



Financial Regulatory Reform and the 111th Congress

Baird Webel, Coordinator
Specialist in Financial Economics

David H. Carpenter
Legislative Attorney

Marc Labonte
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy

Rena S. Miller
Analyst in Financial Economics

Edward V. Murphy
Specialist in Financial Economics

Gary Shorter
Specialist in Financial Economics

March 31, 2010

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R40975

Summary

Financial regulatory reform is being discussed in the 111th Congress, the continuation of a policy debate that began before the September 2008 financial disruption. For example, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson issued a blueprint for financial reform in March 2008. In September 2008, after this blueprint was issued but before congressional action, the financial system suffered severe distress as Lehman Brothers and AIG failed. This financial panic accelerated the review of financial regulation and refocused some of the policy debate on areas that experienced the most distress.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner issued a new reform plan in June 2009. House committees initially reviewed many related bills on an issue-by-issue basis. House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank then consolidated proposals into a comprehensive bill, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (H.R. 4173) and the House passed the bill on December 11, 2009. H.R. 4173 as passed contains elements of H.R. 1728, H.R. 2571, H.R. 2609, H.R. 3126, H.R. 3269, H.R. 3817, H.R. 3818, H.R. 3890, and H.R. 3996. On March 22, 2010, the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee amended and ordered reported Chairman Christopher Dodd's Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (RAFSA).

One issue in financial reform is the potential reorganization of the financial system regulatory architecture. Currently, the United States has many regulators, some with overlapping jurisdictions, but with gaps in oversight of some issues. This structure evolved largely in reaction to past financial crises, with new agencies and rules created to address the perceived causes of the particular financial problems at that time. One option would be to consolidate agencies that appear to have similar missions. For example, the five regulators with bank examination authority could be merged or the two regulators with securities and derivatives oversight could be merged. Another option would be to remove regulatory authority on a particular topic from the multiple agencies that might address it within their area now, and establish a single agency to address that issue. For instance, a single consumer financial protection agency or a single systemic risk regulator could be created. Both the House and the Senate are considering the establishment of a single entity to focus on consumer financial protection and some consolidation of bank regulators, although details differ. Neither the House-passed nor the Senate committee proposals would consolidate the securities and derivatives regulators or create a single systemic risk regulator.

Other issues of financial reform address a particular sector of the financial system or selected classes of market participants. For example, both the House-passed and the Senate committee proposals would require more derivatives to be cleared through a regulated exchange and require additional reporting for derivatives that would remain in the over-the-counter market. There are several proposals to try to increase the amount of information available to regulators, investors, consumers, and financial institutions. Hedge funds would have increased reporting and registration requirements. Credit rating agencies would have to disclose additional information concerning their methodologies and potential conflicts of interest. A federal office would be created to collect insurance information. Institution-level regulatory agencies would have to share information about covered firms with systemic risk regulators. Proposed executive compensation and securitization reforms would attempt to reduce incentives to take excessive risks.

This report reviews issues related to financial regulation. It provides brief descriptions of comprehensive reform bills in the 111th Congress that address these issues. This report will be periodically updated to reflect congressional activity in financial regulatory reform.

Contents

Introduction	1
Comprehensive Financial Reform Proposals.....	1
The Panic of September 2008.....	2
Issues for Regulatory Reform.....	2
Systemic Risk.....	3
Policy Issues	3
Legislation	4
Federal Reserve Emergency Authority and Congressional Oversight	5
Policy Issues	5
Legislation	5
Resolution Regime for Failing Firms.....	6
Policy Issues	6
Legislation	6
Securitization and Shadow Banking	7
Policy Issues	7
Legislation	8
Consolidation of Bank Supervision	9
Policy Issues	9
Legislation	9
Financial Consumer Protection.....	10
Policy Issues	10
Legislation	11
Derivatives.....	12
Policy Issues	12
Legislation	12
Credit Rating Agencies	13
Policy Issues	13
Legislation	13
Investor Protection.....	14
Policy Issues	14
Legislation	14
Hedge Funds	15
Policy Issues	15
Legislation	16
Executive Compensation.....	16
Policy Issues	16
Legislation	16
Insurance	17
Policy Issues	17
Legislation	17

Contacts

Author Contact Information	18
CRS Contacts for Areas Covered by Report.....	18

Introduction

Comprehensive Financial Reform Proposals

The 111th Congress is considering several proposals to reorganize financial regulators and to reform the regulation of financial markets and financial institutions. Following House committee markups on various bills addressing specific issues, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank introduced the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (H.R. 4173) incorporating elements of numerous bills introduced earlier in the session.¹ After two days of floor consideration, the House passed H.R. 4173 as amended on December 11, 2009, by a 232-202 vote.

In the Senate, Chairman Christopher Dodd of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee issued a single comprehensive committee print on November 16, 2009, the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009.² This proposal was revised over the following months and a committee print of the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (RAFSA)³ was issued on March 15, 2010. This original bill was amended in committee on March 22, 2010 and ordered reported to the Senate floor. It has yet to be formally introduced and receive a number.

In addition to Chairman Dodd's and Chairman Frank's bills, other proposals have been made but have not been scheduled for markup. For example, House Financial Services Committee Ranking Member Spencer Bachus introduced a comprehensive reform proposal, the Consumer Protection and Regulatory Enhancement Act (H.R. 3310) and offered a similar amendment (H.Amdt. 539) during House consideration of H.R. 4173.⁴ The Treasury under previous Secretary Hank Paulson issued a "Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure"⁵ in March 2008, whereas the Obama Administration released "Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation" in June 2009 and followed this white paper with specific legislative language, providing a base text for congressional consideration.⁶ This report will focus on H.R. 4173 as passed by the House and Chairman Dodd's original bill as reported.

Understanding the fabric of financial reform proposals requires some analysis both of the Panic of 2008, as well as of more enduring concerns about risks in the financial system. This report begins with that analysis.

¹ Initially incorporated bills included H.R. 2609, H.R. 3126, H.R. 3269, H.R. 3817, H.R. 3818, H.R. 3890, and H.R. 3996.

² The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009 committee print is available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/111609FullBillTextofTheRestoringAmericanFinancialStabilityActof2009.pdf.

³ The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 committee print is available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ChairmansMark31510AYO10306_xmlFinancialReformLegislationBill.pdf. The amendment adopted in committee is available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/032310MangersAmendmentAYO10627.pdf.

⁴ See http://republicans.financialservices.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=601&Itemid=42.

⁵ "Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure" U.S. Treasury, available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf>.

⁶ Treasury has created websites to track financial intervention and financial reform. See <http://ustreas.gov/initiatives/regulatoryreform/> and <http://www.financialstability.gov>.

The Panic of September 2008⁷

Risks to the financial system as a whole are of heightened interest because of the financial disruptions during September 2008. As Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner noted in written testimony delivered to the House Financial Services Committee on September 23, 2009, “The job of the financial system ... is to efficiently allocate savings and risk. Last fall, our financial system failed to do its job, and came precariously close to failing altogether.”⁸ U.S. investment banks suffered heavy losses in 2007 and 2008 primarily because of declines in the value of mortgage-related assets. During the week of September 15, 2008, Merrill Lynch was sold in distress to Bank of America in a deal supported by the Federal Reserve (Fed) and Treasury, which has since become the subject of controversy. The Fed and Treasury failed to find a buyer for Lehman Brothers, which subsequently filed for bankruptcy, disrupting financial markets. A money market mutual fund (The Reserve Primary Fund) that held Lehman-related paper announced losses, triggering a run on other money market funds, and Treasury responded with a guarantee for money market funds. AIG, an insurance conglomerate with a securities subsidiary that specialized in financial derivatives including credit default swaps, was unable to post collateral related to its derivatives and securities lending activities. The Fed intervened with an \$85 billion loan to prevent bankruptcy and to ensure full payment to AIG’s counterparties.

Issues for Regulatory Reform

Several issues contained in financial reform proposals relate directly to the Panic of 2008. In regard to mortgage markets, one regulatory reform option would be to create an agency dedicated to regulating financial products offered to household consumers. Another option would be to extend mortgage regulation to non-bank lenders that were not covered by the underwriting guidances issued by bank regulators. In relation to Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers, one approach would be to supervise large interconnected financial institutions, regulate their assets, liabilities and counterparty concentrations, and provide more flexibility to an authority to unwind them outside of traditional bankruptcy proceedings. Regarding credit default swaps and other financial derivatives, one potential reform could be to mandate clearing and exchange trading of standardized derivative products and require greater transparency for non-standard derivatives traded over-the-counter. Another possible reform would be to establish a systemic regulator or council to monitor and regulate all concentrations of risk in the financial system.

Other issues within reform proposals relate to the fractured regulatory structure for the financial services industry, particularly commercial banks and thrifts, which has evolved into what some have characterized as a patchwork system. The United States has a dual banking system where both federal and state governments charter banks. There are multiple federal banking regulators plus the individual state regulators; each commercial bank or thrift, therefore, is likely to have at least two regulators—its chartering authority and its deposit insurer. In addition, if the institution is within a holding company complex or is a member of the Federal Reserve System, it will be

⁷ See, for example, “The Panic of 2008,” a speech given by Federal Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh on April 6, 2009, for discussion of aspects of typical financial panics and historical examples. Available at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20090406a.htm>.

⁸ Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, Written Testimony House Financial Services Committee, Financial Regulatory Reform, September 23, 2009, available at <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg296.htm>.

subject to Fed regulations.⁹ Other components of the financial services industry, such as insurance companies and investment banks, may be affiliated with commercial banks and thrifts within a holding company structure, with the holding company regulated at the federal level by either the Fed or the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the insurance or securities subsidiaries regulated by state insurance or securities regulators or, in the case of securities activities, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Should the dual banking system of state chartered and federal chartered banks be continued? Should there be a single bank regulator with examination and enforcement authority? Does the Fed's responsibility for overseeing components of the banking system enhance or detract from its monetary authority? Should there be an administrative system for resolving failing financial holding companies similar to that in existence for failing depository institutions, and, if so, within which agency? Should the securities regulator be combined with the derivatives regulator? Should there be an option for a federal charter in insurance?

Some are concerned that a patchwork of regulators may leave regulatory gaps, or might allow firms to “shop” for regulators resulting in weaker regulatory standards. Whether prompted by the recent crisis or as part of a more enduring concern, some have proposed comprehensive reform in part because of greater awareness that failures in one part of the financial sector can disrupt the system as a whole, as well as cause damage to the broader economy.

The next sections of this report provide greater detail on reform issues and proposals. Unless otherwise specified, these sections will refer to the House-passed version of H.R. 4173 and the version of Senator Dodd's Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (RAFSA) as amended and ordered reported.

Systemic Risk

Policy Issues¹⁰

Systemic risk refers to sources of instability for the financial system as a whole, often through “contagion” or “spillover” effects that individual firms cannot protect themselves against.¹¹ While regulators took systemic risk into account before the crisis, and systemic risk can never be eliminated, analysts have pointed to a number of ostensible weaknesses in the current regulatory regime's approach to systemic risk. First, there is no regulator with overarching responsibility for

⁹ In the United States, depository institutions, i.e., commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions, are creatures of a dual banking system; they may be chartered and, therefore, primarily regulated by the chartering authority. Generally all depository institutions are subject to federal regulation. There are five federal regulators of depository institutions: (1) the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) charters national banks; (2) the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) charters and regulates both state and federal thrifts; (3) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) regulates state chartered banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) and regulates, on a consolidated basis, bank holding companies and financial holding companies (4) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures state and federal commercial banks and thrifts and is the primary federal regulator of state-chartered banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve System; and (5) the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) charters and regulates federal credit unions and regulates state-chartered credit unions which are federally insured.

¹⁰ For more information, see CRS Report R40877, *Financial Regulatory Reform: Systemic Risk and the Federal Reserve*, by Marc Labonte.

¹¹ For an overview of systemic risk, see CRS Report R40417, *Macroprudential Oversight: Monitoring Systemic Risk in the Financial System*, by Darryl E. Getter.

mitigating systemic risk. Instead, some analysts argue that systemic risk can fester in the gaps in the regulatory system where one regulator's jurisdiction ends and another's begins. Second, the crisis revealed that liquidity crises and runs were not just a problem for depository institutions. Third, the crisis revealed that non-bank, highly leveraged "too big (or too interconnected) to fail" firms, such as Lehman Brothers and AIG, could be a source of systemic risk. Finally, there were concerns that the breakdown of different payment, clearing, and settlement (PCS) systems, most of which are unregulated, would be another source of systemic risk.

Legislation

Neither H.R. 4173 nor Senator Dodd's bill would create a dedicated systemic risk regulator. Instead, both bills propose creating similar councils (called the Financial Services Oversight Council in the House bill and Financial Stability Oversight Council in the Senate bill). Each bill's council would be chaired by the Treasury Secretary and consist of the heads of federal regulatory agencies;¹² the House bill's council also includes non-voting representatives of state insurance and state banking regulators while the Senate bill's council includes a presidentially appointed member familiar with insurance issues. The council in each bill would be authorized to identify and advise regulators on sources of systemic risk and overcome "regulatory gap" problems. In both bills, the council would identify systemically important firms, which could be banking companies, which are already supervised by the Fed under current law, or non-bank financial firms, and the Fed would subject them to stricter prudential oversight and regulation. In addition, both bills include mechanisms by which the Fed would be empowered to curb the growth or reduce the size of large firms to prevent systemic risk in both bills. H.R. 4173 includes leverage limits for systemically important firms.

H.R. 4173 allows the Fed to ban proprietary trading at systemically significant firms; RAISA bans commercial banks from proprietary trading and investing in hedge funds or private equity firms. The systemic risk titles of H.R. 4173 originated in the Financial Stability Improvement Act of 2009 (H.R. 3996). H.R. 3996 provided for payment, settlement, and clearing systems and activities deemed systemically important by the Council to be regulated by the Fed. In committee consideration of H.R. 4173, an amendment by Representatives Tom Price and Judy Biggert was adopted which eliminated this section. RAISA contains PCS regulation similar to H.R. 3996 as introduced. Both bills would allow the FDIC to set up emergency liquidity programs for bank holding companies; the FDIC's borrowing authority for this program would be capped at \$500 billion in H.R. 4173.

¹² The House council would not include the head of the new Consumer Financial Protection Agency, while the Senate council would include the head of the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.

Federal Reserve Emergency Authority and Congressional Oversight

Policy Issues¹³

During the recent financial turmoil, the Fed engaged in unprecedented levels of emergency lending to non-bank financial firms through its authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. This statute states that

in unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank ... to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange....¹⁴

Such loans can be made only if the targeted borrower is unable to obtain the needed credit through other banking institutions. In addition to the level of lending, the form of the lending has been novel, particularly the creation of three limited liability corporations controlled by the Fed, to which the Fed lent a total of \$72.6 billion to purchase assets from Bear Stearns and AIG. The Fed's recent actions under Section 13(3) have generated debate in Congress about whether measures are needed to amend the institution's emergency lending powers.

Legislation

H.R. 4173 includes several provisions related to Federal Reserve lending authority. In particular, this legislation stipulates that, while the Fed may authorize a Federal Reserve Bank to make collateralized loans as part of broadly available credit facility, it may not authorize a Federal Reserve Bank to lend to only a single and specific individual, partnership, or corporation. In addition, H.R. 4173 would remove some of the existing Government Accountability Office (GAO) auditing restrictions over the Fed, and calls for a GAO audit. This bill would also require the Treasury Secretary to approve emergency lending by the Fed and would cap such lending at \$4 trillion.

Similar to H.R. 4173, RAFSA stipulates that, while the Fed may authorize a Federal Reserve Bank to make collateralized loans as part of broadly available credit, the Fed would be limited in its ability to assist specific individuals, partnerships, or corporations on an individual basis. In addition, the Senate bill proposes granting GAO circumscribed audit authority of Federal Reserve actions initiated under Section 13(3), and calls for the disclosure of Fed borrowers at the Fed's discretion. RAFSA would also make the New York Federal Reserve Bank President appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and would prohibit firms regulated by the Fed from choosing any directors of the regional Federal Reserve Banks.

¹³ See CRS Report RL34427, *Financial Turmoil: Federal Reserve Policy Responses*, by Marc Labonte.

¹⁴ 12 U.S.C. § 343.

Resolution Regime for Failing Firms

Policy Issues¹⁵

When most companies fail in the United States, they are resolved in accordance with the bankruptcy code. However, depository banks that hold Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured deposits are subject to a special resolution regime, called a conservatorship or receivership. Under normal circumstances, bankruptcies are judicial in nature with no additional public resources available to support the process. However, the FDIC's conservatorship/receivership regime is a largely non-judicial, administrative process, which requires the FDIC to resolve depositories such that the total to be expended will cost the Deposit Insurance Fund less than any other possible method. Under limited circumstances, the FDIC may waive this "least-cost resolution" requirement in order to minimize systemic risk.¹⁶ Some believe that the speed and discretion available in the FDIC's conservatorship/receivership regime is a useful model for resolving other types of systemically important financial firms. The collapse of Lehman Brothers (and the near collapse of AIG, Bear Stearns, and others) during the recent financial crisis has now focused congressional attention on policy options for resolving systemically significant non-depository financial institutions.¹⁷

Legislation

H.R. 4173 would establish new dissolution authority for systemically important financial companies (including bank holding companies, financial holding companies, and insurance holding companies and their non-depository and non-insurance company subsidiaries), modeled after the FDIC's existing conservatorship/receivership regime for depository institutions with some major distinctions. For instance, the proposed regime would place even more emphasis on the dissolution of the firm and, rather than explicitly prohibiting these firms from being resolved under the bankruptcy code (as is the case for depository institutions), financial firms could be resolved under the special regime "only if the failure and dissolution of such company under [the bankruptcy code] would be systemically destabilizing...."¹⁸ The special resolution regime would be administered by the FDIC. The FDIC could be appointed only after the Fed, the Secretary of the Treasury, and either the FDIC, the SEC, or a state insurance regulator determine that the appointment would meet the requirements specified in the bill.¹⁹ To provide financing for this new FDIC authority, H.R. 4173 would create a Systemic Dissolution Fund, which would be pre-funded by FDIC assessments on large financial companies and limited to a maximum size of \$150 billion. H.R. 4173 also would require large and interconnected companies to submit plans for their own shutdown should they become financially distressed.

¹⁵ See CRS Report R40530, *Insolvency of Systemically Significant Financial Companies: Bankruptcy vs. Conservatorship/Receivership*, by David H. Carpenter.

¹⁶ 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A).

¹⁷ This overview of resolution regimes is adapted from CRS Report R40928, *Lehman Brothers and IndyMac: Comparing Resolution Regimes*, by David H. Carpenter.

¹⁸ H.R. 4173 § 1604(b).

¹⁹ The SEC would participate in the systemic risk determination if the financial company or an affiliate of the financial company is an SEC-registered broker or dealer. A state insurance regulator would participate in the systemic risk determination if the financial company or its affiliate is an insurance company.

RAFSA would establish a resolution regime for certain systemically important financial institutions similar to the one that would be established under H.R. 4173. However, before the FDIC could be appointed receiver over a firm, a panel of three bankruptcy judges in addition to various financial regulators (i.e., the Treasury Secretary, the Fed, and either the FDIC or the SEC) would have to follow a process specified in the bill to ensure that, among other things, the firm's resolution under the bankruptcy code or other applicable law would have adverse systemic consequences that could be minimized by the special receivership regime. To cover the potential costs of administering receiverships, the FDIC would manage an Orderly Liquidation Fund that would be pre-funded by risk-based assessments on certain large financial institutions, approximately \$50 billion in size or larger. RAFSA also would require certain nonbank financial firms to submit resolution plans for their own shutdown should they become financially troubled.

Securitization and Shadow Banking

Policy Issues²⁰

Shadow banking refers to financial activity conducted either by non-banks or sponsored by banks off of their balance sheets. Securitization supports the shadow banking system. Securitization is the process of turning mortgages, credit card loans, and other debt into marketable securities. Securitizers acquire and pool many loans from primary lenders and then issue new securities based on the flow of payments through the pool. Securitization can allow banks to reduce the risk of their retained portfolio. Securitization also finances non-bank lenders specializing in mortgage loans, credit cards, and other loan products. If the risks of securitized products are accurately rated, then securitization can contribute to financial stability by shifting financial risk to those willing and able to bear it.

Securitization may have contributed to the housing bubble and financial turmoil in a variety of ways. Lenders planning to sell their loans have a reduced stake in the borrower's long-term capacity to repay the loan. Bank underwriting standards are subject to guidances issued by bank regulators because loans to risky borrowers might be unsafe and unsound for the banks themselves. These guidances, however, do not apply to non-bank mortgage lenders that are funded through securitization. Securitization was especially prevalent in the subprime mortgage market and the non-conforming California mortgage market, where loan defaults have been particularly severe.

Opaqueness in the shadow banking system may also have caused problems. When defaults rose among home buyers, the complexity of mortgage-backed securities made it more difficult to identify which firms would suffer the largest losses. Furthermore, a drop in the rating of a mortgage-backed security could require some holders to sell even though the security was still performing. In addition to holding the securities of non-bank subprime lenders, some banks also sponsored their own mortgage funding facilities off of their balance sheets in special purpose vehicles. When the liquidity of mortgage-backed securities declined, some of these sponsoring banks had to pull the assets of such special purpose vehicles back on to their balance sheets and recognize more losses. Potential reforms include regulation of securitization both at the level of the original loan and in the way the products are constructed and offered to investors.

²⁰ See CRS Report RS22722, *Securitization and Federal Regulation of Mortgages for Safety and Soundness*, by Edward V. Murphy.

There are numerous proposals to realign incentives in the shadow banking system. One approach is to require loan securitizers to retain a portion of the long-term default risk. The retained risk is typically not allowed to be hedged. One possible advantage of this approach is that it may help preserve underwriting standards among lenders funded by securitization. Another possible advantage is that securitizers would share in the risks faced by many of the investors to whom they market their securities. A possible disadvantage is that if each step of the securitization chain must retain a portion of risk, then relatively little risk may ultimately be shifted out of the financial sector to investors. To the extent that securitization is used as a device to shift risk to those more willing and able to bear it, concentration of risk in the financial sector may be self-defeating.

Other approaches to reforming securitization include changes to accounting standards and to the liability of the secondary market participants. Accounting changes could require banks to report securitized loans on their balance sheets if the sponsoring bank retains a contingent liability to support the assets. To the extent that changes in financial reporting would affect bank capital requirements, such reforms could dampen any recovery of securitization because banks would have to keep more capital for a given volume of lending. Another approach would be to make secondary market purchasers liable for the acts of primary lenders.

Legislation

H.R. 4173 would require that 5% of a securitization's risk be retained (and not hedged) by the parties involved in the securitization. Regulators may adjust this percentage under some circumstances. In May 2009, the House passed the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (H.R. 1728), which would make secondary market purchasers liable for the acts of primary lenders under certain conditions. Secondary market purchasers could shield themselves from potential liability if they only purchased securities containing qualified mortgages. Qualified mortgages exclude certain categories of risky mortgages. Elements of H.R. 1728 were incorporated into H.R. 4173 by rule before it was considered on the House floor.

RAFSA also contains reforms for securitization. In addition to revisions to the regulation of ratings agencies (discussed elsewhere in this report), the Senate bill would require risk retention similar to the House approach. The OCC, FDIC and SEC are to jointly issue rules implementing a minimum 5% risk retention with the possibility of reducing this percentage for low credit risk assets. Securitizers would be prohibited from hedging their retained risk. Regulators are to establish separate retention rules for different asset classes. Regulators would have the ability to provide for exemptions to the risk retention requirement pursuant to maintaining underwriting standards and effective risk management. Regulators may allocate a portion of the risk retention requirement to loan originators after considering asset quality, incentives for imprudent lending, and the availability of consumer credit. The Senate bill would not establish secondary market liability for securitized mortgages.

Consolidation of Bank Supervision

Policy Issues²¹

Commercial banks and similar institutions are subject to regulatory examination for safety and soundness. Depending on their charter, commercial banks, thrifts and credit unions may be examined by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Federal Reserve, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), or a state authority. State bank examiners often coordinate through the Conference of State Bank Supervisors. Federal bank examiners often conduct joint rulemaking, and coordinate through the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC).

The current system of multiple bank regulators may have problems, some of which could be mitigated by regulatory consolidation. Multiple regulators may find it challenging to implement consistent enforcement even if they employ joint rulemaking. To the extent that regulations are applied inconsistently, institutions may be able to choose the regulator that they feel will be the weakest or least intrusive. If so, then competition among the regulators for covered institutions (regulatory arbitrage) could lead to less effective financial supervision. Among the arguments against consolidation are that regulatory consolidation could change the traditional U.S. dual banking system in ways that put smaller banks at a disadvantage. Another potential argument for maintaining the current system is that competition among regulators could encourage the regulators to monitor each other, and alert policymakers if one regulator lowers standards.

A narrower point also could apply to the Fed, which both regulates bank holding companies and conducts monetary policy. Some argue that the Fed should concentrate on monetary policy and have fewer regulatory responsibilities, especially if the institution's independence is to be preserved. In contrast, the Fed argues that its bank regulation responsibilities provide it with helpful information for the conduct of monetary policy. The Fed also argues that its monetary policy role makes it uniquely positioned to respond to systemic events in the banking system.

Legislation

H.R. 4173 as passed by the House preserves the Federal thrift charter but eliminates the Office of Thrift Supervision as a separate entity. Under the House bill, OTS' regulatory powers are transferred to a newly created Division of Thrift Supervision within the OCC and the Director of OTS is removed from various regulatory councils and boards. The Federal Reserve would retain most existing regulatory authority, including all bank and thrift holding companies. Both bills include slightly differing provisions to enhance federal regulation of companies, such as industrial loan companies and unitary thrift holding companies, which under current law are able to mix commercial and banking activities without being subject to comprehensive federal oversight.²²

²¹ CRS Report R40249, *Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of U.S. Financial Supervision*, by Mark Jickling and Edward V. Murphy.

²² See CRS Report RL32767, *Industrial Loan Companies/Banks and the Separation of Banking and Commerce: Legislative and Regulatory Perspectives*, by N. Eric Weiss.

Under RAFA, the Federal Reserve would regulate all bank and thrift holding companies with \$50 billion or more in assets but would lose its authority over state member banks. The OTS would be eliminated, and its authority over federally chartered thrifts would be transferred to the OCC. The OCC would retain its authority over national banks and would become the consolidated regulator of bank and thrift holding companies with less than \$50 billion in assets where most of the depository institution's assets are held by national banks or thrifts. The FDIC would become the primary regulator of state banks and thrifts, as well as bank and thrift holding companies with less than \$50 billion in assets where most of these institutions' assets are held by state chartered banks or thrifts.

Financial Consumer Protection²³

Policy Issues

In the United States, depository institutions—banks, thrifts, and credit unions—are subject to comprehensive supervision, examination, and enforcement by a number of federal bank regulators. These regulators monitor the institutions that they supervise for both safety and soundness and for compliance with other federal laws, including the various federal consumer protection laws. Many non-depository financial companies, such as payday lenders and nonbank mortgage lenders, are primarily regulated by the states. However, the financial products that these non-depositories offer may still be subject to federal consumer protection laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).²⁴ The Federal Reserve largely is charged with promulgating the regulations to implement the TILA and most other federal consumer protection laws, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) primarily is responsible for enforcing these laws against financial institutions that do not have a primary federal regulator.

In light of this fragmented system, some have proposed legislation that would consolidate consumer financial protection functions. These proposals raise policy questions regarding how best to balance safety and soundness regulation with consumer compliance. Although a loan that cannot be repaid is typically bad for both the borrower and the lender, there are some areas in which there can be a conflict between safety and soundness regulation and consumer protection. When a banking activity is profitable, safety and soundness regulators tend to look upon it favorably, since it enables the bank to meet capital requirements and withstand financial shocks. A consumer protection regulator, however, may look at such activity less favorably, especially if the profit is gained at the expense of consumers. Removing compliance authority from the federal bank regulators arguably may weaken the safety and soundness regulation of banks if, for example, the separation results in a less complete picture of bank operations for the prudential regulator. The Fed has argued that its role in consumer protection aids its other authorities, including bank supervision and systemic risk. On the other hand, some, including the Obama Administration, have argued that professional bank examiners are trained “to see the world through the lenses of institutions and markets, not consumers,”²⁵ and separating compliance and

²³ See CRS Report R40696, *Financial Regulatory Reform: Analysis of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) as Proposed by the Obama Administration and H.R. 4173 (Formerly H.R. 3126)*, by David H. Carpenter and Mark Jickling.

²⁴ 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 *et seq.*

²⁵ U.S. Department of the Treasury, *Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation*, June 2009, pg. 56, available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf.

safety and soundness into different agencies is the best way to protect both consumers and financial institutions. Depending on exactly what rules and regulations a new agency might implement, the cost and availability of credit could be affected.

Legislation

H.R. 4173 would establish a new, independent executive agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), to be the primary federal supervisor, examiner, and enforcer of many large banks and credit unions as well as most nonbank financial companies. The CFPA would not be the primary examiner and enforcer of consumer compliance issues over banks and credit unions with \$10 billion or less in assets. Instead, these powers would remain with those institutions' safety and soundness regulators. However, the bill would provide a procedure by which the CFPA could (1) participate in the examination process conducted by the primary regulator and (2) assume the enforcement and examination powers over any smaller depository institutions that have not been adequately supervised by a prudential regulator.

H.R. 4173 also would transfer to the CFPA rulemaking authority for many of the existing federal consumer protection laws, while also granting the Agency new rulemaking authority over an array of consumer financial products and activities. Under H.R. 4173, the safety and soundness powers over depository institutions would remain with the bank regulators. The CFPA would be required to coordinate certain compliance efforts with prudential regulators and generally consult with those regulators when prescribing regulations. H.R. 4173 establishes a process by which jurisdictional disputes between financial regulators, including the CFPA, could be settled by the Financial Services Oversight Council.²⁶

RAFSA would create a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau), which would have similar authorities as H.R. 4173's CFPA; however, there are a number of notable differences between the two proposals. For one, rather than creating a new, free-standing regulatory agency like in H.R. 4173, the Bureau would be established within the Federal Reserve System. While the Fed currently houses the consumer-focused Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, the Bureau would be more independent than the existing division. For example, the Bureau would be headed by a director that is appointed by the President, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Additionally, the Bureau Director would have greater autonomy over its funding, although much of the Bureau's funding would have to be transferred from the Federal Reserve Board and subject to certain limitations. The Bureau also would have greater independence than the Division of Consumer and Community Affairs in implementing its supervisory, enforcement, and rulemaking authorities.

Another distinction between RAFSA's Bureau and H.R. 4173's CFPA is that the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which would be established by the Senate bill and mainly comprised of the federal financial regulators, would have the ability to set aside a regulation prescribed by the Bureau if the regulation "would put the safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United States at risk." These powers would be in addition to the Financial Stability Oversight Council's authority to settle jurisdictional disputes among the federal financial regulators.

²⁶ H.R. 4173 § 1002.

Derivatives

Policy Issues²⁷

Derivatives are financial contracts whose value is linked to some underlying price or variable. Derivatives are traded on organized exchanges with central clearing houses that guarantee payment on all contracts, and in an unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) market, where credit risk is borne by the individual counterparties. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulates commodity futures and options on futures, while the Securities and Exchange Commission regulates options on securities. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA)²⁸ largely exempted swaps and other derivatives in the over-the-counter market from regulation. The collapse of AIG in 2008 illustrated the risks of large OTC derivatives positions that are not backed by collateral or margin (as a central clearing house would require). If AIG had had to post margin on its credit default swap contracts, it would probably not have been able to build a position so large as to threaten systemic stability and require a costly taxpayer bailout. Such disruptions in markets for financial derivatives during the recent crisis have led some to call for reform of derivatives regulation, particularly reform of the unregulated over-the-counter market.

Legislation

Derivatives reform focuses on requiring the OTC markets to adopt features of the regulated markets, including mandatory clearing through derivatives clearing organizations, trading on exchanges (or exchange-like) facilities, registration of certain market participants, and the like. Current proposals include repeal of provisions exempting OTC derivatives from regulation.

Both H.R. 4173 and RAFSA mandate reporting, centralized clearing, and exchange-trading of OTC derivatives, but provide exemptions from some requirements for certain market participants. Both require regulators to impose capital requirements on swap dealers and “major swap participants.” Both bills designate the CFTC as the regulator for “swaps,” which include contracts based on interest rates, currencies, physical commodities, etc., and give SEC authority over “security-based swaps,” including many credit default swaps and equity swaps.

While generally similar, the bills differ in some key elements, particularly in the exemption from the mandatory clearing requirement, which has dominated the political debate. The scope of the exemptions revolves around three questions: (1) which derivatives must be cleared? (2) which market players must clear their derivatives? and (3) can regulators impose margin requirements on derivatives that otherwise do not have to be cleared?

Both bills allow regulators substantial discretion in writing rules and defining terms. Because of this, it is impossible to say with precision how much of the currently unregulated over-the-counter derivatives market would be moved onto centralized clearing houses under either bill. It appears, however, that the exemptions granted by H.R. 4173 may be broader in scope and could result in a greater share of swaps continuing to trade over-the-counter than would be the case under RAFSA’s provisions. For example, H.R. 4173 automatically exempts from the clearing

²⁷ See CRS Report R40965, *Key Issues in Derivatives Reform*, by Rena S. Miller.

²⁸ P.L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.

requirement trades in which one party is neither a swap dealer nor a major swap participant, whereas the Senate bill allows the regulator the discretion to create such an exemption, but does not require the regulator to do so. Another example is that H.R. 4173 does not give regulators the authority to impose margin requirements on uncleared derivatives, while the Senate bill allows regulators to do so.

Credit Rating Agencies

Policy Issues²⁹

Credit rating agencies provide investors with what many presume to be an informed perspective on the creditworthiness of bonds issued by a wide spectrum of entities, including corporations, sovereign nations, and municipalities. The grading of the creditworthiness is typically displayed in a letter hierarchical format: AAA commonly being the safest, with lower grades representing a greater level of risk. Credit rating agencies are typically paid by the issuers of the securities that are being rated by the agencies, which could be seen as a conflict of interest. In an exchange for adhering to various reporting requirements, the SEC provides interested credit rating agencies with a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) designation. The designation is important because a variety of state and federal laws and regulations reference NRSRO ratings.³⁰

In recent years, credit rating agencies have come under increased public scrutiny following several alleged performance failures. For instance, during the recent housing boom cycle the three dominant agencies (Fitch, Moody's and S&P) initially rated many mortgage-backed securities as AAA before sharply down-grading the securities as the sub-prime mortgage market collapsed, resulting in heavy losses for investors that relied on these ratings. The perceived agency failings have led to a public policy focus on strengthening the accountability of credit rating agencies and reducing potential conflicts of interest that may compromise the integrity of their ratings.

Legislation

H.R. 4173 and RAFA would both enhance the SEC's oversight over NRSROs and would require more disclosure regarding rating methodologies, assumptions and limitations. H.R. 4173 also would require NRSROs to adopt rating symbols that differentiate between ratings for structured products and other products, remove references to credit ratings in a number of federal laws, require financial regulatory agencies to review and remove certain credit ratings references, and mandate SEC registration for all issuer-pays rating agencies (rating agencies that are compensated by the issuers or arrangers of the securities that they rate). With respect to any particular class of security, the Senate bill authorizes the SEC to temporarily suspend or revoke NRSRO registration with respect to a particular class of security if it finds that the NRSRO lacks adequate financial and management resources to consistently provide accurate. RAFA would require financial regulators to remove references to NRSRO ratings in their regulations unless there were no acceptable alternatives.

²⁹ See CRS Report R40613, *Credit Rating Agencies and Their Regulation*, by Gary Shorter and Michael V. Seitzinger.

³⁰ See CRS Report RS22519, *Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006*, by Michael V. Seitzinger.

H.R. 4173 also establishes that in private legal actions against NRSROs, it is sufficient that an NRSRO knowingly or recklessly failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of a rated security with respect to the facts that it relied upon. It also gives investors an additional right of private action where it can be established that the process an NRSRO used in determining a rating was grossly negligent and a substantial factor in the investor's economic loss. In private legal actions against NRSROs, Senator Dodd's bill provides that investors can bring such actions against them for a knowing or reckless failure to conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts underlying a rating or to obtain analysis from an independent source.

Neither H.R. 4173 nor RAFSA specifically directly addresses the issuer-pays business model used by the three dominant rating agencies, although RAFSA calls for a GAO study of the issue.

Investor Protection

Policy Issues

The multi-billion dollar Madoff Ponzi scheme raised concerns over the effectiveness of the SEC's efforts to protect investors. Madoff's operation was a registered broker-dealer subject to both SEC and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA, the self regulatory organization for broker-dealers) oversight, as well as a registered investment adviser subject to SEC oversight. Reform initiatives seek to improve the SEC's performance by providing it with more funding, and by amending the regulatory treatment of broker-dealers and investment advisers, and other similar agents.

Under current law, broker-dealers must make recommendations that are "suitable" to their customers, while investment advisers have a fiduciary duty to act in the customers' best interests, without regard to their own compensation, and with an affirmative duty to disclose any potential conflicts of interest. The services provided by broker-dealers and investment advisers, however, often overlap—both can provide investment advice and there are some concerns that customers may falsely assume that the person advising them is committed to acting in their best interests.

Legislation

H.R. 4173 requires the SEC to adopt rules specifying that the standard of conduct for broker-dealers shall be the same as the standard of conduct for investment advisers when providing personalized investment advice to a retail customer about securities. It would require the SEC to write regulations defining that fiduciary standard of conduct. By contrast, the Senate committee-amended bill requires the SEC to study the effectiveness of existing standards of care for broker-dealers and investment advisers regarding the provision of personalized investment advice and securities recommendations to retail customers.

H.R. 4173 and RAFSA would expand the states' regulatory authority over investment advisers with assets of less than \$100 million, compared to the current \$25 million standard, reducing the number of regulated advisers under SEC jurisdiction. H.R. 4173 would also require SEC rulemaking in order to collect fees from investment advisers to pay for costs of inspections and examinations.

The SEC currently collects fees from sellers of corporate stock, issuers of stocks and bonds, and participants in tender offers. The fees go to an account available to congressional appropriators.

Historically, however, the SEC's budget tends to be much less than total annual fee collections. H.R. 4173 would double SEC appropriations through FY2015 to \$2.25 billion. Alternatively, the Senate bill would provide the SEC with a budget based on self-funding from its fee collections similar to other financial regulators like the FDIC.

Currently, publicly traded corporations with a market value of generally less than \$75 million enjoy a temporary exemption from Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires publicly traded companies to audit their internal controls (a process aimed at ensuring the reliability of a firm's financial reporting).³¹ The SEC has adopted rules to remove this exemption from such reporting. H.R. 4173 would undo the SEC rulemaking, making permanent the exemption.

Hedge Funds

Policy Issues³²

Hedge funds are not explicitly defined in federal securities law. They are generally described as privately organized, pooled investment vehicles administered by professional investment managers and not widely available to the public. Hedge funds whose primary investors are wealthy individuals or institutions are also distinguishable from investments such as mutual funds by their pronounced use of leverage and their use of trading strategies based on short selling. The funds have a significant capital market presence. According to some estimates, they have been responsible for about one-fifth of the daily trading on the New York Stock Exchange and by some estimates have over a trillion dollars in assets.

Hedge funds can provide benefits to financial markets by enhancing liquidity and efficiency and by reallocating financial risk. Some potential risks inherent in the funds' large capital market footprint were revealed in 1998 when the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management teetered on the brink of collapse. Concerns over the systemic implications of the large hedge fund's collapse resulted in the New York Fed engineering a multi-billion dollar rescue of the fund. Hedge funds have generally not been identified as contributors to the recent financial crisis. Because of concerns over possible systemic risks they may pose, however, some observers advocate more sweeping hedge fund regulation akin to the safety and soundness regulatory oversight of banks.

Under a current "private adviser" exemption, hedge fund managers, who do not hold themselves to be investment advisers and who have fewer than fifteen clients, are exempted from registering with the SEC as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act.³³ Although some hedge fund managers currently register voluntarily, there are concerns that the absence of comprehensive hedge fund data that would accompany mandatory fund registration deprives

³¹ See CRS Report RS22482, *Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Management Assessment of Internal Controls): Current Regulation and Congressional Concerns*, by Michael V. Seitzinger.

³² See CRS Report R40783, *Hedge Funds: Legal Status and Proposals for Regulation*, by Kathleen Ann Ruane and Michael V. Seitzinger and CRS Report R40783, *Hedge Funds: Legal Status and Proposals for Regulation*, by Kathleen Ann Ruane and Michael V. Seitzinger.

³³ 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 *et seq.*

regulators of potentially critical information on the size and nature of the funds that could help them better understand the risks that they may pose to the economy.

Legislation

H.R. 4173 and RAFFSA would both basically eliminate the “private adviser” exemption from registration as investment advisers, though they differ slightly as to the nature of the exemptions. H.R. 4173 would exempt venture funds, small business investment companies, and funds with less than \$150 million in assets. By contrast, the Senate bill would exempt venture capital funds, private equity funds, single family offices, and funds with less than \$100 million in assets. Both the House bill and the Senate bill would authorize the SEC to share the records of registered investment advisers with the systemic risk council for the purpose of evaluating systemic risk.

Executive Compensation

Policy Issues³⁴

The financial crisis has led to policy concerns over a possible link between excessive financial firm risk taking and executive compensation practices. Beginning in 2008, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) subjected recipients to various executive pay restrictions and corporate governance requirements. In fall of 2009, as part of its safety and soundness regulatory oversight of banks, the Fed proposed to review bank pay structures to identify any compensation arrangements that provide incentives to take excessive risks that could threaten the banks’ safety and soundness.³⁵ Such initiatives are significantly premised on the widely held belief that large financial firm pay structures contributed to excessive risk taking. However, at least one major academic study has raised some significant questions concerning this premise.³⁶

Legislation

In July 2009, the House passed the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009 (H.R. 3269), which contained provisions on executive compensation. H.R. 4173 and RAFFSA contain sections similar to parts of this bill.

H.R. 4173 would require financial firms above a certain size to disclose incentive-based pay arrangements to federal financial regulators for the purpose of determining whether these are aligned with sound risk management. H.R. 4173 would also authorize federal financial regulators to prohibit incentive structures that encourage inappropriate risk-taking. H.R. 4173 would give shareholders a nonbinding vote on executive pay and golden parachute packages (known as say on pay). H.R. 4173 would authorize the SEC to prescribe rules for proxy access, the right of investors to use a company’s proxy materials to nominate their own directors.

³⁴ See CRS Report RS22583, *Executive Compensation: SEC Regulations and Congressional Proposals*, by Michael V. Seitzinger and CRS Report R40762, *“Say on Pay” and Other Corporate Governance Reform Initiatives*, by Gary Shorter.

³⁵ See CRS Report R40540, *Executive Compensation Limits in Selected Federal Laws*, by Michael V. Seitzinger and Carol A. Pettit.

³⁶ Rudiger Fahlenbrach, Rene Stulz, and Rene M. Bank, “CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis,” *Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2009-13*, July 27, 2009, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439859>.

RAFSA would amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956³⁷ to establish standards prohibiting unsafe and unsound practice in a bank holding company's compensation plan that provides its executive officers, employees, directors, or principal shareholders excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or that could lead to material financial loss to the holding company. The Senate bill contains a say on pay provision similar to H.R. 4173 but does not provide for shareholder approval of golden parachutes. It also stipulates that only shareholder-directed votes can be tallied for such executive pay advisory shareholder votes. RAFSA also provides that the SEC "may" prescribe rules giving shareholders proxy access.

Insurance³⁸

Policy Issues

Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945,³⁹ insurance regulation is generally left to the individual states. For several years prior to the financial crisis, some Members of Congress have introduced legislation to federalize insurance regulation along the lines of the dual regulation of the banking sector, although none of this legislation has reached the committee markup stage.⁴⁰

The financial crisis, particularly the involvement of insurance giant AIG and the smaller monoline bond insurers, changed the tenor of the debate around insurance regulation, with increased emphasis on the systemic importance of insurance companies. Although it could be argued that insurer involvement in the financial crisis demonstrates the need for full-scale federal regulation of insurance, to date the broad financial regulatory reform proposals have not included language implementing such a system. Instead, broad reform proposals have tended to include the creation of a somewhat narrower federal office focusing on gathering information on insurance and setting policy on international insurance issues. Reform proposals may also affect insurance through consumer protection or systemic risk provisions, though insurance is largely exempted from these aspects of the legislation as well.

Legislation

H.R. 4173 and RAFSA contain slightly differing versions of a federal insurance office, which would be a newly created entity within the Treasury Department. (H.R. 4173's language originated in H.R. 2609 as amended) This office would have limited preemptive power over state insurance laws in cases where the state laws result in differential treatment between U.S. and non-U.S. insurers and the case is covered by an existing international agreement. H.R. 4173 would also completely exempt insurance from the Consumer Financial Protection Agency's oversight, a change from the original bill (H.R. 3126), which included title, credit, and mortgage insurance under the agency's oversight. Senator Dodd's bill would also exempt insurers from the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Under both H.R. 4173 and RAFSA, systemically significant insurers could be subject to regulation by the systemic risk regulator and to federal

³⁷ 12 U.S.C. § 1841, *et seq.*

³⁸ See CRS Report R41018, *Insurance and Financial Regulatory Reform in the 111th Congress*, by Baird Webel

³⁹ 15 U.S.C. § 1011 *et seq.*

⁴⁰ See CRS Report R40771, *Insurance Regulation: Issues, Background, and Legislation in the 111th Congress*, by Baird Webel.

resolution authority. The Senate bill would largely exempt insurers from the requirement to pre-fund resolution authority, although, insurers over \$50 billion in assets may be liable for future assessments should they be necessary. In addition, both H.R. 4173 and RAFA contain language from previous bills (H.R. 2571/S. 1363) addressing surplus lines and reinsurance.⁴¹

Author Contact Information

Baird Webel, Coordinator
Specialist in Financial Economics
bwebel@crs.loc.gov, 7-0652

David H. Carpenter
Legislative Attorney
dcarpenter@crs.loc.gov, 7-9118

Marc Labonte
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy
mlabonte@crs.loc.gov, 7-0640

Rena S. Miller
Analyst in Financial Economics
rsmiller@crs.loc.gov, 7-0826

Edward V. Murphy
Specialist in Financial Economics
tmurphy@crs.loc.gov, 7-6201

Gary Shorter
Specialist in Financial Economics
gshorter@crs.loc.gov, 7-7772

CRS Contacts for Areas Covered by Report

Issue Area	Name and Telephone Number
Systemic Risk	Marc Labonte, 7-0640
Federal Reserve	Marc Labonte, 7-0640
Resolution Regimes	David Carpenter, 7-9118
Securitization and Shadow Banking	Edward V. Murphy, 7-6201
Bank Supervision	Maureen Murphy, 7-6971
Financial Consumer Protection	David Carpenter, 7-9118
Derivatives	Rena Miller, 7-0826
Credit Rating Agencies	Gary Shorter, 7-7772
Insurance	Baird Webel, 7-0652
Investor Protection	Michael Seitzinger, 7-7895
Hedge Funds	Kathleen Ruane, 7-9135
Executive Compensation	Gary Shorter, 7-7772

⁴¹ See CRS Report RS22506, *Surplus Lines Insurance: Background and Current Legislation*, by Baird Webel.