A Shift in the International Security
Environment: Potential Implications for
Defense—Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
June 12, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43838
A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Summary
World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the international security
environment is undergoing a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years,
also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to
a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power
competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since
World War II.
A shift in the international security environment could have significant implications for U.S.
defense plans and programs. A previous shift in the international security environment—from the
Cold War to the post-Cold War era—prompted a broad reassessment by the Department of
Defense (DOD) and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to
numerous changes in DOD plans and programs.
A new shift in the international security environment could similarly have a number of
implications for U.S. defense plans and programs. Of perhaps the greatest potential significance,
such a shift could lead to a change in the current overall terms of debate over U.S. defense plans
and programs. Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, as well as subsequent Russian actions
in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have already led to a renewed focus among
policymakers on U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe, and on how to counter Russia’s
so-called “ambiguous warfare” tactics. China’s actions in the East and South China Seas have
prompted a focus among policymakers on how to counter China’s so-called “salami-slicing”
tactics in those areas. A shift in the international security environment may also be generating
implications for areas such as nuclear weapons, submarines and antisubmarine warfare, and DOD
reliance on Russian-made components.
Policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:
• Shift in strategic situations. Has there been a shift in the international security
environment, and if so, what features characterize the new environment?
• Reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions. Should
there be a reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions?
• Congressional role in reassessment. If there is to be such a reassessment, how
should it be done, and what role should Congress play?
• Potential effect on plans and programs. How might such a reassessment affect
the current terms of debate on U.S. defense? What might be the potential
implications for U.S. defense plans and programs?
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A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Shift in International Security Environment .............................................................................. 1
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 1
Cold War Era ....................................................................................................................... 2
Post-Cold War Era ............................................................................................................... 3
The New Situation ............................................................................................................... 3
Congressional Participation in Reassessment of U.S. Defense During Previous Shift ............. 7
Potential or Emerging Implications for Defense ....................................................................... 9
Terms of Debate over U.S. Defense .................................................................................... 9
U.S. and NATO Military Capabilities in Europe ............................................................... 10
New Forms of Aggression and Assertiveness ................................................................... 11
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence ........................................................................ 11
Submarines and Antisubmarine Warfare ........................................................................... 12
Reliance on Russian-Made Components ........................................................................... 13
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 13
Legislative Activity in 2015 ........................................................................................................... 14
FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1735/S. 1376) ........................................ 14
House (Committee Report) ............................................................................................... 14
House (Floor Action) ......................................................................................................... 19
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 21
FY2016 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2685/S. 1558) ......................................................... 34
House ................................................................................................................................. 34
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 35
Appendixes
Appendix. Legislative Activity in 2014 ......................................................................................... 36
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 63
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A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense
Introduction
World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the international security
environment is undergoing a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years to a
new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power
competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since
World War II.1
A shift in the international security environment could have significant implications for U.S.
defense plans and programs. A previous shift in the international security environment—from the
Cold War to the post-Cold War era—prompted a broad reassessment by the Department of
Defense (DOD) and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to
numerous changes in DOD plans and programs.
The issue for Congress is whether a shift in the international security environment has occurred,
and if so, how to respond to that shift. This report briefly describes the shift in the international
security environment that some observers believe has occurred, and identifies some defense-
related issues for Congress that could arise from it. Congress’s decisions on these issues could
have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.
This report focuses on defense-related issues and does not discuss potential implications of a shift
in the international security environment for other policy areas, such as foreign policy and
diplomacy, trade and finance, energy, and foreign assistance. Future CRS reports may address the
potential implications of a shift in the international security environment for these other policy
areas or address the U.S. role in the international security environment from other analytical
perspectives.
Background
Shift in International Security Environment
Overview
World events since late 2013—including Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas since
November 20132 and Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 20143—have led some
1 The term international order generally means the combination of laws, rules, norms, and supporting institutions that
shapes and helps govern international politics and economics. The U.S.-led international order established at the end of
World War II, also known as the liberal international order, can be characterized as one that features, among other
things, a reliance on international law rather than force or coercion as the preferred means of settling international
disputes, an emphasis on human rights, an open international trading system that attempts to evolve in the direction of
free trade, and the treatment of the world’s oceans, international airspace, outer space, and cyberspace as international
commons.
2 For discussions of these actions, see CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial
Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan.
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observers to conclude that the international security environment is undergoing a shift from the
familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years, also known as the unipolar moment (with the
United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different strategic situation that features,
among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led
international order that has operated since World War II.4
In August 2014, outgoing Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel referred to “the dangerous
unpredictability of a world that is I think trying to define a new world order.... We are seeing a
new world order being built in the early 21st Century.”5 In October 2014, Hagel stated: “I think
we are living through one of these historic, defining times.... We are seeing a new world order—
post-World War II, post-Soviet implosion—being built.”6
Cold War Era
The Cold War, which is generally viewed as lasting from the late 1940s until the late 1980s/early
1990s, was generally viewed as a strongly bipolar situation featuring two superpowers—the
United States and the Soviet Union—engaged in a political, ideological, and military competition
for influence across multiple regions. The military component of that competition was often most
(...continued)
3 For discussion Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, see CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and
U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel.
4 See, for example, Walter Russell Mead, “The End of History Ends,” The American Interest, December 2, 2013; Paul
David Miller, “Crimea Proves That Great Power Rivalry Never Left Us,” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2014; Walter
Russell Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014; Robert Kagan, “Superpowers Don’t Get
to Retire,” New Republic, May 26, 2014; James Kitfield, “The New Great Power Triangle Tilt: China, Russia Vs.
U.S.,” Breaking Defense, June 19, 2014; Lilia Shevtsova, “Putin Ends the Interregnum,” The American Interest, August
28, 2014; David E. Sanger, “Commitments on Three Fronts Test Obama’s Foreign Policy,” New York Times,
September 3, 2014; Steven Erlanger, “NATO’s Hopes for Russia Have Turned to Dismay,” New York Times,
September 12, 2014; Richard N. Haass, “The Era of Disorder,” Project Syndicate, October 27, 2014; Bruce Jones,
“What Stretgic Environment does the Transatlantic Community Confront?” German Marshall Fund of the United
States, Policy Brief, January 15, 2015, 5 pp.; Garry Kasparov, “The Global War on Modernity,” Wall Street Journal,
January 20, 2015; Chester A Crocker, “The Strategic Dilemma of a World Adrift,” Survival, February-March 2015: 7-
30; Robert Kagan, “The United States Must Resist A Return to Spheres of Interest in in the International System,”
Brookings Institution, February 19, 2015; Richard Fontaine, “Salvaging Global Order,” The National Interest, March
10, 2015; Philip Stephens, “Why the Business of Risk Is Booming,” Financial Times, March 12, 2015.
5 As quoted in Chris Uhlmann, “US Secretary of Defense Says ‘New World Order Being Built,’” Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, August 11, 2014.
6 As quoted in David A. Graham, “Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel: Get Used to Endless War,” The Atlantic, October
29, 2014. In September 2014, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work stated:
I think there’s two things happening, both with Russia and China. First, they clearly are staking out
their position in their near abroads. And this is one of the things that we're going to have to work
out over the course of the next several years on what they consider to be areas of their vital interest,
and what we have to do is find a means by which to make sure that those desires do not resort to the
use of force and would require an overt response militarily from us. We have to work these out and
make sure that Russia and China feel secure in their near abroads. But both of those countries
definitely believe that the current world order, as established over the last 70 years, they would like
to change certain aspects of it. So that’s going to be a constant point of attention. So at the strategic
level, it is, how are we going to work with two very strong powers, regional powers right now?
And how will we be able to work out ways in which we engage with each other over time?
(Department of Defense news transcript, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Work Delivers Remarks at
the Council on Foreign Relations,” September 30, 2014, accessed October 31, 2014, at
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5509.)
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acutely visible in Europe, where the U.S.-led NATO alliance and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact
alliance faced off against one another with large numbers of conventional forces and theater
nuclear weapons, backed by longer-ranged strategic nuclear weapons.
Post-Cold War Era
The post-Cold War era, which is generally viewed as having begun in the early 1990s, tended
toward a unipolar situation, with the United States as the world’s sole superpower. The Warsaw
Pact had disbanded, the Soviet Union had dissolved into Russia and the former Soviet republics,
and neither Russia, China, nor any other country was viewed as posing a significant challenge to
either the United States’ status as the world’s sole superpower or the U.S.-led international order.
Compared to the Cold War, the post-Cold War era generally featured reduced levels of overt
political, ideological, and military competition among major states. Following 9/11, the post-Cold
War era was additionally characterized by a strong focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on
countering transnational terrorist organizations that had emerged as significant non-state actors,
particularly Al Qaeda.
The New Situation
Some Emerging Features
Observers who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new strategic
situation generally view the new period not as a bipolar situation (like the Cold War) or a unipolar
situation (like the post-Cold War era), but as a multipolar situation characterized by renewed
competition among three major world powers—the United States, China, and Russia. Other
emerging characteristics of the new international security situation as viewed by these observers
include the following:
• renewed ideological competition, this time against 21st-century forms of
authoritarianism in Russia, China, and other countries;7
• the promotion in China and Russia through their state-controlled media of
nationalistic historical narratives emphasizing assertions of prior humiliation or
7 See, for example, Anne Applebaum, “Russia’s Anti-Western Ideology Has Global Consequences,” Washington Post,
March 28, 2014; Paula J. Dobriansky, “U.S. Needs A Strong Moral Narrative To Combat Putin,” Washington Post,
May 23, 2014; Christopher Walker, “Authoritarian Regimes Are Changing How The World Defines Democracy,”
Washington Post, June 13, 2014; Lilia Shevtsova, “Crowning a Winner in the Post-Crimea World,” The American
Interest, June 16, 2014; Timothy Garton Ash, “Putin’s Deadly Doctrine,” New York Times, July 18, 2014; Fareed
Zakaria, “The Rise of Putinism,” Washington Post, July 31, 2014; David Brooks, “The Battle of the Regimes,” New
York Times, August 4, 2014; Robert Tracinski, “Putinism and the ‘Battle of Regimes,’” The Federalist, August 14,
2014; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “The Dual Threats to Western Values,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2014;
Jeremy Page, “Why Russia’s President Is ‘Putin the Great’ in China,” New York Times, October 1, 2014; Yigal
Schleifer, “Hungary At The Turning Point,” Slate, October 3, 2014; Margit Feher, “Prompted by U.S. Comments,
Hungary Insists It respects Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2014; Krizstina Than, “U.S. Diplomat
Criticizes PM Orban’s Russia Policies,” Reuters, October 24, 2014; Zoran Radosavljevik and Krizstina Than,
“Washington Tries To Check Hungary’s Drift Into Kremlin Orbit,” Reuters, November 1, 2014; Gideon Rachman,
“The West Has Lost Intellectual Self-Confidence,” Financial Times, January 5, 2015; Garry Kasparov, “The Global
War on Modernity,” Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2015; Anna Borshchevskaya, “Moral Clarity Is Needed In
Countering Anti-Western Propaganda,” Forbes, March 14, 2015.
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victimization by Western powers, and the use of those narratives to support
revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims;
• the use by Russia and China of new forms of aggressive or assertive military and
paramilitary operations—called ambiguous warfare, among other terms, in the
case of Russia’s actions, and called salami-slicing tactics or gray-zone warfare,
among other terms, in the case of China’s actions—to gain greater degrees of
control of areas on their peripheries;
• challenges by Russia and China to key elements of the U.S.-led international
order, including the principle that force or threat of force should not be used as a
routine or first-resort measure for settling disputes between countries, and the
principle that the world’s oceans are to be treated as an international commons;
and
• alongside the above features, continued regional security challenges from
countries such as Iran and North Korea, and a continuation of the post-Cold War
era’s focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist
organizations that have emerged as significant non-state actors (now including
the Islamic State organization, among other groups).
The Obama Administration’s February 2015 National Security Strategy document states:
Around the world, there are historic transitions underway that will unfold over decades....
Five recent transitions, in particular, have significantly changed the security landscape,
including since our last strategy in 2010.
First, power among states is more dynamic.... Shifting power dynamics create both
opportunities and risks for cooperation, as some states have been more willing than others to
assume responsibilities commensurate with their greater economic capacity. In particular,
India’s potential, China’s rise, and Russia’s aggression all significantly impact the future of
major power relations.
Second, power is shifting below and beyond the nation-state.... While largely positive, these
trends can foster violent non-state actors and foment instability—especially in fragile states
where governance is weak or has broken down—or invite backlash by authoritarian regimes
determined to preserve the power of the state.
Third, the increasing interdependence of the global economy and rapid pace of technological
change are linking individuals, groups, and governments in unprecedented ways. This
enables and incentivizes new forms of cooperation to establish dynamic security networks,
expand international trade and investment, and transform global communications. It also
creates shared vulnerabilities, as interconnected systems and sectors are susceptible to the
threats of climate change, malicious cyber activity, pandemic diseases, and transnational
terrorism and crime.
Fourth, a struggle for power is underway among and within many states of the Middle East
and North Africa....
Fifth, the global energy market has changed dramatically. The United States is now the
world’s largest natural gas and oil producer.... On the other hand, energy security concerns
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have been exacerbated by European dependence on Russian natural gas and the willingness
of Russia to use energy for political ends.8
Markers of the Shift to the New Situation
For observers who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new
strategic situation, the sharpest single marker of the shift arguably was Russia’s seizure and
annexation of Crimea in March 2014, which represented the first forcible seizure and annexation
of one country’s territory by another country in Europe since World War II. Other markers of the
shift, such as Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe since March
2014, China’s economic growth and military modernization over the last several years, and
China’s actions in the East and South China Seas over the last several years, have been more
gradual and cumulative.
Some observers trace the beginnings of the argued shift in strategic situations back to 2008. In
that year, Russia invaded and occupied part of the former Soviet republic of Georgia without
provoking a strong cost-imposing response from the United States and its allies. Also in that year,
the financial crisis and resulting deep recessions in the United States and Europe, combined with
China’s ability to weather that crisis and its successful staging of the 2008 Summer Olympics, are
seen by observers as having contributed to a perception in China of the United States as a
declining power, and to a Chinese sense of self-confidence or triumphalism.9 China’s assertive
actions in the East and South China Seas can be viewed as having begun (or accelerated) soon
thereafter.10
Comparisons to Earlier Periods
Each strategic situation features a unique combination of major actors, dimensions of competition
and cooperation among those actors, and military and other technologies available to them. A new
strategic situation can have some similarities to previous ones, but it will also have differences,
including, potentially, one or more features not present in any previous strategic situation. In the
early years of a new strategic situation, some of its features may be unclear, in dispute, or not yet
apparent. In attempting to understand a new strategic situation, comparisons to earlier ones are
potentially helpful in identifying avenues of investigation. If applied too rigidly, however, such
comparisons can act as intellectual straightjackets, making it more difficult to achieve a full
understanding of a new strategic situation’s characteristic features, particularly those that
differentiate it from previous ones.
Some observers have stated that the world is entering a new Cold War. That term may have some
utility in referring specifically to U.S.-Russian relations, because the new strategic situation that
some observers have identified features competition and tension with Russia. Considered more
broadly, however, the Cold War was a bipolar situation, while the new environment appears to be
a multipolar situation that also includes China as a major competing power. The bipolarity of the
Cold War, moreover, was reinforced by the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, whereas
8 National Security Strategy, February 2015, pp. 4-5.
9 See, for example, Howard W. French, “China’s Dangerous Game,” The Atlantic, October 13, 2014.
10 Some observers trace the roots of the end of the post-Cold War era further, to years prior to 2008; see, for example,
Walter Russell Mead, “Who’s to Blame for a World in Flames?” The American Interest, October 6, 2014.
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in contrast, Russia today does not lead an equivalent of the Warsaw Pact. And while terrorists
were a concern during the Cold War, the U.S. focus on countering transnational terrorist groups
was not nearly as significant during the Cold War as it has been since 9/11.
Other observers, viewing the emerging multipolar situation, have drawn comparisons to the
multipolar situation that existed in the 19th century and the years prior to World War I. Still others,
observing both multipolarity and the promotion in China and Russia of nationalistic historical
narratives supporting revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims, have drawn comparisons to the
1930s. Those two earlier situations, however, did not feature a strong focus on countering
globally significant transnational terrorist groups, and the military and other technologies
available then differ vastly from those available today. The new strategic situation that some
observers have identified may be similar in some respects to previous strategic situations, but it
also differs from previous situations in certain respects, and might be best understood by direct
observation and identification of its key features.
Renewed Emphasis on Grand Strategy and Geopolitics
The discussion of the shift in the international security environment that some observers have
identified has led to a renewed emphasis in discussions of U.S. security and foreign policy on
grand strategy and geopolitics.11 From a U.S. perspective, grand strategy can be understood as
strategy considered at a global or interregional level, as opposed to strategies for specific
countries, regions, or issues. Geopolitics refers to the influence on international relations and
strategy of basic world geographic features such as the size and location of continents, oceans,
and individual countries.
From a U.S. perspective on grand strategy and geopolitics, it can be noted that most of the
world’s people, resources, and economic activity are located not in the Western Hemisphere, but
in the other hemisphere, particularly Eurasia. In response to this basic feature of world geography,
U.S. policymakers for the last several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U.S.
national strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia
or another, on the grounds that such a hegemon could represent a concentration of power strong
enough to threaten core U.S. interests by, for example, denying the United States access to some
of the other hemisphere’s resources and economic activity. Although U.S. policymakers have not
often stated this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U.S. military (and diplomatic)
11 See, for example, William C. Martel, “Why America Needs a Grand Strategy,” The Diplomat, June 18, 2012; Aaron
David Miller, “The Naiveté of Distance,” Foreign Policy, March 31, 2014; Robert Kaplan, “The Gift of American
Power,” Real Clear World, May 15, 2014; William C. Martel, “America’s Grand Strategy Disaster,” The National
Interest, June 9, 2014; Adam Garfinkle, “The Silent Death of American Grand Strategy,” American Review, 2014;
Christopher A. Ford, “Ending the Strategic Holiday: U.S. Grand Strategy and a ‘Rising’ China,” Asia Policy, Number
18 (July 2014): 181-189; William Ruger, “A Realist’s Guide to Grand Strategy,” The American Conservative, August
26, 2014; Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, 2014, 256
pp. (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs); R. D. Hooker, The Grand Strategy of the United States, Washington, National
Defense University Press, October 2014, 35 pp. (INSS Strategic Monograph, Institute for National Strategic Studies);
F.G. Hoffman, “Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations,” Orbis, Volume 58, Issue 4 (Fall 2014), 2014: 472–
485; Michael Page, “Is ‘Restraint’ a Realistic Grand Strategy?” Cicero Magazine, October 21, 2014; Bryan McGrath,
“Unconstrained Grand Strategy,” War on the Rocks October 28, 2014; Joseph Sarkisian, “American Grand Strategy or
Grand Illusion?” Cicero, December 1, 2014; Chris Miller, “State of Disunion: America’s Lack of Strategy is its Own
Greatest Threat, Cicero, January 27, 2015; Jerry Hendrix, Avoiding Trivia: A Strategy for Sustainment and Fiscal
Responsibility, Center for a New American Security, February 2015, 36 pp.; Jim Mattis, “A New American Grand
Strategy,” Hoover Institution, February 26, 2015.
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operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—can be
viewed as having been carried out in no small part in support of this key goal.
The U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or
another is a major reason why the U.S. military is structured with force elements that enable it to
cross broad expanses of ocean and air space and then conduct sustained, large-scale military
operations upon arrival. Force elements associated with this goal include, among other things, an
Air Force with significant numbers of long-range bombers, long-range surveillance aircraft, long-
range airlift aircraft, and aerial refueling tankers, and a Navy with significant numbers of aircraft
carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines, large surface combatants, large amphibious ships,
and underway replenishment ships.
Congressional Participation in Reassessment of U.S. Defense
During Previous Shift
A previous shift in the international security environment—from the Cold War to the post-Cold
War era—prompted a broad reassessment of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that
led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. Many of these changes were articulated in
the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR),12 a reassessment of U.S. defense plans and programs whose
very name conveyed the fundamental nature of the reassessment that had occurred.13 In general,
the BUR reshaped the U.S. military into a force that was smaller than the Cold War U.S. military,
and oriented toward a planning scenario being able to conduct two major regional contingencies
(MRCs) rather than the Cold War planning scenario of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.14
Through both committee activities and the efforts of individual Members, Congress played a
significant role in the reassessment of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that was
prompted by the end of the Cold War. In terms of committee activities, the question of how to
change U.S. defense plans and programs in response to the end of the Cold War was, for example,
a major focus for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in holding hearings and
marking up annual national defense authorization acts in the early 1990s.15
12 See Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, October 1993, 109
pp.
13 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s introduction to DOD’s report on the 1993 BUR states:
In March 1993, I initiated a comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure,
modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. I felt that a department-wide review needed to be
conducted “from the bottom up” because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world as
a result of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes in the
international security environment have fundamentally altered America’s security needs. Thus, the
underlying premise of the Bottom-Up Review was that we needed to reassess all of our defense
concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up.
(Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense,
October 1993, p. iii.)
14 For additional discussion of the results of the BUR, see CRS Report 93-839 F, Defense Department Bottom-Up
Review: Results and Issues, October 6, 1993, 6 pp., by Edward F. Bruner, and CRS Report 93-627 F, Defense
Department Bottom-Up Review: The Process, July 2, 1993, 9 pp., by Cedric W. Tarr, Jr. [both nondistributable and
available from the author of this report].
15 See, for example:
•
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept.
(continued...)
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In terms of efforts by individual Members, some Members put forth their own proposals for how
much to reduce defense spending from the levels of the final years of the Cold War,16 while others
put forth detailed proposals for future U.S. defense strategy, plans, programs, and spending.
Senator John McCain, for example, issued a detailed, 32-page policy paper in November 1991
presenting his proposals for defense spending, missions, force structure, and weapon acquisition
programs.17
Perhaps the most extensive individual effort by a Member to participate in the reassessment of
U.S. defense following the end of the Cold War was the one carried out by Representative Les
Aspin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. In early 1992, Aspin, supported by
members of the committee’s staff, devised a force-sizing construct and potential force levels and
associated defense spending levels U.S. defense for the new post-Cold War era. A principal aim
of Aspin’s effort was to create an alternative to the “Base Force” plan for U.S. defense in the post-
Cold War era that had been developed by the George H. W. Bush Administration.18 Aspin’s effort
included a series of policy papers in January and February 199219 that were augmented by press
(...continued)
101-665 of August 3, 1990, on H.R. 4739), pp. 7-14;
•
the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept.
101-384 of July 20 (legislative day, July 10), 1990, on S. 2884), pp. 8-36;
•
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1992 and FY1993 National Defense Authorization
Act (H.Rept. 102-60 of May 13, 1991, on H.R. 2100), pp. 8 and 13;
•
the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1992 and FY1993 National Defense Authorization
Act (S.Rept. 102-113 of July 19 (legislative day, July 8), 1991, on S. 1507), pp. 8-9;
•
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept.
102-527 of May 19, 1992, on H.R. 5006), pp. 8-10, 14-15, and 22;
•
the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept.
102-352 of July 31 (legislative day, July 23), 1992, on S. 3114), pp. 7-12;
•
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept.
103-200 of July 30, 1993, on H.R. 2401), pp. 8-9 and 18-19;
•
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept.
103-499 of May 10, 1994, on H.R. 4301), pp. 7 and 9;
•
the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept.
103-282 of June 14 (legislative day, June 7), 1994, on S. 2182), pp. 8-9; and
•
the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept.
104-131 of June 1, 1995, on H.R. 1530), pp. 6-7 and 11-12.
16 See, for example, Clifford Krauss, “New Proposal for Military Cut,” New York Times, January 7, 1992: A11
[discussing a proposal by Senator Phil Gramm for reducing defense spending by a certain amount]; “Sen. Mitchell
Proposes $100 Billion Cut in Defense,” Aerospace Daily, January 17, 1992: 87; John Lancaster, “Nunn Proposes 5-
Year Defense Cut of $85 Billion,” Washington Post, March 25, 1992: A4.
17 Senator John McCain, Matching A Peace Dividend With National Security, A New Strategy For The 1990s,
November 1991, 32 pp.
18 See, for example, “Arms Panel Chief Challenges Ending Use of Threat Analysis,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, January 13, 1992: 28; Patrick E. Tyler, “Top Congressman Seeks Deeper Cuts in Military Budget,” New
York Times, February 23, 1991: 1; Barton Gellman, “Debate on Military’s Future Crystallizes Around ‘Enemies List,’”
Washington Post, February 26, 1992: A20; Pat Towell, “Planning the Nation’s Defense,” CQ, February 29, 1992: 479.
For more on the Base Force, see CRS Report 92-493 S, National Military Strategy, The DoD Base Force, and U.S.
Unified Command Plan, June 11, 1992, 68 pp., by John M. Collins [nondistributable and available from the authors of
this report].
19 These policy papers included the following:
•
National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces, Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman,
(continued...)
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releases and speeches. Aspin’s policy paper of February 25, 1992, served as the basis for his
testimony that same day at a hearing on future defense spending before the House Budget
Committee. Although DOD and some other observers (including some Members of Congress)
criticized Aspin’s analysis and proposals on various grounds,20 the effort arguably proved
consequential the following year, when Aspin became Secretary of Defense in the new Clinton
Administration. Aspin’s 1992 effort helped inform his participation in DOD’s 1993 BUR. The
1993 BUR in turn created a precedent for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process that
remains in place today.
Potential or Emerging Implications for Defense
The shift in strategic situations that some observers have identified could have a number of
implications for U.S. defense plans and programs, including those discussed briefly below.
Terms of Debate over U.S. Defense
Of perhaps the greatest potential significance, a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new
strategic situation could lead to a change in the current overall terms of debate over U.S. defense
plans and programs. The current terms of debate are shaped by things such as the limits on
defense spending established under the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of
August 2, 2011) as amended, the defense strategic guidance document of January 2012,21 and the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.22 If the current terms of debate largely reflect the features of
the post-Cold War era, they may not be responsive to features of the new strategic situation that
some observers have identified.23
Some observers, citing recent world events, have raised the question of whether defense spending
should be increased above levels set forth in the BCA, and consequently whether the BCA should
be amended or repealed.24 If policymakers judge that a shift in strategic situations of the kind
(...continued)
House Armed Services Committee, Before the Atlantic Council of the United States, January 6, 1992, 23 pp.;
•
An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era, Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman,
House Armed Services Committee, January 24, 2991, 20 pp.;
•
Tomorrow’s Defense From Today’s Industrial Base: Finding the Right Resource Strategy For A New Era, by
Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, Before the American Defense Preparedness
Association, February 12, 1992, 20 pp.; and
•
An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era, Four Illustrative Options,
Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1992, 27 pp.
20 See, for example, “Aspin Defense Budget Plans Rebuffed By Committee,” Defense Daily, February 24, 1992: 289;
“Pentagon Spurns Aspin’s Budget Cuts as ‘Political,’” Washington Post, February 28, 1992: A14.
21 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp.
For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42146, Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG): In
Brief, by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.
22 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 64 pp. For additional discussion, see CRS Report
R43403, The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Defense Strategy: Issues for Congress, by Catherine Dale.
23 See, for example, David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Addressing Tomorrow’s Challenges With Yesterday’s Budget,”
War on the Rocks, February 10, 2015; John Grady, “Think Tank Panel Tells House U,.S. Military Faces More
Challenges, Suggests Pentagon Spending Reforms,” USNI News, February 11, 2015.
24 See, for example, John T. Bennett, “Could Global Threat Picture Restore US Defense Increases?” Defense News,
(continued...)
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discussed here is occurring, the nature of the U.S. response to that shift could lead to defense
spending levels that are higher than, lower than, or about the same as those in the BCA.
U.S. and NATO Military Capabilities in Europe
Russia’s seizure and annexation of Ukraine and Russia’s subsequent actions in eastern Ukraine
and elsewhere in Eastern Europe have led to a renewed focus among policymakers on U.S. and
NATO military capabilities in Europe.25 In July 2014, the Administration, as part of its FY2015
funding request for the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) part of DOD’s budget,
requested $1 billion for a European Reassurance Initiative, of which $925 million would be for
DOD to carry out several force deployments and operations in Europe.26 At the September 4-5,
2014, NATO summit in Wales, NATO leaders announced a series of initiatives for refocusing
NATO away from “out of area” (i.e., beyond-Europe) operations, and back toward a focus on
territorial defense and deterrence in Europe itself.27 Officials in NATO countries are also
considering whether to increase defense spending. In December 2014, Russia issued a new
military doctrine that, among other things, calls for a more assertive approach toward NATO.28
The increased attention that U.S. policymakers are paying to the security situation in Europe,
combined with U.S. military operations in the Middle East against the Islamic State organization
and similar groups, has intensified preexisting questions among some observers about whether
the United States will be able to fully implement the military component of the U.S. strategic
(...continued)
August 31, 2014; Charles Lane, “The U.S. Needs To Get Serious About Defense Spending,” Washington Post,
September 3, 2014; Robert J. Samuelson, “America’s Neglected Defense,” Washington Post, September 7, 2014;
Michele Flournoy and Eric Edelman, “Cuts To Defense Spending Are Hurting Our National Security,” Washington
Post, September 19, 2014; Mackenzie Eaglen, “GOP, Dems Must Rebuild Military Readiness,” Breaking Defense,
September 26, 2014; Ron Haskins and Michael O’Hanlon, “Commentary: Stop Sequestering Defense,” Defense News,
October 13, 2014; Merrill D’Arezzo, “Experts Call For National Debate On U.S. Military Priorities,” Military Times,
October 23, 2104; Martin Matishak and Rebecca Shabad, “Defense Hopes For Sequester Relief,” The Hill, October 26,
2014; James Jay Carafano, “Is America’s Defense Budget Too Small?” The National Interest, October 31, 2014.
25 See, for example, Richard Sisk, “US Army Plans to Send Abrams Tanks and Bradleys to Eastern Europe,”
Military.com, December 1, 2014; Michael R. Gordon, “Nimble New NATO Force to Take Form Next Year,” New York
Times, December 2, 2014; Oriana Pawlyk, “U.S. Lawmakers Want Aircraft in Europe Until Russia Backs Down,”
Military Times, December 4, 2014; Mike Collier and Vaidotas Beniusis, “Baltics Up Defense Spending As Russia
Buzzes Borders,” Defense News, December 13, 2014; Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force To Increase Op Tempo in Europe in
2015,” Military Times, December 18, 20914; Bill Sweetman, “Changing Times; European Nations Prepare for
Disrupted Peace,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 29, 2014-January 14, 2015: 57; John-Thor Dahlburg,
“NATO’s Priority in 2015: Setting Up Reaction Force in Europe,” Stars and Stripes, January 6, 2015; Kristina Wong,
“Army Plans to Shift 3,000 Troops to Europe,” The Hill, January 10, 2015; Wiktor Szary, “NATO Looking at Beefing
Up Baltic Exercises: Top General,” Reuters, January 13, 2015; David Larter, “NAVEUR: Ships Needed in 6th Fleet for
High-End Training,” Navy Times, January 13, 2015; John R. Deni, “Cutting U.S. Force Structure in Europe: A
Repreive?” War on the Rocks, January 13, 2015; Carol J. Williams, “NATO Sends Rapid-Reaction Forces to Russia’s
Neighbors,” Los Angeles Times, January 14, 2015.
26 Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Admiral James A.
Winnefeld, Jr, USN, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the House Armed Services Committee on the
FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Budget Request for the Department of Defense, Wednesday, July 16, 2014,
pp. 2, 4-5.
27 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R43698, NATO’s Wales Summit: Outcomes and Key Challenges, by Paul
Belkin.
28 See, for example, Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Russia Overhauls Military Doctrine,” Defense News, January 10, 2015.
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rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region that was formally announced in the January 2012 defense
strategic guidance document.
New Forms of Aggression and Assertiveness
Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, as well as subsequent Russian actions in eastern
Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have already led to a renewed focus among
policymakers on how to counter Russia’s so-called “ambiguous warfare” tactics.29 China’s actions
in the East and South China Seas have prompted a focus among policymakers on how to counter
China’s so-called “salami-slicing” tactics in those areas.30
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence
Russia’s reassertion of its status as a major world power has included, among other things,
references by Russian officials to nuclear weapons and Russia’s status as a major nuclear weapon
29 See, for example, Jackson Diehl, “Ukraine’s Wake-Up Call for NATO,” Washington Post, April 27, 2014; Peter
Pomerantsev, “How Putin Is Reinventing Warfare,” Foreign Policy, May 5, 2014; Frank Hoffman, “On Not-So-New
Warfare: Political Warfare Vs. Hybrid Threats,” War on the Rocks, July 28, 2014; Masha Gessen, “The Putin Military
Doctrine,” Slate, August 15, 2014; Peter Apps, “‘Ambiguous Warfare’ Providing NATO With New Challenge,”
Reuters, August 21, 2014; Paul Huard, “‘Maskirovka’ Is Russian Secret War,” War Is Boring, August 25, 2014; Sam
Jones, “Ukraine: Russia’s New Art of War,” Financial Times, August 28, 2014; Uri Friedman, “Russia’s Slow-Motion
Invasion of Ukraine, Is Russia Waging A New Form of Warfare, Or A Very Old One?” The Atlantic, August 29, 2014;
Matthew Gault, “NATO Is Acting Like It’s 1985; Old Alliance Needs New Ideas To Combat Russian Secret War,”
War Is Boring, August 30, 2014; Jakub Grygiel and A. Weiss Mitchell, “Limited War Is Back,” The National Interest,
September 1, 2014; Cathy Young, “Derangement in Moscow,” The Weekly Standard, September 8, 2014; Peter
Pomerantsev, “Russia and the Menace of Unreality,” The Atlantic, September 9, 2015; Andrew Higgins, “Tensions
Surge in Estonia Amid a Russian Replay of Cold War Tactics,” New York Times, October 5, 2014; Joe Gould, “US
Military Girds for More ‘Unconventional Warfare,’” Defense News, October 24, 2014; Douglas Mastriano, “Defeating
Putin’s Strategy of Ambiguity,” War on the Rocks, November 6, 2014; Peter Apps, “West Struggles With Russia’s
‘Ambiguous Warfare’ Tactics,” Reuters, November 27, 2014; Matthew Armstrong, “Russia’s War in Information,”
War on the Rocks, December 15, 2014; Bill Sweetman, “Denial And Disinformation Will Shape Future Warfare,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 30, 2014; Peter Pomerantsev, “The Putin Show,” Commentary, January
1, 2015; Peter Pomerantsev, “Inside Putin’s Information War,” Politico, January 4, 2015; Tim Starks, “New House
Armed Services Chairman Plans Focus on Unconventional Warfare,” Roll Call, January 14, 2015; Edgar Buckley and
Ioan Pascu, “Report Warms Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’ In Ukraine Could Inspire Others,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, February 18, 2015; “NATO’s Article 5 and Russian Hybrid Warfare,” Atlantic Council, March 17, 2015;
Agence France-Presse, “NATO Allies Brace for Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” Defense News, March 18, 2015.
30 Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Beefs Up Military Options for china as Obama Reassures Allies in Asia,”
Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2014; Jackson Diehl, “China’s ‘Creeping Invasion,’” Washington Post, September 14,
2014; Joe Gould, “US Military Girds for More ‘Unconventional Warfare,” Defense News, October 24, 2014; Robert
Haddick, “The Struggle for a Strategy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2015: 52-57; Tim Starks, “New
House Armed Services Chairman Plans Focus on Unconventional Warfare,” Roll Call, January 14, 2015; Michael
Mazza, “US in the Asia-Pacific: Toward A More Effective Asia Strategy,” American Enterprise Institute, January 30,
2015; Andrew Erickson, et al., “China’s Menacing Sandcastles in the South China Sea,” War on the Rocks, March 2,
2015 (a collection of short writings by several authors); Richard Fontaine, “Chinese Land Reclamation Pushes
Boundaries,” Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2015; Harry J. Kazianis, “Superpower Showdown: America Can Stop
Chinese Aggression in Asia,” The National Interest, March 6, 2015; John Schaus, “Concrete Steps for the U.S. in the
South China Sea,” War on the Rocks, March 16, 2015; David Brunnstrom, “Senators Seek U.S. Strategy to Stop
China’s South China Sea Reclamation,” Reuters, March 19, 2015; Colin Clark, “US Should ‘Slow’ Or ‘Stop’ China’s
Island Building: SASC, Foreign Relations Leaders, Breaking Defense, March 19, 2015.
. See also CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China:
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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power.31 This has led to an increased emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense and security on
nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence32—a development that comes at a time when DOD is in
the early stages of a multi-year plan to spend scores of billions of dollars to modernize U.S.
strategic nuclear deterrent forces.33 DOD, for example, currently has plans to acquire a new class
of ballistic missile submarines34 and a new long-range bomber.35
Submarines and Antisubmarine Warfare
The growing capabilities and operations of China’s submarine fleet,36 combined with a stated
intention by Russia to rebuild its navy (including its submarine force) and renewed Russian
submarine operations (including suspected Russian submarine operations in Swedish waters and
near Scotland), have led to a renewed focus in discussions of U.S. defense and security on the
value of the U.S. attack submarine force for preserving U.S. command of the seas on a global
basis, and on U.S. and allied antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.37 This could lead to an
increased focus on the procurement of Virginia-class submarines38 and ASW platforms and
31 See, for example, Jeffrey Tayler, “Putin’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Policy, September 4, 2014; Alexei Anishchuk,
“Putin Warns U.S. Spay Over Ukraine Threatens Global Stability,” Reuters, October 15, 2014; Adrian Croft, “UK
Concerned Over ‘Threatening’ Russian Nuclear Strategy,” Reuters, February 6, 2015.
32 See, for example, Ralph Vartabedian and W.J. Hennigan, “NATO Nuclear Drawdown Now Seems Unlikely,” Los
Angeles Times, September 19, 2014; William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Ramping Up Major Renewal in
Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, September 21, 2014; Bill Sweetman, “Opinion: Nuclear Deterrence Back On The
Policy Menu,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 29, 2014; Robert Spalding III and Adam Lowther, “It’s
Time to Talk About Nukes Again,” Real Clear Defense, October 23, 2014; Gideon Rachman, “The Nuclear Gun Is
Back On The Table,” Financial Times, November 17, 2014; Elbridge Colby, “Welcome to China and America’s
Nuclear Nightmare,” The National Interest, December 19, 2014; Julian Borger, “US and Russia in Danger of Returning
to Era of Nuclear Rivalry,” The Guardian, January 4, 2015; Jeffrey Lewis, “Led Zeppelin Comes to Washington,”
Foreign Policy, January 5, 2015.
33 See, for example, William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Ramping Up Major Renewal in Nuclear Arms,” New
York Times, September 21, 2014; CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments,
and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf, and Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024
January 2015, 7 pp.
34 CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
35 CRS Report R43049, U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Jeremiah Gertler.
36 For a discussion of China’s submarine fleet, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
37 See, for example, Jeff W. Benson, “Opinion: A New Era in Anti-Submarine Warfare,” USNI News, August 27, 2014;
Kris Osborn, “US Navy Issues Warnings on Russia, China’s Submarine Fleets, Military.com, September 20, 2014; Karl
Ritter and Matti Huuhtanen (Associated Press), “Submarine Hunt Sends Cold War Chill Across Baltic,” Washington
Post, October 20, 2014; Kris Osborn, “CNO Warms of Advanced Russian Submarine Development,” Military.com,
October 23, 2014; James R. Holmes, “Relearning Anti-Submarine Warfare,” The Diplomat, October 30, 2014; Sam
LaGrone, “CNO Greenert: Russian Navy ‘Very Busy in the Undersea Domain,’” USNI News, November 4, 2014; Tony
Osborne, “Canadians, French, U.S. Hunt For Submarine Off Scotland,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, December
9, 2014; Kylie Maclellan, “Britain Calls on NATO Allies To Help in Submarine Hunt: Media,” Reuters, December 10,
2014; Jeffrey Lewis, “Led Zeppelin Comes to Washington,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2015; Jamie Merrill, “MoD
Asks for American Help in Searching For Russian Submarine Near Scotland,” The Independent, January 8, 2015; Tony
Osborne, “Sweden Acknowledges Second Submarine Hunt,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, January 16, 2015: 3.
38 For a discussion of the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack
Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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equipment, including (to cite just two examples), P-8 Poseidon multi-mission aircraft and ASW
equipment for Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs).39
Reliance on Russian-Made Components
Increased tensions with Russia have led to an interest in eliminating instances of being dependent
on Russian-made military systems and components for U.S. military systems. A current case in
point concerns the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine, which is incorporated into U.S. space
launch rockets, including rockets used by DOD to put military payloads into orbit.40
Issues for Congress
Potential policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:
• Shift in strategic situation. Has there been a shift in the international security
environment, and if so, what features characterize the new environment?
• Reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions. Should
there be a reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions?
• Congressional role in reassessment. If there is to be such a reassessment, how
should it be done, and what role should Congress play? Should Congress conduct
the reassessment itself, through committee activities? Should Congress establish
the terms of reference for a reassessment to be conducted by the executive branch
or by an independent, third-party entity (such as a blue ribbon panel)? Should
some combination of these approaches be employed?
• Potential effect on plans and programs. How might such a reassessment affect
the current terms of debate on U.S. defense? What might be the potential
implications for U.S. defense plans and programs?
• U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe. Are the United States and its
NATO allies taking appropriate steps regarding U.S. and NATO military
capabilities and operations in Europe? What potential impacts would a
strengthened U.S. military presence in Europe have on total U.S. military force
structure requirements? What impact would it have on DOD’s ability to
implement the military component of the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the
Asia-Pacific region?
• New forms of aggression and assertiveness. Do the United States and its allies
and partners have an adequate strategy for countering Russia’s so-called
ambiguous warfare in eastern Ukraine and China’s so-called salami-slicing
tactics in the East and South China Seas?
39 For a discussion of the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
40 For a discussion, see CRS Report IN10069, Russian Sanctions Reprisal Against the RD-180 Rocket Engine: Paths
Ahead for U.S. National Security Space Launch, by Steven A. Hildreth. See also Daniel Goure, “With A New Cold
War Beginning, Reliance On Russia For Rocket Engines Is Madness,” Lexington Institute, August 7, 2014; David A.
Deptula, “The Russians Have Us Over a Rocket,” Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2014.
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• Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Are current DOD plans for
modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, and for numbers and basing of non-
strategic (i.e., theater-range) nuclear weapons aligned with the needs of the new
strategic situation?
• Submarines and antisubmarine warfare. Are current Navy plans for numbers
and capabilities of attack submarines, and ASW capabilities, aligned with the
needs of the new strategic situation?
• Reliance on Russian-made components. Aside from the Russian-made RD-180
rocket engine, what other Russian-made components, if any, are incorporated
into DOD equipment? What are DOD’s plans regarding reliance on Russian-
made components for DOD equipment?
Legislative Activity in 2015
The Administration’s proposed FY2016 defense budget was submitted to Congress on February
2, 2015.
FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1735/S. 1376)
House (Committee Report)
Section 1088 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 114-
102 of May 5, 2015) states:
SEC. 1088. Department of Defense strategy for countering unconventional warfare.
(a) Strategy required.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the President and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall develop a strategy for the Department of Defense
to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors.
(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include each of the
following:
(1) An articulation of the activities that constitute unconventional warfare being waged upon
the United States and allies.
(2) A clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in providing
indications and warning of, and protection against, acts of unconventional warfare.
(3) The current status of authorities and command structures related to countering
unconventional warfare.
(4) An articulation of the goals and objectives of the Department of Defense with respect to
countering unconventional warfare threats.
(5) An articulation of related or required interagency capabilities and whole-of-Government
activities required by the Department of Defense to support a counter-unconventional
warfare strategy.
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(6) Recommendations for improving the counter-unconventional warfare capabilities,
authorities, and command structures of the Department of Defense.
(7) Recommendations for improving interagency coordination and support mechanisms with
respect to countering unconventional warfare threats.
(8) Recommendations for the establishment of joint doctrine to support counter-
unconventional warfare capabilities within the Department of Defense.
(9) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
determine necessary.
(c) Submittal to Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees the
strategy required by subsection (a). The strategy shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
(d) Definition of unconventional warfare.—In this section, the term “unconventional
warfare” means activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with
an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area.
Section 1531 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1531. Statement of policy regarding European Reassurance Initiative.
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In February 2015, Lieutenant General James Clapper (retired), Director of National
Intelligence, testified to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that “Russian
dominance over the former Soviet space is Russia’s highest foreign policy goal”.
(2) Russia, under the direction of President Vladimir Putin, has demonstrated its intent to
expand its sphere of influence beyond its borders and limit Western influence in the region.
(3) The Russian military is aggressively postured on the Ukrainian boarder and continues its
buildup of military personnel and material. These aggressive and unwarranted actions serve
to intimidate, with a show of force, the Ukrainian people as well as the other nations in the
region including Georgia, the Baltic States, and the Balkan States.
(4) In December 2014, Congress enacted the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (Public
Law 113–272), which gives the President the authority to expand assistance to Ukraine,
increase economic sanctions on Russia, and provide equipment to counter offensive
weapons.
(5) In February 2015, the Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institute, and the Chicago Council
on Global Affairs published a report entitled “Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting
Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do” advocating for increased
United States assistance to Ukraine with nonlethal and lethal defensive equipment.
(6) Despite Russia signing the February 2015 Minsk Agreement, it has continued to violate
the terms of the agreement, as noted by Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland, at the German Marshall Fund Brussels Forum in March
2015: “We’ve seen month on month, more lethal weaponry of a higher caliber...poured into
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Ukraine by the separatist Russian allies...the number one thing is for Russia to stop sending
arms over the border so we can have real politics.”.
(7) The military of the Russian Federation continues to increase their show of force globally,
including frequent international military flights, frequent snap exercises of thousands of
Russian troops, increased global naval presence, and the threat of the use of nuclear weapons
in defense of the annexation of Crimea in March 2014.
(8) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to exert and increase undue
influence on the free will of sovereign nations and people with intimidation tactics, covert
operations, cyber warfare, and other unconventional methods.
(9) In testimony to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives in
February 2015, Commander of European Command, General Philip Breedlove, United
States Air Force, stated that “Russia has employed ‘hybrid warfare’...to illegally seize
Crimea, foment separatist fever in several sovereign nations, and maintain frozen conflicts
within its so-called ‘sphere of influence’ or ‘near abroad’”.
(10) The use of unconventional methods of warfare by Russia presents challenges to the
United States and its partners and allies in addressing the threat.
(11) An enhanced United States military presence and readiness posture and the provision of
security assistance in Europe are key elements to deterring further Russian aggression and
reassuring United States allies and partners.
(12) In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291),
Congress authorized and appropriated $1 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative,
which supports Operation Atlantic Resolve of the United States Armed Forces.
(13) The European Reassurance Initiative expands United States military presence in Europe,
through—
(A) bolstered and continual United States military presence;
(B) bilateral and multilateral exercises with partners and allies;
(C) improved infrastructure;
(D) increased prepositioning of United States equipment throughout Europe; and
(E) building partnership capacity for allies and partners.
(14) The European Reassurance Initiative has served as a valuable tool in strengthening the
partnerships with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as partnerships
with non-member allies in the region.
(15) As a result of the NATO 2014 Summit in Wales, NATO has initiated a Readiness
Action Plan to increase partner nation funding and resourcing to combat Russian aggression.
NATO’s efforts with the Readiness Action Plan and United States investment in regional
security through the European Reassurance Initiative will serve to continue and reinforce the
strength and fortitude of the alliance against nefarious actors.
(16) The President’s Budget Request for fiscal year 2016 includes $789.3 million to continue
the European Reassurance Initiative focus on increased United States military troop rotations
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in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, maintaining and further expanding increasing
regional exercises, and building partnership capacity.
(b) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States to continue and expand its
efforts in Europe to reassure United States allies and partners and deter further aggression
and intimidation by the Russian Government, in order to enhance security and stability in the
region. This policy shall include—
(1) continued use of conventional methods, including increased United States military
presence in Europe, exercises and training with allies and partners, increasing infrastructure,
prepositioning of United States military equipment in Europe, and building partnership
capacity;
(2) increased emphasis on countering unconventional warfare methods in areas such as cyber
warfare, economic warfare, information operations, and intelligence operations, including
increased efforts in the development of strategy, operational concepts, capabilities, and
technologies; and
(3) increased security assistance to allies and partners in Europe, including the provision of
both non-lethal equipment and lethal equipment of a defensive nature to Ukraine.
Section 1610 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1610. Prohibition on reliance on China and Russia for space-based weather data.
(a) Prohibition.—The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Department of Defense does
not rely on, or in the future plan to rely on, space-based weather data provided by the
Government of China, the Government of Russia, or an entity owned or controlled by the
Government of China or the Government of Russia for national security purposes.
(b) Certification.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a certification that the
Secretary is in compliance with the prohibition under subsection (a).
H.Rept. 114-102 states:
Russian Unconventional Warfare
Tactics employed by the Russian Federation in its aggression against Ukraine are not unique.
However, Russia has combined them in new, effective, and troubling ways. It has fomented
and taken advantage of ethnic disputes to train, build, and equip a separatist army in Ukraine
under Russian direction. It has combined this line of effort with propaganda, diplomatic, and
economic measures to try to reduce the effectiveness of Ukraine’s response, as well as the
response of the United States and Europe, and to preserve and extend its perceived sphere of
influence.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful military alliance in
history, defending the security interests of its members against external threats for over 60
years. The committee supports the NATO alliance and believes that it can successfully
continue to serve as a bedrock for U.S. and European security. However, the committee
notes that the methods currently being used by Russia in Ukraine pose a challenge to the
NATO system.
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The core of the NATO alliance is provided by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which
enshrines the principle of collective selfdefense: ‘‘The Parties agree that an armed attack
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all . . .’’ In the wake of Russian actions in Ukraine, both the United States, in a
series of bilateral actions referred to as the European Reassurance Initiative, and NATO
collectively, in the Readiness Action Plan, have taken steps to ensure that all parties are
postured to respond to any new aggression. The committee is concerned, however, that these
steps may not sufficiently address the challenges posed by Russian tactics.
At its core, collective self-defense requires that the parties to the treaty agree that one of the
members is under attack. This implies that such aggression can be correctly attributed to
some actor outside the alliance. Russia’s actions have been designed to be deniable and
difficult to attribute directly to Russian government activity. Should similar tactics, or even
more covert methods, be applied to NATO member states that border Russia, it may be
difficult to attribute them to Russian activity and therefore difficult to trigger a collective
NATO response. It is likely that some NATO members will have different views on the
degree of Russian involvement. In addition, it is possible that Russia would perceive NATO
may have difficulty in coming to an agreement about a collective response, which could
undermine NATO’s ability to deter Russia from engaging in attempts to intervene in
sovereign issues of NATO members.
The committee believes that the Department of Defense, and NATO, should fully explore
how the United States, NATO, and member states can, as necessary, establish deterrence
mechanisms against activities such as those undertaken by the Russian government in
Ukraine. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Office of Net
Assessment or other such organization as the Secretary considers appropriate, to undertake a
study exploring various strategies for deterring external efforts to interfere with the internal
workings of NATO member states by Russia, or any other actor utilizing tactics such as
propaganda in media, economic warfare, cyber warfare, criminal acts, and intelligence
operations, similar to those being used by Russia in Ukraine. The committee expects the
Secretary to deliver a report to the congressional defense committees containing the findings
of such study not later than March 31, 2016.
This study would complement a provision contained elsewhere in this Act requiring the
Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter
unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors. (Pages 257-
258)
H.Rept. 114-102 also states:
Funding and Support for the European Reassurance Initiative
The budget request included $789.3 million for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI).
The committee supports the policy and activities contained in the ERI, which was originally
proposed as part of the budget request for fiscal year 2015. However, the committee observes
that these initiatives are largely focused on conventional reassurance and deterrence
activities. The committee also recognizes that the Russian Federation has employed
unconventional warfare methods in areas such as cyber warfare, economic warfare,
information operations, and intelligence operations, and believes the Department of Defense
should increase its focus on countering such methods.
The committee believes that ERI funds for fiscal year 2016 should be allocated for continued
conventional reassurance and deterrence activities, as outlined in section 1535 of the Carl
Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2015 (Public Law 113–291), as well as countering unconventional threats. Therefore,
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elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would: (1) lay out a statement
of policy regarding ERI; (2) require a Department of Defense strategy to address
unconventional warfare methods; and (3) authorize increased funding for U.S. intelligence
and warning capabilities related to the European theater, technologies supporting U.S.
information operations and strategic communications activities, the Javelin weapon system,
and Stryker combat vehicle upgrades to meet U.S. Army Europe operational needs.
The committee further believes that, as part of the U.S. effort to increase security assistance
to allies and partners in Europe, ERI funds should be allocated to provide both nonlethal
equipment and lethal equipment of a defensive nature to Ukraine. Therefore, elsewhere in
this Act, the committee includes a provision that would authorize appropriations to provide
sustainment and assistance to the military and national security forces of Ukraine.
The committee believes that all of these U.S. efforts taken in combination are vital to address
regional security and to deter and counter continued Russian aggression. The committee
further believes that these efforts should be enduring and must be sustained as core activities
of the Department of Defense in Europe. (Pages 281-282)
House (Floor Action)
On May 15, 2015, as part of its consideration of H.R. 1735, the House agreed by voice vote to
H.Amdt. 229, an en bloc amendment that included, among other things, an amendment that was
number 59 in H.Rept. 114-112 of May 13, 2015, on H.Res. 260, providing for the further
consideration of H.R. 1735. Amendment number 59 in H.Rept. 115-102 states:
Page 227, after line 19, insert the following new section:
SEC. 569. REPORT ON CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EDUCATION TO RESPOND TO
FUTURE THREATS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than June 1, 2016, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report describing both civilian and military education
requirements necessary to meet any threats anticipated in the future security environment as
described in the quadrennial defense review. Such report shall include—
(1) an assessment of the learning outcomes required of future members of the Armed Forces
and senior military leaders to meet such threats;
(2) an assessment of the shortfalls in current professional military education requirements in
meeting such threats;
(3) an assessment of successful professional military education programs that further the
ability of the Department of Defense to meet such threats;
(4) recommendations of subjects to be covered by civilian elementary and secondary schools
in order to better prepare students for potential military service;
(5) recommendations of subjects to be included in professional military education programs;
(6) recommendations on whether partnerships between the Department of Defense and
private institutions of higher education (as defined in section 101(a) of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a))) would help meet such threats; and
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(7) an identification of opportunities for the United States to strengthen its leadership role in
the future security environment and a description of how the recommendations made in this
report contribute to capitalizing on such opportunities.
(b) UPDATED REPORTS.—Not later than 10 months after date of the publication of each
subsequent quadrennial defense review, the Secretary of Defense shall update the report
described under subsection (a) and shall submit such report to the congressional defense
committees.
The above section became Section 570 of H.R. 1735 as passed by the House on May 15, 2015.
Also on May 15, 2015, as part of its consideration of H.R. 1735, the House agreed by voice vote
to H.Amdt. 236, an en bloc amendment that included, among other things, an amendment that
was number 115 in H.Rept. 114-112 of May 13, 2015, on H.Res. 260, providing for the further
consideration of H.R. 1735. Amendment number 115 in H.Rept. 115-102 states:
At the end of subtitle G of title XII (page 622, after line 22), add the following:
SEC. 12xx. REPORT ON IMPACT OF ANY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN UNITED
STATES TROOP LEVELS OR MATERIEL IN EUROPE ON NATO’S ABILITY TO
CREDIBLY ADDRESS EXTERNAL THREATS TO ANY NATO MEMBER STATE.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—(1) in order to demonstrate
United States commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, especially
those NATO allies under pressure on the Eastern flank of the Alliance, and to enhance the
United States deterrent presence and resolve to countering threats to NATO’s collective
security, United States Armed Forces stationed and deployed in Europe should be increased
in number and combat power; and (2) the ‘‘current and foreseeable security environment’’,
as referenced in paragraph 12 of Section IV on Political-Military Matters of the Founding
Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian
Federation (NATO-Russia Founding Act), has changed significantly since the signing of
such Act in 1997 and thus such Act should not be read, interpreted, or implemented so as to
constrain or in any way limit additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces
anywhere on the territory of any NATO member State in furtherance of NATO’s core
mission of collective defense and other missions.
(b) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to ensure that the United States contribution to NATO’s core
mission of collective defense remains robust and ready to meet any future challenges, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
the impact of any significant reduction in United States troop levels or materiel in Europe on
NATO’s ability to credibly deter, resist, and, if necessary, repel external threats to any
NATO member State.
(2) DEADLINE.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted not later than
30 days prior to the date on which any significant reduction described in paragraph (1) is
scheduled to take place.
(3) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may contain a classified annex if necessary to protect the national security interests
of the United States.
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(4) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’
means—
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.
The above section became Section 1274 of H.R. 1735 as passed by the House on May 15, 2015.
Senate
Section 212 of S. 1376 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 114-49 of
May 19, 2015) states:
SEC. 212. Department of Defense technology offset program to build and maintain the
military technological superiority of the United States.
(a) Program established.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish a technology offset program to
build and maintain the military technological superiority of the United States by—
(A) accelerating the fielding of offset technologies that would help counter technological
advantages of potential adversaries of the United States, including directed energy, low-cost,
high-speed munitions, autonomous systems, undersea warfare, cyber technology, and
intelligence data analytics, developed using Department of Defense research funding and
accelerating the commercialization of such technologies; and
(B) developing and implementing new policies and acquisition and business practices.
(2) GUIDELINES.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall issue guidelines for the operation of the program, including—
(A) criteria for an application for funding by a military department, defense agency, or a
combatant command;
(B) the purposes for which such a department, agency, or command may apply for funds and
appropriate requirements for technology development or commercialization to be supported
using program funds;
(C) the priorities, if any, to be provided to field or commercialize offset technologies
developed by certain types of Department research funding; and
(D) criteria for evaluation of an application for funding or changes to policies or acquisition
and business practices by a department, agency, or command for purposes of the program.
(b) Development of directed energy strategy.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary, in consultation with such officials and third-party experts as the Secretary
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considers appropriate, shall develop a directed energy strategy to ensure that the United
States directed energy technologies are being developed and deployed at an accelerated pace.
(2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) A technology roadmap for directed energy that can be used to manage and assess
investments and policies of the Department in this high priority technology area.
(B) Proposals for legislative and administrative action to improve the ability of the
Department to develop and deploy technologies and capabilities consistent with the directed
energy strategy.
(C) An approach to program management that is designed to accelerate operational
prototyping of directed energy technologies and develop cost-effective, real-world military
applications for such technologies.
(3) BIENNIAL REVISIONS.—Not less frequently than once every 2 years, the Secretary
shall revise the strategy required by paragraph (1).
(4) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—(A) Not later than 90 days after the date on which the
Secretary completes the development of the strategy required by paragraph (1) and not later
than 90 days after the date on which the Secretary completes a revision to such strategy
under paragraph (3), the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a copy of
such strategy.
(B) The strategy submitted under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
(c) Applications for funding.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Under the program, the Secretary shall, not less frequently than
annually, solicit from the heads of the military departments, the defense agencies, and the
combatant commands applications for funding to be used to enter into contracts, cooperative
agreements, or other transaction agreements entered into pursuant to section 845 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103–160; 10 U.S.C.
2371 note) with appropriate entities for the fielding or commercialization of technologies.
(2) TREATMENT PURSUANT TO CERTAIN CONGRESSIONAL RULES.—Nothing in
this section shall be interpreted to require any official of the Department of Defense to
provide funding under this section to any earmark as defined pursuant to House Rule XXI,
clause 9, or any congressionally directed spending item as defined pursuant to Senate Rule
XLIV, paragraph 5.
(d) Funding.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of appropriations for such purpose, of the
amounts authorized to be appropriated for research, development, test, and evaluation,
Defense-wide for fiscal year 2016, not more than $400,000,000 may be used for any such
fiscal year for the program established under subsection (a).
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(2) AMOUNT FOR DIRECTED ENERGY.—Of this amount, not more than $200,000,000
may be used for activities in the field of directed energy.
(e) Transfer authority.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may transfer funds available for the program to the
research, development, test, and evaluation accounts of a military department, defense
agency, or a combatant command pursuant to an application, or any part of an application,
that the Secretary determines would support the purposes of the program.
(2) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—The transfer authority provided in this subsection is
in addition to any other transfer authority available to the Department of Defense.
(f) Termination.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The authority to carry out a program under this section shall terminate
on September 30, 2020.
(2) TRANSFER AFTER TERMINATION.—Any amounts made available for the program
that remain available for obligation on the date the program terminates may be transferred
under subsection (e) during the 180-day period beginning on the date of the termination of
the program.
Regarding Section 212, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Department of Defense technology offset program to build and maintain the military
technological superiority of the United States (sec. 212)
The committee notes with concern that the United States has not faced a more diverse and
complex array of crises since the end of World War II, and that taken together, they
constitute the greatest challenge in a generation to the integrity of the liberal world order,
which has consistently been underwritten by U.S. military technological superiority. At the
same time, the committee is alarmed by the apparent erosion in recent years of this
technological advantage, which is in danger of disappearing altogether. To prevent such a
scenario and to maintain the country’s global military technological edge, the committee
recommends a provision that would establish a new $400.0 million initiative.
In doing so, the committee notes that the Defense Department is facing an emerging
innovation gap. Commercial research and development in the United States now represents
80 percent of the national total, and the top four U.S. defense contractors combined spend
only one-quarter of what the single biggest internet company does on research and
development. Furthermore, global research and development is now more than twice that of
the United States. The committee also notes that defense innovation is moving too slowly—
in cycles that can last up to 18 years, whereas commercial innovation can be measured in
cycles of 18 months or less.
The committee understands that accessing sources of innovation beyond the Defense
Department is critical for national security, particularly in the areas of directed energy, low-
cost high-speed munitions, cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, undersea warfare, and
intelligence data analytics. However, there are currently too many barriers that limit
cooperation with U.S. allies and global commercial firms, posing a threat to the country’s
future military technological dominance.
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For the past several years, U.S. adversaries have been rapidly improving their own military
capabilities to counter our unique advantages. Structural trends, such as the diffusion of
certain advanced military technologies, pose new operational challenges to U.S. armed
forces. As a result, the dominance of the United States military can no longer be taken for
granted. Consequently, the Department of Defense must remain focused on the myriad
potential threats of the future and thus maintain technological superiority against potential
adversaries.
The committee notes that since 1960, the department has invested more than $6.0 billion in
directed energy science and technology initiatives. The committee is concerned that, despite
this significant investment, the department’s directed energy initiatives are not resourced at
levels necessary to transition them to fullscale acquisition programs. The committee is
encouraged by the Navy’s demonstration a 100–150 kilowatt prototype laser and by the Air
Force’s demonstration of high-powered electromagnetic weapons capabilities. However, the
committee is concerned about the future of directed energy technologies as a whole. The
committee notes that there is no inter-service entity dedicated to advancing promising
directed energy platforms beyond the development point towards acquisition.
The committee is encouraged that the department established a department-wide Defense
Innovation Initiative in November 2014 to pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance
our military superiority and to improve business operations throughout the department.
However, the committee is concerned by the possibility that this initiative is not being
implemented in an appropriate and expeditious manner.
In response to these factors, the committee recommends a provision that would establish an
initiative within the Department of Defense to maintain and enhance the military
technological superiority of the United States. The provision would establish a program to
accelerate the fielding of offset technologies, including, but not limited to, directed energy,
low-cost high-speed munitions, autonomous systems, undersea warfare, cyber technology,
and intelligence data analytics, developed by the department and to accelerate the
commercialization of such technologies. As part of this program, the committee expects that
the Secretary of Defense would also establish updated policies and new acquisition and
management practices that would speed the delivery of offset technologies into operational
use.
The provision would authorize $400.0 million for fiscal year 2016 for the initiative, of which
$200.0 million would be authorized specifically for directed energy technology.
Accordingly, the provision would mandate the Secretary to develop a directed energy
strategy to ensure that appropriate technologies are developed and deployed at an accelerated
pace, and update it every 2 years. The committee expects that this strategy would include a
recommendation on rationalizing the roles and authorities of the Joint Technology Office for
High Energy Lasers. The provision would further direct the Secretary to submit this strategy
to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee no later
than 90 days after completing the strategy, and biennially thereafter.
To speed up the development of these vitally needed national security capabilities, the
committee directs that the Secretary of Defense shall consider all appropriate flexible
acquisition authorities granted in law and in this Act. These should include the management
structure and streamlined procedures for rapid prototyping outlined in section 803 of this Act
on the middle tier of acquisition for rapid prototyping and rapid fielding, and the procedures
and authorities to be considered under section 805 of this Act on use of alternative
acquisition paths to acquire critical national security capabilities to include other
transactions, rapid acquisition, and commercial item authorities.
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The committee expects that the Secretary of Defense would keep the Senate Committee on
Armed Services and the House Committee on Armed Services regularly updated on progress
of activities under this technology offsets initiative. (Pages 44-46)
Section 1253 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1253. Increased presence of United States ground forces in Eastern Europe to deter
aggression on the border of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the increased presence of United States and allied ground forces in Eastern Europe since
April 2014 has provided a level of reassurance to North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) members in the region and strengthened the capability of the Organization to
respond to any potential Russian aggression against Organization members;
(2) at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Wales summit in September 2014 member
countries agreed on a Readiness Action Plan which is intended to improve the ability of the
Organization to respond quickly and effectively to security threats on the borders of the
Organization, including in Eastern Europe, and the challenges posed by hybrid warfare;
(3) the capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to respond to threats on the
eastern border of the Organization would be enhanced by a more sustained presence on the
ground of Organization forces on the territories of Organization members in Eastern Europe;
and
(4) an increased presence of United States ground forces in Eastern Europe should be
matched by an increased force presence of European allies.
(b) Report.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Secretary of State, submit to the
congressional defense committees a report setting forth an assessment of options for
expanding the presence of United States ground forces of the size of a Brigade Combat Team
in Eastern Europe to respond, along with European allies and partners, to the security
challenges posed by Russia and increase the combat capability of forces able to respond to
unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as those used by the Russian Federation in
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report under this subsection shall include the following:
(A) An evaluation of the optimal location or locations of the enhanced ground force presence
described in paragraph (1) that considers such factors as—
(i) proximity, suitability, and availability of maneuver and gunnery training areas;
(ii) transportation capabilities;
(iii) availability of facilities, including for potential equipment storage and prepositioning;
(iv) ability to conduct multinational training and exercises;
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(v) a site or sites for prepositioning of equipment, a rotational presence or permanent
presence of troops, or a combination of options; and
(vi) costs.
(B) A description of any initiatives by other members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, or other European allies and partners, for enhancing force presence on a
permanent or rotational basis in Eastern Europe to match or exceed the potential increased
presence of United States ground forces in the region.
Regarding Section 1253, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Increased presence of United States ground forces in Eastern Europe to deter
aggression on the border of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (sec. 1253)
The committee recommends a provision that would require a report to the congressional
defense committees, not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, by the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, assessing options for
expanding the presence of U.S. ground forces of the size of a brigade combat team in Eastern
Europe to respond, along with European allies and partners, to the security challenges posed
by Russia and to increase the combat capability of allied forces to respond to unconventional
or hybrid warfare tactics like those used by Russia in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The
committee believes that any increases in the presence of U.S. ground forces in Eastern
Europe should be matched by similar increases in the commitment of ground forces by
European allies and partners for these purposes. (Page 233)
Section 1254 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1254. Sense of Congress on European defense and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
spending.
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, at the 2014 North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Summit in Wales, pledged to “reverse the trend of declining defense budgets,
to make the most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs
and responsibilities”.
(2) Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated on May 2, 2014, that “[t]oday,
America’s GDP is smaller than the combined GDPs of our 27 NATO allies. But America’s
defense spending is three times our Allies’ combined defense spending. Over time, this
lopsided burden threatens NATO’s integrity, cohesion, and capability, and ultimately both
European and transatlantic security”.
(3) Former North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
stated on July 3, 2014, that “[d]uring the last five years, Russia has increased defense
spending by 50 percent, while NATO allies on average have decrease their defense spending
by 20 percent. That is not sustainable, we need more investment in defense and security”.
(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) it is in the national security and fiscal interests of the United States that prompt efforts
should be undertaken by North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to meet defense budget
commitments made in Declaration 14 of the Wales Summit Declaration of September 2014;
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(2) the United States Government should continue efforts through the Department of Defense
and other agencies to encourage North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies towards meeting
the defense spending goals set out at the Wales Summit;
(3) some North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have already taken positive steps to
reverse declines in defense spending and should continue to be supported in those efforts;
and
(4) thoughtful and coordinated defense investments by European allies in military
capabilities would add deterrence value to the posture of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization against Russian aggression and terrorist organizations and more appropriately
balance the share of Atlantic defense spending.
Section 1255 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1255. Additional matters in annual report on military and security developments
involving the Russian Federation.
(a) Additional matters.—Subsection (b) of section 1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P.
“Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–
291) is amended—
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (15) as paragraphs (6) through (17), respectively;
and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraphs (4) and (5):
“(4) An assessment of the force structure and capabilities of Russian military forces stationed
in each of the Arctic, Kaliningrad, and Crimea, including a description of any changes to
such force structure or capabilities during the one-year period ending on the date of such
report and with a particular emphasis on the anti-access and area denial capabilities of such
forces.
“(5) An assessment of Russian military strategy and objectives for the Arctic region.”.
(b) Effective date.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of
the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to reports submitted under section
1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2015 after that date.
Regarding Section 1255, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Additional matters in annual report on military and security developments involving
the Russian Federation (sec. 1255)
The committee recommends a provision that would add a reporting requirement to section
1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291) requiring an assessment of the force
structure and capabilities of Russian military forces stationed in the Arctic region,
Kaliningrad, and Crimea, as well as an assessment of the Russian military strategy in the
Arctic region.
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The committee is concerned about increased Russian military activity in the Arctic region
and notes that Russian activities and apparent ambitions could present challenges to
international law, norms, and agreements relating to the Arctic region. (Page 233)
Section 1256 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1256. Report on alternative capabilities to procure and sustain nonstandard rotary wing
aircraft historically procured through Rosoboronexport.
(a) Report on assessment of alternative capabilities.—Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics shall, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submit to
the congressional defense committees a report setting forth an assessment, obtained by the
Under Secretary for purposes of the report, of the feasibility and advisability of using
alternative industrial base capabilities to procure and sustain, with parts and service,
nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically acquired through Rosoboronexport, or
nonstandard rotary wing aircraft that are in whole or in part reliant upon Rosoboronexport
for continued sustainment, in order to benefit United States national security interests.
(b) Independent assessment.—The assessment obtained for purposes of subsection (a) shall
be conducted by a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), or another
appropriate independent entity with expertise in the procurement and sustainment of
complex weapon systems, selected by the Under Secretary for purposes of the assessment.
(c) Elements.—The assessment obtained for purposes of subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) An identification and assessment of international industrial base capabilities, other than
Rosoboronexport, to provide one or more of the following:
(A) Means of procuring nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically procured through
Rosoboronexport.
(B) Reliable and timely supply of required and appropriate parts, spares, and consumables of
such aircraft.
(C) Certifiable maintenance of such aircraft, including major periodic overhauls, damage
repair, and modifications.
(D) Access to required reference data on such aircraft, including technical manuals and
service bulletins.
(E) Credible certification of airworthiness of such aircraft through physical inspection,
notwithstanding any current administrative requirements to the contrary.
(2) An assessment (including an assessment of associated costs and risks) of alterations to
administrative processes of the United States Government that may be required to procure
any of the capabilities specified in paragraph (1), including waivers to Department of
Defense or Department of State requirements applicable to foreign military sales or
alterations to procedures for approval of airworthiness certificates.
(3) An assessment of the potential economic impact to Rosoboronexport of procuring
nonstandard rotary wing aircraft described in paragraph (1)(A) through entities other than
Rosoboronexport.
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(4) An assessment of the risks and benefits of using the entities identified pursuant to
paragraph (1)(A) to procure aircraft described in that paragraph.
(5) Such other matters as the Under Secretary considers appropriate.
(d) Use of previous studies.—The entity conducting the assessment for purposes of
subsection (a) may use and incorporate information from previous studies on matters
appropriate to the assessment.
(e) Form of report.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
Regarding Section 1256, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Report on alternative capabilities to procure and sustain nonstandard rotary wing
aircraft historically procured through Rosoboronexport (sec. 1256)
The committee recommends a provision that would require an independent assessment
directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to report on the feasibility and
advisability of using alternative industrial base capabilities to procure and sustain
nonstandard rotary wing aircraft historically acquired through the Russian state corporation
Rosoboronexport. The assessment would include an analysis of the economic impact as well
as alterations that would be required for waivers of foreign military sales requirements and
procedures for approval of airworthiness certificates.
The committee notes that the use of alternative industrial base capability to divest reliance on
Rosoboronexport could benefit United States national security interests, deny financial
support to the Russian Federation, and could potentially benefit U.S. and Ukrainian
commercial interests. (pages 233-234)
Section 1603 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1603. Exception to the prohibition on contracting with Russian suppliers of rocket
engines for the evolved expendable launch vehicle program.
Section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C.
2271 note) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a), by striking “subsections (b) and (c)” and inserting “subsections (b), (c),
and (d)”; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(d) Special rule for phase 1A competitive opportunities.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—For not more than 9 competitive opportunities described in paragraph
(2), the Secretary of Defense may award a contract—
“(A) requiring the use of a rocket engine designed or manufactured in the Russian Federation
that is eligible for a waiver under subsection (b) or an exception under subsection (c); or
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“(B) if a rocket engine described in subparagraph (A) is not available, requiring the use of a
rocket engine designed or manufactured in the Russian Federation that is not eligible for
such a waiver or exception.
“(2) COMPETITIVE OPPORTUNITIES DESCRIBED.—A competitive opportunity
described in this paragraph is—
“(A) an opportunity to compete for a contract for the procurement of property or services for
space launch activities under the evolved expendable launch vehicle program; and
“(B) one of the 9 Phase 1A competitive opportunities for fiscal years 2015 through 2017, as
specified in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the budget
of the President for fiscal year 2016 (as submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title
31, United States Code).”.
Regarding Section 1603, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Exception to the prohibition on contracting with Russian suppliers of rocket engines for
the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program (sec. 1603)
The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1608 of the Carl Levin
and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015
(Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C. 2271 note) by adding a special rule for
Phase 1A competitive opportunities. For not more than nine competitive Phase 1A launches,
the special rule would allow the Secretary of Defense to award a contract requiring the use of
a rocket engine designed or manufactured in the Russian Federation that is eligible for the
existing waiver or exception requirements as specified in the existing statute. If a
circumstance arises during the Phase 1A period where a launch provider is awarded a
competitive contract and requires a rocket engine unable to meet the waiver or exception
requirements, the provision would allow for the Secretary to waive the waiver or exception.
In order to qualify for the new special rule, all engines that meet the waiver or exception of
the existing statute must first be used.
The committee notes that for the Phase 1A competitive period, this could result in as few as
zero Russian rocket engines or up to nine, depending upon the outcome of the competitions.
The committee believes that the continued use of Russian rocket engines represents a threat
to our national security and that their use should be minimized to the greatest extent
practicable.
National Security Presidential Directive 40 states that Assured Access to Space is ‘‘a
requirement for critical national security, homeland security, and civil missions and is
defined as a sufficiently robust, responsive, and resilient capability to allow continued space
operations, consistent with risk management and affordability. The Secretary of Defense and
the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as appropriate, are
responsible for assuring access to space.’’ The committee notes that under section 1608, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is not prohibited from procuring
launches that utilize rocket engines manufactured or designed in the Russian Federation. The
committee also notes that NASA has contracts for numerous launches that rely on Russian
rocket engines for the foreseeable future. While the committee does not condone the use of
Russian rocket engines for NASA purposes, the committee recognizes that assured access to
space can still be met if a national emergency required the use of a NASA procured launch
for Department of Defense purposes. (Pages 258-259)
S.Rept. 114-49 also states:
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Committee overview
For seven decades, the U.S. military has been the most reliable guarantor of the foundations
of international order that American statesmen of both parties helped to establish in the
aftermath of World War II. The relative security and prosperity that our nation has enjoyed,
and made possible for so many others across the world, has been painstakingly maintained
through the deterrence of adversaries, the cooperation with allies and partners, the global
leadership of the United States, and the credibility and capability of our Armed Forces.
The committee is concerned that growing threats abroad and continued limitations on
defense spending at home are increasingly harming the ability of the United States, and its
military, to play an effective leadership role in the world. Indeed, military readiness and
capabilities have deteriorated to the point where senior military leaders have warned that we
are putting at risk the lives of the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces. There is a
growing consensus that we must reverse this damage so that we can respond adequately to a
host of disturbing challenges to the international order that adversely impact our national
security.
These challenges include:
• In Ukraine, Russia has sought to redraw an international border and annex the territory of
another sovereign country through the use of military force. It continues aggressively to
destabilize Ukraine, with troubling implications for security in Europe.
• A terrorist army with tens of thousands of fighters, many holding Western passports, has
taken over a vast swath of territory and declared an Islamic State in the heart of the Middle
East. Nearly 3,000 U.S. troops have returned to Iraq to combat this threat, with U.S. aircraft
flying hundreds of strike missions a month over Iraq and Syria.
• Amid negotiations over its nuclear program, Iran continues to pursue its ambitions to
challenge regional order in the Middle East by increasing its development of ballistic
missiles, support for terrorism, training and arming of pro-Iranian militant groups, and other
malign activities in places such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Bahrain, and Yemen.
• Yemen has collapsed, as a Shia insurgency with ties to the Iranian regime has toppled the
U.S.-backed government in Sanaa, Al-Qaeda continues to use parts of the country to plan
attacks against the West, the U.S. Embassy has been evacuated, and a U.S.-backed coalition
of Arab nations has intervened militarily to reverse the gains of the Houthi insurgency and to
restore the previous government to power.
• Libya has become a failed state, beset by civil war and a growing presence of transnational
terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, similar to Afghanistan in 2001.
• North Korea, while continuing to develop its nuclear arsenal and ever-more capable
ballistic missiles, committed the most destructive cyberattack ever on U.S. territory.
• China is increasingly taking coercive actions to assert expansive territorial claims that
unilaterally change the status quo in the South and East China Seas and raise tensions with
U.S. allies and partners, all while continuing to expand and modernize its military in ways
that challenge U.S. access and freedom of movement in the Western Pacific. (Pages 2-3)
S.Rept. 114-49 also states:
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Congressional Defense Review to Prepare for Future Strategic Challenges
For the past 14 years, the United States has been engaged in a long war against terrorist and
violent extremist groups. The committee believes that this conflict will persist, at one level or
another, across multiple theaters of operation, for some time to come, and that winning this
war must be a top priority of the U.S. military and the Department of Defense (DOD).
At the same time, the committee is deeply concerned by the growth of more traditional
security threats posed by powerful states, such as China and Russia, and rogue regimes such
as Iran and North Korea. States such as these are modernizing their military capabilities,
developing advanced technologies that could undermine U.S. military advantages—from
precision-guided munitions and advanced sensors, to undersea-warfare and unmanned
systems, to offensive cyber and space capabilities—and pursuing strategies that seek to deter
the United States from achieving its national security interests and meeting its commitments
to allies and partners.
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter captured this new military challenge well when he said
‘‘for decades, U.S. global power projection has relied on the ships, planes, bases, aircraft
carriers, satellite networks, and other advanced capabilities that comprise our military’s
unrivaled technological edge. But today that superiority is being challenged in unprecedented
ways.’’ In short, for the first time in three decades, the United States faces a potential turning
point where our nation’s long-standing military advantages threaten to be eroded by new
shifts in the balance of military power.
Accordingly, over the coming 18 months, the committee plans to conduct a comprehensive
review of the roles, capabilities/size of the U.S. Armed Forces and DOD in meeting, and
succeeding against, these new security challenges, especially those posed by the growing
anti-access/area denial capabilities of U.S. adversaries. This review will utilize open
hearings, classified briefings, the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional
Research Service, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, and consultation
with former senior defense and military leaders and other national security experts. Building
on the series of strategy-focused hearings that the committee has already conducted, the
committee will deepen its oversight of military strategy while also delving deeper into
intelligence and threat assessments, contingency planning, force structure and posture, joint
concept development, domestic and overseas basing and infrastructure, theater and strategic
lift requirements, munition quality and quantity, and institutional and personnel reforms. The
committee will also review civilian personnel policy, DOD infrastructure, and acquisition
policies and practices to bring them more into line with the needs of the future.
Ultimately, the committee intends to review each of the major defense acquisition programs
and its related industrial base to determine whether they are sufficient and appropriate to
meet developing national security challenges. This review will take nothing for granted and
will evaluate each program, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the broader context of
the roles, missions, requirements, and other capabilities of the armed services, as well as
emerging technologies that could significantly alter previous assumptions underpinning the
current programs of record. The committee’s future budgetary decisions will be based on the
outcome of this strategic review.
The committee acknowledges that for this review to be successful it will require a sustained
commitment of many years and potentially multiple chairmen. The much-heralded ‘‘offset
strategy’’ of the 1970s required a tremendous amount of intellectual capital and research and
development dollars invested over the course of a decade before capabilities like stealth,
precision-guided-munitions, and advanced sensors could be effectively deployed.
Nevertheless, it is possible to embark upon a new period of sustained military innovation
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today if DOD, the military services, and industry can be aligned towards this goal. The
committee intends to use all of the resources at its disposal to this end. (Page 214-215)
S.Rept. 114-49 also states:
Countering Russian propaganda
The committee has watched with increasing concern the proliferation and expansion of
Russian propaganda not only in Eastern Europe, but also throughout Central and Western
Europe to levels not seen since the end of the Cold War. Russian-speaking populations in
Eastern Europe in former Soviet Union nations, including North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies, are especially vulnerable to propaganda that could be used to
create more favorable conditions for future Russian aggression. Moreover, the sophistication
and pervasiveness of outlets such as the Russia Today (RT) television network that broadcast
in multiple languages in Western European democracies is cause for concern.
The committee notes that Russian propaganda has promoted a false narrative on the nature,
scope, and cause of the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and has unfortunately
achieved some success with targeted audiences in obscuring attribution for Russian-driven
aggression and disregard for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law.
The committee recognizes that propaganda is a critical element of Russia’s ‘‘hybrid
warfare’’ concept. The speed and reach of Russian propaganda and the ambiguity it creates
pose a challenge to NATO collective defense and the political consensus upon which it
relies.
Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to consult with the Secretary
of State with the objective of developing a strategy, including supporting resources, to
counter Russian propaganda in Europe. (page 238)
S.Rept. 114-49 also states:
Report on capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to respond to
unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as used by the Russian Federation in
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
The committee is concerned about the capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to respond to unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as those used by the
Russian Federation in Crimea and eastern Ukraine due to the ambiguous nature of those
tactics and the resultant challenges of attribution. As such, the committee directs the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report not later than September 1, 2016 to the congressional
defense committees on recommendations for improving the alliance’s response options,
decision-making processes and implementation timelines for addressing the use of
unconventional or hybrid warfare tactics such as those used by the Russian Federation. The
report should include:
(1) An identification of the unconventional or hybrid tactics the Russian Federation may
employ against NATO nations;
(2) A consolidation of tactics identified pursuant to paragraph (1) into a set of possible
scenarios to be used to analyze potential response options by NATO;
(3) An assessment of the response options NATO could potentially pursue for each of the
scenarios identified pursuant to paragraph (2);
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(4) Recommendations to improve response options, decisionmaking processes, and
implementation timelines for the scenarios identified pursuant to paragraph (2);
(5) An assessment of implementation by NATO of commitments made at the Wales Summit
regarding the Readiness Action Plan;
(6) Recommendations, if any, for exercises or mechanisms to improve the ability of NATO
to consult and reach consensus in scenarios relating to the employment of unconventional or
hybrid tactics; and
(7) Such other matters as the Secretary considers appropriate. (page 240)
FY2016 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2685/S. 1558)
House
Section 8105 of H.R. 2685 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 114-139
of June 5, 2015) states:
Sec. 8105. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any
other Act may be used by the Secretary of Defense, or any other official or officer of the
Department of Defense, to enter into a contract, memorandum of understanding, or
cooperative agreement with, or make a grant to, or provide a loan or loan guarantee to
Rosoboronexport or any subsidiary of Rosoboronexport.
(b) The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation in subsection (a) if the Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, determines
that it is in the vital national security interest of the United States to do so, and certifies in
writing to the congressional defense committees that, to the best of the Secretary's
knowledge:
(1) Rosoboronexport has ceased the transfer of lethal military equipment to, and the
maintenance of existing lethal military equipment for, the Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic;
(2) the armed forces of the Russian Federation have withdrawn from Crimea, other than
armed forces present on military bases subject to agreements in force between the
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine; and
(3) agents of the Russian Federation have ceased taking active measures to destabilize the
control of the Government of Ukraine over eastern Ukraine.
(c) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall conduct a review of any action
involving Rosoboronexport with respect to a waiver issued by the Secretary of Defense
pursuant to subsection (b), and not later than 90 days after the date on which such a waiver is
issued by the Secretary of Defense, the Inspector General shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report containing the results of the review conducted with respect to
such waiver.
H.Rept. 114-139 states:
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EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE
The Committee supports efforts started in fiscal year 2015 to reassure NATO allies and
partners of the continued commitment of the United States to their security and territorial
integrity. The Committee recommends $789,300,000 for the European Reassurance Initiative
(ERI) to support increased capability, presence, readiness, and responsiveness to deter
further destabilization in central and eastern Europe. Efforts include an increased U.S.
military presence in Europe, additional bilateral and multilateral exercises and training
opportunities with allies and partners, improved infrastructure to allow for greater
responsiveness, enhanced prepositioning of equipment in Europe, and intensified efforts to
build partner capacity for new NATO members and other partners.
This funding is provided as requested in the fiscal year 2016 budget request in the military
personnel and operation and maintenance accounts at the budget activity and sub-activity
group level of detail. The Committee again directs the Secretary of Defense to request any
required fiscal year 2017 funding within the existing military personnel and operation and
maintenance accounts as part of the fiscal year 2017 budget request. (Pages 317-318)
Senate
Section 8105 of S. 1558 as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 114-63 of
June 11, 2015) states:
Sec. 8105. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this or any
other Act may be used by the Secretary of Defense, or any other official or officer of the
Department of Defense, to enter into a contract, memorandum of understanding, or
cooperative agreement with, or make a grant to, or provide a loan or loan guarantee to
Rosoboronexport or any subsidiary of Rosoboronexport.
(b) The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation in subsection (a) if the Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, determines
that it is in the vital national security interest of the United States to do so, and certifies in
writing to the congressional defense committees that, to the best of the Secretary's
knowledge:
(1) Rosoboronexport has ceased the transfer of lethal military equipment to, and the
maintenance of existing lethal military equipment for, the Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic;
(2) The armed forces of the Russian Federation have withdrawn from Crimea, other than
armed forces present on military bases subject to agreements in force between the
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Ukraine; and
(3) Agents of the Russian Federation have ceased taking active measures to destabilize the
control of the Government of Ukraine over eastern Ukraine.
(c) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall conduct a review of any action
involving Rosoboronexport with respect to a waiver issued by the Secretary of Defense
pursuant to subsection (b), and not later than 90 days after the date on which such a waiver is
issued by the Secretary of Defense, the Inspector General shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report containing the results of the review conducted with respect to
such waiver.
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Appendix. Legislative Activity in 2014
Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291)
Section 1251 of Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2015 (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 of December 19, 2014) states:
SEC. 1251. STRATEGY TO PRIORITIZE UNITED STATES DEFENSE INTERESTS IN
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Required Report.—
(1) In general.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
contains the strategy of the Department of Defense to prioritize United States defense
interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
(2) Matters to be included.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall address the
following:
(A) United States national security interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
(B) The security environment, including threats to global and regional United States national
security interests emanating from the Asia-Pacific region, including efforts by the People’s
Republic of China to advance their national interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
(C) Regional multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations
(ASEAN).
(D) Bilateral security cooperation relationships, including military-to-military engagements
and security assistance.
(E) United States military presence, posture, and capabilities supporting the rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific region.
(F) Humanitarian and disaster relief response capabilities.
(G) International rules-based structures.
(H) Actions the Department of Defense could take, in cooperation with other Federal
agencies, to advance United States national security interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
(I) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines to be appropriate.
(3) Form.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex if necessary.
(b) Resources.—The report required by subsection (a)(1) shall be informed by the results of
the integrated, multi-year planning and budget strategy for a rebalancing of United States
policy in Asia submitted to Congress pursuant to section 7043(a) of the Department of State,
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Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76; 128 Stat. 533)).
(c) Annual Budget.—The President, acting through the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, shall ensure that the annual budget submitted to Congress under
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, clearly highlights programs and projects that are
being funded in the annual budget of the United States Government that relate to the strategy
required by subsection (a)(1) and the integrated strategy referred to in subsection (b).
Section 1254 of H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 states:
SEC. 1254. REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MUNITIONS STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND.
(a) Report Required.—Not later than April 1, 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report on the munitions strategy of the United States
Pacific Command to address deficiencies in the ability of the United States Pacific
Command to execute major operational plans.
(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of current and projected critical munitions requirements, including as
identified in the most-recent future-years defense program submitted to Congress by the
Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 221 of title 10, United States Code.
(2) An assessment of—
(A) significant munitions gaps and deficiencies; and
(B) munitions capabilities and necessary munitions investments to address identified gaps
and deficiencies.
(3) A description of current and planned munitions programs to address munitions gaps and
deficiencies identified in paragraph (2), including with respect to—
(A) research, development, test, and evaluation efforts;
(B) cost, schedule, performance, and budget, to the extent such information is available; and
(C) known industrial base issues.
(4) An assessment of infrastructure deficiencies or needed enhancements to ensure adequate
munitions storage and munitions deployment capability.
(5) Any other matters concerning the munitions strategy of the United States Pacific
Command the Secretary of Defense determines to be appropriate.
(c) Form.—The report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified or
unclassified form.
Section 1257 of H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 states:
SEC. 1257. INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE ABILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE TO COUNTER ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL STRATEGIES,
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CAPABILITIES, AND OTHER KEY TECHNOLOGIES OF POTENTIAL
ADVERSARIES.
(a) Assessment Required.—
(1) In general.—The Secretary of Defense shall enter into an agreement with an independent
entity to conduct an assessment of the ability of the Department of Defense to counter anti-
access and area-denial strategies, capabilities, and other key technologies of potential
adversaries.
(2) Matters to be included.—The assessment required under paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
(A) An assessment of anti-access and area-denial trategies, capabilities, and other key
technologies of potential adversaries during each of the fiscal year periods described in
paragraph (3) that would represent a significant challenge to deployed forces and systems of
the United States military, including an assessment of the extent to which such strategies,
capabilities, and other key technologies could affect United States military operations.
(B) An assessment of gaps and deficiencies in the ability of the Department of Defense to
address anti-access and area-denial strategies, capabilities, and other key technologies
described in subparagraph (A), including an assessment of the adequacy of current strategies,
programs, and investments of the Department of Defense.
(C) Recommendations for adjustments in United States policy and strategy, force posture,
investments in capabilities, systems and technologies, and changes in business and
management processes, or other novel approaches to address gaps and deficiencies described
in subparagraph (B), or to restore, maintain, or expand United States military technological
advantages, particularly in those areas in which potential adversaries are closing gaps or have
achieved technological superiority with respect to the United States.
(D) Any other matters the independent entity determines to be appropriate.
(3) Fiscal year periods described.—The fiscal year periods described in this paragraph are
the following:
(A) Fiscal years 2015 through 2019.
(B) Fiscal years 2020 through 2030.
(C) Fiscal years 2031 and thereafter.
(b) Report Required.—
(1) In general.—Not later than March 1, 2016, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that includes the assessment required under
subsection (a) and any other matters the Secretary determines to be appropriate.
(2) Form.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may contain a classified annex if necessary.
(c) Department of Defense Support.—The Secretary of Defense shall provide the
independent entity described in subsection (a) with timely access to appropriate information,
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data, resources, and analysis so that the entity may conduct a thorough and independent
assessment as required under subsection (a).
Regarding Section 1257, the joint explanatory statement for H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 states:
Independent assessment of the ability of the Department of Defense to counter anti-access
and area-denial strategies, capabilities, and other key technologies of potential adversaries
(sec. 1257)
The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 221) that would require the
Secretary of Defense to task the Defense Science Board or other independent group to
examine the potential specific challenges to U.S. military technological superiority within
the next 10 years, and the specific planned responses by the Department of Defense (DOD)
to meet these challenges.
The House bill contained a similar provision (sec. 1237) that would require the Secretary of
Defense to enter into an agreement with an independent entity to conduct an assessment of
anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) strategies and capabilities that pose a threat to security in
the Asia-Pacific region and strategies to mitigate such threats.
The agreement includes the House provision with an amendment that would require the
Secretary of Defense to task an independent entity to conduct an assessment of the ability of
the DOD to counter A2AD strategies, capabilities, and other key technologies that could be
implemented by potential adversaries.
In the annual report to Congress on “Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2014,” the Department of Defense notes that China continues to
sustain investments in key anti-access and area denial capabilities to deter or counter third-
party intervention in the region. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics has warned that America’s “technological superiority is not
assured,” and that “the Department of Defense is being challenged in ways that I have not
seen for decades, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.” We share this concern and believe
that an independent assessment could help focus the Department’s investments and strategic
thinking on these challenges.
We remain concerned by questions regarding the relative U.S. advantages in technological
capabilities, which could be undercut as advanced technologies continue to proliferate. The
potential for greater technological parity among adversaries carries the risk of U.S. military
forces operating without the traditional level of overmatch needed to succeed swiftly in a
contingency, which raises further questions about the impact that the loss of technological
superiority would have on the freedom of U.S. action in securing national security
objectives. These questions merit examination in the assessment.
Elsewhere in this Act, we require the Secretary of Defense to report on the Department’s
munitions strategy for United States Pacific Command, based on a provision in the House
bill (sec. 1234). However, we believe that some of the reporting elements contained in the
House bill would be better suited to this independent assessment. These include assessing
other countries’ munitions programs, capabilities, and technologies that could challenge U.S.
deployed forces and military systems, and providing recommendations for how the United
States can counter these challenges or restore, maintain, or expand U.S. military
technological advantages in munitions.
We expect, as part of the information, data, resources, and analyses provided to the
independent entity, the Department also provide a baseline description of the counter-A2AD
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policies, strategies, force posture, programs, capabilities, systems and technologies that are
currently in place or funded. (pdf pages 213-215 of 513)
Section 1259 of H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 states:
SEC. 1259. REPORT ON MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION.
(a) Report Required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees, the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives a report that outlines the strategy of the Department of Defense with regard
to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region, with particular emphasis on the South China
Sea and the East China Sea.
(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall outline the strategy described in
that subsection and include the following:
(1) An assessment of how the actions of the People’s Republic of China in the South China
Sea and the East China Sea have affected the status quo with regard to competing territorial
and maritime claims and United States security interests in those seas.
(2) An assessment of how the naval and other maritime strategies and capabilities of the
People’s Republic of China, including military and law enforcement capabilities, affect the
strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.
(3) An assessment of how anti-access and area denial strategies and capabilities of the
People’s Republic of China in the Asia-Pacific region, including weapons and technologies,
affect the strategy.
(4) A description of any ongoing or planned changes in United States military capabilities,
operations, and posture in the Asia-Pacific region to support the strategy.
(5) A description of any current or planned bilateral or regional naval or maritime capacity-
building initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region.
(6) An assessment of how the strategy leverages military-to-military engagements between
the United States and the People’s Republic of China to reduce the potential for
miscalculation and tensions in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, including a
specific description of the effects of such engagements on particular incidents or interactions
involving the People’s Republic of China in those seas.
(7) Any other matters the Secretary may determine to be appropriate.
(c) Form.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
Regarding Section 1259, the joint explanatory statement for H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 states:
Report on maritime security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region (sec. 1259)
The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 1245) that would require the
President to submit to the congressional defense committees a report that outlines the
strategy of the Department of Defense with regard to maritime security in the South China
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Sea and East China Sea. The provision would also require an annual briefing on the military
to military engagement with the People’s Republic of China.
The House bill contained no similar provision.
The agreement includes the Senate provision with a clarifying amendment.
We direct that, not later than March 15, 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall provide the
congressional defense committees a briefing (in classified form, if appropriate) on the
following:
(1) An assessment of the military to military engagements between the United States and the
People’s Republic of China in the previous 12 months, before March 15, 2015, including an
assessment of the success of such engagements in meeting the objectives of the Commander
of the United States Pacific Command for such engagements; and
(2) A detailed description of all planned and potential military to military engagements
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China for the next 12 months, after
March 15, 2015, including the objectives of such engagements.
Section 1259B of H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 states:
SEC. 1259B. MODIFICATION OF MATTERS FOR DISCUSSION IN ANNUAL
REPORTS OF UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW
COMMISSION.
(a) Matters for Discussion.—Section 1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by P.L. 106-398; 22 U.S.C.
7002(c)(2)) is amended by striking subparagraphs (A) through (J) and inserting the following
new subparagraphs:
``(A) The role of the People’s Republic of China in the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and other weapon systems (including systems and technologies of a dual use
nature), including actions the United States might take to encourage the People’s Republic of
China to cease such practices.
``(B) The qualitative and quantitative nature of the transfer of United States production
activities to the People’s Republic of China, including the relocation of manufacturing,
advanced technology and intellectual property, and research and development facilities, the
impact of such transfers on the national security of the United States (including the
dependence of the national security industrial base of the United States on imports from
China), the economic security of the United States, and employment in the United States,
and the adequacy of United States export control laws in relation to the People’s Republic of
China.
``(C) The effects of the need for energy and natural resources in the People’s Republic of
China on the foreign and military policies of the People’s Republic of China, the impact of
the large and growing economy of the People’s Republic of China on world energy and
natural resource supplies, prices, and the environment, and the role the United States can
play (including through joint research and development efforts and technological assistance)
in influencing the energy and natural resource policies of the People’s Republic of China.
``(D) Foreign investment by the United States in the People’s Republic of China and by the
People’s Republic of China in the United States, including an assessment of its economic
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and security implications, the challenges to market access confronting potential United States
investment in the People’s Republic of China, and foreign activities by financial institutions
in the People’s Republic of China.
``(E) The military plans, strategy and doctrine of the People’s Republic of China, the
structure and organization of the People’s Republic of China military, the decision-making
process of the People’s Republic of China military, the interaction between the civilian and
military leadership in the People’s Republic of China, the development and promotion
process for leaders in the People’s Republic of China military, deployments of the People’s
Republic of China military, resources available to the People’s Republic of China military
(including the development and execution of budgets and the allocation of funds), force
modernization objectives and trends for the People’s Republic of China military, and the
implications of such objectives and trends for the national security of the United States.
``(F) The strategic economic and security implications of the cyber capabilities and
operations of the People’s Republic of China.
``(G) The national budget, fiscal policy, monetary policy, capital controls, and currency
management practices of the People’s Republic of China, their impact on internal stability
the People’s Republic of China, and their implications for the United States.
``(H) The drivers, nature, and implications of the growing economic, technological, political,
cultural, people-to-people, and security relations of the People’s Republic of China’s with
other countries, regions, and international and regional entities (including multilateral
organizations), including the relationship among the United States, Taiwan, and the People’s
Republic of China.
``(I) The compliance of the People’s Republic of China with its commitments to the World
Trade Organization, other multilateral commitments, bilateral agreements signed with the
United States, commitments made to bilateral science and technology programs, and any
other commitments and agreements strategic to the United States (including agreements on
intellectual property rights and prison labor imports), and United States enforcement policies
with respect to such agreements.
``(J) The implications of restrictions on speech and access to information in the People’s
Republic of China for its relations with the United States in economic and security policy, as
well as any potential impact of media control by the People’s Republic of China on United
States economic interests.
``(K) The safety of food, drug, and other products imported from China, the measures used
by the People’s Republic of China Government and the United States Government to
monitor and enforce product safety, and the role the United States can play (including
through technical assistance) to improve product safety in the People’s Republic of China.’’.
(b) Effective Date.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of
the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to annual reports submitted under
section 1238(c) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001 after such date of enactment.
Section 1274 of H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 states:
SEC. 1274. UNITED STATES STRATEGY AND PLANS FOR ENHANCING SECURITY
AND STABILITY IN EUROPE.
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(a) Review.—The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a review of the force posture,
readiness, and responsiveness of United States forces and the forces of other members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the area of responsibility of the United States
European Command, and of contingency plans for such United States forces, with the
objective of ensuring that the posture, readiness, and responsiveness of such forces are
appropriate to meet the obligations of collective self-defense under Article V of the North
Atlantic Treaty. The review shall include an assessment of the capabilities and capacities
needed by the Armed Forces of the United States to respond to unconventional or hybrid
warfare tactics like those used by the Russian Federation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
(b) United States Strategy and Plans.—
(1) Report on strategy and plans required.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall, in coordination with the Secretary of
State, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on a strategy and plans for
enhancing security and stability in Europe.
(2) Elements.—The report required by this subsection shall include the following:
(A) A summary of the relevant findings of the review conducted under subsection (a).
(B) A description of any initiatives or recommendations of the Secretary of Defense for
enhancing the force posture, readiness, and responsiveness of United States forces in the area
of responsibility of the United States European Command as a result of the review.
(C) A description of any initiatives of other members of NATO for enhancing the force
posture, readiness, and responsiveness of their forces within the area of responsibility of
NATO.
(D) A plan for reassuring Central European and Eastern European members of NATO
regarding the commitment of the United States and other members of NATO to their
obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, including collective defense under Article V,
including the following:
(i) A description of measures to be undertaken by the United States to reassure members of
NATO regarding the commitment of the United States to its obligations under the North
Atlantic Treaty.
(ii) A description of measures undertaken or to be undertaken by other members of NATO to
provide assurances of their commitment to meet their obligations under the North Atlantic
Treaty.
(iii) A description of any planned measures to increase the presence of the Armed Forces of
the United States and the forces of other members of NATO, including on a rotational basis,
on the territories of the Central European and Eastern European members of NATO.
(iv) A description of the measures undertaken by the United States and other members of
NATO to enhance the capability of members of NATO to respond to tactics like those used
by the Russian Federation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine or to assist members of NATO in
responding to such tactics.
(E) A plan for enhancing bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with appropriate
countries participating in the NATO Partnership for Peace program using the authorities for
enhancing security cooperation specified in subsection (c), which plan shall include the
following:
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(i) An identification of the objectives and priorities of such United States security assistance
and cooperation programs, on a bilateral and regional basis, and the resources required to
achieve such objectives and priorities.
(ii) A methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of such United States security assistance
and cooperation programs, bilaterally and regionally, in making progress toward identified
objectives and priorities.
(3) Form.—The report required by this subsection shall be submitted in an unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
(c) Authorities for Enhancing Security Cooperation.—The authorities for enhancing security
cooperation specified in this subsection include the following:
(1) Section 168 of title 10, United States Code, relating to the Warsaw Initiative Fund.
(2) Section 2282 of title 10, United States Code (as added by section 1205 of this Act),
relating to authority to build the capacity of foreign military forces.
(3) Section 1206 of this Act, relating to training of security forces and associated ministries
of foreign countries to promote respect for the rule of law and human rights.
(4) Section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (10 U.S.C.
168 note), relating to the Ministry of Defense Advisors program.
(5) Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C.
2151 note), relating to the Global Security Contingency Fund.
(6) Any other authority available to the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State
appropriate for the purpose of this section.
(d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate
committees of Congress” means—
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Regarding Section 1274, the joint explanatory statement for H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 states:
United States strategy and plans for enhancing security and stability in Europe (sec. 1274)
The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 1242) that would require the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a strategy for enhancing security and stability in Europe.
The House bill contained no similar provision.
The agreement includes the Senate provision with an amendment that would require the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a review of the force posture, readiness, and responsiveness
of U.S. forces and the forces of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members
in Europe, and the contingency plans for those U.S. forces, to ensure they are appropriate to
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meet the obligation of collective self-defense under the North Atlantic Treaty. The
amendment would also require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary
of State, to submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress on a strategy and plans
for enhancing security and stability in Europe. The report would include a plan for reassuring
NATO members regarding the U.S. and NATO commitments to collective self-defense
under the North Atlantic Treaty, and a plan on enhancing U.S. security cooperation with
NATO partner nations.
We expect that at the time the report required under this section is submitted, the Department
of Defense will brief the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the findings of the review, including those relating to U.S. contingency
plans. We also expect the Secretary of Defense, in developing the plan on enhancing U.S.
security cooperation with NATO partner nations, to take into consideration a partner nation’s
commitment to upholding and enhancing regional security and stability. (pdf pages 222-223
of 513)
Section 1535 of H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 states:
SEC. 1535. EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE.
(a) Total Amount and Authorized Purposes of ERI.—The $1,000,000,000 authorized to be
appropriated in sections 1502, 1504, 1505, 1511, and 2904 for fiscal year 2015 for the
European Reassurance Initiative, as specified in the funding tables in sections 4102, 4302,
4402, 4502, and 4602, may be used by the Secretary of Defense solely for the following
purposes:
(1) Activities to increase the presence of the United States Armed Forces in Europe.
(2) Bilateral and multilateral military exercises and training with allies and partner nations in
Europe.
(3) Activities to improve infrastructure in Europe to enhance the responsiveness of the
United States Armed Forces.
(4) Activities to enhance the prepositioning in Europe of equipment of the United States
Armed Forces.
(5) Activities to build the defense and security capacity of allies and partner nations in
Europe.
(b) Activities to Build Defense and Security Capacity of Allies and Partner Nations.—Of the
funds made available for the European Reassurance Initiative that will be used for the
purpose specified in subsection (a)(5)—
(1) not less than $75,000,000 shall be available to be used for programs, activities, and
assistance to support the Government of Ukraine;
(2) not less than $30,000,000 shall be available to be used for programs and activities to
build the capacity of European allies and partner nations; and
(3) the Secretary of Defense may transfer the funds to support activities conducted under the
authorities of the Department of Defense specified in section 1274(c) of this Act.
(c) Transfer Requirements Related to Certain Funds.—
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(1) Use of funds only pursuant to transfer.—In the case of the funds authorized to be
appropriated in section 1511 for the European Reassurance Initiative Fund, as specified in
the funding tables in section 4502, the funds may be used for the purposes specified in
subsection (a) only pursuant to a transfer of the funds to either or both of the following
accounts of the Department of Defense:
(A) Military personnel accounts.
(B) Operation and maintenance accounts.
(2) Effect on authorization amounts.—During fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the transfer of an
amount made available for the European Reassurance Initiative to an account under the
authority provided by paragraph (1) or subsection (b)(3) shall be deemed to increase the
amount authorized for such account by an amount equal to the amount transferred.
(3) Construction with other transfer authority.—The transfer authority provided by paragraph
(1) and subsection (b)(3) is in addition to any other transfer authority available to the
Department of Defense.
(d) Notification Requirements.—Not later than 15 days before that date on which a transfer
of funds under subsection (b)(3) or (c)(1) takes effect, the Secretary of Defense shall notify
the congressional defense committees in writing of the planned transfer. Each notice of a
transfer of funds shall include the following:
(1) A detailed description of the project or activity to be supported by the transfer of funds,
including any request of the Commander of the United States European Command for
support, urgent operational need, or emergent operational need.
(2) The amount planned to be transferred and expended on such project or activity.
(3) A timeline for expenditure of the transferred funds.
(e) Duration of Transfer Authority.—The transfer authority provided by subsections (b)(3)
and (c)(1) expires September 30, 2016.
Regarding Section 1535, the joint explanatory statement for H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291 states:
European Reassurance Initiative (sec. 1535)
A proposed amendment to the Senate committee-reported bill (amendment number 3875)
contained a provision (sec. 1527) that would specify the purposes for which amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) could be used
and provide other limitations on the use of such funds.
The House bill contained no similar provision.
The agreement includes the Senate provision with an amendment clarifying that for fiscal
year 2015 $1.0 billion is authorized to be appropriated in Overseas Contingency Operations
funds for the ERI. The amendment would also provide that of these funds not less than $75.0
million would be available for programs, activities, and assistance to support Ukraine, and
not less than $30.0 million would be available for programs and activities to build the
capacity of European allies and partner nations. Amounts specified for the ERI fund would
be available for the purposes of ERI through September 30, 2016.
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We are deeply concerned about the ongoing violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity and note that a provision in another section of this title expresses the
sense of Congress in support of providing Ukraine military assistance, both non-lethal and
lethal assistance, that is defensive and non-provocative.
We are also concerned about the potential spread of the unconventional and hybrid warfare
tactics used by Russia in Ukraine to other countries in the region, potentially including the
Baltic countries, Moldova, and Georgia. We urge the Secretary of Defense to devote the
appropriate level of planning and resources, including resources under the ERI, to countering
the threat posed by these unconventional and hybrid warfare tactics. (pdf pages 256-257 of
513)
FY2015 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 83/P.L. 113-
235)
The FY2015 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 83/P.L. 113-235 of December 16,
2014) includes the following appropriation in the section that makes appropriations for operations
and maintenance for Overseas Contingency Operations (Title IX):
European Reassurance Initiative
(including transfer of funds)
For the “European Reassurance Initiative”, $175,000,000, to remain available until
September 30, 2015: Provided, That such funds shall be available under the authority
provided to the Department of Defense by any other provision of law, for programs,
activities, and assistance to provide support to the Governments of Ukraine, Estonia,
Lithuania and Latvia, including the provision of training, equipment, and logistical supplies,
support, and services, and the payment of incremental expenses of the Armed Forces
associated with prepositioning additional equipment and undertaking additional or extended
deployments in such countries and adjacent waters: Provided further, That the Secretary of
Defense shall transfer the funds provided herein to other appropriations provided for in this
Act to be merged with and to be available for the same purposes and for the same time
period as the appropriation to which transferred: Provided further, That the Secretary of
Defense shall, not fewer than 15 days prior to transferring amounts from this appropriation,
notify the congressional defense committees in writing of the details of any such transfer:
Provided further, That upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense that all or part of
the funds transferred from this appropriation are not necessary for the purposes herein, such
amounts may be transferred back to the appropriation and shall be available for the same
purposes and for the same time period as originally appropriated: Provided further, That the
transfer authority provided under this heading is in addition to any other transfer authority
provided elsewhere in this Act: Provided further, That such amount is designated by the
Congress for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism pursuant to section
251(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
FY2015 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act (Division I of H.R. 83/P.L. 113-235)
The FY2015 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act (Division I of H.R. 83/P.L. 113-235 of December 16, 2014) includes the following
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appropriation in the section that makes appropriations for Department of Defense overseas
contingency operations (Title IV):
European Reassurance Initiative Military Construction
For an additional amount for “Military Construction, Army”, “Military Construction, Air
Force”, and “Military Construction, Defense-Wide”, $175,000,000 to remain available until
September 30, 2017, for military construction (including planning and design) for projects
associated with the European Reassurance Initiative: Provided, That such amount is
designated by the Congress for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism
pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985: Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this heading may be
obligated or expended until the Secretary of Defense submits to the Committees on
Appropriations of both Houses of Congress: (1) a final spending plan for the European
Reassurance Initiative military construction projects, and (2) the relevant Department of
Defense Form 1391 for each project prior to the execution of that project.
Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act (H.R. 4495)
H.R. 4495, introduced on April 28, 2014, is a bill to “strengthen the United States commitment to
the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and for other purposes.” The table of contents
of the bill, as presented in Section 1 of the bill, is as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act’.
(b) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 3. Congressional defense committees.
TITLE I—MATTERS RELATING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Sec. 101. Report on Department of Defense munitions strategy for United States Pacific
Command.
Sec. 102. Establishment of Department of Defense unmanned systems office.
Sec. 103. Independent assessment on countering anti-access and area-denial capabilities in
the Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 104. Assessment of the maritime balance of forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 105. Missile defense cooperation.
Sec. 106. Department of Defense Space Security and Defense Program.
Sec. 107. Space situational awareness.
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Sec. 108. Sense of Congress on access to training ranges within United States Pacific
Command area of responsibility.
Sec. 109. Sense of Congress on Pohakuloa Training Area in Hawaii.
Sec. 110. Special easement acquisition authority, Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking
Sands, Kauai, Hawaii.
TITLE II—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS
Sec. 201. Statement of policy on maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 202. Sense of Congress reaffirming security commitment to Japan.
Sec. 203. Report on opportunities to strengthen relationship between the United States and
the Republic of Korea.
Sec. 204. Maritime capabilities of Taiwan and its contribution to regional peace and stability.
Sec. 205. Modifications to annual report on military and security developments involving the
People’s Republic of China.
H.Res. 704
H.Res. 704, a resolution “Reaffirming the strong support of the United States Government for
freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific
region, and for the peaceful diplomatic resolution of outstanding territorial and maritime claims
and disputes,” was introduced on July 31, 2014. The text of the resolution as introduced is as
follows:
RESOLUTION
Reaffirming the strong support of the United States Government for freedom of navigation
and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region, and for
the peaceful diplomatic resolution of outstanding territorial and maritime claims and
disputes.
Whereas Asia-Pacific’s maritime domains, which include both the sea and airspace above the
domains, are critical to the region’s prosperity, stability, and security, including global
commerce;
Whereas the United States is a longstanding Asia-Pacific power and has a national interest in
maintaining freedom of operations in international waters and airspace both in the Asia-
Pacific region and around the world;
Whereas, for over 60 years, the United States Government, alongside United States allies and
partners, has played an instrumental role in maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific,
including safeguarding the prosperity and economic growth and development of the Asia-
Pacific region;
Whereas the United States, from the earliest days of the Republic, has had a deep and
abiding national security interest in freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas, respect for
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international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce, including in the East China and South
China Seas;
Whereas the United States alliance relationships in the region, including with Japan, Korea,
Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, are at the heart of United States policy and
engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and share a common approach to supporting the
maintenance of peace and stability, freedom of navigation, and other internationally lawful
uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas territorial and maritime claims must be derived from land features and otherwise
comport with international law;
Whereas the United States Government has a clear interest in encouraging and supporting the
nations of the region to work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes and is
firmly opposed to coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force;
Whereas the South China Sea contains great natural resources, and their stewardship and
responsible use offers immense potential benefit for generations to come;
Whereas the United States is not a claimant party in either the East China or South China
Seas, but does have an interest in the peaceful diplomatic resolution of disputed claims in
accordance with international law, in freedom of operations, and in the free-flow of
commerce free of coercion, intimidation, or the use of force;
Whereas the United States supports the obligation of all members of the United Nations to
seek to resolve disputes by peaceful means;
Whereas freedom of navigation and other lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific
region are embodied in international law, not granted by certain states to others;
Whereas, on November 23, 2013, the People’s Republic of China unilaterally and without
prior consultations with the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea or other nations of
the Asia-Pacific region, declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East
China Sea, also announcing that all aircraft entering the PRC’s self-declared ADIZ, even if
they do not intend to enter Chinese territorial airspace, would have to submit flight plans,
maintain radio contact, and follow directions from the Chinese Ministry of National Defense
or face `emergency defensive measures’;
Whereas the `rules of engagement’ declared by China, including the `emergency defensive
measures’, are in violation of the concept of `due regard for the safety of civil aviation’ under
the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Chicago Convention and thereby are a
departure from accepted practice;
Whereas the Chicago Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization
distinguishes between civilian aircraft and state aircraft and provides for the specific
obligations of state parties, consistent with customary law, to `refrain from resorting to the
use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and ... in case of interception, the lives of
persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered’;
Whereas international civil aviation is regulated by international agreements, including
standards and regulations set by ICAO for aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity,
as well as for aviation environmental protection;
Whereas, in accordance with the norm of airborne innocent passage, the United States does
not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state
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aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the United States apply its ADIZ
procedures to foreign state aircraft not intending to enter United States airspace;
Whereas the United States Government expressed profound concerns with China’s
unilateral, provocative, dangerous, and destabilizing declaration of such a zone, including the
potential for misunderstandings and miscalculations by aircraft operating lawfully in
international airspace;
Whereas the People’s Republic of China’s declaration of an ADIZ in the East China Sea will
not alter how the United States Government conducts operations in the region or the
unwavering United States commitment to peace, security and stability in the Asia-Pacific
region;
Whereas the Government of Japan expressed deep concern about the People’s Republic of
China’s declaration of such a zone, regarding it as an effort to unduly infringe upon the
freedom of flight in international airspace and to change the status quo that could escalate
tensions and potentially cause unintentional consequences in the East China Sea;
Whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea has expressed concern over China’s
declared ADIZ, and on December 9, 2013, announced an adjustment to its longstanding Air
Defense Identification Zone, which does not encompass territory administered by another
country, and did so only after undertaking a deliberate process of consultations with the
United States, Japan, and China;
Whereas the Government of the Philippines has stressed that China’s declared ADIZ seeks to
transfer an entire air zone into Chinese domestic airspace, infringes on freedom of flight in
international airspace, and compromises the safety of civil aviation and the national security
of affected states, and has called on China to ensure that its actions do not jeopardize
regional security and stability;
Whereas, on November 26, 2013, the Government of Australia made clear in a statement its
opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China
Sea;
Whereas, on March 10, 2014, the United States Government and the Government of Japan
jointly submitted a letter to the ICAO Secretariat regarding the issue of freedom of overflight
by civil aircraft in international airspace and the effective management of civil air traffic
within allocated Flight Information Regions (FIR);
Whereas Indonesia Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, in a hearing before the Committee
on Defense and Foreign Affairs on February 18, 2014, stated, `We have firmly told China we
will not accept a similar [Air Defense Identification] Zone if it is adopted in the South China
Sea. And the signal we have received thus far is, China does not plan to adopt a similar Zone
in the South China Sea.’;
Whereas over half the world’s merchant tonnage flows through the South China Sea, and
over 15,000,000 barrels of oil per day transit the Strait of Malacca, fueling economic growth
and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas the increasing frequency and assertiveness of patrols and competing regulations
over disputed territory and maritime areas and airspace in the South China Sea and the East
China Sea are raising tensions and increasing the risk of confrontation;
Whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has promoted multilateral
talks on disputed areas without settling the issue of sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with
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China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that
committed all parties to those territorial disputes to `reaffirm their respect for and
commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea as
provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law’ and to `resolve
their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat
or use of force’;
Whereas ASEAN and China committed in 2002 to develop an effective Code of Conduct
when they adopted the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, yet
negotiations are irregular and little progress has been made;
Whereas, in recent years, there have been numerous dangerous and destabilizing incidents in
waters near the coasts of the Philippines, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam;
Whereas the United States Government is deeply concerned about unilateral actions by any
claimant seeking to change the status quo through the use of coercion, intimidation, or
military force, including the continued restrictions on access to Scarborough Reef and
pressure on long-standing Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal by the People’s
Republic of China; actions by any state to prevent any other state from exercising its
sovereign rights to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf
by making claims to those areas that have no support in international law; declarations of
administrative and military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea; and the
imposition of new fishing regulations covering disputed areas, which have raised tensions in
the region;
Whereas international law is important to safeguard the rights and freedoms of all states in
the Asia-Pacific region, and the lack of clarity in accordance with international law by
claimants with regard to their South China Sea claims can create uncertainty, insecurity, and
instability;
Whereas the United States Government opposes the use of intimidation, coercion, or force to
assert a territorial claim in the South China Sea;
Whereas claims in the South China Sea must accord with international law, and those that
are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed;
Whereas ASEAN issued Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea on July 20, 2012,
whereby ASEAN’s Foreign Ministers reiterated and reaffirmed `the commitment of ASEAN
Member States to: ... 1. the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea (2002); ... 2. the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2011); ... 3. the early conclusion of a
Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea; ... 4. the full respect of the universally
recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); ... 5. the continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use
of force by all parties; and ... 6. the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with
universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).’;
Whereas, in 2013, the Republic of the Philippines properly exercised its rights to peaceful
settlement mechanisms with the filing of arbitration case under Article 287 and Annex VII of
the Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to achieve a peaceful and durable solution to
the dispute, and the United States hopes that all parties in any dispute ultimately abide by the
rulings of internationally recognized dispute-settlement bodies;
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Whereas China and Japan are the world’s second and third largest economies, and have a
shared interest in preserving stable maritime domains to continue to support economic
growth;
Whereas there has been an unprecedented increase in dangerous activities by Chinese
maritime agencies in areas near the Senkaku islands, including between 6 and 25 ships of the
Government of China intruding into the Japanese territorial sea each month since September
2012, between 26 and 124 ships entering the `contiguous zone’ in the same time period, and
9 ships intruding into the territorial sea and 33 ships entering in the contiguous zone in
February 2014;
Whereas, although the United States Government does not take a position on the ultimate
sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, the United States Government acknowledges that they
are under the administration of Japan and opposes any unilateral actions that would seek to
undermine such administration;
Whereas the United States Senate has previously affirmed that the unilateral actions of a
third party will not affect the United States acknowledgment of the administration of Japan
over the Senkaku Islands;
Whereas the United States remains committed under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security to respond to any armed attack in the territories under the administration of Japan,
has urged all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage disagreements through
peaceful means, and commends the Government of Japan for its restrained approach in this
regard;
Whereas both the United States and the People’s Republic of China are parties to and are
obligated to observe the rules of the Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs);
Whereas, on December 5, 2013, the USS Cowpens was lawfully operating in international
waters in the South China Sea when a People’s Liberation Army Navy vessel reportedly
crossed its bow at a distance of less than 500 yards and stopped in the water, forcing the USS
Cowpens to take evasive action to avoid a collision;
Whereas the reported actions taken by the People’s Liberation Army Navy vessel in the USS
Cowpens’ incident, as publicly reported, appear contrary to the international legal
obligations of the People’s Republic of China under COLREGs;
Whereas, on May 1, 2014, the People’s Republic of China’s state-owned energy company,
CNOOC, placed its deepwater semi-submersible drilling rig Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-
981), accompanied by over 25 Chinese ships, in Block 143, 120 nautical miles off Vietnam’s
coastline;
Whereas, from May 1 to May 9, 2014, the number of Chinese vessels escorting HD-981
increased to more than 80, including seven military ships, which aggressively patrolled and
intimidated Vietnamese Coast Guard ships in violation of COLREGs, reportedly
intentionally rammed multiple Vietnamese vessels, and used helicopters and water cannons
to obstruct others;
Whereas, on May 5, 2014, vessels from the Maritime Safety Administration of China
(MSAC) established an exclusion zone with a radius of three nautical miles around HD-981,
which undermines maritime safety in the area and is in violation of universally recognized
principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS);
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Whereas the People’s Republic of China is looking to expand its presence in the contested
Spratly archipelago by means of land reclamation in an effort to add several new islands to
the existing Johnston South Reef;
Whereas, on January 19, 1998, the United States and People’s Republic of China signed the
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, creating a mechanism for consultation and
coordination on operational safety issues in the maritime domain between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China;
Whereas the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, inaugurated in 1988 and comprising the
navies of Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the People’s Republic of China, the Philippines, the
Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United States,
and Vietnam, whose countries all border the Pacific Ocean region, provides a forum where
leaders of regional navies can meet to discuss cooperative initiatives, discuss regional and
global maritime issues, and undertake exercises to strengthen norms and practices that
contribute to operational safety, including protocols for unexpected encounters at sea,
common ways of communication, common ways of operating, and common ways of
engagement;
Whereas, Japan and the People’s Republic of China sought to negotiate a Maritime
Communications Mechanism between the defense authorities and a Maritime Search and
Rescue Agreement and agreed in principle to these agreements to address operational safety
on the maritime domains but failed to sign them;
Whereas the Changi Command and Control Center in Singapore provides a platform for all
the countries of the Western Pacific to share information on what kind of contact at sea
occurs and to provide a common operational picture for the region;
Whereas 2014 commemorates the 35th anniversary of normalization of diplomatic relations
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and the United States
welcomes the development of a peaceful and prosperous China that becomes a responsible
international stakeholder, the government of which respects international norms,
international laws, international institutions, and international rules; enhances security and
peace; and seeks to advance relations between the United States and China; and
Whereas ASEAN plays an important role, in partnership with others in the regional and
international community, in addressing maritime security issues in the Asia-Pacific region
and the Indian Ocean, including open access to the maritime domain of Asia; Now, therefore,
be it
Resolved,
SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
The House of Representatives—
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede freedom of
operations in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo or to
destabilize the Asia-Pacific region;
(2) urges the Government of the People’s Republic of China to refrain from implementing
the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which is contrary to
freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative
actions elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region; and
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(3) commends the Governments of Japan and of the Republic of Korea for their restraint, and
commends the Government of the Republic of Korea for engaging in a deliberate process of
consultations with the United States, Japan and China prior to announcing its adjustment of
its Air Defense Identification Zone on December 9, 2013, and for its commitment to
implement this adjusted Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in a manner consistent with
international practice and respect for the freedom of overflight and other internationally
lawful uses of international airspace.
SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) reaffirm its unwavering commitment and support for allies and partners in the Asia-
Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the United
States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and that Article V of the United States-Japan
Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea that belong
to all nations;
(3) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including illegal
occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed claims;
(4) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;
(5) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law;
(6) support efforts by ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China to develop an effective
Code of Conduct, including the `early harvest’ of agreed-upon elements in the Code of
Conduct that can be implemented immediately;
(7) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States
Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the People’s Republic of China;
(8) support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN
Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and
the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the region and
reinforce the role of international law;
(9) encourage the adoption of mechanisms such as hotlines or emergency procedures for
preventing incidents in sensitive areas, managing them if they occur, and preventing disputes
from escalating;
(10) fully support the rights of claimants to exercise rights they may have to avail themselves
of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms;
(11) encourage claimants not to undertake new unilateral attempts to change the status quo
since the signing of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct, including not asserting administrative
measures or controls in disputed areas in the South China Sea;
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime
domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government
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to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a `common operating
picture’ in the South China Sea that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing
behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;
(13) establish and implement a policy framework with the Government of Vietnam reflecting
both the progress in and challenges that remain regarding Vietnam’s human rights record as
well as the vital national security interests the United States has in deepening and expanding
the comprehensive partnership with Vietnam through the sale or transfer of United States
defense articles appropriate for the development and maintenance of Vietnam’s external
defense capabilities, excluding those items that can be used to suppress protesters, for crowd
control, or for other domestic security purposes; and
(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region,
including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the principle
of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established
principles and practices of international law.
S.Res. 412 (Agreed to by the Senate)
S.Res. 412, a resolution “Reaffirming the strong support of the United States Government for
freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific
region, and for the peaceful diplomatic resolution of outstanding territorial and maritime claims
and dispute,” was introduced on April 7, 2014. On May 20, 2014, it was reported by Senator
Menendez with amendments and with an amended preamble, and without a written report. On
July 10, it was agreed to in the Senate with amendments and an amended preamble by unanimous
consent. The text of the resolution as agreed to by the Senate is as follows:
RESOLUTION
Reaffirming the strong support of the United States Government for freedom of navigation
and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region, and for
the peaceful diplomatic resolution of outstanding territorial and maritime claims and
disputes.
Whereas Asia-Pacific’s maritime domains, which include both the sea and airspace above the
domains, are critical to the region’s prosperity, stability, and security, including global
commerce;
Whereas the United States is a longstanding Asia-Pacific power and has a national interest in
maintaining freedom of operations in international waters and airspace both in the Asia-
Pacific region and around the world;
Whereas for over 60 years, the United States Government, alongside United States allies and
partners, has played an instrumental role in maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific,
including safeguarding the prosperity and economic growth and development of the Asia-
Pacific region;
Whereas the United States, from the earliest days of the Republic, has had a deep and
abiding national security interest in freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas, respect for
international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce, including in the East China and South
China Seas;
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Whereas the United States alliance relationships in the region, including with Japan, Korea,
Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, are at the heart of United States policy and
engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and share a common approach to supporting the
maintenance of peace and stability, freedom of navigation, and other internationally lawful
uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas territorial and maritime claims must be derived from land features and otherwise
comport with international law;
Whereas the United States Government has a clear interest in encouraging and supporting the
nations of the region to work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes and is
firmly opposed to coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force;
Whereas the South China Sea contains great natural resources, and their stewardship and
responsible use offers immense potential benefit for generations to come;
Whereas the United States is not a claimant party in either the East China or South China
Seas, but does have an interest in the peaceful diplomatic resolution of disputed claims in
accordance with international law, in freedom of operations, and in the free-flow of
commerce free of coercion, intimidation, or the use of force;
Whereas the United States supports the obligation of all members of the United Nations to
seek to resolve disputes by peaceful means;
Whereas freedom of navigation and other lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific
region are embodied in international law, not granted by certain states to others;
Whereas, on November 23, 2013, the People’s Republic of China unilaterally and without
prior consultations with the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea or other nations of
the Asia-Pacific region, declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East
China Sea, also announcing that all aircraft entering the PRC’s self-declared ADIZ, even if
they do not intend to enter Chinese territorial airspace, would have to submit flight plans,
maintain radio contact, and follow directions from the Chinese Ministry of National Defense
or face `emergency defensive measures’;
Whereas the `rules of engagement’ declared by China, including the `emergency defensive
measures’, are in violation of the concept of `due regard for the safety of civil aviation’ under
the Chicago Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization and thereby are a
departure from accepted practice;
Whereas the Chicago Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization
distinguishes between civilian aircraft and state aircraft and provides for the specific
obligations of state parties, consistent with customary law, to `refrain from resorting to the
use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and ... in case of interception, the lives of
persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered’;
Whereas international civil aviation is regulated by international agreements, including
standards and regulations set by ICAO for aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity,
as well as for aviation environmental protection;
Whereas, in accordance with the norm of airborne innocent passage, the United States does
not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state
aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does the United States apply its ADIZ
procedures to foreign state aircraft not intending to enter United States airspace;
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Whereas the United States Government expressed profound concerns with China’s
unilateral, provocative, dangerous, and destabilizing declaration of such a zone, including the
potential for misunderstandings and miscalculations by aircraft operating lawfully in
international airspace;
Whereas the People’s Republic of China’s declaration of an ADIZ in the East China Sea will
not alter how the United States Government conducts operations in the region or the
unwavering United States commitment to peace, security and stability in the Asia-Pacific
region;
Whereas the Government of Japan expressed deep concern about the People’s Republic of
China’s declaration of such a zone, regarding it as an effort to unduly infringe upon the
freedom of flight in international airspace and to change the status quo that could escalate
tensions and potentially cause unintentional consequences in the East China Sea;
Whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea has expressed concern over China’s
declared ADIZ, and on December 9, 2013, announced an adjustment to its longstanding Air
Defense Identification Zone, which does not encompass territory administered by another
country, and did so only after undertaking a deliberate process of consultations with the
United States, Japan, and China;
Whereas the Government of the Philippines has stressed that China’s declared ADIZ seeks to
transfer an entire air zone into Chinese domestic airspace, infringes on freedom of flight in
international airspace, and compromises the safety of civil aviation and the national security
of affected states, and has called on China to ensure that its actions do not jeopardize
regional security and stability;
Whereas, on November 26, 2013, the Government of Australia made clear in a statement its
opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China
Sea;
Whereas, on March 10, 2014, the United States Government and the Government of Japan
jointly submitted a letter to the ICAO Secretariat regarding the issue of freedom of overflight
by civil aircraft in international airspace and the effective management of civil air traffic
within allocated Flight Information Regions (FIR);
Whereas Indonesia Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, in a hearing before the Committee
on Defense and Foreign Affairs on February 18, 2014, stated, `We have firmly told China we
will not accept a similar [Air Defense Identification] Zone if it is adopted in the South China
Sea. And the signal we have received thus far is, China does not plan to adopt a similar Zone
in the South China Sea.’;
Whereas over half the world’s merchant tonnage flows through the South China Sea, and
over 15,000,000 barrels of oil per day transit the Strait of Malacca, fueling economic growth
and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas the increasing frequency and assertiveness of patrols and competing regulations
over disputed territory and maritime areas and airspace in the South China Sea and the East
China Sea are raising tensions and increasing the risk of confrontation;
Whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has promoted multilateral
talks on disputed areas without settling the issue of sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with
China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that
committed all parties to those territorial disputes to `reaffirm their respect for and
commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea as
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provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law’ and to `resolve
their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat
or use of force’;
Whereas ASEAN and China committed in 2002 to develop an effective Code of Conduct
when they adopted the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, yet
negotiations are irregular and little progress has been made;
Whereas in recent years, there have been numerous dangerous and destabilizing incidents in
waters near the coasts of the Philippines, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam;
Whereas the United States Government is deeply concerned about unilateral actions by any
claimant seeking to change the status quo through the use of coercion, intimidation, or
military force, including the continued restrictions on access to Scarborough Reef and
pressure on long-standing Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal by the People’s
Republic of China; actions by any state to prevent any other state from exercising its
sovereign rights to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf
by making claims to those areas that have no support in international law; declarations of
administrative and military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea; and the
imposition of new fishing regulations covering disputed areas, which have raised tensions in
the region;
Whereas international law is important to safeguard the rights and freedoms of all states in
the Asia-Pacific region, and the lack of clarity in accordance with international law by
claimants with regard to their South China Sea claims can create uncertainty, insecurity, and
instability;
Whereas the United States Government opposes the use of intimidation, coercion, or force to
assert a territorial claim in the South China Sea;
Whereas claims in the South China Sea must accord with international law, and those that
are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed;
Whereas ASEAN issued Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea on July 20, 2012,
whereby ASEAN’s Foreign Ministers reiterated and reaffirmed `the commitment of ASEAN
Member States to: ... 1. the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea (2002); ... 2. the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2011); ... 3. the early conclusion of a
Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea; ... 4. the full respect of the universally
recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); ... 5. the continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use
of force by all parties; and ... 6. the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with
universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).’;
Whereas, in 2013, the Republic of the Philippines properly exercised its rights to peaceful
settlement mechanisms with the filing of arbitration case under Article 287 and Annex VII of
the Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to achieve a peaceful and durable solution to
the dispute, and the United States hopes that all parties in any dispute ultimately abide by the
rulings of internationally recognized dispute-settlement bodies;
Whereas China and Japan are the world’s second and third largest economies, and have a
shared interest in preserving stable maritime domains to continue to support economic
growth;
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Whereas there has been an unprecedented increase in dangerous activities by Chinese
maritime agencies in areas near the Senkaku islands, including between 6 and 25 ships of the
Government of China intruding into the Japanese territorial sea each month since September
2012, between 26 and 124 ships entering the `contiguous zone’ in the same time period, and
9 ships intruding into the territorial sea and 33 ships entering in the contiguous zone in
February 2014;
Whereas although the United States Government does not take a position on the ultimate
sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, the United States Government acknowledges that they
are under the administration of Japan and opposes any unilateral actions that would seek to
undermine such administration;
Whereas the United States Senate has previously affirmed that the unilateral actions of a
third party will not affect the United States acknowledgment of the administration of Japan
over the Senkaku Islands;
Whereas the United States remains committed under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security to respond to any armed attack in the territories under the administration of Japan,
has urged all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage disagreements through
peaceful means, and commends the Government of Japan for its restrained approach in this
regard;
Whereas both the United States and the People’s Republic of China are parties to and are
obligated to observe the rules of the Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs);
Whereas, on December 5, 2013, the USS Cowpens was lawfully operating in international
waters in the South China Sea when a People’s Liberation Army Navy vessel reportedly
crossed its bow at a distance of less than 500 yards and stopped in the water, forcing the USS
Cowpens to take evasive action to avoid a collision;
Whereas the reported actions taken by the People’s Liberation Army Navy vessel in the USS
Cowpens’ incident, as publicly reported, appear contrary to the international legal
obligations of the People’s Republic of China under COLREGs;
Whereas, on May 1, 2014, the People’s Republic of China’s state-owned energy company,
CNOOC, placed its deepwater semi-submersible drilling rig Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-
981), accompanied by over 25 Chinese ships, in Block 143, 120 nautical miles off Vietnam’s
coastline;
Whereas from May 1 to May 9, 2014, the number of Chinese vessels escorting Hai Yang Shi
You 981 (HD-981) increased to more than 80, including seven military ships, which
aggressively patrolled and intimidated Vietnamese Coast Guard ships in violation of
COLREGS, reportedly intentionally rammed multiple Vietnamese vessels, and used
helicopters and water cannons to obstruct others;
Whereas, on May 5, 2014, vessels from the Maritime Safety Administration of China
(MSAC) established an exclusion zone with a radius of three nautical miles around Hai Yang
Shi You 981 (HD-981), which undermines maritime safety in the area and is in violation of
universally recognized principles of international law;
Whereas China’s territorial claims and associated maritime actions in support of the drilling
activity that Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981) commenced on May 1, 2014, have not been
clarified under international law, constitute a unilateral attempt to change the status quo by
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force, and appear to be in violation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea;
Whereas, on January 19, 1998, the United States and People’s Republic of China signed the
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, creating a mechanism for consultation and
coordination on operational safety issues in the maritime domain between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China;
Whereas the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, inaugurated in 1988 and comprising the
navies of Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the People’s Republic of China, the Philippines, the
Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United States,
and Vietnam, whose countries all border the Pacific Ocean region, provides a forum where
leaders of regional navies can meet to discuss cooperative initiatives, discuss regional and
global maritime issues, and undertake exercises to strengthen norms and practices that
contribute to operational safety, including protocols for unexpected encounters at sea,
common ways of communication, common ways of operating, and common ways of
engagement;
Whereas Japan and the People’s Republic of China sought to negotiate a Maritime
Communications Mechanism between the defense authorities and a Maritime Search and
Rescue Agreement and agreed in principle to these agreements to address operational safety
on the maritime domains but failed to sign them;
Whereas the Changi Command and Control Center in Singapore provides a platform for all
the countries of the Western Pacific to share information on what kind of contact at sea and
to provide a common operational picture for the region;
Whereas 2014 commemorates the 35th anniversary of normalization of diplomatic relations
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and the United States
welcomes the development of a peaceful and prosperous China that becomes a responsible
international stakeholder, the government of which respects international norms,
international laws, international institutions, and international rules; enhances security and
peace; and seeks to advance relations between the United States and China; and
Whereas ASEAN plays an important role, in partnership with others in the regional and
international community, in addressing maritime security issues in the Asia-Pacific region
and the Indian Ocean, including open access to the maritime domain of Asia: Now, therefore,
be it
Resolved,
SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE.
The Senate—
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede freedom of
operations in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo or to
destabilize the Asia-Pacific region;
(2) urges the Government of the People’s Republic of China to refrain from implementing
the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which is contrary to
freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative
actions elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region;
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(3) commends the Governments of Japan and of the Republic of Korea for their restraint, and
commends the Government of the Republic of Korea for engaging in a deliberate process of
consultations with the United States, Japan and China prior to announcing its adjustment of
its Air Defense Identification Zone on December 9, 2013, and for its commitment to
implement this adjusted Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in a manner consistent with
international practice and respect for the freedom of overflight and other internationally
lawful uses of international airspace; and
(4) calls on the Government of the People’s Republic of China to withdraw its Hai Yang Shi
You 981 (HD-981) drilling rig and associated maritime forces from their current positions, to
refrain from maritime maneuvers contrary to COLREGS, and to return immediately to the
status quo as it existed before May 1, 2014.
SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) reaffirm its unwavering commitment and support for allies and partners in the Asia-
Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the United
States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and that Article V of the United States-Japan
Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea that belong
to all nations;
(3) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including illegal
occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed claims;
(4) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;
(5) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law;
(6) support efforts by ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China to develop an effective
Code of Conduct, including the `early harvest’ of agreed-upon elements in the Code of
Conduct that can be implemented immediately;
(7) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States
Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the People’s Republic of China;
(8) support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN
Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and
the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the region and
reinforce the role of international law;
(9) encourage the adoption of mechanisms such as hotlines or emergency procedures for
preventing incidents in sensitive areas, managing them if they occur, and preventing disputes
from escalating;
(10) fully support the rights of claimants to exercise rights they may have to avail themselves
of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms;
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(11) encourage claimants not to undertake new unilateral attempts to change the status quo
since the signing of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct, including not asserting administrative
measures or controls in disputed areas in the South China Sea;
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime
domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government
to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a `common operating
picture’ in the South China Sea that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing
behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities; and
(13) assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region,
including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the principle
of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established
principles and practices of international law.
SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as a declaration of war or authorization to use
force.
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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