009.82 From FY2004 through June 2009, ATF referred 882 cases for prosecution
involving more than 1,838 defendants, including almost 415 cases for firearms trafficking
involving more than 1,135 defendants and almost 13,382 guns.83 The 111th Congress has
approved legislation providing additional funding to support Project Gunrunner. The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), signed into law February 17, 2009,
provided $10 million for Project Gunrunner. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8),
signed into law March 11, 2009, provided another $5 million.
In addition to these efforts in the United States, under the Mérida Initiative, ATF received $4.5
million for the deployment of eTrace firearms tracking technology to U.S. Consulates in Mexico
to combat arms trafficking.84 In FY2008, Mexico submitted more than 7,500 recovered guns for
tracing, showing that most originated in Texas, Arizona, and California.85
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), especially ICE and CBP are also involved in
taking action to stop the southbound flow of weapons to Mexico. Both ICE and CBP have the
authority to enforce export provisions of the Arms Exports Control Act. In collaboration with
Mexican law enforcement authorities, ICE launched a new bilateral program against weapons
smuggling in June 2008 known as Operation Armas Cruzadas. Among other activities, the
program involves intelligence sharing and joint law enforcement efforts with vetted Mexican
units. As DHS reported in March 2009, the operation has resulted in more than 100 criminal
arrests, 42 convictions, and the seizure of more than 400 weapons.86
On June 18, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report identifying
some problems that exist in the information-gathering and coordination efforts of U.S. agencies
80 “Mexico: Army Seizes Huge Weapons Cache,” Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2008.
81 For background on ATF funding and Project Gunrunner, see CRS Report RL34514, The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): Budget and Operations, by William J. Krouse.
82 U.S. Embassy, Mexico, “Border and Law Enforcement, Project Gunrunner,” ATF Factsheet, available at
http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/texts/et080116eTrace.html; and Department of Justice, Statement of William
Hoover, Assistant Director for Field Operations, ATF, and Anthony P. Placido, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence
Division, DEA, before Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, March 17, 2009.
83 DOJ, Statement of Anthony P. Placido, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence Division, DEA, and Bill McMahon,
Deputy Assistant Director, ATF, before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime,
and Global Counterterrorism, July 16, 2009.
84 U.S. Department of Justice, “Statement of Joseph M. Arabit, Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division, Drug
Enforcement Administration, and William McMahon, Deputy Assistant Director, Field Operations, ATF,” before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 30, 2009.
85 U.S. Department of Justice, “Department of Justice Announces Resources for Fight against Mexican Drug Cartels,”
Fact Sheet, March 24, 2009.
86 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement of Mark Koumans, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of
International Affairs,” before House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, March 10,
2009.
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charged with combating arms trafficking to Mexico, namely ATF within DOJ and ICE within
DHS.87 The two agencies have since signed an updated agreement on how to coordinate their
Southwest border gun trafficking programs. Further, on August 13, 2009, DHS and DOJ, along
with Mexico, signed a letter of intent to develop a coordinated, bilateral arms trafficking strategy,
another recommendation suggested in the GAO report.
Mexico, for its part, began a pilot program in February 2009 to screen incoming traffic to look for
guns, bulk cash, and other contraband, and is expanding the program across the entire border. On
August 16, 2009, the Mexican government replaced all of the customs inspectors posted at the
country’s airports and border crossings with 1,454 new, better-trained inspectors. Those
inspectors are now using non-intrusive inspection equipment provided through the Merida
Initiative to check vehicles entering Mexico for arms and/or cash smuggled from the United
States.
In light of intensified U.S. efforts to curb weapons trafficking to Mexico, some advocates have
called for the U.S. Senate to act on a pending treaty, the Inter-American Convention Against the
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related
Materials (CIFTA).88 The treaty, which was signed by the United States in 1997 entered into
force in July 1998, was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent in June 1998.89
President Obama called for congressional action on CIFTA while in Mexico in April 2009.
Human Smuggling
The Operation Against Smuggling Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS) is a bilateral effort
begun in August 2005 to combat human smuggling. The program, spearheaded by ICE and
several Mexican agencies, was initially limited to the area between San Diego, California and
Yuma, Arizona, but was extended to El Paso, Texas in April 2006. In August 2007, the United
States and Mexico agreed to extend the program to the Mexican state of Coahuila and the area
between El Paso and Eagle Pass, Texas. The program assists both the Mexican and U.S.
governments in the prosecution of alien smugglers and human traffickers along the southwest
border. According to DHS, with funding from the Mérida Initiative, Mexico intends to implement
the program across the entire United States-Mexico border. 90
Human Rights Issues
According to the State Department’s human rights report covering 2008, the Mexican government
generally respected human rights at the national level by investigating, prosecuting, and
sentencing public officials and members of the security forces accused of abuses, but serious
problems remained. These included unlawful killing by security forces; kidnappings; physical
87 U.S. GAO, U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico: Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, GAO-
09-709, June 2009.
88 Peter DeShazo and Johnna Mendelson Forman, “A treaty that can help stem drug violence in Mexico,” Washington
Times, February 24, 2009.
89 U.S. Department of State, The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials,” Fact Sheet, March 25, 2009
90 House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Statement of Mark Koumans, Deputy y
Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs, at hearing on “DHS Security Response to Violence on the Border
with Mexico,” March 10, 2009.
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abuse; poor and overcrowded prison conditions; arbitrary arrests and detention; corruption,
inefficiency and lack of transparency in the judicial system; confessions coerced through torture;
criminal intimidation of journalists leading to self-censorship; impunity and corruption at all
levels of government; domestic violence against women; trafficking in persons; social and
economic discrimination against some members of the indigenous population; and child labor.
The State Department report maintained that the government or its forces did not commit any
politically motivated killings, but that there were reports that security forces killed several people
during the year in various cases. The report asserted that cruel treatment and physical abuse of
security forces, especially at the state and local level, remained a serious problem. Corruption was
reported to be a major problem, particularly at the state and local level, with police involved in
kidnapping, extortion, or providing protection for organized crime and drug traffickers. Impunity
was pervasive, according to the report, and was a reason that many victims were reluctant to file
complaints.
In the case of the American journalist Bradley Will, shot and killed while covering a protest in
Oaxaca in 2006, the State Department report noted that Mexico’s National Human Rights
Commission (CNDH) issued a report in September 2008 criticizing the federal and Oaxacan state
investigations into the killing and implicating Oaxacan state officials. In October 2008, the
government arrested three antigovernment protestors for the killing, maintaining that Will was
shot at close range. Human rights groups and the CNDH maintain that Will was shot at a
distance.91
In its 2009 human rights report, the New York-based Human Rights Watch asserted that Mexico’s
criminal justice system remained plagued with human rights problems; that persons under arrest
face torture and ill-treatment; and that law enforcement officials often neglect to investigate and
prosecute those responsible for human rights violations. On a more positive note, the report
praised the Mexican government’s approval of justice reform legislation in 2008 that created the
basis for an adversarial criminal justice system with oral trials and the presumption of innocence.
It raised concerns, however, that individuals suspected of being involved in organized crime
could be held for up to 80 days without being charged.92
Compliance with Human Rights Conditions in the Mérida Initiative
Human rights organizations generally lauded the inclusion of human rights conditions in Mérida
Initiative appropriations legislation. More recently, however, there have been concerns that
Mexico has not been fulfilling the conditions set forth in the legislation. In particular, Mexican
and international human rights groups have criticized the Mexican government for failing to hold
military and police officials accountable for past abuses. In late April 2009, Human Rights Watch
released a report detailing 17 human rights cases (including several from 2007 and 2008) in
which military members were allegedly responsible.93 On July 13, 2009, Human Rights Watch
issued a statement asserting that “Mexican military courts ... have not convicted a single member
91 Elisabeth Malkin, “Mexico Says U.S. Journalist Was Killed by a Protester,” New York Times, October 18, 2008.
92 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2009, January 2009, pp. 191-195.
93 Human Rights Watch, Uniform Impunity, Mexico’s Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses in
Counternarcotics and Public Security Operations, April 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/29/
mexico-hold-military-account-rights-abuses.
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of the military accused of committing a serious human rights violation.”94 The head of the
Mexican military’s human rights office held a press conference on July 23, 2009, to dispute those
assertions, but reportedly did not provide details on particular cases that had been successfully
prosecuted in the military justice system.95 In late July, a coalition of U.S. and Mexican human
rights groups sent a letter to the State Department urging it not to issue a favorable report on the
Mexican government’s human rights record.96
On August 13, 2009, the State Department submitted its human rights progress report for Mexico
to Congress, thereby meeting the statutory requirements for FY2008 supplemental and FY2009
regular funds that had been on hold to be released. While acknowledging that serious problems
remain, the report outlines steps that the Mexican government has made to improve police
transparency and accountability, consult with Mexican human rights organizations and civil
society on the Mérida Initiative, investigate and prosecute allegations of human rights abuses by
security forces, and prohibit the use of torture. The report acknowledges that human rights
complaints against the Mexican military have “increased almost six-fold” since the beginning of
the Calderon government. It also states that “the opaqueness of the [Mexican] military court
system makes it difficult to analyze the nature and type of complaints filed, the status of cases
against members of the military alleged to have violated human rights, or the results of the
military prosecution.”97
Accountability for Abuses Committed During the “Dirty War” Period
During his administration, President Fox pledged to investigate and prosecute those responsible
for past human rights violations, including the “Dirty War” period from the 1960s to 1980s. The
CNDH presented a report to President Fox in November 2001 that documented human rights
abuses and disappearances of persons in the 1970s and early 1980s, and President Fox named
legal scholar Ignacio Carrillo in January 2002 as a Special Prosecutor to investigate these and
other cases. In November 2006, Ignacio Carrillo presented his final report on the repressive era
from the late 1960s to 1982. The report found that the repression was a matter of state policy and
led to the summary execution of over 700 Mexicans; torture; and the razing of villages.
The report was praised by some as an acknowledgment of state responsibility. Others remain
critical since no one has been convicted of charges relating to these alleged crimes. Only one of
the three presidents from this period, Luis Echeverria (1970-1976), is still alive. President
Echeverria faced genocide charges for his role in the repression of a 1968 student protest that left
dozens dead when he was interior minister. Echeverria tried to evade prosecution by claiming the
30-year statute of limitations had expired. A judge rejected this argument and reinstated the arrest
order in November 2006 after he determined that the statute of limitations did not go into effect
until Echeverria left public office in December 1976. In July 2007, the Criminal Tribunal
absolved Echeverria of any responsibility for the 1968 killings. This ruling was upheld by a
Mexican federal court in March 2009, and was criticized by human rights organizations. Amnesty
94 Human Rights Watch, “Mexico: U.S. Should Withhold Military Aid: Rights Conditions in Merida Initiative Remain
Unmet,” July 13, 1009, available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/13/mexico-us-should-withhold-military-aid.
95 Booth and Fainaru, August 5, 2009.
96 Letter from Amnesty International and Other Human Rights Groups to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Human
Rights Concerns to Inform the U.S. Department of State’s Merida Initiative Reporting on Mexico, July 24, 2009.
97 U.S. Department of State, “Mexico- Merida Initiative Report,” August 2009.
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International maintains that the Mexican government is effectively condoning the abuses of the
past by not effectively prosecuting past human rights cases.98
Migration
Widely cited demographers at the Pew Hispanic Center estimate that there were 7 million
undocumented Mexican migrants residing in the United States as of March 2008, accounting for
almost 59% of the total estimated illegal alien population of 11.9 million.99 Mexico takes the view
that the migrants are “undocumented workers,” making the point that since the U.S. market
attracts and provides employment for the migrants, it bears some responsibility. Mexico regularly
voices concern about alleged abuses suffered by Mexican workers in the United States, and for
the loss of life and hardships suffered by Mexican migrants as they utilize increasingly dangerous
routes and methods to circumvent tighter border controls. Mexico benefits from illegal migration
in at least two ways: (1) it is a “safety valve” that dissipates the political discontent that could
arise from higher unemployment in Mexico, and (2) it is a source of remittances by workers in the
United States to families in Mexico.
In February 2006, the Mexican Congress approved a concurrent resolution on migration and
border security calling for the development of a guest worker program in the United States under
the principle of shared responsibility. The resolution commits Mexico to enforcing legal
emigration “if a guest country offers a sufficient number of appropriate visas.”100 In the
resolution, Mexico also accepts the need to revisit its migration policies to consider enforcement
of its northern and southern borders, enforcement of Mexican immigration laws that respect the
human rights of migrants, and the need to combat human trafficking. The Mexican government
further acknowledges that Mexican workers will continue to emigrate until there are more
opportunities in Mexico. That February 2006 resolution remains the most detailed explanation to
date of the major principles behind Mexico’s policy on immigration.
The U.S. Congress last enacted major immigration reform in 1986 and 1996. Main provisions of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-603) included civil and criminal
penalties for U.S. employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers; increased border
control and enforcement measures; anti-discrimination safeguards; provision for legalization of
illegal aliens who resided continuously in the United States before 1982; and a special
legalization for farm workers previously employed on American farms. In 1996, two laws relating
to immigration were enacted, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208) and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). The first measure sought to control illegal
immigration by adding 1,000 Border Patrol agents per year for five years (FY1997-FY2001),
along with additional personnel, equipment, and procedures. The IIRIRA increased penalties for
unlawful presence and created the expedited removal program.101 Individuals who depart the
United States after more than 180 days of unlawful presence now face either a three or 10-year
bar to admission to the United States, depending on the total period of unlawful presence.
98 “Mexico: Hopes of Justice Vanish,” Amnesty International, March 27, 2009.
99 Pew Hispanic Center, Trends in Undocumented Immigration: Undocumented Inflow Now Trails Legal Inflow, by
Jeffrey Passel and D’Vera Cohn, October 2, 2008.
100 “Mexico-U.S.: Migration and Border Security,” Embassy of Mexico, February 2006.
101 For more information on expedited removal, see CRS Report RL33109, Immigration Policy on Expedited Removal
of Aliens, by Alison Siskin and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
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In the 110th Congress, the U.S. Senate voted against cloture on the Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1348) in June 2007, and the measure was not considered after that vote.
The bill would have improved border security, established a temporary worker program, and
normalized the status of most illegal immigrants in the United States. Mexico has long lobbied for
such reforms. Immigration reform legislation also was introduced in the House of Representatives
in March 2007. The House measure, the Security Through Regularized Immigration and Vibrant
Economy Act of 2007 (H.R. 1645), would have set border and document security benchmarks to
be met before normalizing the status of illegal immigrant or the creation of a guest worker
program. A variety of other migration-related legislative initiatives were introduced in the 110th
Congress, but no action was taken.102
It is unclear whether comprehensive immigration legislation will be considered in the 111th
Congress.103 During Secretary of State Clinton’s March 2009 visit to Mexico, she maintained that
“President Obama remains committed to comprehensive immigration reform” and that
immigration reform “is and will be a high priority for him and his presidency.” On June 25, 2009,
President Obama and officials in his Administration met with Members of Congress from both
parties on comprehensive immigration reform. During that meeting, he announced the formation
of a high-level working group headed by DHS Secretary Napolitano to work with Members from
the relevant House and Senate committees that will be drafting immigration legislation.104 At the
North American Leaders Summit in early August, President Obama acknowledged that since
several of his other major legislative initiatives are still pending, immigration reform is unlikely
to occur until early 2010.105
Trade Issues106
Trade between Mexico and the United States has grown dramatically since the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada entered into
force in 1994.107 Total U.S. trade with Mexico more than quadrupled from $82 billion in 1993 to
$367 billion in 2008, but the balance of U.S. trade with Mexico has shifted from a surplus of $1.3
billion in 1994 to a deficit of $64.4 billion in 2008 (U.S. exports of $151.5 billion; U.S. imports
of $215.9 billion). Despite the deficit, Mexico has been one of the fastest growing export markets
for the United States in recent years. In 2008, Mexico remained the second largest U.S. export
market in 2008 after Canada and ranked third in U.S imports after China and Canada.108
102 For a brief history of U.S.-Mexican migration policies, see: Marc R. Rosenblum, “U.S.-Mexican Migration
Cooperation: Obstacles and Opportunities,” in Migration, Trade and Development: Conference Proceedings, Hollifield
et al, eds., Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2007.
103 For more information, see: CRS Report R40501, Immigration Reform Issues in the 111th Congress, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
104 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President After Meeting with Members of
Congress to Discuss Immigration,” June 25, 2009.
105 Karoun Demirjian, “Obama Says Immigration Overhaul Will Slide Until 2010,” CQ Today, August 11, 2009.
106 For more information, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
107 The NAFTA agreement was negotiated in 1991 and 1992, and side agreements on labor and environmental matters
were completed in 1993. The agreements were approved by the respective legislatures in late 1993 and went into force
on January 1, 1994. Under the agreements, trade and investment restrictions were eliminated over a 15-year period,
with most restrictions eliminated in the early years of the agreement.
108 U.S. Department of Commerce statistics, as presented by World Trade Atlas.
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The United States is Mexico’s most important customer by far, receiving about 80% of Mexico’s
exports, including petroleum, automobiles, auto parts, and winter vegetables, and providing about
50% of Mexico’s imports. The United States is the source of over 60% of foreign investment in
Mexico, and the primary source of important tourism earnings. Mexico is also the leading country
in Latin America in terms of U.S. investment, with the total stock of U.S. investment reaching
more than $120 billion in 2008.109
While NAFTA has increased Mexican trade with the United States and contributed to rising
foreign investment in the country, it has also increased Mexico’s dependence on the U.S.
economy. Declining U.S. demand for Mexican exports, combined with a drop in tourism revenues
and remittances from Mexican workers in the United States, have caused a dramatic downturn in
the Mexican economy. Analysts predict that Mexico’s economy will be among the poorest
performing in Latin America this year, and that the country’s GDP will contract by more than 7%.
They have attributed the severity of the current crisis in Mexico to a lack of diversification in the
country’s export markets.110
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions
Several NAFTA institutions mandated by the agreements have been functioning since 1994. The
tripartite Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established in Montreal,
Canada; and the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) was established in Dallas, Texas. In
addition, the bilateral Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), located in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico; and the North American Development Bank (NADBank), headquartered in San
Antonio, Texas, were created to promote and finance environment projects along the U.S.-Mexico
border. Following up on a March 2002 agreement by Presidents Bush and Fox in Monterrey,
Mexico, to broaden the mandate of the NADBank, Congress agreed in March 2004 to permit the
NADBank to make grants and nonmarket rate loans for environmental infrastructure along the
border. The NAFTA institutions have operated to encourage cooperation on trade, environmental
and labor issues, and to consider nongovernmental petitions under the labor and environmental
side agreements.
Trade Disputes
Outstanding trade disputes between the countries include access for Mexican trucks to operate in
the United States and access for Mexican tuna to the U.S. market. A longstanding dispute
involving sugar and high fructose corn syrup was resolved in 2006.111
Trucking112
Since 1995, the implementation of NAFTA trucking provisions has been in dispute. In March
2009, Congress included a provision in P.L. 111-8, the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, to
109 U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, “U.S.-Mexico at a Glance: Foreign Direct Investment,” June 2009.
110 “Mexico: No Help From NAFTA,” EIU – Business Latin America, August 17, 2009.
111 For more information on recent trade disputes, see CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends,
Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
112 For further information, see CRS Report RL31738, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking Across the Mexican Border, by John Frittelli.
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terminate a pilot program that had allowed Mexican-registered trucks to operate beyond the 25-
mile border commercial zone inside the United States. This move prompted retaliation from
Mexico, which argued that the U.S. action was protectionist. Mexico imposed tariffs on over 90
U.S. agricultural and industrial products. The goods accounted for a value of $2.4 billion in U.S.
exports to Mexico in 2007, and most will now face Mexican import duties of between 10-20% of
their value, although in the case of fresh grapes, a 45% duty was imposed.113
Obama Administration officials have repeatedly expressed confidence that a resolution to the
current trucking dispute can be found that will satisfy congressional concerns about the safety of
Mexican trucks, but still fulfill U.S. market access obligations under NAFTA. In March 2009,
Secretary of State Clinton acknowledged that Mexico had the right to use remedies under NAFTA
to impose tariffs on U.S. products, but maintained that neither the U.S. congressional action on
Mexican trucking nor Mexico’s retaliation were in the best interests of either country.114
Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood submitted a set of principles on how to resolve the issue to
the White House in May 2009. President Obama reiterated his commitment to resolving the issue
to President Calderon at their August 9, 2009, meeting in Guadalajara, Mexico, but did not
present a proposal.
While some Members of Congress favor the creation of a new pilot program with Mexico, others,
though concerned about the effects of Mexican retaliatory tariffs on U.S. businesses, remain
staunchly opposed to allowing Mexican trucks to operate in the United States. 115 In late July
2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee issued a report (S.Rept. 111-69) to the FY2010
Department of Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies
Appropriations measure (H.R. 3288) that includes non-binding language urging the Obama
Administration to develop a cross-border trucking program that meets U.S. safety standards.
Tuna
On tuna issues, the Clinton Administration lifted the embargo on Mexican tuna in April 2000
under relaxed standards for a dolphin-safe label in accordance with internationally agreed
procedures and U.S. legislation passed in 1997 that encouraged the unharmed release of dolphins
from nets. However, a federal judge in San Francisco ruled that the standards of the law had not
been met, and the Federal Appeals Court in San Francisco sustained the ruling in July 2001.
Under the Bush Administration, the Commerce Department ruled on December 31, 2002, that the
dolphin-safe label may be applied if qualified observers certify that no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured in the netting process, but Earth Island Institute and other environmental groups
filed suit to block the modification. On April 10, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California enjoined the Commerce Department from modifying the standards for the
dolphin-safe label. On August 9, 2004, the federal district court ruled against the Bush
Administration’s modification of the dolphin-safe standards, and reinstated the original standards
in the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act. That decision was appealed to the
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled against the Administration in April 2007,
113 Christopher Conkey, Jose de Cordoba, and Jim Carlton, “Mexico Issues Tariff List in U.S. Trucking Dispute,” Wall
Street Journal, March 19, 2009.
114 U.S. Department of State, “Press Availability at TecMilenio University,” March 26, 2009.
115 For the opposing point of view, see: “Kirk Agrees to Work to Minimize Effects of Mexican Trucking Dispute,”
Inside U.S. Trade, August 14, 2009.
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finding that the Department of Commerce did not base its determination on scientific studies of
the effects of Mexican tuna fishing on dolphins.
In late October 2008, Mexico initiated World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute proceedings
against United States, maintaining that U.S. requirements for Mexican tuna exporters prevents
them from using the U.S. “dolphin-safe” label for its products.116 In April 2009, the WTO agreed
to set up a dispute panel to rule on Mexico’s complaint. The United States maintained that the
dispute should be handled by a NAFTA dispute panel instead of a WTO panel. Since that time,
U.S. and Mexican negotiators have held discussions, but no significant progress toward a
resolution has been made.117
North American Cooperation on Security and Economic Issues
In addition to the increased U.S.-Mexican bilateral cooperation that has occurred during the past
two decades, trilateral cooperation between the United States, Mexico, and Canada has also
increased, particularly since NAFTA took effect. During the second George W. Bush
Administration, annual meetings between the North American leaders and their ministers took
place within the framework of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America,
established in March of 2005. 118 Through the SPP, which consisted of expanded cooperation and
harmonization of policies, the three governments sought to advance the common security and
prosperity of their countries. To make this partnership operational, the leaders established
ministerial-led working groups to develop measurable and achievable goals in priority areas:
competitiveness, smart and secure borders, energy security and environmental protection, food
and product safety, and emergency response. Beginning in June 2005, the SPP working groups
provided annual reports to the three North American leaders on their work and key
accomplishments, with the last SPP report submitted prior to the April 2008 North American
Leaders’ Summit.
Although President Obama and his counterparts in Mexico and Canada no longer refer to
trilateral cooperation as occurring under the SPP initiative, North American cooperation continues
to occur on a wide range of economic and security issues. As previously discussed, the most
recent North American Leaders’ Summit took place in Guadalajara, Mexico on August 9-10,
2009. In addition to important discussions that occurred with respect to combating drug
trafficking and preparing for the fall flu season, the leaders produced, among other things, a list of
energy deliverables aimed at reducing carbon emissions in North America.119 The leaders also
committed to meet again in Canada in 2010.
116 “Mexico Initiates WTO Dispute Proceeding Against U.S. ‘Dolphin-Safe’ Label for Tuna,” International Trade
Reporter, October 30, 2008.
117 “WTO Sets Up Panel to Rule on Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Case; U.S. Wants NAFTA Panel,” International
Trade Reporter, April 23, 2009; “Kirk Highlights Truck Solution Over Challenge of Mexican Sanctions,” Inside U.S.
Trade, July 31, 2009.
118 For more information, see CRS Report RS22701, Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: An
Overview and Selected Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Jennifer E. Lake; also see the website of the SPP, available
at http://www.spp.gov/
119 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “North American Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change and
Clean Energy,” August 10, 2009.
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Legislation in the 111th Congress
Enacted and Considered Legislation
P.L. 111-5 (H.R. 1), American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Signed into law
February 17, 2009, the measure provides $220 million for construction for the water quantity
program of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. The
measure also provides $40 million in Department of Justice state and local law enforcement
assistance for competitive grants to provide assistance and equipment along the southern border
and in high-intensity drug trafficking areas to combat criminal narcotics activity, of which $10
million is to be transferred to ATF for Project Gunrunner.
P.L. 111-8 (H.R. 1105), Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009. Signed into law March 11, 2009.
In Division H, the measure appropriates $300 million for Mexico as a second installment under
the Mérida Initiative. In Division I, Section 136, the measure prohibits funds in the Act from
being used for a pilot program granting certain Mexican trucks access to U.S. highways beyond
the commercial zone. In the joint explanatory statement for Division B, not less than $5 million is
provided for Project Gunrunner and other firearms trafficking efforts targeting Mexico and the
border region.
P.L. 111-32 (H.R. 2346), Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009. Signed into law June 24,
2009, the measure appropriates $420 million in Mérida Initiative funding for Mexico: $160
million in INCLE assistance and $260 million in FMF assistance. Of the $420 million in FY2009
supplemental assistance to Mexico, 15% of the $160 million in INCLE assistance is subject to the
same human rights conditions set forth in P.L. 111-8, section 7045(e) of Division H. However, the
FMF funds appropriated are not subject to human rights conditions. According to the conference
report (H.Rept. 111-151), the supplemental measure requires a report from the Secretary of State
within 45 days of enactment of the measure detailing actions by the government of Mexico since
June 30, 2008, to investigate and prosecute human rights violations by members of the Mexican
federal police and military forces. The report also calls for a “thorough, independent, and credible
investigation” of the murder of Bradley Will, an American journalist killed while covering a
protest in Oaxaca in 2006.
H.R. 2410 (Berman) Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2010 and FY2011. Introduced
May 14, 2009; House Committee on Foreign Affairs held markup and ordered the bill reported
(H.Rept. 111-136). House approved June 22, 2009. Title IX, Subtitle A of the bill, as introduced,
consists of actions to enhance the Mérida Initiative, including the designation of a high-level
coordinator within the Department of State to implement the program; the addition of Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) countries to the Mérida Initiative; the establishment and
implementation of a program to assess the effectiveness of assistance provided under the Mérida
Initiative; within 180 days and not later than December 1 of each year thereafter, a reporting
requirement regarding the programs and activities carried out under the Mérida Initiative. Title
IX, Subtitle B of the bill would require the President to establish an inter-agency task force on the
prevention of illicit small arms trafficking in the Western Hemisphere; increase penalties for illicit
trafficking in small arms and light weapons; and express congressional support for the ratification
by the United States of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA).
H.Amdt. 201 (King) to H.R. 2410, introduced and agreed to on June 10, 2009, provides that the
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Secretary of State shall report to Congress on the flow of people, goods, and services across the
borders shared by the United States, Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, and the Caribbean nations.
H.R. 2647 (Skelton)/S. 1390 (Levin), National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010. House
approved June 25, 2009. Senate approved July 23, 2009, with an amendment substituting the
language of S. 1390. House and Senate are resolving differences. The measure contains a
provision that allows for the Department of Defense to continue providing support for counter-
drug activities in Mexico.
H.R. 2892 (Price)/S. 2198 (Byrd), Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
FY2010. House approved June 24, 2009. Senate approved with an amendment on July 9, 2009.
House and Senate are resolving differences. During June 24, 2009 consideration of H.R. 2892,
the House approved H.Amdt. 250 (King), which would redirect funds toward the removal of the
lookout posts that have been established along the U.S.-Mexico border. During July 8, 2009
consideration of the bill, the Senate approved S.Amdt. 1399 (DeMint), which would require the
completion of at least 700 miles of fencing along the southwest border by December 31, 2010.
That provision became section 560 of the Senate version of H.R. 2892.
H.R. 3081 (Lowey)/S. 1434 (Leahy), Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2010. House Committee on Appropriations held markup and
ordered the bill reported (H.Rept. 111-187) June 26, 2009. House approved July 9, 2009. H.R.
3081 would provide $246.9 million in assistance for Mexico, including $235.8 in the INCLE,
ESF, and FMF accounts. In H.Rept. 111-187, the Committee no longer refers to this assistance as
the “Mérida Initiative,” but would subject funding in the ESF and INCLE accounts to human
rights conditions that are similar to P.L. 110-252. The Senate bill was introduced and reported
(P.L. 111-44) July 9, 2009. The bill would provide $105 million in INCLE and $10 million in ESF
for Mexico as part of the Mérida Initiative. It would also provide $10 million in DA for Mexico.
It also contains human rights conditions similar to P.L. 110-252.
Additional Legislative Initiatives
H.Res. 258 (Giffords)/S.Res. 72 (Menendez). H.Res. 258 introduced March 18, 2009; referred
to Committee on Foreign Affairs. S.Res. 72 introduced March 10, 2009; referred to Committee on
Foreign Relations. The identical resolutions would express full support for Mexico’s efforts to
confront drug trafficking organizations, apprehend their members, and bring them to justice. The
resolutions would also call on the Department of State to ensure the prompt delivery of Mérida
Initiative equipment and training; to continue to support the Mexican government’s efforts to
strengthen institutions and the rule of law, root out corruption, and protect human rights; and to
ensure full accountability for all assistance and equipment provided by the United States to
Mexico.
H.R. 314 (Cuellar), Federal Criminal Immigration Courts Act of 2009. Introduced February
9, 2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill would increase Federal judgeships along
the southwest border of the United States in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.
H.R. 495 (Rodriguez)/S. 205 (Bingaman), Southwest Border Violence Reduction Act of 2009.
H.R. 495 introduced January 14, 2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary and Committee on
Foreign Affairs. S. 205 introduced January 12, 2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. Both
bills would direct the Attorney General to expand the resources provided for ATF’s Project
Gunrunner initiative to identify, investigate, and prosecute individuals involved in the trafficking
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of firearms across the international border between the United States and Mexico. The bills would
authorize $15 million for each of FY2010 and FY2011 for Project Gunrunner in the United
States, and $9.5 million for each of FY2010 and FY2011 for the Attorney General, in cooperation
with the Secretary of State, to assign ATF agents to the U.S. mission in Mexico, provide
equipment to support ATF efforts, and provide training for Mexican law enforcement.
H.R. 937 (Filner), Visitors Interested in Strengthening America (VISA) Act of 2009.
Introduced February 10, 2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill would waive
certain entry documentary requirements for a non-immigrant child (unmarried and under the age
of 16) who is a citizen or national of Mexico and accompanying parent or adult chaperone in
instances of medical visits, student groups, and/or special community events.
H.R. 1437 (Cuellar), Southern Border Security Task Force Act of 2009. Introduced March 11,
2009; referred to Committees on Homeland Security and the Judiciary. Would establish a task
force to coordinate the efforts of federal, state, and local border law enforcement officials and
task forces to protect U.S. border cites and communities from violence associated with drug
trafficking, gunrunning, illegal alien smuggling, violence, and kidnapping along and across the
international border between the United States and Mexico.
H.R. 1448 (Rodriguez), Border Reinforcement and Violence Reduction Act of 2009.
Introduced March 11, 2009; referred to Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland Security, and
Foreign Affairs. The bill would authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney
General to increase resources to identify and eliminate illicit sources of firearms smuggled into
Mexico for use by violent drug trafficking organizations and for other unlawful activities by
providing for border security grants to local law enforcement agencies and reinforcing Federal
resources on the border. It would authorize: $150 million for FY2010 and each succeeding fiscal
year to the Secretary of Homeland Security for a border relief grant program; $9.5 million for
each of FY2010 and FY2011 for Project Gunrunner (an ATF program) and $15 million for each
of FY2010 and FY2011 for Operation Armas Cruzadas (an ICE program) to deter the trafficking
of firearms across the international border between the United States and Mexico.
H.R. 1611 (Flake). Introduced March 19, 2009; referred to Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure. The bill would repeal a provision in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L.
111-8, Division I, Section 136) that prohibits the use of funds for a cross-border motor carrier
demonstration program to allow Mexican-domiciled motor carriers to operate beyond the
commercial zones along the international border between the United States and Mexico.
H.R. 1867 (Kirkpatrick), Border Violence Prevention Act of 2009. Introduced April 2, 2009;
referred to Committee on Homeland Security. The bill would authorize additional resources to
enhance security activities along the international border with Mexico.
H.R. 1900 (Jackson-Lee), Border Security, Cooperation, and Act Now Drug War Prevention
Act. Introduced April 2, 2009; referred to Committees on Homeland Security and the Judiciary.
Among its provisions, the bill would authorize emergency deployments of U.S. Border Patrol,
DEA, and ATF agents along the border with Mexico; and would authorize $150 million in
FY2010 and each subsequent fiscal year for a border relief grant program.
H.R. 2083 (Hunter), Border Sovereignty and Protection Act. Introduced April 23, 2009;
referred to Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland Security, and Education and Labor. The bill
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would require the completion of at least 350 miles of reinforced fencing along the southwest
border within one year of the enactment of the measure.
H.R. 3239 (Kirkpatrick) Introduced July 16, 2009; referred to Committees on Homeland
Security and Foreign Affairs. The bill would require the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, to submit a report on the effects of the Mérida Initiative
on the border security of the United States.
H.R. 3252 (Hinojosa). Introduced July 17, 2009; referred to Committee on Financial Services.
The bill would authorize the President to agree to an amendment to the agreement between the
U.S. and Mexican governments to expand the purposes and functions of the Border Environment
Cooperation Commission and the North American Development Bank to allow the Commission
to certify, and the Bank to finance, any type of border infrastructure project.
H.R. 3289 (Hunter), Unlawful Border Entry Prevention Act of 2009. Introduced on July 22,
2009; referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, the bill, which is similar to H.R. 2083,
would require the Secretary of Homeland Security to complete at least 350 miles of reinforced
fencing along the southwest border.
S. 91 (Vitter). Introduced January 6, 2009; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. The bill
would reduce the amount of financial assistance provided to the government of Mexico in
response to the illegal border crossing from Mexico into the United States.
S. 339 (Bingaman), Border Law Enforcement Relief Act of 2009. Introduced January 28,
2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill would provide financial aid to local law
enforcement officials along the nation’s borders. It would authorize $100 million for each of
FY2010 through FY2014 for a border relief grant program run by the Attorney General.
S. 1190 (Bingaman), Border Law Enforcement Anti-Drug Trafficking Act of 2009.
Introduced June 4, 2009; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. The bill, related to S. 339,
would authorize the Attorney General to award competitive grants to local law enforcement
agencies and institutions of higher education for combating drug-related criminal activity.
Enacted Legislation in the 110th Congress
P.L. 110-432 (H.R. 2095), Railroad Safety Enhancement Act of 2008. Signed into law on
October 16, 2008. Section 416, related to safety inspections in Mexico, provides that mechanical
and brake inspections of rail cars performed in Mexico shall not be treated as satisfying U.S. rail
safety laws or regulations until the Secretary of Transportation certifies that certain conditions are
met.
P.L. 110-329 (H.R. 2638), FY2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and
Continuing Appropriations Act. Signed into law September 30, 2008, the bill provides an
additional $37.5 million for the “International Boundary and Water Commission, United States
and Mexico” for construction of the water quantity program to meet immediate repair and
rehabilitation requirements.
P.L. 110-252 (H.R. 2642), Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008. Originally introduced
June 11, 2007 as the FY2008 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, this
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bill subsequently became the vehicle for the second FY2008 supplemental appropriations
measure, which was approved by the House on June 19, 2008 and the Senate on June 26, 2008. In
the final version of the bill, signed into law on June 30, 2008, Congress provided $400 million in
FY2008 and FY2009 supplemental assistance for Mexico, with not less than $73.5 million for
judicial reform, institution-building, anti-corruption, and rule of law activities. The measure
provides $352 million in FY2008 supplemental funds for Mexico within the INCLE, FMF, and
ESF accounts, and $48 million in FY2009 supplemental funds within the INCLE account.
The human rights conditions in P.L. 110-252 are less demanding than earlier versions of the bill,
largely because of Mexico’s objections that some of the original conditions would have violated
its national sovereignty. In the final version, human rights conditions require that 15% of INCLE
and FMF assistance be withheld until the Secretary of State reports in writing that Mexico is
taking action in four human rights areas. The Secretary of State, after consultation with Mexican
authorities, is also required to submit a report on procedures in place to implement Section 620J
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Section 630J prohibits the provision of U.S. assistance to
any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence
that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.
P.L. 110-181 (H.R. 4986), FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act. This bill, signed into
law on January 28, 2008, contains a provision in Title X, Section 1022, that allows for the
Department of Defense to provide support for counter-drug activities to Mexico.
P.L. 110-161 (H.R. 2764), Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, signed into law on December 26, 2007, includes several FY2008
appropriations measures. It includes several provisions related to Mexico.
In Division, K, Title I, Section 136 prohibits funding for the establishment of a Department of
Transportation (DOT) NAFTA trucking pilot program, under which a limited number of Mexican
cargo trucks can deliver goods within the United States.
Division E, Title VI, incorporates the Border Infrastructure and Technology Act of 2007, which
includes a provision in Section 606 authorizing funds as needed (from FY2009 to FY2013) for
the implementation of projects described in the Declaration on Embracing Technology and
Cooperation to Promote the Secure and Efficient Flow of People and Commerce across our
Shared Border between the United States and Mexico, agreed to March 22, 2002, Monterrey,
Mexico (commonly known as the Border Partnership Action Plan).
In Division G, Title V, Section 526 provides that no funds appropriated by this act may be used by
the Commissioner of Social Security or the Social Security Administration to pay the
compensation of employees of the Social Security Administration to administer Social Security
benefit payments, under any agreement between the United States and Mexico establishing
totalization arrangements between the social security system established by Title II of the Social
Security Act and the social security system of Mexico, which would not otherwise be payable but
for such agreement.
The joint explanatory statement also noted the Administration’s request for $500 million in the
FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations request to fund the proposed Mérida Initiative, but stated
that the Department of State failed to adequately consult with Congress prior to submitting the
budget amendment.
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P.L. 110-53 (H.R. 1), Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007.
Section 701 of P.L. 110-53, signed into law August 3, 2007, requires that the Secretaries of State
and Homeland Security, with the Director of National Intelligence, and heads of other relevant
agencies, submit a report to Congress, no later than 270 days after the bill’s enactment, on the
status of U.S. efforts to collaborate with allies and international partners to improve border
security, global document security, and to exchange terrorist information. Section 511 of the
measure calls for the Secretary of Homeland Security to make it a priority to assign personnel
from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard to regional, state, and local intelligence fusion centers in order
to enhance land and maritime border security and to improve dissemination of information
amongst the myriad of jurisdictions in border areas.
P.L. 110-28 (H.R. 2206), U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007. The bill was signed into law on May 25, 2007.
Section 6901 mandates that a pilot program to give Mexican trucks access beyond the border
region cannot begin until U.S. trucks have similar access to Mexico. Before a pilot project can
begin, the Department of Treasury must meet certain reporting and public notice requirements.
The Transportation Department’s Inspector General must prepare a report to Congress to verify
that the Department of Transportation has established mechanisms to ensure that Mexican trucks
comply with U.S. federal motor carrier safety laws. The report must also verify that Mexican
trucks meet the safety provisions of P.L. 107-87. The Department of Transportation must also
publish a Federal Register notice and allow for public comment on pre-audit inspection data and
plans to protect the health and safety of Americans.
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
June S. Beittel
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
jbeittel@crs.loc.gov, 7-7613
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689
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