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Fundamental Elements of the U.S. Sugar Program

Overview

The U.S. sugar program is singular among major farm commodity programs in that it combines a floor price guarantee with a supply management structure that encompasses both domestic production for human use and sugar imports. Historically, the U.S. sugar market has been managed to help stabilize supplies and support prices. The current sugar program provides a price guarantee to the processors of sugarcane and sugar beets and, by extension, to the producers of both crops. The 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) reauthorized the sugar program that expired with the 2013 crop year through crop year 2018 with no changes. It directs the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to administer the program at no budgetary cost to the federal government by limiting the amount of sugar supplied for food use in the U.S. market (see CRS Report R43998, *U.S. Sugar Program Fundamentals*). To achieve the dual objectives of providing a price guarantee to producers while avoiding program costs, USDA uses four tools to keep domestic market prices above guaranteed levels. These are:

- **Price support loans** are the basis for the price guarantee;
- **Marketing allotments** limit the amount of sugar each processor can sell for domestic human use;
- **Import quotas** control the quantity and source of imported sugar; and
- **A sugar-to-ethanol backstop** (Feedstock Flexibility Program) removes sugar from food channels to help keep market prices above loan forfeiture levels.

In addition, agreements with Mexico that were finalized in late 2014 impose important limits on a substantial and previously unrestricted supply of sugar to the U.S. market.

Key Program Element: Price Support Loans

Nonrecourse loans taken out by a processor of a sugar crop, not producers themselves, provide a source of short-term, low-cost financing until a raw cane sugar mill or beet sugar refiner sells sugar. The "nonrecourse" feature means that processors—to meet their loan repayment obligation—can forfeit sugar offered as collateral to USDA to secure the loan, if the market price is below the effective support level when the loan comes due. The "loan rate" is the amount processors receive for placing sugar under loan. For 2016 crops (FY2017), the national average raw cane sugar loan rate is 18.75¢/lb; that of refined beet sugar is higher at 24.09¢/lb. The loan rate for raw cane sugar is lower because raw cane must be further processed to have the same value and characteristics as refined beet sugar for food use.

The minimum market price that a processor requires to repay the loan instead of forfeiting sugar is higher than the loan rate. This "effective support level," also called the "loan forfeiture level," represents all of the costs that processors need to offset to make it economically viable to repay the loan. These costs equal the loan rate, plus interest accrued over the nine-month term of the loan, plus certain marketing costs. The effective support level for the 2016 crop of raw cane sugar is 20.87¢/lb and from 24.41¢ to 26.09¢/lb for refined beet sugar, depending on the region.

If market prices are below these loan forfeiture levels when a price support loan comes due (i.e., usually July to September), and a processor hands over sugar pledged as collateral rather than repaying the loan, USDA records a budgetary expense (i.e., an outlay). USDA then gains title to the sugar and is responsible for disposing of it. To avoid such loan forfeitures and associated outlays, USDA sets annual limits on the quantity of domestically produced sugar that can be sold for human use. It also restricts the level of imports that may enter the U.S. market through tariff-rate quotas and annual limits on Mexican sugar.

Figure 1. U.S. Supply and Overall Allotment Quantity



Source: Derived by CRS from USDA sugar program announcements and USDA's World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates.

Key Program Element: Marketing Allotments

Sugar marketing allotments limit the amount of domestically produced sugar that processors can sell each year. They do not limit how much beet and cane farmers can produce, nor do they limit how much sugar beets and sugarcane that beet refiners and raw sugar cane mills can process. The farm bill requires USDA each year to set the overall allotment quantity (OAQ) at not less than 85% of estimated U.S. human consumption of sugar for food as illustrated in **Figure 1**. Sugar production in excess of a processors' allotment may only be sold for human use to allow another processor to meet its allocation or for export.

The national OAQ is split between the beet and cane sectors and then allocated to processing companies based on

previous sales and production capacity. If either sector is not able to supply sugar against its allotment, USDA has authority to reassign such a "shortfall" to imports. **Figure 1** illustrates the persistent gap between domestic sugar production, the higher levels of the OAQ, and U.S. domestic consumption for human use. As a result, substantial quantities of sugar have been imported to cover shortfall between domestic output and human consumption.

Key Program Element: Import Quotas

The United States imports sugar in order to meet total food demand. From FY2014 through FY2016, imports accounted for 29% of U.S. sugar consumption. The amount of foreign sugar supplied to the U.S. market reflects U.S. tariff-rate quota (TRQ) import commitments under various trade agreements at low, or zero, tariff rates (**Table 1**), as well as duty-free sugar from Mexico, as discussed below.

Table 1. Major U.S. Tariff-Rate Quota Commitments
(Quantities are in short tons, raw value)

Trade Agreement	FY2017 Quantity
World Trade Organization	1,410,062
CAFTA-DR	146,628
Columbia	59,249

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Notes: CAFTA-DR includes Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

Additionally, for FY2017, Panama and Peru have TRQs of 7,562 and 2,205 short tons, raw value, respectively. High tariffs discourage imports of over-quota sugar to help fulfill the farm bill directive to avoid incurring program costs.

Policy Mechanisms to Counter Low Prices

In addition to domestic marketing allotments, import quotas, limits and tariffs, USDA has several policy tools to help prevent prices from slipping below effective loan forfeiture levels that could result in budget outlays. These include offering Commodity Credit Corporation-owned sugar to processors in exchange for surrendering rights to import tariff-rate quota sugar; purchasing sugar from processors in exchange for surrendering tariff-rate quota sugar; and purchasing sugar for domestic human use from processors for resale to ethanol producers for fuel ethanol production under the Feedstock Flexibility Program (FFP).

Agreements Recast Sugar Trade with Mexico

Events subsequent to the reauthorization of the sugar program in the 2014 farm bill have materially altered the U.S. sugar market. In December 2014, the U.S. government signed suspension agreements (SAs) with the Mexican government and with the Mexican sugar industry that have fundamentally changed bilateral trade in Mexican sugar, with implications for the sugar program and sugar users.

The SAs stem from parallel countervailing duty (CVD) and antidumping (AD) investigations initiated in 2014 by the U.S. government at the behest of U.S. sugar industry interests. Substantial duties were applied to Mexican sugar imports in the fall of 2014, when preliminary findings in the investigations concluded that Mexican sugar was being subsidized by the government and dumped in the U.S. market and that these actions were injuring the U.S. sugar industry. The SAs suspended the CVD and AD investigations and removed the duties in exchange for a number of concessions from Mexico, among which:

- Mexico relinquished the unlimited, duty-free access to the U.S. sugar market it gained via the North American Free Trade Agreement;
- Mexican sugar exports to the United States would be subject to minimum prices (at Mexican plants) of 26¢/lb for refined sugar and 22.25¢/lb for all other sugar—levels well above U.S. loan support.

Imported Mexican sugar represented on average 15% of the sum of U.S. sugar production plus imports during the three years prior to the SAs and comprised the only unmanaged source of U.S. supplies. The SAs impose an annual export limit on Mexican sugar based on USDA's assessment of U.S. needs after taking into account domestic production and TRQ imports. Additionally, imports of refined sugar from Mexico may not exceed 53% of the Mexican total.

Suspension Agreements: Increasingly Controversial

The SAs were expected to greatly facilitate USDA's ability to operate the sugar program at no cost, while also avoiding possible retaliatory actions from Mexico that might have followed if the duties on Mexican sugar remained in place. Since coming into force, the agreements have come under attack from a number of key stakeholders in the U.S. sugar economy, although views on what action should be taken differ. Some stakeholders have called on DOC to withdraw from the agreements, while others want them altered so that raw cane comprises a far larger share of Mexican imports.

A common complaint from U.S. stakeholders (including organizations representing sugar growers and processors, commercial users of sugar, and certain cane refiners) is that the SAs are not working as intended. In part, this reflects concern that U.S. cane refiners that rely on raw sugar cane from Mexico have received an inadequate share of imported Mexican sugar. These refiners contend this situation has placed them in economic jeopardy, and sugar users are concerned that the loss of a major domestic cane refiner could reduce competition among suppliers of refined sugar.

To date, discussions between the DOC and Mexico to alter terms of the SAs have not been successful. Following an initial review of the SAs in November 2016, DOC indicated the SAs may not be meeting the statutory requirements. Final results from this review are expected in April 2017. Parties to the SAs can terminate them any time, an action that would be expected to trigger the imposition of steep duties on Mexican sugar imports, potentially pricing Mexican sugar out of the U.S. market. For more, see CRS In Focus IF10517, *U.S. Stakeholders Critical of U.S.-Mexico Sugar Agreements*.

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