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Summary

Tanzania is an East African country comprising a union of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, and the semiautonomous Zanzibar archipelago. The United States has long considered Tanzania a partner in economic development and, increasingly, in regional security efforts. With nearly 54 million people, Tanzania is one of the largest countries in Africa by population and is endowed with substantial natural resource wealth and agricultural potential. Over the past decade, it has experienced robust economic growth based largely on favorably high gold prices and tourism; growth has averaged nearly 7% annually. The ongoing development of large reserves of offshore natural gas discovered in 2010 has raised the prospect of substantial foreign investment inflows and export revenue. Nevertheless, corruption and poor service delivery have hindered efforts to curb widespread poverty, and extensive development challenges remain.

Since 1977, Tanzanian politics have been dominated by the ruling *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM, Party of the Revolution), created through the merger that year of the single parties that had controlled the mainland and Zanzibar since 1964. Opposition parties face periodic harassment and de facto restrictions on their activities. President John Magufuli, who leads the CCM, was elected in late October 2015 and is serving his first five-year term in office. His predecessor, Jakaya Kikwete, also of the CCM, assumed power in 2005 and won reelection in 2010, but was constitutionally barred from running for a third term. The 2015 polls featured a close contest between the CCM and a coalition of the leading opposition parties.

Tanzania is generally stable and peaceful, despite periodic threats to public safety. These include sporadic attacks on tourists in Zanzibar, several unattributed armed attacks on police, and occasional bombings of Christian churches and other targets. Tanzania has occasionally arrested suspected Islamic extremists, as in April 2015, when a group of 10 alleged members of the Somali Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al Shabaab were taken into custody.

U.S.-Tanzanian relations are cordial, but have suffered tensions over the contentious 2015/2016 election in Zanzibar, restrictions on civil liberties, and other issues. President Kikwete was the first African head of state to meet with former President Obama after the latter took office, and President Obama stated that a “shared commitment to the development and the dignity of the people of Tanzania” underpins bilateral ties. Tanzania also maintains close economic and political ties with China.

Under the Obama Administration, aid cooperation was generally robust. How ties and assistance cooperation may proceed under the Administration of President Donald Trump and during the 115th Congress has yet to be determined. U.S. aid for Tanzania has focused primarily on health, food security, agricultural development, and infrastructure, largely under multiple major presidential initiatives. U.S. assistance has also supported Tanzania’s hosting of large numbers of refugees from the region. Tanzania is eligible for African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade benefits and in 2013 completed a \$698 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact focused on poverty reduction and economic growth. The MCC has since suspended activity in support of a possible second compact, citing governance concerns.

U.S. security assistance increased after the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania was one of six initial participants in the Obama Administration’s African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), which aims to build the peacekeeping capacity of African militaries. Tanzania is a troop contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations in multiple African countries and Lebanon.

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Introduction

The United Republic of Tanzania is an East African country of nearly 54 million people that is about twice as large as California. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates it to have been the 31st-poorest country globally in 2016 when ranked by per capita gross domestic product (GDP), which stood at \$970 in 2016. The country has substantial natural resource wealth and agricultural potential, however, and multiple socioeconomic development indicators have generally improved in recent years. Its relative political stability and government reforms have attracted substantial official development aid, although there are abiding concerns regarding corruption and a difficult business climate. Despite such challenges, some sectors of the economy, most notably the extractive industries, are attracting private investment. President John Magufuli was elected in 2015 and is serving his first five-year term in office.

U.S.-Tanzanian ties have generally been cordial and U.S. aid expanded significantly under the last two U.S. Administrations. Since the 2015 elections, however, U.S. concerns about Tanzania's governance have raised some tensions. Such concerns have centered on the nullification of the 2015 election results (and the subsequent rerun in 2016) in the semiautonomous coastal region of Zanzibar, restrictions on civil liberties, and similar issues. Citing such concerns, in March 2016, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Board announced it would suspend its partnership with Tanzania, deferring a vote on the country's continued eligibility for a potential second large development compact; this effectively ended, for the time being, the development of a second MCC compact with Tanzania, following its completion of an initial compact between 2008 and 2013.¹ The MCC had previously authorized and helped fund initial research and concept design activities focused on the development of a second compact, which had been expected to center on the electrical power sector—and in mid-2015 had informed Congress of its intent to negotiate such a compact Tanzania.

These developments ran counter to a prior narrative of improving governance and economic development in Tanzania and closer U.S. ties, underscored by former President Obama's July 2013 visit to the country, during which he highlighted such progress, as well as growing U.S. trade and investment ties. Despite the later tensions, the Obama Administration described bilateral ties as being characterized by a "strong" partnership focused on a "shared vision of improving the quality of life for all Tanzanians" in its FY2017 State Department/U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) foreign aid budget submission to Congress. How bilateral ties may proceed under the Trump Administration and during the 115th Congress has yet to be determined, but they appear likely to remain on a positive track. An April 26, 2017, press release issued under the name of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson characterized the U.S.-Tanzanian relationship as "strong," and "marked by a collaborative effort toward shared goals and close cooperation on a variety of programs and initiatives, from health and education, promoting economic growth and democratic governance, and advancing regional security," and projected similar trends in the future. Tanzania may also benefit from the fact that Mark Green, the new USAID Administrator, is a former U.S. ambassador to the country (2007 to 2009).²

¹ MCC, "MCC Statement on Decision of Board of Directors to Suspend Partnership with Tanzania," March 28, 2016.

² Secretary Tillerson's press release was a routine communication marking Union Day, a celebration of the merger in 1964 of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, and Zanzibar, a semiautonomous coastal archipelago. State Department, "Africa: On the Occasion of the United Republic of Tanzania's Union Day," April 26, 2017. U.S. Embassy-Tanzania, "Former U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania Confirmed as USAID Administrator," August 22, 2017.

In recent years, Tanzania has been the second- or third-largest annual recipient of such aid in sub-Saharan Africa, with funding reaching a high of \$634.1 million in FY2015 and a low of \$546.6 million in FY2017 (provisional current estimate; see **Table 1**). The Trump Administration has requested \$535 million for Tanzania in FY2018, the second-highest level requested for a country in the region and a minimal 2% drop relative to the current FY2017 estimate for Tanzania. This decrease would be modest compared to the roughly one-third decrease in overall global aid levels proposed by the Trump Administration.

The bulk of U.S. development aid for Tanzania in recent years has been provided under Obama Administration presidential development initiatives, including Feed the Future (FTF), the Global Health Initiative, the Global Climate Change Initiative, Power Africa, and Trade Africa. In 2014 Tanzania was selected as one of six initial partner countries under the Obama Administration's African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP).³ It was also chosen to be a Partnership for Growth (PFG) country, one of four worldwide. (See assistance section, below, for more on these efforts.) While most U.S. aid has focused on health and economic growth, bilateral security cooperation has also increased. Tanzania is a top African contributor of personnel to international peacekeeping operations.

While there is generally little Tanzania-focused congressional activity or legislation, some Members of Congress occasionally travel to the country and periodically host visits from Tanzanian leaders, such as that of former President Jakaya Kikwete during the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. Some Members have sponsored legislation advocating protections for albinos, who are the target of attacks, as discussed below.

Background

Tanzania, formed in 1964, is a union of Tanganyika, the mainland territory, which gained independence from Britain in 1961, and the Zanzibar archipelago. Zanzibar, which gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1963, remains semiautonomous, with its own government. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's president from 1964 until 1985, remained influential until his death in 1999. Under Nyerere, Tanzania was governed as a socialist state, but maintained cordial, albeit sometimes tepid relations with the West. Nyerere advanced a set of national social policies known collectively as *ujamaa* ("socialism" in Swahili, the lingua franca), which centered on rural, village-based collectivism and self-reliance and the nationalization of key industries.

Ujamaa had a decidedly mixed record. At a national level, central state control of economic policy failed to spur transformative growth and industrialization and inhibited market-based economic transaction efficiencies and private sector growth, while at the village level, collectivization faced increasing resistance. Such factors, together with a range of global ones (e.g., the oil crisis of the 1970s and poor commodity prices for Tanzania's core agricultural exports) led the country to seek credit and technical cooperation with international financial institutions in the mid-1980s. This led to the gradual liberalization of the economy and later of the state. In contrast to the economic effects of *ujamaa*, Nyerere's leadership and policies are widely seen as having united an ethnically and religiously diverse population under a strong shared national identity. His leadership, by many accounts, spared the mainland from the ethnic tensions that have inhibited national unity or destabilized some other African countries. Zanzibar, however, has experienced some internal ethnic and religious frictions.

³ PFG was an initiative intended to expand development cooperation with countries that had shown a strong commitment to good governance and development, but was not expanded beyond the initial four countries.

Figure I. Tanzania at a Glance



Population/Population growth rate: 53.95 million/2.8%

Youth (Persons Aged 0-24 as a Percent of Total Population of): 63.6%

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Total/Per Capita/Growth Rate: \$47.2 billion/\$970/6.6% (2016)

External Debt Total/Public Debt as Proportion of GDP: \$15.89 billion/36.6% (2016)

Ethnic Groups: Over 120 ethnic groups, the largest of which are the Sukuma and related groups

Languages: Kiswahili (official), Kiunguja (Zanzibari Kiswahili), English (official, primary commercial, administrative, and higher education language), Arabic (in Zanzibar); about 120 local languages, some tiny and endangered.

Religions: Mainland: Christian 58% (32% Catholic), Muslim 35%, local beliefs 5% (2010). Zanzibar: 99% Muslim (2015) (Religious demography estimates vary widely, and local beliefs often influence Christian and Muslim beliefs)

Literacy: Male: 83.2%; Female: 73.1% (2015)

Under-5 Mortality rate: 49 deaths/1,000 live births (2015)

HIV/AIDS (adult prevalence rate): 4.7% (2016)

Life Expectancy: Male, 60.8 years; Female, 63.6 years (2016)

Sources: CIA World Factbook; IMF; Ethnologue; UNAIDS; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life *Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa Topline Survey Results, 2010*; and State Department, *International Religious Freedom Report for 2015*. Data for 2017 unless otherwise indicated. Map created by CRS.

Since the mid-1990s, successive governments have taken steps to further liberalize the economy, but Tanzania's business environment remains challenging, due, in part, to the enduring effects of state-centric policies and bureaucratization during the socialist period. A 2016 State Department assessment observed that "in certain sectors the legacy of socialist attitudes has not fully dissipated, sometimes resulting in suspicion of foreign investors and slow decision making."⁴

⁴ State Department, *2016 Investment Climate Statement - Tanzania*.

Despite a stated commitment to reform, corruption and poor service delivery have hampered Tanzania's efforts to curb widespread poverty and reduce reliance on subsistence agriculture. As is common in the region, Tanzania's aging infrastructure has suffered from chronic underinvestment. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration viewed the Tanzanian government as committed to development and governance reform, and provided substantial aid to spur progress in these areas, and to invest in infrastructure.

Politics and Governance

Tanzania's ruling party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM, Swahili for Party of the Revolution), was created by Nyerere in 1977 through the merger of the ruling parties of the mainland and Zanzibar. It has dominated Tanzanian politics since its inception, a key point of criticism by opposition parties. In the first multiparty elections in 1995, the CCM won a landslide victory in voting marred by irregularities. The party has continued to enjoy considerable electoral success on the mainland, in part due to the powers of incumbency, but opposition parties have won a growing share of legislative seats in successive elections. Still, opposition parties reportedly face periodic harassment and de facto restrictions on their activities. Increased political pluralism may distribute political power more widely, but it may also hold the potential to spur increasing ethnic, regional, and/or religious divisions, which the CCM long sought to avert.

Recent years have seen a rise in the harassment of opposition political figures and restrictions on their activities. In September 2017, Tundu Lissu, a member of parliament and parliamentary chief whip of the opposition Chadema party (*Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo*, the Party for Democracy and Progress), was shot by unknown assailants and seriously wounded. Lissu, who is also the president of the Tanganyika Law Society, is a fierce critic of President Magufuli and his government, but also a long-standing critic of corruption who may face hostility from many quarters.⁵ Lissu has often been arrested for his long-standing criticism of the government.⁶ The shooting was preceded by a firebombing of a local blue chip law firm, IMMMA Advocates, a local affiliate of the U.S. firm DLA Piper, which Lissu alleged police were involved in.⁷

Other opposition parliamentarians also face frequent duress from police. In late September 2017, police arrested a Chadema MP after a party event, and another complained that police were prohibiting his meetings with constituents, as had another in August. Such events have been preceded by many similar ones in recent years, notably during electoral periods.⁸ Similarly,

⁵ The shooting was widely condemned, including by the U.S. government and Magufuli, who ordered a manhunt for the attackers. Police have, however, refused assistance from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and Britain's Scotland Yard. Lissu's CHADEMA party alleges the government was behind the attack. U.S. Embassy-Tanzania, "Statement on the Shooting of Tanzanian Member of Parliament Tundu Lissu," September 8, 2017; The Guardian (Tanzania), "Tanzania rejects call for FBI probe in MP attack," Via BBC Monitoring, September 18, 2017; Agence France Press (AFP), "Opposition blames Tanzania govt for critic's shooting," September 12, 2017; and Fumbuka Ng'wanakilala, "Vocal critic of Tanzanian president seriously hurt in gun attack," *Reuters*, September 7, 2017.

⁶ He was detained on six occasions in 2017, most recently in August 2017, for insulting Magufuli after he revealed that a Canadian court had ordered the seizure of a state-owned Air Tanzania aircraft after a government debt default, and in July 2017 for calling Magufuli a dictator. The Canadian judgement resulted from the government's failure to pay \$38 million in payments and interest for a road a firm had constructed in Tanzania. Court-ordered property seizure orders in the case are also active in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, England and Uganda. Deogratus Kamagi, "Tanzania: Why TZ Plane Is Yet to Arrive in the Country," *The Citizen*, August 19, 2017.

⁷ Police denied the claim. Louis Kolumbia, "Tanzania: TLS Blames Police for Blasts at Law Firm Offices," *The Citizen*, August 28, 2017, among others.

⁸ In February, the deputy leader was accused by the governor of the Dar es Salaam region of drug trafficking. CHADEMA, "Mbunge wa Kilombero Peter Lijualikali akamatwa na Polisi," September 7, 2017, and "Msigwa (continued...)"

newspapers have faced suspension or other sanction for coverage seen as critical of the government. Most recently, in September 2017, the publication of two newspapers was banned, in one case for 90 days and in another for two years, three months after another publication was also shuttered for two years.⁹

The strength of electoral challenges to the CCM has grown during the past two national elections, in 2010 and in 2015 (see below), notably from Chadema, which was formed prior to the 2000 elections.¹⁰ In 2014, opposition parties boycotted the process of drafting of a new constitution, claiming the CCM had refused to include opposition proposals to limit the power of the executive and establish a federal government system. The CCM-majority legislature then adopted a draft charter and the government scheduled a nationwide referendum for April 2015, but later postponed it indefinitely. Opposition parties had called for a referendum boycott and had legally challenged the reform process.¹¹ Rivalry between the CCM and UKAWA (an opposition alliance made up of Chadema, the Civic United Front [CUF], and two smaller parties) remains a key focus of politics.¹²

Zanzibar

Background. Zanzibar is made up of three islands—Unguja (also known as Zanzibar island), Pemba, and Mafia—and several islets. Its 1.3 million people mainly speak Kiswahili and are predominately Muslim. The islands offer protected anchorages just off the East African coast, making them a strategic location along the historic trading routes of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Zanzibar was a British protectorate from 1890 until independence in 1963. Shortly thereafter, Zanzibar's black African majority (known as Shirazis) revolted against the Arab-dominated government. A new socialist-oriented government, led by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), then joined with the head of the ruling party of the mainland to form the United Republic of Tanzania, which helped protect the ASP against a counterrevolution. Zanzibar remains a semiautonomous part of Tanzania, electing its own regional government. The first Zanzibari multiparty elections in 1995, in contrast to simultaneous polls on the mainland, were contentious and accompanied by violence. The CCM received a slim majority of the vote in the Zanzibari legislative and presidential polls, and won by wider margins in the 2000 elections, amid voting irregularities and the violent suppression of postelection protests. In 2001, the CCM and opposition CUF signed a peace accord aimed at stemming politically motivated violence. The agreement led to constitutional and electoral reforms. These were apparent factors in international observer assessments suggesting that the 2005 elections were administered better than past ones, although excessive use of force by security forces reportedly remained a problem.

In 2010, after years of negotiations, Zanzibari voters approved a new constitutional amendment providing for firmer

(...continued)

Kulishitaki Jeshi la Polisi kwa Kuzuia Majukumu Yake ya Kikazi,” September 26, 2017; Jenerali Ulimwengu, “No end to harassment of Tanzania opposition,” *Deutsche Welle*, September 9, 2017; *Le Monde*, “Tanzanie : le chef de l'opposition accusé de trafic de drogue par le gouverneur de Dar es-Salaam,” February 9, 2017; and AFP Via ENCA, “Tanzania rights body slams 'harassment' of opposition,” August 24, 2017.

⁹ All three had published stories critical of the government or construed to be defamatory of the president or other officials. AFP via France 24, “Tanzanian newspaper suspended for 'insulting president',” September 19, 2017; and Reuters, “Tanzania closes third newspaper since June as part of media crackdown,” September 29, 2017.

¹⁰ In 2010, then-incumbent President Jakaya Kikwete, in office since 2005, won around 60% of the vote against 26% for Wilbrod Slaa of Chadema. Despite some opposition charges of vote rigging and poor electoral administration, the State Department characterized those elections as “largely free and fair” in annual human rights reports on Tanzania, and other observers viewed them as an improvement over previous elections.

¹¹ The opposition had called for a federal system comprising a union government and separate Zanzibari and mainland governments. The draft would have required presidential election winners to receive more than 50% of votes; allowed election results to be challenged in court; allowed independent candidates to run; and established a fully independent National Electoral Commission. *Africa Confidential*, “Unfinished constitutional business,” July 22, 2015; and Nick Branson, “What's at stake in Tanzania's constitutional referendum?,” Parts I-III, March 2015, Africa Research Institute blog, among others.

¹² UKAWA is an acronym of *Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi* (roughly Union for a Citizens' Constitution in Swahili).

recognition of Zanzibari autonomy and accommodations for the opposition, setting the conditions for more peaceful elections in that year, which the current Zanzibari president, Ali Mohamed Shein, won in a close race. Under the 2010 amendment, the majority party holds the post of first vice president and the partisan makeup of the cabinet is proportional to party representation in the legislature. Zanzibaris also vote in national presidential and parliamentary elections, and hold an outsize share of seats in Tanzania's National Assembly: although 3% of Tanzanians are from Zanzibar, the 1964 constitution guarantees Zanzibar over 15% of National Assembly seats. Five members of the Zanzibari House of Representatives are indirectly elected to serve in the National Assembly.

Communal relations in Zanzibar remain tense. Several church burnings since 2011 and periodic clashes between authorities and Islamists who seek secession from the mainland reflect discord between the mostly Muslim population and small, sometimes proselytizing Christian groups. Zanzibar is a focus of some U.S. military regional counterterrorism efforts. These include activities undertaken by the U.S. Africa Command's Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based in Djibouti, which has conducted civil-military and humanitarian assistance projects in the region.

Recent Developments. In mid-July 2015, Zanzibar's President Shein won the CCM nomination to run for a second term in office. He faced no CCM rivals, but was viewed as facing fierce competition in the general election, given his slim victory in the 2010 elections (50% against 49% for the CUF candidate). CCM-CUF tensions over an allegedly flawed voter registration process and a lockout from the parliament of the CUF leader preceded the October 2015 elections.¹³ The results of that vote were controversially nullified; a subsequent March 2016 rerun of the election was boycotted by the CUF, leading to a dominant victory for Shein, amid widespread criticism (see below).

The 2015 Elections

Tanzania held national and Zanzibari elections on October 25, 2015. Key electoral issues included access to land, poverty and unemployment, state service provision, corruption, and political dominance of the state by the CCM, as well as energy sector development. Then-President Kikwete was constitutionally barred from running for a third term, but his CCM party was widely favored to win the polls, given its power of incumbency. The opposition, however, mounted a strong challenge, resulting in the closest presidential election in Tanzania's history. The CCM chose as its candidate, Dr. John Magufuli, a long-time government minister (see profile below), while the main UKAWA opposition coalition candidate was Edward Lowassa, of the Chadema party. Lowassa's candidacy was unusual, as he was a major CCM figure and former prime minister (2005-2008)—albeit a controversial one—who defected shortly before the election to become the main opposition candidate after not being selected in a contentious CCM nomination process, a major development in Tanzanian politics.¹⁴ Lowassa drew large crowds of supporters, and his challenge to the CCM was seen as energizing the 23 million-person electorate, especially among the large youth population, and as a credible threat to the CCM. The apparently close election contest raised tensions, and there was some limited campaign-period violence, notably between militant members of party youth wings and in Zanzibar, where opposition supporters were reportedly subject to intimidation. Opposition parties also complained of a few instances of police interference or limitations on assembly.

¹³ EIU, "Zanzibar's presidential election is a rerun of 2010," July 13, 2015.

¹⁴ Lowassa was forced to resign as prime minister in the face of corruption allegations, which he denied, pertaining to an emergency power generation contract linked to an opaque U.S. firm. Lowassa worked to expand an abiding core base of support within the CCM, but faced internal party leadership opposition and was sidelined in a party presidential nomination process that was controversially managed by central CCM organs. Lowassa, asserting that the CCM had "lost its direction" and was "infested with leaders who are dictators, undemocratic, and surrounded with greedy power mongers," then left the party to accept the presidential nomination of Chadema (and later of UKAWA, of which Chadema is a faction). Reuters, "Ex-Tanzanian PM joins opposition to challenge ruling party in polls," July 29, 2015; and AFP, "Tanzanian ex-prime minister joins opposition ahead of poll," July 28, 2015.

In the presidential race, Magufuli won a 58.5% vote share, while Lowassa won 40%. The CCM also won 74% of elected legislative seats for which results were announced, while Chadema won just under 13%, the CUF 12%, and two minor parties less than 1% each. Due to additional indirect elections and seat apportionment, the CCM holds 69% of parliamentary seats, Chadema just under 19%, the CUF just over 11%, and the two minor parties each old one seat.¹⁵

Zanzibar Election Controversy and Implications for Mainland Election

An October 27, 2015, European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) characterized the national election as “largely well administered” but asserted that “insufficient efforts at transparency meant that both the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) did not enjoy the full confidence of all parties.”¹⁶ In Zanzibar, this finding was strongly substantiated the next day, when the ZEC chairman announced a unilateral decision to nullify the Zanzibari elections while vote-counting was underway. His action came after soldiers reportedly “stormed the collation centre” and evicted journalists and observers, and two days after CUF candidate Seif Sharif Hamad had announced that he had won the Zanzibar presidency with 52% of votes. The ZEC chair later announced that new elections would be held.¹⁷

The ZEC chief’s decision raised questions over the credibility of the Zanzibari vote and spurred electoral violence in Zanzibar. A string of small bombings using homemade devices occurred days after the annulment, along with some youth protests. The ZEC’s actions also cast a shadow over the Union elections, as the latter took place in concert with the Zanzibar polls and at the same polling stations. Tanzania’s NEC, however, did not take account of the Zanzibari poll nullification in its vote tallies, and counted Zanzibari votes in determining the outcome of the presidential election. The NEC decision also came despite opposition calls for a recount of the Union presidential vote, based on alleged voting irregularities and vote-tallying fraud. While the NEC’s Union decision did not draw international concern, the ZEC’s nullification did, along with criticism and calls for its reversal.¹⁸

There were several late 2015 ad hoc dialogue and mediation efforts involving the CUF and parties interested in finding a resolution, including figures in the CCM and foreign missions. Details about the focus and outcomes of these efforts were not made public, however, and they resulted in no changes to the outcome. Instead, despite CUF opposition, on March 21, 2016, the ZEC held a rerun of the Zanzibar vote, which the CUF boycotted. The ZEC subsequently announced that the CCM candidate, Ali Mohamed Shein, had won the election—with 91% of

¹⁵ National Election Commission, “Matokeo ya Uchaguzi Mkuu wa Bunge, 2015,” *Gazeti la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania*, October 28, 2016; and Inter-Parliamentary Union, Tanzania entry in *Parline* database.

¹⁶ East African Community observers largely concurred. See EAC Election Observation Mission, “Preliminary Statement,” October 27, 2015; and EUEOM, “Highly competitive, generally well organised elections, but with insufficient efforts at transparency from the election administrations,” October 27, 2015.

¹⁷ Hamad based his claim upon the CUF’s own assessment of vote return tallies reported by CUF election monitors, who were present at every polling place in Zanzibar. CRS discussion with CUF deputy leader, March 7, 2017. Quote from BBC, “Tanzania election: Government ministers suffer shock defeat,” October 27, 2015; see also Andrea Schmidt, “Why Is Tanzania’s Peaceful Election Suddenly Unravelling?,” *Deutsche Welle*, October 30, 2015.

¹⁸ A U.S. statement said that the nullification “gravely alarmed” the U.S. government and undermined what had been “an orderly and peaceful election”; it called for the announcement to be reversed. State Department, “U.S. Embassy Statement on Elections in Zanzibar,” October 28, 2015. This view dovetailed with statements by the Tanzania’s governmental Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance and a former Zanzibar Attorney General indicating that they viewed the nullification as illegal, and critical statements by the EAC and the EUEOM, Commonwealth, Southern African Development Community, and African Union (which issued a joint statement).

votes—and that his party had also won a majority in the House of Representatives and local councils. In a joint declaration on the election, the United States, 14 European governments, and the European Union stated that

We regret the Zanzibar Electoral Commission’s decision to hold a rerun of the 25 October 2015 election, without a mutually acceptable and negotiated solution to the current political impasse. In order to be credible, electoral processes must be inclusive and truly representative of the will of the people. We reiterate our call on the Government of Tanzania to exercise leadership in Zanzibar, and to pursue a negotiated solution ... with a view to maintaining peace and unity in ... Tanzania. We commend once again the population of Zanzibar for having exercised calm and restraint throughout this process, and call on all parties and their supporters to re-start the national reconciliation process to find an inclusive, sustainable and peaceful resolution.¹⁹

As discussed elsewhere in this report, due to the outcome of the Zanzibar vote and due to concerns over freedom of expression, in March 2016, the U.S. MCC Board voted to suspend the MCC’s partnership with Tanzania.²⁰ Since the vote there have been periodic acts of aggression against putative opposition supporters by so-called “Zombies,” informal pro-CCM youth militia, and in the latter half of 2016, several opposition politicians were reportedly arrested. The CUF advocates the creation of a caretaker interim government of national unity and that it conduct new, fully legitimate elections.²¹

Magufuli Administration

President Magufuli is a former MP who previously held several government ministerial posts, notably including two stints as public works minister. He came to office with a generally positive reputation for public service, based especially on his infrastructure project leadership. He also had a reputation as a loyal, mainstream party member not allied to any particular factions, rather than as a charismatic leader.²² Magufuli’s running mate, Samia Hassan Suluhu, a former minister of state in the vice president’s office, became Tanzania’s first female vice president.

Upon taking office, Magufuli took a tough, proactive line against corruption and state agency inefficiency, promoted civic service, and advocated austerity and cost-saving measures.²³ These actions initially drew a degree of public support—and humorous social media commentary centering on Magufuli’s reputed penchant for thrift, frugality, and micromanagement—as well as provisional support from Western donors. His presidency has also been characterized by a more controversial form of populist, often top-down leadership by the president in diverse issue areas. While his emphasis on austerity has reportedly caused some apprehension within the political establishment and others who have traditionally influenced or benefitted from state funding, he

¹⁹ U.S. Embassy-Tanzania, “Statement on Election Re-Run in Zanzibar,” March 21, 2016.

²⁰ The agency stated that the March 2016 rerun of the elections “was neither inclusive nor representative,” and flew in the face of the repeated stated “concerns of the U.S. Government and the international community.” MCC, “MCC Statement on Decision of Board of Directors to Suspend Partnership with Tanzania,” March 28, 2016.

²¹ *Economist*, “Zanzibar: Trouble in paradise,” October 6, 2016; and CRS discussion with Zanzibari opposition politician, March 2017.

²² Magufuli, whose full name is John Pombe Joseph Magufuli, was born in 1959. He holds several university chemistry degrees, including a PhD from the University of Dar es Salaam. In addition to serving three terms as an MP, served two separate terms as the public works minister, and as Minister of Lands and Human Settlements and Minister of Livestock and Fisheries Development, and in capacities in the World Road Congress and U.N.-HABITAT.

²³ For instance, he reduced parliamentary inaugural and Independence Day celebration funding, calling them wasteful; reallocated funds saved to hospitals and roadwork; fired several agency heads for malfeasance; and personally partook in a street cleaning campaign to improve sanitation and halt a cholera outbreak.

reportedly has remained popular. His unilateral decisionmaking—often sans consultation with other relevant policymakers, absent the involvement of cabinet ministries and, in some cases, accompanied by procedural or legal irregularities—has, however, prompted observers to raise concerns about an autocratic, and even semiauthoritarian governance pattern under his presidency. Such concerns have deepened amid efforts by Magufuli’s administration to prosecute critics, censor critical media outlets, and otherwise curtail freedom of expression.²⁴

Magufuli: Priorities in Action

Economy. Some of Magufuli’s actions have targeted the economy. In early 2017, Magufuli dismissed the head of TANESCO, the national power utility, after it raised electricity prices, a decision that Magufuli later reversed. His action flouted IMF advice to the government regarding efforts to reform and financially stabilize TANESCO, which is burdened by a reported \$300 million debt and has sought emergency World Bank loans.²⁵ Also in early 2017, during an address to the judiciary, Magufuli—who has sought to reduce tax evasion—“ordered the courts to enforce payment of tax claims worth more than 7.5 trillion Tanzanian shillings from big firms” in cases in which he said firms contesting tax assessments had lost. He also called for greater judicial accountability, pointing out that during the past year, of 28 magistrates prosecuted for “various criminal offences, mostly corruption,” all had been acquitted.²⁶

In March 2017, he ordered the seizure of the passports of foreign staff of an Indian firm managing a water project facing delays. In April 2017, he fired nearly 10,000 civil servants, whom he asserted had submitted fake education certificates as part of their job credentials. In May 2017, he said his government would enforce a rule requiring mining firms to register on a local stock bourse and, in a separate development, dismissed his mining minister and the chief of a state-run mineral audit agency following a probe into tax-evading, undeclared mining firm exports. He had earlier called for a halt to copper concentrate exports, and in response the energy and minerals ministry immediately banned such exports, as well as mineral sand exports. In late 2016, Magufuli’s government banned imports of coal and gypsum—of which Tanzania reportedly has abundant reserves—in an attempt to expand the mining sector. In late 2016, Magufuli also alarmed major foreign gold mining companies when he called for Tanzania’s gold to be smelted in Tanzania prior to export. According to a Reuters report, “some foreign investors have expressed concern about what they say are unpredictable government policies and actions, while some big mining companies feel they are being unfairly targeted by Magufuli’s administration.”²⁷

Law Enforcement. The president has also focused on law enforcement issues. In early 2016, Magufuli suspended two senior immigration officials “at the beginning of an investigation into allegations of corruption, mismanagement and poor revenue collection.” In late 2016, asserting that the ruling CCM “party is among institutions accused of rampant corruption,” Magufuli pledged to strongly combat CCM corruption, notably during electoral periods, saying there would be “no mercy” for corrupt officials. In February 2017, he ordered security forces to crack down on illicit drug trafficking and “said no one should be spared, even if they are top politicians or their relatives.”²⁸

Freedom of Expression. Perhaps most troubling for foreign observers have been a number of actions by Magufuli or officials in his government limiting or prospectively curtailing civil liberties, notably freedom of expression. In early 2017, Magufuli warned that the “days were numbered” for “newspapers deemed to incite dissent,” an action targeted at press criticism and documentation of his administration’s economic and governance record. His warning followed

²⁴ Voice of America, “Rights Groups: Freedom of the Press Under Fire in Tanzania,” September 27, 2017; Lyal White and Adrian Kitimbo, “Op-Ed: Tanzania’s Magufuli – timely reformist or just another despot?,” *Daily Maverick*, October 13, 2016; Michael Jennings, “Magufuli’s Reformist Drive Takes an Autocratic Turn in Tanzania,” *World Politics Review*, October 24, 2016; and Constantine Manda, “It’s not just a rapper’s arrest that should raise alarms about authoritarianism in Tanzania,” Monkey Cage [Washington Post blog], March 29, 2017.

²⁵ TANESCO’s fiscal status has been seen as a potential hindrance to a state plan to sell \$800 million in Eurobonds, as well as borrow billions more from other sources, including a Turkish construction firm and the World Bank. Omar Mohammed, “Tanzania Power Issues Casts Shadow on \$12 Billion Debt Plan,” *Bloomberg News*, February 16, 2017.

²⁶ *Reuters*, “Tanzania’s President Magufuli vows to toughen tax evasion crackdown,” February 2, 2017.

²⁷ Quote from Fumbuka Ng’wanakilala, “Tanzania’s Magufuli orders seizure of expatriate construction workers’ passports,” *Reuters*, March 3, 2017; events set out in Reuters and other wire service stories.

²⁸ Quotes from in three sentences above from, respectively, Peter Clotey, “Tanzania’s Magufuli, Promising Accountability, Suspends 2 Officials,” *VOA News*, January 23, 2016; Fumbuka Ng’wanakilala/ *Reuters*, “Tanzania’s Magufuli takes anti-corruption drive to ruling party,” December 14, 2016, and “Tanzanian president tells security forces to target drug traffickers,” February 6, 2017.

the late 2016 arrest of a founder of a corruption-reporting and whistle-blowing website, *Jamii Forums*, and a police demand that the site reveal its users' names. The website's cofounder was charged on several counts of obstructing justice and running an unregistered website.²⁹ In March 2017, a day after Magufuli had again warned of limitations on freedom of expression—in an example of a statement that critics see as “curbing dissent and stifling free speech”—a rap musician was arrested after he released “a song deemed insulting to the government.”³⁰ Also in March, Magufuli fired his information minister, Nape Nnauye, after Nnauye defended a radio/TV media outlet, Clouds FM, in its dispute with a reputed Magufuli ally, Dar es Salaam regional commissioner Paul Makonda.³¹

The government also closed down two private radio stations in August 2016, and in April 2016 had halted live coverage of parliament—citing inordinate costs, despite a reported private media offer to pay for the service. Critics charged that the move reduced citizen participation in governance and amounted to official censorship on matters of public concern. These moves came after other government media firm closures, as well as threats by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) to suspend multiple television and radio stations if they failed to pay license fees. Civil society critics asserted that TCRA's action curtailed the public right to information, amid reports that such regulatory actions have been applied selectively, notably against government critics.³²

Related developments have included the legislature's passage in November 2016 of the Media Services Act, which introduces a comprehensive regulatory framework on media production and sanctions for outlets found to violate the act. Critics charge that the act “will negatively impact press freedom and was passed hastily, without proper discussion” and may require private media to act as an arm of the state, given an act requirement that licensed media “broadcast or publish news or issues of national importance as the Government may direct.” In 2015, Tanzania also enacted a Cybercrimes Act, under which the state has prosecuted several persons, including some on charges of insulting the president. It sets out punishments of up to three years in jail. In March 2016, the MCC warned that the government had “not taken measures to ensure freedom of expression and association are respected in the implementation of the Cybercrimes Act.”³³

Corruption Challenges

Corruption—a key Magufuli target—is a long-persistent problem in Tanzania. A 2012 public audit revealed widespread corruption in several ministries and state entities, and six cabinet ministers resigned in connection with the controversy that year. Other scandals have arisen since, including, notably, the illicit diversion by senior government officials of \$122 million in central bank funds, ostensibly to pay for energy contracts, to overseas accounts—a finding which led international donors to suspend \$490 million in budget support in October 2014 pending an investigation, and culminated in the resignation of three government ministers.³⁴ Tanzania's

²⁹ Quotes from Fumbuka Ng'wanakilala, “Tanzania's president warns newspapers over dissent,” *Reuters*, January 13, 2017. See also Daniel Finnan, “Tanzania: Authorities 'Trying to Suppress' Anonymous Whistle-Blowing Website,” *Radio France International*, December 5, 2016; and Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “Tanzania police raid popular website's office in effort to learn users' identities,” December 14, 2016.

³⁰ BBC News, “Tanzania rapper Nay wa Mitego freed after Magufuli criticism,” March 28, 2017.

³¹ Makonda, backed by security personnel, had reportedly “raided” Clouds FM and demanded that it broadcast material designed to discredit a popular local evangelist preacher who had accused Makonda of claiming fake education credentials and abuse of public office, including a false claim that the preacher was party to illegal drug deals. The demand came in the wake of mutual criticism of one another by Makonda, and the preacher's effort to force Makonda's removal by Magufuli, which the president refused to do. Manda, “It's not just a rapper's arrest...,” *op. cit.*

³² CPJ, “Tanzania bans two radio stations,” August 31, 2016; and Murithi Mutiga/CPJ, “Tanzania cuts live parliamentary coverage, ending vital news source for citizens,” May 13, 2016; Ruth Carlitz and Constantine Manda, “Tanzania loves its new anti-corruption president. Why is he shutting down media outlets?,” Monkey Cage [Washington Post blog], January 25, 2016.

³³ Constance Johnson, “Tanzania: New Law on Media Services,” *Global Legal Monitor*, November 15, 2016; and MCC, “MCC Statement on Decision of Board of Directors to Suspend Partnership with Tanzania,” March 28, 2016.

³⁴ Mark Anderson, “UK and international donors suspend Tanzania aid after corruption claims,” *The Guardian*, October 13, 2014; and Fumbuka Ng'wanakilala, “Tanzania announces cabinet reshuffle after energy minister resigns,” *Reuters*, January 24, 2015.

ranking in Transparency International's *Corruption Perception Index* (CPI) has slipped in recent years (from 100th in 2011 to 116th in 2016, slightly up from its 119th place ranking in 2014).³⁵

Security Challenges and Human Rights Trends

While Tanzania is generally stable and peaceful, there are periodic, usually generally limited threats to state and public security. There have been sporadic attacks on tourists in Zanzibar attributed to Islamist radicals, and there have been several unattributed armed attacks on police stations in which weapons have been looted, as in 2015, or on police personnel (with seven killed in April 2017 in the Pwani region).³⁶ There have also been occasional bombings of Christian churches, among other targets, that analysts have speculatively attributed to Islamist radicals. Tanzania has occasionally arrested Islamic extremists, including 10 alleged members of the Somali Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group Al Shabaab, in April 2015. In May 2015, Tanzanian authorities also arrested Jamil Mukulu, the leader of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group of Ugandan origin that is made up of Islamist extremists whom Uganda claims have ties with Al Shabaab. In July 2015, Tanzania extradited Mukulu—who is also wanted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the ADF is currently based—to Uganda.

Tanzania has a mixed human rights record. Freedom House rates Tanzania as “partly free” due to various legal restrictions on the press and nongovernmental organization operations, media bias favoring the CCM, and crackdowns on opposition protests. According to Tanzania’s independent, nonprofit Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and other sources, key issues include a lack of capacity and institutional weakness in providing access to justice, as well as the conduct of security and law enforcement agencies. The U.S. State Department, in its 2016 *Country Report on Human Rights* on Tanzania, states:

The most widespread human rights problems in the country were use of excessive force by security forces, resulting in death and injury; restrictions on assembly and political expression; and gender-based violence, including rape, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation/cutting. Other major human rights problems included harsh and life-threatening prison conditions, lengthy pretrial detention, limits to freedom of expression on the internet, restrictions on religious freedom, restrictions on the movement of refugees, official corruption at many levels nationwide, child abuse, discrimination based on sexual orientation, mob killings and injuries, and societal violence against persons with albinism. Trafficking in persons, both internal and international, and child labor were also problems.

The State Department also reports that while the government took some steps to “investigate and prosecute officials who committed abuses ... generally impunity in the police and security forces was widespread”; and that while “security forces reported to civilian authorities ... there were instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control.”³⁷

According to various reports, a particular human rights challenge faced by Tanzania is witchcraft-related killings and mutilation. Albinos are a notable target of such acts by attackers who reportedly harvest their body parts for use or sale in traditional witchcraft rites. There have been multiple reports of such albino murders and attacks in recent years.³⁸ The problem has attracted

³⁵ The CPI presents composite scores for countries derived from 13 regularly published corruption assessments.

³⁶ *Reuters*, “Gunmen kill seven in attack on Tanzanian police station,” July 13, 2015; and U.S. Embassy-Tanzania, “Increased police checkpoints in the Pwani region,” April 27, 2017.

³⁷ State Department, “Tanzania,” *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014*.

³⁸ BBC News, “In pictures: Hope for Tanzania's albino attack survivors,” October 8, 2015; Kizito Makoye, “Four (continued...)”

the attention of some Members of Congress supportive of efforts to end such acts.³⁹ In March 2017, four Tanzanian albino children who have lost limbs in attacks and had been living in so-called “safe houses” in Tanzania arrived in the United States to receive medical treatment and a “respite from a homeland where they are persecuted and feared.”⁴⁰

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons also face discrimination. Homosexuality is illegal in Tanzania, and homosexuals and transgender persons have been the focus of threatening comments by government officials, as well as police harassment.⁴¹ In 2016 the Tanzanian government halted “U.S.-funded programs that provide testing, condoms and medical care to gays,” according to the *Washington Post*, and in 2017 reportedly prohibited 40 private clinics from providing services HIV/AIDS “to ‘key populations’—a category that includes gay men, transgender people and sex workers,” according to National Public Radio.⁴²

The Economy

Tanzania’s GDP stood at about \$47.2 billion in 2016, and has grown at an estimated 6.6% annually, on average, over the past decade. This growth has been based largely on earnings from agricultural exports, such as coffee, tea, and cotton; tourism, which has steadily increased and is a key source of hard currency; and exports of gold, the price of which rose over the past decade and spiked in 2011, but has since declined. Gradual diversification into manufacturing is occurring, and development of uranium and gemstone mining is underway. Industry contributes about 26% of GDP. Tanzania also has coal, iron, and nickel resources, as well as a newly discovered massive reserve of helium, which remains critical to numerous technologies despite depleted worldwide supplies. The communications, transport, financial services, construction, and retail sectors are also growing rapidly. Services contribute about 43% of GDP. Agriculture, however, remains a mainstay of the economy, contributing about 31% of GDP.⁴³ Roughly 68% and by some estimates up to 77% of the workforce engaged in agriculture in 2014, but agricultural growth has been relatively slow, at 3.1% between 2010 and 2015.

The benefits of growth often have not reached the large rural population or been evenly distributed. Tanzania’s per capita GDP, estimated at \$970 in 2016, ranks low globally but higher

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sentenced to death in Tanzania for killing albino teenager,” Thomson Reuters Foundation, July 1, 2015; Fumbuka Ng’wanakilala, “Tanzania arrests 32 witch doctors over albino murders,” *Reuters*, March 7, 2015; International Federation of Red Cross, *Through Albino Eyes: The Plight of Albino People in Africa’s Great Lakes Region and a Red Cross Response*, 2009; and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Persons with Albinism*, A/HRC/24/57, September 12, 2013, among others.

³⁹ See, e.g., H.Res. 406, “Recognizing the progress made and challenges still faced by people living with albinism in East Africa,” introduced July 31, 2015, by Rep. Mo Brooks; H.Res. 1088 (111th Congress), “Recognizing the plight of people with albinism in East Africa and condemning their murder and mutilation,” introduced by Rep. Connolly and passed by the House in 2010; and various statements in the *Congressional Record*.

⁴⁰ Ellen Wulforst, “Tanzanian albino children, attacked for body parts, seek care in U.S.,” *Reuters*, March 26, 2017.

⁴¹ Aengus Carroll, *State-Sponsored Homophobia: A World Survey of Sexual Orientation Laws: Criminalisation, Protection and Recognition*, 11th Edition, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), October 2016; and Edith Honan, “How Tanzania Is Cracking Down On LGBT People — And Getting Away With It,” *BuzzFeed*, April 8, 2017.

⁴² Amy Fallon, “People With HIV Are Panicking Due To Tanzania’s Crackdown On Gays,” *National Public Radio*, March 15, 2017; and Kevin Sieff, “Tanzania suspends U.S.-funded AIDS programs in a new crackdown on gays,” *Washington Post*, November 23, 2016, among others.

⁴³ GDP value and growth figures from IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (WEO), April 2017; contributions to GDP data from World Bank, World Development Indicators database (WDI).

than roughly half of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly 47% of Tanzanians live on \$1.90 or less per day.⁴⁴ Key barriers to economic development include poor infrastructure, low productivity growth, a high population growth rate, and a cumbersome and uncertain regulatory environment that generally deters foreign investment. Tanzania ranked 132nd out of 190 countries surveyed in the World Bank's 2017 *Doing Business* index, notwithstanding marked recent improvements in ensuring access to credit. Tanzania's overwhelmingly youthful population, 71% of which is under the age of 30, poses a major challenge, as growing demand for health and education services could stir unrest.⁴⁵

Energy and Mining Sectors

Since 2010, the discovery of large reserves of natural gas off the southern coast, in a region near far larger reserves in Mozambican territory, has increased foreign investment and raised the prospect of export revenue. The government estimates that the country has 57 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, and it may also have additional onshore resources. Key firms that have been active in exploring and/or developing Tanzania's reserves have included U.S.-based ExxonMobil and several European firms, including Statoil (Norway), Eni (Italy), and BG Group (United Kingdom), as well as several smaller ones.⁴⁶

Many Tanzanians have welcomed the discoveries, especially as the resources at issue, notably gas, are slated to be used in part for domestic electricity generation, potentially vastly increasing Tanzania's limited supply of power. There have been sometimes violent protests against a natural gas pipeline in the southern port city of Mtwara, however, due to local fears that gas revenues from the Mnazi Bay gas field along the shore zones south of the city may not benefit the gas-rich region. The sector has been the subject of substantial periodic political controversy. In 2015, for instance, the CCM-dominated parliament overwhelmingly passed an oil and gas development and regulation bill after the speaker of the parliament suspended 40 opposition MPs for shouting during an earlier debate on the matter. The bill was controversial because it has important implications for future revenue earnings, state-corporate relations, and the role of the sector in helping to spur development, and transparency advocates asserted that its passage was rushed without adequate public scrutiny.⁴⁷

Despite such controversies, many Tanzanians are generally likely to benefit from gas development and gas-fueled electricity generation. Transmission of gas has begun along a 330-mile natural gas pipeline run by Tanzania's state-run Petroleum Development Corp (TPDC). The line links gas reserves in Mnazi Bay area, along the southern coast, to gas-fired power plants near the commercial capital, Dar es Salaam. The government hopes to greatly expand gas-fired electricity generation capacity. Tanzania is also expanding its use of significant national coal reserves to fuel power production, and plans to construct a geothermal power plant within the next decade.⁴⁸ A planned cross-border oil pipeline, which will carry crude oil from Western

⁴⁴ WDI; WEO and State Department, *Investment Climate Statement for Tanzania 2016*.

⁴⁵ U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, accessed April 24, 2017.

⁴⁶ Fumbuka Ng'wanakilala, "Tanzania says Japan's Koyo Corp plans to build \$1 bln power plant," *Reuters*, May 13, 2016; and Nicholas Bariyo, "Tanzania Says Gas Reserves Rise 18% to Reach 55 Trillion Cubic Feet," *Frontiers* [Wall Street Journal blog], June 8, 2015.

⁴⁷ Under the law, which was signed into statute by then-President Kikwete in August 2015, energy firms are to pay a 12.5% royalty for onshore oil and gas production and 7.5% for offshore gas output, while the state would realize between 60% and 85% of the natural gas production profits.

⁴⁸ Major projects under development include a 1,500 megawatt (MW) natural gas-fired power plant expected to be operational by late 2018 and a planned 1,000 MW plant announced in May 2016. Sumitomo Corporation, "Construction (continued...)"

Uganda to a port in northern Tanzania, is scheduled to be completed by 2020. The expansion of gas-fueled, coal-fired, and geothermal power generation is in part intended to diversify the country's hydroelectricity-dependent energy mix, which is periodically hamstrung by recurrent droughts. In late 2015, for instance, drought conditions caused all of Tanzania's hydroelectric plants, which provide a reported 35% of power supplies, to temporarily suspend production.

The manner in which a key 2015 oil and gas bill was enacted may raise questions among some analysts regarding whether Tanzania has adequately developed its energy governance capacity, as may its mixed record of implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an international effort to foster transparent and accountable governance in resource-rich countries. Under EITI, countries voluntarily agree to abide by EITI reporting guidelines, most notably including the public release of government revenues from extractive industry firm payments. Tanzania was suspended by the EITI Board in September 2015 for failing to issue a mandatory EITI transparency report; that suspension was lifted in late 2015. Tanzania has since complied with EITI reporting requirements, and began a new process of "validation" (i.e., proof of compliance with EITI standards) under the 2016 *EITI Standard*, an updated set of benchmarks that compliant countries must meet.⁴⁹

As noted earlier (see text box entitled "Magufuli: Priorities in Action"), increased national beneficiation from the mining sector is another key priority of the Magufuli administration. In July, the government extended the normal parliamentary session and successfully pushed through legislative changes fundamentally reshaping the mining sector. The changes allow the government to annul current contracts with firms if they are found to be detrimental to the national interest, abolish the use of international arbitration in dispute resolution, give the government a 16% ownership share in mining projects (with an acquisition option of up to 50% of a project's value), require local processing of minerals prior to export and the deposit of mining sector earnings in local banks, and marginally increase the royalty rate on multiple mined commodities. The changes come on the heels of several disputes between the government and foreign mining firms. Observers see the changes as likely to negatively affect levels of foreign investment in Tanzania's mining sector.⁵⁰

Foreign Affairs

Lake Malawi

Malawi and Tanzania have engaged in a long-standing dispute over competing sovereign claims to Lake Malawi (also known as Lake Nyasa); the dispute has periodically flared since the mid-1960s but never been resolved. The dispute reemerged in 2012, amid reports that the lake may contain deep-water fossil fuel reserves. Malawi has claimed the entire lake while Tanzania claims half, based on different interpretations of maps and the colonial administrative history of the lake. Regional efforts to mediate the dispute, which had stalled in recent years, have been facilitated by Mozambique's former president, Joaquim Chissano.

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begun on Tanzania's first natural gas-fired combined cycle power plant," March 17, 2016; and *Reuters*, "Tanzania says Japan's Koyo Corp plans to build \$1 bln power plant," May 13, 2016.

⁴⁹ On Tanzania's EITI implementation record, see EITI, "Tanzania," as of June 2017.

⁵⁰ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Mining sector in crisis," July 18 2017; and *Africa Confidential*, "Magufuli's Law," July 21, 2017, and "Risks for All in Mining Row," June 23, 2017, among others

The dispute recommenced in early 2016, when Malawi lodged a diplomatic protest with Tanzania's government after the latter published an official map showing the international border equally splitting the lake zone between the two countries. In May 2017, despite earlier statements that mediation would resume, Malawian President Peter Mutharika announced that Malawi would take the dispute to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, though the Court's jurisdiction would require the consent of both parties.⁵¹ Meanwhile, Malawi's government has allowed exploration for oil and gas in the lake to continue, drawing criticism from environmentalists and UNESCO. Some analysts contend that economic plans for the lake, including oil development and shipping projects, may remain stymied by uncertainty linked to the ongoing border dispute.⁵²

Refugee Flows

Tanzania has for decades hosted refugees from various conflicts and political crises in the conflict-afflicted and densely inhabited countries in the Great Lakes region of central Africa—some for extended periods—and has played a mediational role in attempts to resolve such crises. In 2014, Tanzania also naturalized a large number of long-term Burundian refugees.⁵³ In September 2016, Tanzania participated in the Leaders' Summit on Refugees, an event hosted by then-President Obama and intended to increase shared global efforts to aid refugees worldwide. At the summit, Tanzania agreed to “continue to receive persons running from wars, conflicts, political instability and persecution,” as per its commitments under various international accords, among other related pledges.⁵⁴ Observers have nonetheless periodically questioned Tanzania's commitment to these principles, noting that Tanzanian domestic sensitivities over land access and the country's regional diplomatic ties have sometimes led the government to curtail protections for refugees and asylum seekers, and/or pressure them to return to their countries of origin.

Since 2015, Tanzania has faced a new influx of refugees from Burundi in connection with a political and security crisis rooted in that country's disputed 2015 elections.⁵⁵ The number of refugees from both Burundi has grown steadily since the start of the Burundi crisis in April 2015,⁵⁶ and stood at 358,600 in early September 2017.⁵⁷ Almost all of the recently arrived

⁵¹ AFP, “Malawi, Tanzania to revive lake dispute talks,” February 7, 2017; and Reuters, “Malawi plans to take lake dispute with Tanzania to Hague court,” May 17, 2017.

⁵² Malawi also shares a border with Mozambique that includes territory within the southern portion of the lake, but that frontier is not contested. Lucky Mkandawire, “World Heritage demands report on Malawi oil exploration,” *The Nation*, November 26, 2016; and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Malawi: The government has grand ambitions for Lake Malawi,” December 19, 2016.

⁵³ Roughly 162,000 Burundian refugees and their offspring, some of whom had lived in Tanzania for decades after fleeing there after a crisis in 1972, were naturalized after a multiyear process aided by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Tanzania also initiated a new naturalization process for 40,000 additional persons. Francis Markus/UNHCR, “Tanzania grants citizenship to 162,000 Burundian refugees in historic decision,” October 17, 2014.

⁵⁴ The event, cohosted by the United States, took place on the heels of a related broader high-level U.N. refugee summit. See *Summary Overview Document Leaders' Summit on Refugees*, available online at <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/>. On the Leaders' Summit, see White House, *Fact Sheet on the Leaders' Summit on Refugees*, September 20, 2016. On the related September 19, 2016 U.N. Summit for Refugees and Migrants see <http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit>.

⁵⁵ On Burundi's crisis, see CRS Report R44018, *Burundi's Political Crisis: In Brief*, by (name redacted)

⁵⁶ In March 2017, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an average of 190 Burundians were entering Tanzania daily, with surges of up to 480 arrivals a day. Some estimates of the inflow were higher; in March 2017, the European Commission/Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO) reported that there were 700 daily arrivals in Tanzania from Burundi. ECHO, “Burundi Regional Crisis,” *ECHO Factsheet*, March 2017.

⁵⁷ As of September 2017, Tanzania was hosting more than 59% of all refugees from Burundi. Of all refugees in Tanzania, about 79% were Burundian, while about 21% were Congolese. UNHCR, “Tanzania-Refugee Population (continued...)”

Burundian refugee population resides in the Kigoma Region, adjacent to Burundi, in three large camps supported by Tanzanian and international public and nongovernmental humanitarian and social services agencies. Tanzania also hosts a smaller number of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The United States and other donors provide funding to support these camps (see U.S. aid section below).

Despite its 2016 pledges at the Leaders' Summit on Refugees, in early 2017, the Tanzanian government stopped providing *prima facie* refugee recognition of Burundian refugees, according to UNHCR.⁵⁸ In July 2017, during a visit to Tanzania—on his first foreign trip outside Burundi since a May 2015 putsch and his later controversial July 2015 reelection—Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza urged all Burundians in Tanzania to repatriate. President Magufuli mirrored his statement, calling on the refugees to “voluntarily return home,” and later in the month suspended further registrations and naturalizations of Burundian refugees. In late August, Magufuli again called for the UNHCR to voluntarily repatriate thousands of Burundian refugees, and a Burundian-Tanzanian-UNHCR coordinating group met to discuss the purportedly voluntary repatriation of nearly 12,000 Burundians.⁵⁹ These moves have sparked criticism from human rights advocacy groups, which assert that Burundi's crisis is far from settled; Amnesty International, for instance, called for a halt to what it called “mounting pressure” on Burundian refugees “to return to their country where they would be at risk of death, rape and torture.”⁶⁰

Tanzania's Contribution to Mediation in Burundi

Tanzania facilitated the landmark peace settlement that helped end Burundi's decade-long civil war in the 1990s, and it is involved in halting regional mediation efforts aimed at resolving the current Burundian crisis. In March 2016, the East African Community (EAC) appointed former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa to facilitate an “inter-Burundian dialogue,” though President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda technically remains the chief EAC mediator. After consultations, Mkapa set out a plan of action at an EAC summit in September 2016 and later presented Museveni with a more detailed roadmap. It provided for a series of engagements beginning in late 2016 and culminating in a “final agreement” in mid-2017, an outcome that was not achieved. Mkapa has so far been unable to convene fully representative government-opposition talks. This has been due to disagreements over who is entitled to participate and Burundian opposition doubts over Mkapa's credibility and neutrality, and what they see as his

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Update as of 31 August 2017”; and State Department, “Tanzania,” Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, September 2017.

⁵⁸ In brief, *prima facie* recognition refers to a government's presumptive acknowledgement that persons fleeing a country are at risk of harm in their country of origin and qualify for refugee status. In practice in Tanzania, it has been applied to both individuals and groups. UNHCR has reported that in the wake of Tanzania's actions, guidance on refugee status determination (RSD) has been unclear. In mid-March 2017, UNHCR reported that some asylum-seekers were facing ad hoc screening by Tanzanian immigration officers inhibiting their entry into the country

According to the UNHCR, Tanzania's action involved its revocation of its Refugee (Declaration) Notice No. 54. 6.

⁵⁹ AP, “Tanzania urges UN to repatriate over 8,000 Burundi refugees,” August 25, 2017, and “Burundi Leader Urges Nearly 250,000 Refugees to Return Home,” July 21, 2017; and 19th Tripartite Commission Meeting for the Voluntary Repatriation of Burundi Refugees in Tanzania, *Joint Communiqué*, August 31, 2017.

⁶⁰ Amnesty International (AI), “Burundi: Thousands of refugees under pressure to return despite risk of torture and killings,” September 29, 2017; and AI report *Conform or Flee: Repression and Insecurity Pushing Burundians Into Exile*, Report AFR 16/7139/2017, September 29, 2017.

bias toward the Burundian government, based on Mkapa's repeated assertion that Nkurunziza's 2015 reelection—a highly contentious key factor driving the ongoing crisis—was “legitimate.”⁶¹

In May 2017, an EAC summit heard a progress report on Mkapa's efforts and the broader dialogue, but took no substantive actions to enhance its conflict mitigation approach. Individual EAC leaders, including President Magufuli, did, however, issue statements opposing U.S. and EU targeted sanctions on Burundi, angering the Burundian opposition. An EAC summit communiqué also tied the EU's sanctions on Burundi, among other issues of concern, to an ongoing EU-EAC negotiation over a proposed EU-EAC regional Economic Partnership Agreement.⁶² The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) has continued to endorse Mkapa's efforts and the overall “inter-Burundian dialogue”—which, in an August 2017 statement, the UNSC called “the only viable process for a sustainable political settlement.” The council also, however, stated that it “remains deeply concerned over the lack of progress in this dialogue” and a range of related human rights, political, and other developments inside Burundi. It also reiterated its “intention to pursue targeted measures against all actors, inside and outside Burundi, who threaten the peace and security of Burundi.” The council has previously outlined similar concerns.⁶³

China

China is among Tanzania's top international partners. The two countries have a long history of warm political relations and close trade and economic development cooperation, dating back to the early postcolonial period and, notably, China's construction in the 1970s of the Tanzania–Zambia Railway (TAZARA). China is Tanzania's largest trading partner, and several large Chinese firms are active there. China is also a key security partner for Tanzania; the two militaries share long ties and retain a close relationship. After Chinese President Xi Jinping took office in 2013, Tanzania was the first country he visited.

The natural gas pipeline project noted above was financed by a \$1.23 billion Chinese loan. Construction is also underway on a \$10 billion megaproject at Bagamoyo, former President Kikwete's home town, which includes a multipurpose deep water port, special economic zone, and linked railway. The multiyear project is financed by China Merchants Holdings-International (CMHI), China's largest port operator, and Oman's State General Reserve Fund. CMHI is the designated construction manager and, according to some reports, may have multidecade concession rights to the facility. The Bagamoyo development—with a planned annual 20 million container throughput capacity—is projected to dwarf ports in Dar es Salaam and Mombasa, Kenya, and provide access to multiple countries in East and Southern Africa. In mid-2016, Tanzania's government also reported that China's Export-Import Bank had agreed to provide Tanzania with a \$7.6 billion loan to fund construction of a railroad to boost linkages between Tanzania to its EAC neighbors.⁶⁴ Other major deals in recent years include a \$500 million housing project between Tanzania's SOE National Housing Corporation and China Railway Jianchang Engineering signed in 2013; several power project deals signed in 2013 worth more

⁶¹ Agnès Ndirubusa and Pierre Emmanuel Ngendakumana, “The roadmap for an end to the crisis,” *IWACU English News*, January 23, 2017; Pierre Emmanuel Ngendakumana, “Burundi: Mkapa - ‘Burundi Government Is Legitimate,’” *IWACU English News*, December 19, 2016; and UNSC, S/2017/16 and CRS Report R44018, *Burundi's Political Crisis: In Brief*, both previously cited.

⁶² Pierre Emmanuel Ngendakumana, “Summit of Surprises,” *Iwacu*, May 29, 2017; and EAC, *Joint Communiqué: 18th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State of the East African Community*, May 20, 2017.

⁶³ UNSC, “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” S/PRST/2017/13, August 2, 2017.

⁶⁴ Fumbuka Ng'wanakilala, “Tanzania gets \$7.6 bln loan from China's Exim Bank for railway,” *Reuters*, July 20, 2016.

than \$828 million; an integrated coal mine and power plant project; and an integrated iron ore mine and steel mill project worth a total investment of up to \$3 billion.

Tanzanian-Chinese bilateral trade reached a reported \$4.67 billion in 2015, but fell to \$4 billion in 2016. The balance of this trade varies considerably year to year, but in recent years has grown exponentially in favor of China (e.g., Chinese exports were almost 12 times larger than its imports from Tanzania in 2016). U.S.-Tanzanian trade, in comparison, is much lower, with U.S.-Tanzania trade totaling \$278 million in 2015 and \$309 million in 2016.⁶⁵ Chinese-Tanzanian economic ties have periodically prompted domestic backlash among Tanzanians negatively affected by Chinese businesses, such as communities displaced during large construction projects or Tanzanian traders hurt by direct competition from Chinese retail rivals.⁶⁶

Wildlife Trafficking and Alleged Chinese Involvement

Wildlife poaching—a focus of U.S. concern in Africa under the Obama Administration—poses key threats to Tanzania, with respect to both its environmental conservation efforts and its crucial wildlife-centered tourism industry, and has worsened in recent years. While Tanzanians are key actors in poaching and related trafficking activities, Chinese actors have been implicated in the trade as well. The reported involvement of Chinese nationals in illegal ivory trafficking from Tanzania has introduced some tension into Chinese-Tanzanian relations. In 2015, the Tanzanian government reported that its elephant population had dropped by more than 60% in the previous five years, from 109,051 animals in 2009 to 43,330 by late 2014. Within Africa, Tanzania, which has for many years hosted some of the largest elephant populations in Africa, is both a key ivory source country and trafficking export exit point.⁶⁷

Tanzania has periodically prosecuted Chinese nationals for wildlife trafficking or interdicted illicit wildlife exports destined for China. In 2014, the UK-based environmental advocacy group Environmental Investigation Agency alleged that members of a delegation accompanying Chinese President Xi Jinping during a 2013 visit purchased illicit ivory, driving up the domestic black-market price of ivory prior to and during the visit. The Chinese government rejected the allegation.⁶⁸ In 2015, a Chinese businesswoman active in Tanzania was charged with large-scale trafficking and illicit purchases of elephant ivory, allegedly in collaboration with well-placed Tanzanians, reportedly worth millions of dollars. Soon thereafter, Chinese officials made a large wildlife trafficking seizure that included 804 kilograms of African ivory. This action came several months after Tanzania's natural resources and tourism minister had publicly called on China to reduce Chinese demand for ivory.⁶⁹ In response to increasing international pressure, China has restricted ivory imports and plans to end them entirely by late 2017.⁷⁰

Despite efforts to counter wildlife trafficking, it has continued, as have efforts to combat it. In September 2017, a court sentenced nine people, including two police officers, to prison terms for illegal possession of ivory.⁷¹ The case followed the August 2017 murder of Wayne Lotter, the South African cofounder of the PAMS Foundation, an antipoaching and conservation organization, and the second expatriate antipoaching specialist to be murdered in two years. Lotter, with some U.S. assistance, had facilitated the intelligence training of Tanzanian antitrafficking authorities,

⁶⁵ Data from Global Trade Atlas using Chinese and U.S.-reported trade data.

⁶⁶ Beibei Yin, "Chinese investment in Tanzania bears bitter fruit," *Guardian*, March 2, 2012; and Kizito Makoye, "Tanzanian Traders Seek Rescue From Chinese," *Inter-Press Service*, August 15 2013, *inter alia*.

⁶⁷ Karl Mathiesen, "Tanzania Elephant Population Declined by 60% in Five Years, Census Reveals," *The Guardian (UK)*, June 2, 2015; and Samuel Wasser et al., "Genetic Assignment of Large Seizures of Elephant Ivory Reveals Africa's Major Poaching Hotspots," *Science* (349: 6243), July 3, 2015, among other sources.

⁶⁸ A similar phenomenon reportedly occurred during a 2009 visit by China's ex-president, Hu Jintao. Ilya Gridneff and Aipeng Soo, "Chinese Accused of Smuggling Tanzania Ivory in State Visit," Bloomberg News, November 6, 2014; and EIA, *Vanishing Point: Criminality, Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania's Elephants*, November 2014.

⁶⁹ Kevin Sieff, "Prosecutors say this 66-year-old Chinese woman is one of Africa's most notorious smugglers," *Washington Post*, October 8, 2015; and Reuters, "Tanzania urges China to curb ivory demand to save elephants," June 18, 2015.

⁷⁰ AP, "China Bans Ivory Imports," February 26, 2015; Reuters, "China slaps one-year ban on imports of African ivory hunting trophies," October 15, 2015; and Simon Denyer, "China's vow to shut down its ivory trade by the end of 2017 is a 'game changer' for elephants," *Washington Post*, December 30, 2016.

⁷¹ AFP, "Nine given stiff sentences in Tanzania for ivory possession," September 16, 2017.

including its elite antipoaching National and Transnational Serious Crimes Investigation Unit, which investigated the case of Yang Feng Glan, the Chinese businesswoman noted above. Several suspects have been arrested in his killing.⁷²

International Security

Tanzania actively contributes to regional and international peace and security efforts. In addition to being a troop contributor to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations, with personnel deployed in multiple African countries and Lebanon, Tanzania hosts large numbers of refugees from the region, including from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which tries Rwandan genocide suspects, is located in the northern Tanzanian city of Arusha, as is the African Union's African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, a continental court with a mandate to protect human rights.

In September 2017, Tanzania drew negative attention after U.N. sanctions investigators reported that they were “investigating information by a Member State” that North Korea's Haegeumgang Trading Corporation was “repairing and upgrading the surface-to-air missile Pechora (S-125) systems” of the Tanzanian military, which was also reported to be “repairing and upgrading its P-12 air defence radar.” Both systems originate in the Soviet bloc. Such actions may violate various provisions in U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea, including arms and related materiel embargoes and proliferation-related and potentially financial-transaction-related sanctions. The investigators reported that the “prohibited military-related contracts” between Tanzania and North Korea were reportedly worth €10.5 million. Tanzania had not responded to the panel's enquiries as of the date of the report's publication.⁷³

U.S. Relations and Policy

U.S.-Tanzanian ties are robust and have grown in recent years, despite tensions since 2015 related to Tanzanian governance patterns, as discussed in this report's introduction. Another irritant in bilateral relations has been a contract dispute between TANESCO, the national power utility, and Symbion Power, a U.S. firm. Along with partners, Symbion received more than \$110 million in MCC procurement awards to help improve Tanzania's electrical power sector and later reportedly expanded its business beyond its initial MCC contract.⁷⁴ Notwithstanding these tensions, as of late 2016, the State Department portrayed the bilateral relationship as “an established partnership characterized by mutual respect, shared values, and aspirations for a more peaceful and

⁷² In 2016 nine Tanzanians were charged with killing a British conservationist patrol pilot whose helicopter was shot down while he was pursuing suspected poachers. AFP, “Tanzanians charged with British wildlife pilot murder: court,” February 11, 2016; AP, “Tanzania: Police hold suspects in killing of conservationist,” September 8, 2017; Sophie Tremblay, “Leading elephant conservationist shot dead in Tanzania,” *The Guardian*, August 17, 2017; *The Economist*, “Wayne Lotter: The ivory game,” September 2, 2017; and Drazen Jorgic, “How to trap elephant poachers with their own technology,” Reuters, February 10, 2016.

⁷³ See U.N. Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council, S/2017/742*, September 5, 2017, containing the most recent report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), as requested by the Security Council in Resolution 2345 (2017).

⁷⁴ Symbion is seeking \$561 million from TANESCO under an international arbitration, alleging a breach of contract by TANESCO over the payment of \$35 million in power supplies. Symbion owns a 120 MW gas-fired power plant and is one of TANESCO's few independent power suppliers. *Reuters*, “U.S. firm seeks \$561 million from Tanzania in power supply dispute,” March 21, 2017; Omar Mohammed, “Tanzania Power Issues Casts Shadow on \$12 Billion Debt Plan,” *Bloomberg News*, February 16, 2017; and MCC, “Testimony of Daniel W. Yohannes, CEO of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Before The House Committee on Foreign Affairs,” April 25, 2013.

prosperous future.”⁷⁵ Such sentiments had been reflected in cordial high-level engagements over several years. Former President Kikwete was the first African head of state to meet with former President Obama after Obama took office in 2009. Later, in 2013, then-President Obama visited Tanzania, and in 2014, President Kikwete attended the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. President Obama’s 2013 trip followed prior high-profile visits (e.g., by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011 and then-President George W. Bush in 2008). How U.S.-Tanzanian relations may change under the Trump Administration, if at all, has yet to be determined but, as noted in the introduction of this report, they appear set to remain on a generally positive track.

Trade Issues

Tanzania is eligible for U.S. trade preferences, including apparel benefits, under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized under P.L. 114-27) and is a member of the East African Community (EAC) along with Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. The EAC has taken several steps to promote regional integration: a customs union was formed in 2005, followed by a common market in 2010 and, in 2013, an agreement to establish a monetary union within the next decade. The bloc seeks to adopt a single currency by 2024. Many of its trade integration efforts have been supported under an Obama Administration-initiated initiative called Trade Africa.⁷⁶

Tanzanian-U.S.-trade is moderate by global comparison. It hit a record \$482 million in 2013, but later dropped. It stood at \$310 million by 2016 (made up of nearly \$153 million in U.S. imports from Tanzania and \$157 million in U.S. exports). The proportion of U.S. imports from Tanzania that benefit from AGOA has risen markedly in recent years, reaching 24% in 2016. Top U.S. imports from Tanzania include precious stones, apparel, coffee, and cashews. U.S. exports are more diverse; top ones include machinery, used clothes, cereals, and aircraft and parts.

In June 2017, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) initiated an out-of-cycle review of Tanzania’s eligibility for AGOA trade benefits. It was launched in response to a petition by the Secondary Materials and Recycled Textiles Association (SMART), a U.S. used clothes exporting trade group whose member firms source used clothes in the United States, mostly from charity or other donations, and export them, mostly to developing countries. SMART asserts that a March 2016 EAC decision to initiate a phased-in ban on imports of used clothing and footwear, preceded by the imposition of large tariffs, has imposed a significant and “untenable” economic hardship on the U.S. used clothing industry.⁷⁷ SMART outlined its concerns about EAC’s actions at an August 2016 USTR annual AGOA eligibility hearing. A July 2017 out-of-cycle hearing spurred SMART’s petition; Tanzanian and other EAC member country officials and other parties also testified. One expert at the hearing, Stephen Lande, head of Manchester Trade (a consulting firm), contended that that AGOA eligibility should not be determined based upon individual objections to “each and every trade restriction a country has,” and that any decision to entirely revoke Tanzania’s AGOA eligibility based on the complaint of an single industry group might cause disproportionate damage to overall trade and investment.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Relations with Tanzania*, Fact Sheet, November 1, 2016.

⁷⁶ Trade Africa is a multiagency initiative that aims to encourage U.S. private sector trade and investment activities in Africa and boost intra-regional and international African trade through a wide range of trade capacity-building efforts. See CRS Insight IN10015, *Trade Africa Initiative*, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), and USAID, Trade Africa Annual Report 2016, among others.

⁷⁷ Transcript of USTR annual AGOA eligibility review hearing, August 22, 2016.

⁷⁸ He also asserted that in general, Tanzania is “doing more to maintain market opportunities for U.S. exports than (continued...)”

USTR officials are to submit their out-of-cycle review recommendations to U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer, who is to then make his own recommendations to President Trump. USTR officials are also conducting a regular annual review of Tanzania's AGOA eligibility. They plan to announce the results of both reviews simultaneously, so that any resulting determinations on Tanzania's eligibility would come into effect in early January 2017, alongside the routine annual eligibility announcements for other AGOA-implementing countries.

In 2012, U.S. and EAC officials agreed to pursue a trade and investment partnership dialogue potentially leading to a U.S.-EAC Investment Treaty and discuss a possible Trade Facilitation Agreement, among other ends. Toward such ends, the U.S. Department of Commerce opened a new office in Tanzania in 2014. In 2015, the United States and the EAC signed a cooperation agreement on technical cooperation to advance EAC implementation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade Facilitation, sanitary and phytosanitary trade capacity-building, and the reduction of technical barriers to trade.⁷⁹ In late 2016, U.S. officials also launched a \$194 million, five-year grant in support of the EAC. It centers on institutional capacity-building for the EAC's Secretariat, and increasing regional economic integration and U.S.-EAC member state trade and investment, enhancing the sustainable management of natural resources in the Lake Victoria Basin and Mara River ecosystems, and increasing access to integrated healthcare in border areas.⁸⁰ The grant complements Trade Africa, a U.S. trade capacity-building and related assistance initiative aimed at increasing U.S.-Africa and intra-African trade and investment. It was initially focused primarily on the EAC and its member states, but has been expanded to other regions of Africa.⁸¹

U.S. Bilateral Assistance

U.S. assistance to Tanzania has focused primarily on health, food security, agricultural development, infrastructure, and environmental conservation. The State Department and USAID administer most of this aid. In addition, Tanzania implemented an MCC Compact between 2008 and 2013 (see below). Under the Obama Administration, the bulk of U.S. aid for Tanzania was channeled through several global presidential development initiatives—most of which were launched under the Obama Administration, most notably Feed the Future (FTF), the Global Health Initiative, and the Global Climate Change Initiative—as well as two initiatives launched by former President George W. Bush: the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI).⁸² Tanzania was also a focus country under

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many other countries are in the world." Transcript of USTR hearing on AGOA eligibility out of cycle review of Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda, July 13, 2017; and USTR, "USTR Announces AGOA Out-of-Cycle Review for Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda," June 20, 2017.

⁷⁹ USTR, "U.S. and East African Community Join to Increase Trade Competitiveness and Deepen Economic Ties," February 25, 2015

⁸⁰ U.S. Embassy-Tanzania, "U.S. Government and EAC Sign \$194 Million Partnership Agreement to Strengthen Regional Development," November 16, 2016.

⁸¹ See CRS Insight IN10015, *Trade Africa Initiative*, op cit.; and USAID, *Trade Africa Annual Report 2016*.

⁸² On these initiatives, see CRS Report R44216, *The Obama Administration's Feed the Future Initiative*, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted); CRS Report R43115, *U.S. Global Health Assistance: FY2001-FY2018 Request*, by (name redacted); CRS Report R41845, *The Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCCI): Budget Authority and Request, FY2010-FY2016*, by (name redacted); CRS Report R43593, *Powering Africa: Challenges of and U.S. Aid for Electrification in Africa*, by (name redacted) et al.

the Obama Administration's African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP, see below) and its Partnerships for Growth (PFG) initiative.⁸³

Table I. State Department and USAID-Administered Bilateral Aid for Tanzania
(in millions of dollars)

	FY2014 (Actual)	FY2015 (Actual)	FY2016 (Actual)	FY2017 (Estimate)	FY2018 (Request)
Total	591.5	634.1	626.3	546.6	535.3
DA	115.7	122.0	96.5	65.8	-
ESDF	-	-	-	-	23.0
GHP-USAID	98.3	98.3	99.3	99.4	41.5
GHP-STATE	372.4	409.4	415.4	380.7	470.0
INCLE	0.5	0.5	-	-	-
NADR	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
IMET	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6
FMF	0.2	-	-	-	-
FFP^a	3.8	3.1	14.2	-	-

Source: State Department, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations (CBJ), FY2015-FY2018.

Notes: DA-Development Assistance; GHP-Global Health Programs; IMET-International Military Education and Training; FFP-Food For Peace (P.L. 480 Title II). FMF: Foreign Military Financing; INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; and NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs. ESDF or Economic Support and Development Fund, is a merger of the DA and ESF accounts proposed in the FY2018 Trump Administration request. Figures do not include emergency humanitarian assistance or certain types of aid provided through regional programs. Totals may not add up due to rounding.

- a. There is no FFP aid in FY2017. The Trump Administration did not request FFP aid in FY2018, and instead seeks to fund all emergency food aid under the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account. FFP aid may be used for developmental purposes and for emergency food need.

In practice, Tanzania's applied PFG goals largely centered on and have largely been subsumed under Power Africa, a presidential initiative launched under President Obama to vastly increase access to electricity in Africa. Power Africa is expected to continue under the Trump Administration. Tanzania is also a beneficiary of the regional Trade Africa initiative (see above). In mid-2016, Tanzania and USAID signed a five-year strategic agreement for continued development assistance to support Tanzania's transition toward middle income status by 2025, including through programs in the areas of health, agriculture, natural resource management, education, energy, and democratic governance.⁸⁴ Like most African countries, Tanzania is also a participant in the U.S. Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), initiated during the Obama Administration. YALI has been retained by the Trump Administration, albeit potentially at a reduced level.⁸⁵ Tanzanians also participate in several other educational or professional State

⁸³ PFG was an initiative designed to increase bilateral cooperation with selected countries through a mix of aid, public-private partnership, and private sector investment with the aim of spurring sustainable, broad-based economic growth. In 2012 Tanzania and the United States signed a PFG Joint Country Action Plan. It prioritized shared efforts to develop national electrical capacities and rural roads.

⁸⁴ A notable focus of education assistance was aid to increase adolescent female access to high-quality education under the Let Girls Learn initiative, launched in 2015 by then-President Obama and then-First Lady Michelle Obama.

⁸⁵ YALI, a presidential initiative begun in 2010, fosters the development of emergent young African business, civic, (continued...)

Department exchange programs, and there is a Peace Corps program in Tanzania with roughly 220 volunteers, who work in various areas, such as agriculture, education, and health, as of September 2017.⁸⁶

Focus on Healthcare Assistance

Health funding has comprised the bulk of State Department/USAID aid, and accounted for \$480.1 million, or nearly 88% of a total of \$546.6 million (provisional estimate) in FY2017 bilateral aid. Health aid would be funded at \$511.5 million (95.5% of total aid) under the Trump Administration's total bilateral \$535.3 million FY2018 aid request. Such health aid has been largely devoted to fighting HIV/AIDS under PEPFAR, and HIV/AIDS-centered aid would make up about 92% of all FY2018 total health spending under the Trump Administration's FY2018 proposal. Antimalaria programs carried out under the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) are another key focus of U.S. health programs, as are maternal and child health efforts, although both are funded at far lower levels than are HIV/AIDS programs. Tanzania is also a partner country under the Global Health Security Agenda (GHS), which seeks to mitigate the impact of disease outbreaks, notably those that threaten global health.⁸⁷

According to UNAIDS, in 2016 Tanzania had an adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 4.7% and a total population of 1.4 million people living with the disease, and suffered 55,000 new infections but averted 1.1 million additional ones. The State Department's U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator reports that Tanzania's HIV/AIDS epidemic varies greatly by region (between 0.1% and 14.8%) and is higher in urban areas (7.2%) than in rural ones (4.3%) and by gender (male prevalence stands at 3.8% and that for females at 6.2%). Tanzania is making efforts to achieve the UNAIDS "90-90-90" target—the goal of ensuring that by 2020, 90% of people living with HIV are diagnosed, 90% of those diagnosed receive antiretroviral treatment (ART), and 90% of those in treatment have fully suppressed viral loads. It is making fair progress toward the "first 90" goal, as 70% of those with HIV are diagnosed, and is quickly progressing toward the second, as 88% of those diagnosed are in treatment. The overall estimated treatment rate (including those who are estimated to be HIV-positive but may not be diagnosed) is lower, at 62%. Data were insufficient to determine progress toward the third goal. Tanzania has also made substantial progress toward prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission; 84% of pregnant women who needed antiretroviral therapy were receiving it.⁸⁸

According to PEPFAR, key challenges relating to improved HIV/AIDS responses include "weak health infrastructure, shortages of health and social workers, high levels of stigma, and cumbersome government procurement systems." PEPFAR efforts support HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment and related health systems and governance programs, and center on helping Tanzania to meet the UNAIDS 90-90-90 targets and diverse related goals outlined under its

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and public management leaders through exchange-based fellowships and follow-up support. The State Department primarily administers the U.S.-based portion, while USAID implements most Africa-based activities. Under YALI, USAID provides online information on networking, professional opportunities, and sources of seed funding and mentoring support for community service for Fellows, including through regional leadership centers.

⁸⁶ The agency's Tanzania program is funded at \$3.3 million in FY2017, and it requested \$3.5 million in FY2017.

⁸⁷ CRS In Focus IF10022, *The Global Health Security Agenda and International Health Regulations*, by (name redacted).

⁸⁸ UNAIDS, "90-90-90 Country Scorecards: Eastern and southern Africa" in *Ending AIDS: Progress Towards the 90-90-90 Targets*, 2017. See also online country data at <http://aidsinfo.unaids.org/>; and FY2017 PEPFAR Congressional Budget Justification Supplement.

national HIV/AIDS multisectorial framework and other plans. Tanzania is one of 13 focus countries under the Trump Administration's PEPFAR *Strategy for Accelerating HIV/AIDS Epidemic Control (2017-2020)*, released by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in September 2017. Key PEPFAR foci to date have included prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) through antiretroviral therapy throughout pregnancy and breastfeeding for affected women. Others have included efforts to scale up ART coverage, expand access to and participation in voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC), increase HIV counseling and testing (HCT), and enhance prevention through the provision of condoms. PEPFAR programs prioritize gender-differentiated strategies, given the higher female rate of infection, and pediatric treatment is another special priority. To decrease new infections and enhance epidemic control, PEPFAR efforts are also being shifted toward prioritizing responses in high-prevalence and high-burden geographic areas and population sub-groups facing high HIV/AIDS infection risks or prevalence rates. PEPFAR also supports efforts to counter cervical cancer through a public-private partnership called Pink Ribbon Red Ribbon (PRRR). Between FY2011 and 2015, an average of 29% of PEPFAR funds in Tanzania went to prevention, 21% to care, 34% to treatment, and 16% to health governance and system support.⁸⁹

Development Assistance

Agriculture development aid, which constituted \$54 million of the Obama Administration's FY2017 request, has been the second-largest target of U.S. support in recent years, but funding would fall to \$10 million under the Trump Administration's FY2018 request.⁹⁰ Such aid has been channeled primarily through Feed the Future, a major global U.S. food security and agricultural economic growth initiative. In Tanzania, it has focused on improving agricultural productivity and rural infrastructure, including roads and irrigation; bolstering staple food and horticulture commodity value chain and marketing efficiency; improving access to nutrition for children and mothers; and improving private- and public-sector policymaking, including regarding land tenure. Roughly 80% of FTF resources are focused on southern Tanzania, an area that the government sees as having great untapped agricultural potential, while much of the balance is devoted to work in the Zanzibar region and selected areas of central and northern Tanzania.⁹¹ FTF activities have also involved collaboration with U.S. global health programming. Tanzania is also a participant in the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, a Feed the Future-supported, G8-led global agricultural investment initiative in Africa. It has also received U.S. support under the Scaling Seeds and Other Technologies Partnership, a project of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, an international multistakeholder effort to boost African farm production. The future of FTF is uncertain.⁹²

⁸⁹ FY2017 PEPFAR Congressional Budget Justification Supplement. The Supplement provides a useful 6 pages summary of current program priorities in Tanzania. It is supplemented the PEPFAR FY2017 (March 2017) and data in the Tanzania PEPFAR Country Operational Plan (COPS), the *Thirteenth Annual Report to Congress* (2017), and prior COPS, reports, and other documents available at the PEPFAR website: <https://www.pepfar.gov/>.

⁹⁰ Other foci have included agricultural finance; research and development; leadership training; agriculture and water management-focused climate change adaptation; and enhanced private sector investment policies, among other goals.

⁹¹ Feed the Future, *Country Profile: Tanzania*, at <http://www.feedthefuture.gov/country/tanzania>; and USAID, *Feed the Future Tanzania* (factsheet), July 2017.

⁹² Existing FTF programs are continuing with prior year funding, but the FY2018 request does not specifically reference the initiative, and provides few details on how Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195) -mandated activities would be pursued, and proposes no multifaceted initiative akin to FTF. It does contain some details. While proposing generally reduced country agricultural development aid allocations, the FY2018 request seeks to maintain a State Department Global Food Security Special Representative (using Office of the Secretary funding), fund USAID's Bureau of Food Security, and seeks to "align" interagency implementation of the U.S. Global Food Security Strategy (continued...)

U.S. assistance has also supported strengthening of governance; infrastructure building (roads, power, water, and sanitation); economic growth; primary education; law enforcement capacity-building (see below); and biodiversity preservation.

Focus on Wildlife Conservation

A range of U.S. bilateral and regional programs support Tanzanian efforts to combat wildlife trafficking.⁹³ In mid-2015, the U.S. embassy in Tanzania launched a five-year project called the Promoting Tanzania's Environment, Conservation, and Tourism (PROTECT) Project, a \$14.5 million, five-year contractor-implemented project. Its aim is to enhance conservation and combat wildlife poaching and trafficking nationwide by supporting capacity building centered on wildlife resource management policymaking and institutions and trafficking law enforcement and prosecution. It also aims to enhance cooperation between civil society and the government and support development of community capabilities relating to the management of wildlife management areas (WMAs, locally controlled natural areas). PROTECT activities are accompanied by \$2.75 million in natural resource small grants supporting wildlife management innovation, incentives for private investment, and other purposes. A second, \$14 million, five-year program called "Endangered Ecosystems Northern Tanzania Project," launched later in the year, aims to increase antipoaching incentives and directly support WMAs, communities, and tourism operations in order to improve wildlife management in northern Tanzania.⁹⁴ Another is the Southern Highlands and Ruaha-Katavi Protection Program (SHARPP), an \$8.5-million, five-year program launched by USAID in 2014, centering on Support for WMAs; livelihoods; habitat management; and elephant monitoring and protection.⁹⁵ These efforts follow on similar ones in prior recent years.

Other Assistance

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Bureau of International Labor Affairs also funds projects aimed at combatting child labor in Tanzania, particularly in agricultural and domestic service contexts.⁹⁶ U.S. assistance to support Tanzania's hosting of refugees is administered by the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), which reports that U.S. funding for refugee support in Tanzania totaled roughly \$1.2 million in FY2014, \$16.7 million in FY2015, \$36.2 million in FY2016, and \$12 million in FY2017 to date, with more planned.⁹⁷

(...continued)

(submitted by the Obama Administration in compliance with P.L. 114-195).

⁹³ In 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order (EO) 13648 on "Combating Wildlife Trafficking" and pledged to boost regional and bilateral training and technical aid funding in Africa to combat wildlife trafficking. EO 13648 established an inter-agency Presidential Task Force on Wildlife Trafficking and a non-governmental Advisory Council on Wildlife Trafficking, and issuance of a National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking, which was issued in February 2014. A year later, the Presidential Task Force released a Strategy implementation plan.

⁹⁴ WMAs are part an approach called community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), in which communities manage natural resources. The aim is to build local stakes in and income streams from local wildlife and other natural resources, in order to incentivize collective conservation and managed resource uses. U.S. Embassy-Tanzania, "U.S. Government Launches \$14.5 Million Project to Protect Tanzania's Environment and Promote Conservation and Tourism," June 23, 2015, *inter alia*.

⁹⁵ U.S. Embassy-Tanzania, "U.S. Army and National Guard Train 50 Tanzanian Game Scouts," August 25, 2016.

⁹⁶ See DOL Bureau of International Labor Affairs, "ILAB in Tanzania," <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/map/countries/tanzania.htm>.

⁹⁷ This funding is drawn from the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account except some FY2015 funding, which included some Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA) funds from a prior year. MRA is the main (continued...)

Millennium Challenge Corporation

In September 2013, Tanzania completed a \$698 million, five-year MCC compact. Awarded in 2008, this compact sought to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth through targeted investments in roads and access to electrical services and potable water. In late 2014, the MCC agreed to provide an additional \$9.78 million to support further feasibility studies and other work linked to the development of a second compact focused on the power sector.⁹⁸

In June 2015 the MCC Board stated that a second compact “will not be considered for approval until, among other pending items,” Tanzania’s government “makes progress on energy sector reform commitments made in 2014.” The agency stated that once a compact was prepared, the MCC would again “scrutinize the government’s track record on good governance, including control of corruption and freedom of expression.”⁹⁹

In March 2016, the MCC suspended negotiations toward a second compact that would reportedly have been worth \$472 million. It did so on the basis that Tanzania had “moved forward with a new election in Zanzibar that was neither inclusive nor representative, despite the repeated concerns of the U.S. Government and the international community.” Another issue was that Tanzania had “not taken measures to ensure freedom of expression and association are respected in the implementation of the Cybercrimes Act,” which had also been the focus of repeated U.S. expressions of concern. In addition to stating that the elections in Zanzibar had not been credible, the Board stated that “Tanzania has taken no measures to ensure freedom of expression and association are respected in the implementation of the Cybercrimes Act.”¹⁰⁰

Security Cooperation

U.S. security cooperation and assistance has grown since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, but it remains limited compared to that pursued with Tanzania’s East African neighbors. Peacekeeping support is a top main focus of military cooperation and aid ties, and expanded in FY2014-FY2016 under APRRP.¹⁰¹ That initiative’s future is uncertain, as the Trump Administration has not requested funding to continue it. Tanzanian troops have also received training under the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and its train-and-equip African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which seeks

(...continued)

account that funds refugee operations; ERMA is available for unexpected and urgent refugee and migration needs globally on an as-needed basis. PRM responses to CRS queries, April 6, 2017 and September 28, 2017.

⁹⁸ MCC, “MCC Provides Funding to Tanzania to Develop Compact Focused on the Power Sector,” November 14, 2014, and “Tanzania II Compact,” Quarterly Status Report, December 2014.

⁹⁹ MCC, “Readout of the June 2015 MCC Board of Directors Meeting,” June 19, 2015.

¹⁰⁰ MCC, “MCC Statement on Decision of Board of Directors to Suspend Partnership with Tanzania,” March 28, 2016; and AFP, “US suspends \$472m Tanzania aid over Zanzibar vote,” March 29, 2016.

¹⁰¹ APRRP assistance in Tanzania has centered on command control communication and information systems (C3IS) capacity-building; logistics, with a focus on vehicles and troop provisioning; and soldier and medical staff training. APRRP provides targeted assistance to enhance the international peacekeeping deployment capacity of selected African countries seen as possessing relatively high-level military capabilities and with a record of contributing to international peacekeeping operations. Examples of capabilities targeted for improvement may include military logistics, airlift, field hospital operation, and formed police units. Equipment transfers may comprise another key APRRP aid component. Other APRRP countries include Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda. White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa,” August 6, 2014; “Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peace, Security, and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa,” July 27, 2015; and State Department, *Factsheet: U.S. Peacekeeping Capacity Building Assistance*, January 25, 2017.

to increase available international peacekeeping troops. Such assistance is complemented by a U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which supports military professionalization and institutional reform in the Tanzanian military.

Tanzania receives some counterterrorism assistance through the State Department-led, multicountry Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT).¹⁰² It also hosts the regional East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, in which the United States has observer status, and receives U.S. regional funding to combat terrorist financing. Smaller U.S. security aid programs center on strengthening border security and improving police capacity to deter crime and terrorism. Some recent military-to military or U.S. military activities, all in 2016, have included the following:

- U.S. and Tanzanian participation, with other partner nations, in Eastern Accord 2016, an annual, combined, joint military exercise that took place in Tanzania and centered on a simulated peacekeeping operation command post exercise.
- The Tanzania military's hosting of the U.S.-aided African Land Forces Summit (ALFS), a seminar of land military chiefs from across Africa focused on developing cooperative solutions to regional challenges and threats.
- Specialized training of Tanzanian game scouts by U.S. military personnel on “surveillance and patrol techniques, arrest and detention procedures, search and seizure, crime scene investigation, first aid, human rights and rules of engagement” aimed at enhancing their ability to counter wildlife poaching and trafficking.¹⁰³

Law Enforcement Cooperation

The United States and Tanzania have increasingly cooperated in a limited number of criminal cases and with respect to joint efforts to build Tanzania's law enforcement capabilities. Among the most notable recent cases, cooperation occurred between 2016 and 2017. In May 2017, a Tanzanian named Ali Khatib Haji Hassan (a.k.a. “Shkuba”) and two associates were extradited to the United States to face a U.S. federal indictment brought against them by a Houston, TX, grand jury charging them with conspiracy to possess and then distribute heroin between 2010 and 2015. In March 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) had designated Hassan and his trafficking organization as significant foreign narcotics traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act).¹⁰⁴

Recent U.S. law enforcement capacity training has focused on such activities as the following:

¹⁰² According to the State Department, PRACT focuses on “reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks; developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner nations; enhancing border security; countering the financing of terrorism; and reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism.” State Department, Programs and Initiatives, Bureau of Counterterrorism.

¹⁰³ The program was sponsored under USAID's SHARPP conservation program (see above). U.S. Embassy-Tanzania, “African Land Forces Summit 2016,” May 19, 2016, “Eastern Accord 2016 (EA16),” July 22, 2016, and “U.S. Army and National Guard Train 50 Tanzanian Game Scouts,” August 25, 2016.

¹⁰⁴ The action related to his alleged smuggling of multi-ton shipments of heroin (from southwest Asia) and cocaine (from Latin America) to Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America since 2006. It froze assets of the designees within U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited transactions between them and U.S. persons. Hassan had been in Tanzanian police custody since being arrested in 2014 for smuggling about 210 kilograms of heroin seized in 2012 on Tanzania's southern coast. Hassan allegedly has a record of repeatedly trying to bribe police in the case and other police matters. Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Tanzanian Kingpin and his East Africa-Based Drug Trafficking Organization,” March 9, 2016; and U.S. Embassy-Tanzania, “Three Alleged Drug Traffickers Extradited to the United States,” May 3, 2017.

- canine training by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) aimed at detecting illegal drugs and ivory at ports and airports, as well as related investigations and prosecutions;
- anticorruption training of Tanzanian prosecutors and investigators by the U.S. Embassy’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT); and
- wildlife crime scene investigations and evidence collection training by USAID and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in at least one case facilitated by the conservation and antipoaching organization the PAMS Foundation, whose cofounder was murdered in 2017 (see above).¹⁰⁵

Outlook

Tanzania is likely to remain a generally stable but poor developing country for the foreseeable future. Increasing multiparty competition may contribute to gradual growth in demand for political change, democratic accountability, improved governance, and greater political pluralism—but potentially also to increased political tension. Growing access to information, notably via mobile phones, may spur similar trends by increasing exposure to information on current events, and global social and governance norms. It may also contribute to market growth through increased information to pricing data and improved social services.¹⁰⁶ Such changes, along with continuing infusions of foreign assistance, including from the United States, and gradually improving public infrastructure and government services, are likely to spur increasing economic activity, production, and trade, thus improving quality of life for the Tanzanian people. The United States, while expressing periodic concern over issues such as corruption, appears likely—as suggested by bilateral relations trends and aid levels in recent years—to continue to support the strengthening of Tanzania’s democratic system and the socioeconomic development of its people, and to look to Tanzania as a key development partner in East and Southern Africa.

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¹⁰⁵ U.S. Embassy-Tanzania, “United States and Tanzania Inaugurate Canine Program to Detect Illegal Drugs and Ivory at the Port and Airport,” March 2, 2016, “U.S. Government Sponsors Anti-Corruption Training in Tanzania,” March 7, 2017, “U.S. Government conducts wildlife crime scene investigation training in Tanzania,” December 15, 2016, and “U.S. Trains Tanzanian Officials on Wildlife Crime Scene Investigations,” May 16, 2016.

¹⁰⁶ Thomson Reuters Foundation/Kizito Makoye, “Mobile phones a boon for Tanzanian women in business, banking: researchers,” October 5, 2015, and “Tanzania rolls out birth registrations by mobile phone,” October 13, 2015.

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