



Congress and Police Reform: Current Law and Recent Proposals

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In May and June 2020, [protests erupted nationwide](#) after the publication of video footage of a Minneapolis police officer pressing his knee into the neck of George Floyd, leading to his death. That incident and its aftermath have sparked [heightened interest](#) in Congress’s ability to implement reforms of state and local law enforcement.

As [a companion to this Sidebar](#) outlines in greater detail, congressional power to regulate state and local law enforcement is not without limits. The Constitution grants the federal government only certain enumerated authorities, with the [Tenth Amendment](#) reserving all other powers for the states. The regulation of state and municipal law enforcement is an area that the Constitution generally entrusts to the states. However, Congress possesses some authority to legislate on that subject, primarily through statutes designed to enforce the protections of the [Fourteenth Amendment](#) and legislation requiring states to take specified action in exchange for federal funds disbursed under the [Spending Clause](#). This Sidebar provides an overview of existing federal authorities intended to prevent and redress constitutional violations by state and local public safety officials. It then presents some recent proposals that would change federal regulation of state and local law enforcement. The Sidebar concludes with a list of additional CRS resources related to law enforcement reform.

Federal Regulation of State and Local Law Enforcement

Existing federal remedies for constitutional violations by state and local law enforcement include civil and criminal enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and private suits by individuals deprived of their rights by someone acting “under color of” state law. In addition, the federal government encourages states to enact certain policies related to law enforcement by placing conditions on federal funding. Federal agencies also independently investigate and gather data on law enforcement activities.

Federal Criminal Law

A provision of the federal criminal code, [18 U.S.C. § 242 \(Section 242\)](#), makes it a crime for (among other things) a person acting “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom” to “willfully subject[] any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” Section 242 also prohibits a person acting

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under color of law from subjecting any person to “different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens[.]” A simple violation of the statute is punishable by a fine and/or up to a year in prison. If bodily injury results, the offender may be fined and/or imprisoned for up to ten years. If death results or other aggravating factors are present, Section 242 provides for a fine and/or imprisonment for ten years to life or a death sentence (though the Constitution [forbids imposition of the death penalty for non-homicide offenses](#)). A related provision, [18 U.S.C. § 241](#) (Section 241), makes it a crime for “two or more persons [to] conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” Violations of Section 241 are punishable by up to ten years in prison or, if certain aggravating factors are present, up to life in prison or death.

The Supreme Court has [held](#) that “officers of the State . . . performing official duties,” including public safety officials, act “under color of . . . law” for purposes of Section 242. As [DOJ has explained](#), law enforcement officers may violate Section 242 through “excessive force, sexual assault, intentional false arrests, theft, or the intentional fabrication of evidence resulting in a loss of liberty to another.” [DOJ enforces Sections 241 and 242](#) by bringing criminal charges against officers accused of violating those statutes. People who believe their rights have been infringed may [report such violations to DOJ](#), but Sections 241 and 242 provide no private right of enforcement. Notably, if DOJ elects to pursue criminal charges under Section 242, it faces a high standard of proof: in *Screws v. United States*, the Supreme Court [held](#) that to show a violation of a prior statute whose wording mirrored that of Section 242, the prosecution must prove the defendant had “a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law.” The Supreme Court [extended this holding to Section 241 cases](#) in *United States v. Guest*. In practice, the specific intent requirement requires the prosecution to prove that a local official intended to violate a federal right, as opposed to simply intending to, for example, [assault a victim](#). This results in what some view as a [significant hurdle](#) to bringing Section 241 and 242 claims.

DOJ Civil Enforcement

Another section of the U.S. Code, [34 U.S.C. § 12601](#) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141) renders it “unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, . . . to engage in a [pattern or practice](#) of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” According to DOJ, [potential violations](#) of this provision include “excessive force, discriminatory harassment, false arrests, coercive sexual conduct, and unlawful stops, searches or arrests.” DOJ [enforces this provision](#) by filing civil complaints against allegedly offending law enforcement agencies. The statute does not create a private right of action (*i.e.*, a right for individuals harmed by violations to sue). Moreover, because the law applies only to a “pattern or practice of conduct,” it cannot remedy isolated instances of misconduct. Finally, the statute does not provide for monetary penalties. If DOJ successfully sues under the provision, it may “obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.”

Private Civil Rights Litigation

Federal law also allows individuals to seek civil redress for violations of their legal rights. The applicable statute, [42 U.S.C. § 1983](#) (Section 1983), provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured[.]

Unlike the foregoing statutory provisions, Section 1983 creates a private right of action, meaning that anyone suffering a covered deprivation of rights may sue the persons responsible. Moreover, unlike

Sections 241 and 242, courts have [interpreted](#) Section 1983 *not* to contain a specific intent requirement. A prevailing Section 1983 plaintiff may be entitled to [injunctive relief](#), attorney’s fees, and/or money damages. Recovery may include both [compensatory damages](#) (designed to make the plaintiff whole and compensate for the legal injury) and [punitive damages](#) (designed to punish the defendant and deter future, similar misconduct).

Similar to Section 242, Section 1983 applies to persons acting “under color of” state law. State and local public safety officers generally act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983: as the Supreme Court has [stated](#), “a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” However, law enforcement liability under Section 1983 is subject to a significant judicially created limitation: based on concerns that frequent litigation could interfere with the work of law enforcement officers, the Supreme Court has held that law enforcement officers benefit from [qualified immunity](#) from suit. The Supreme Court announced the modern qualified immunity test in *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, [holding](#) that “government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages” if they do not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

The Supreme Court has [explained](#) that qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” As a result, courts generally consider qualified immunity early in a Section 1983 case, and a defendant whose qualified immunity defense is denied is [entitled to an immediate interlocutory appeal](#). A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity considers [two questions](#): (1) whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right”; and (2) “whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.” While that two-step analysis was once considered mandatory, in the 2009 case *Pearson v. Callahan*, the Supreme Court [held](#) that judges could “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” In a [series of recent cases](#) involving police use of force, the Roberts Court has reversed lower court denials of qualified immunity, stating that “clearly established law” must not be defined at a high level of generality and instead needs to be particularized to the facts of the case, which can amount to a high bar for plaintiffs to overcome.

The Supreme Court articulated another limitation on Section 1983 suits in *Monell v. Department of Social Services*. In that case, the Court [held](#) that a municipality is a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983. However, the Court further [held](#) that a local government cannot be sued “for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents” under the theory of [respondeat superior](#) (the legal doctrine that an employer may be liable to suit for wrongful acts of its employees). Rather, under *Monell*, a Section 1983 plaintiff must show that an injury stems from a “policy or custom” of the municipality. This requires a showing that “through its [deliberate conduct](#), the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged,” and that the municipality acted with “[deliberate indifference](#) to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow.” This exacting standard has led one commentator to [assert](#) that municipal liability “is practically a dead letter.”

Grant Conditions and Federal Oversight

The federal government provides financial support to state and local law enforcement in the form of grants, and may require states to enact certain policies to qualify for such funding. As one example, the [Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant \(Byrne JAG\) Program](#) provides [federal support for state and local criminal justice programs](#). Among other conditions, states that receive Byrne JAG funding must certify compliance with the [Death in Custody Reporting Act \(DCRA\)](#). Enacted in 2014 the DCRA requires states to report to the Attorney General certain information regarding the deaths of individuals in the custody of law enforcement agencies. Byrne JAG grants have also have been used to [train officers](#) on

use of force and de-escalation of conflict. In addition to guiding state and local law enforcement policy through grant funding, federal government agencies independently [collect data](#) related to the use of force by state and local law enforcement.

June 2020 Executive Order

On June 16, 2020, President Donald Trump issued an [Executive Order on Safe Policing for Safe Communities](#). In perhaps its most consequential provision, the Executive Order directs the Attorney General to establish best practices for law enforcement agencies and condition federal grants on compliance with those standards. Specifically, the Executive Order directs the Attorney General to certify independent credentialing bodies that can assess agencies' policies in areas such as use of force, de-escalation, and identifying officers who may require intervention. Of particular note, credentialing bodies will need to "confirm" that state and local use-of-force policies prohibit the use of chokeholds. The Executive Order directs the Attorney General to allocate DOJ discretionary grant funding only to state and local law enforcement agencies that have sought or are in the process of seeking such credentials.

In addition, the Executive Order directs the Attorney General to create a database to track and publish data related to instances of excessive use of force by law enforcement, requiring law enforcement agencies that receive discretionary grant funding to submit information to the database. The Executive Order also requires the Attorney General to develop and propose legislation to improve law enforcement practices and build community engagement, and to identify and develop opportunities to train law enforcement officers with respect to encounters with individuals suffering from impaired mental health, homelessness, and addiction. Importantly, the Executive Order provides that many of its requirements must be implemented "as appropriate and consistent with applicable law." As a result, provisions that seek to change existing grant conditions may be tempered by recent court [rulings](#) expressing skepticism of the executive branch's ability to unilaterally change conditions related to federal grants, such as those provided under the Byrne JAG program.

Proposals for Law Enforcement Reform in Congress

Even before the high-profile events of May and June 2020, commentators and legislators had suggested numerous avenues for congressional reform and oversight of state and local law enforcement, and recent events have prompted additional proposals in that area. This section provides a sample of these proposals, including bills that would target specific issues related to police reform as well as comprehensive proposals that would alter federal regulation of law enforcement on many fronts. Another [Legal Sidebar](#) compares key provisions of those comprehensive proposals.

Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity has been the subject of significant debate in recent years. A May 2020 report by Reuters found that "since 2005, the [federal appellate] courts have shown an [increasing tendency to grant immunity](#) in excessive force cases." Critics of qualified immunity assert that the test the Supreme Court announced in *Pearson v. Callahan* improperly hinders Section 1983 claims. Not only is it [difficult for plaintiffs to overcome a claim of qualified immunity](#), these commentators assert, but furthermore courts often consider *only* whether a defendant violated clearly established law, without reaching the question of whether the defendant violated the plaintiff's rights—albeit in circumstances courts have not yet assessed. Legal commentators have argued that this limited inquiry [prevents the development of clearly established law](#) that could govern future Section 1983 cases. Some commentators also assert that the current doctrine of [qualified immunity fails to protect law enforcement officers](#) from suit. Others [defend the doctrine or favor limited judicial reforms](#), asserting the need to afford police officers some level of deference when making split-second decisions about the use of force, for example to subdue a fleeing or resisting suspect.

The doctrine of qualified immunity arises from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 1983. Thus, either the Court or Congress could modify the doctrine, and some legal scholars have called on [both branches](#) to address the issue. The Court has considered [multiple petitions for certiorari](#) raising challenges to qualified immunity, and [Justice Thomas](#) and [Justice Sotomayor](#) have both expressed concerns about the doctrine. On the legislative side, the [Ending Qualified Immunity Act](#) introduced in June 2020 would wholly “remove the defense of qualified immunity.” Another proposal aimed at removing barriers to Section 1983 liability is the [Reforming Qualified Immunity Act](#). Unlike current law, which grants officials qualified immunity if the constitutional right alleged to have been violated is not “clearly established,” this proposal would place the burden on Section 1983 defendants to affirmatively show with some particularity that the conduct at issue was authorized by law. Specifically, the proposal would seek to remove the existing doctrine of qualified immunity and instead provide that an individual defendant “shall not be liable” if the defendant reasonably believed that his or her conduct was lawful *and* either (1) the conduct at issue was “specifically authorized or required” by federal or state law, or (2) a federal or state court had issued a final decision holding that “the specific conduct alleged to be unlawful was consistent with the Constitution of the United States and Federal laws.” The Reforming Qualified Immunity Act would also revise the rule articulated in *Monell* by providing that “a municipality or other unit of local government shall be liable for a violation [of Section 1983] by an agent or employee of the municipality or other unit of local government acting within the scope of his or her employment,” in effect applying the doctrine of *respondeat superior* to such governmental entities.

Criminal Liability

While changes to the doctrine of qualified immunity could alter *civil* liability for law enforcement officers, other proposals would aim to expand *criminal* liability for civil rights violations by officers. For example, the [Eric Garner Excessive Use of Force Prevention Act of 2019](#) would amend Section 242 to provide explicitly that “the application of any pressure to the throat or windpipe which may prevent or hinder breathing or reduce intake of air is a punishment” that may not be imposed on a racially disparate basis. The [Police Accountability Act of 2020](#) would provide a federal criminal penalty for assault or homicide committed by certain state or local law enforcement officers. Some commentators also advocate [removing the specific intent requirement](#) for Sections 241 and 242 announced in *Screws* and *Guest*.

Limitations on Military-Grade Equipment

Under a federal program known as the [1033 Program](#), the federal government transfers certain excess military equipment to state and local law enforcement agencies. Some commentators contend that this type of equipment [contributes to militarization](#) of police forces without increasing public safety and [increases the risk of incidents of excessive force](#). The 1033 Program is [authorized by statute](#), so Congress has the power to alter or discontinue the program. There are a number of specific proposals on this front. For instance, on May 31, 2020, Sen. Brian Schatz [announced](#) his intention to introduce legislation that would end the 1033 Program. Another proposal related to the 1033 Program, the [Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act](#), would maintain the program but impose additional limitations and reporting requirements.

Grants and Conditions on Federal Funds

Numerous proposals currently before Congress would invoke the Spending Clause in an effort to regulate state and local law enforcement activities. Some proposals would fund voluntary state and local measures, such as [use of force and bias awareness training](#) or [body cameras](#). Other proposals would require states to enact certain policies in exchange for federal grants. For instance, the [Police Training and Independent Review Act of 2019](#) would fund training on cultural diversity and de-escalation tactics while requiring participating states to “enact laws requiring the independent investigation and prosecution of the use of

deadly force by law enforcement officers.” The [Preventing Tragedies Between Police and Communities Act of 2019](#) would oblige Byrne JAG grant recipients to mandate training on ways to reduce the use of force. The [Police Exercising Absolute Care With Everyone Act of 2019](#) (PEACE Act) would require Byrne JAG grantees to enact laws limiting the use of lethal and less than lethal force by law enforcement. The [Next Step Act of 2019](#) would, among other things, direct Byrne JAG grant recipients to submit quarterly reports to the Attorney General on officers’ use of force.

Comprehensive Reform Efforts

The Justice in Policing Act of 2020

On June 8, 2020, Members of Congress led by the Congressional Black Caucus presented the [Justice in Policing Act of 2020](#). The bill would build on some of the foregoing proposals to reform multiple facets of federal, state, and local law enforcement, including, but not limited to, the following:

- [Section 101](#) of the bill would amend Section 242 to change the mental state required for conviction from “willfully” to “knowingly or with reckless disregard.”
- [Section 102](#) would limit qualified immunity for local law enforcement officers and state correctional officers, providing that it is not a defense to liability under Section 1983 that such an officer believed in good faith that his or her conduct was lawful or that the rights the officer infringed were not clearly established.
- [Sections 103 and 104](#) would seek to enhance investigations into incidents involving law enforcement uses of force or a pattern or practice of law enforcement misconduct by, among things, granting subpoena power to DOJ under 34 U.S.C. § 12601.
- Multiple provisions of the Act would facilitate federal data collection related to police reform. For instance, [Section 118](#) and [Title II, Subtitle B](#) of the Act would require federal funding recipients to report incidents involving uses of force by law enforcement, and [Section 201](#) would create a federal law enforcement misconduct registry.
- [Section 362](#) would ban [no-knock warrants](#) in drug cases at the federal level. The section would also condition Byrne JAG funding upon states and localities prohibiting the use of no-knock warrants in similar drug cases.
- [Section 363](#) would require states that receive Byrne JAG funding to enact laws banning the use of chokeholds by law enforcement officers.
- [Section 364](#), the PEACE Act, would allow federal law enforcement officers to use force only as a last resort when necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury, and condition federal grants on state and local law enforcement agencies’ establishing the same use of force standard.
- [Section 365](#), the Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act, would limit the transfer of military-grade equipment to state and local law enforcement.
- [Title III, Subtitle B](#) of the Act would seek to prevent and remedy racial profiling by law enforcement, including by authorizing civil suits by DOJ and affected individuals. The Title would also establish various programs and policies to help eliminate racial profiling, such as by funding training programs for state and local police.
- [Title III, Subtitle C](#) would require the use of body cameras by certain federal law enforcement officers and fund expanded use of body cameras by state and local officers.
- [Title IV](#), the Justice for Victims of Lynching Act, would create a new criminal prohibition on lynching, defined as conspiracy to violate certain federal hate crime statutes.

The JUSTICE Act

On June 17, 2020, Senate Republicans unveiled the [Just and Unifying Solutions To Invigorate Communities Everywhere Act of 2020](#) (JUSTICE Act). The JUSTICE Act would enact various reforms related to law enforcement, including but not limited to the following:

- Under Title I, [Section 101](#) of the bill, the George Floyd and Walter Scott Notification Act, and [Section 102](#), the Breonna Taylor Notification Act, would respectively require recipients of certain federal funding to report to the federal government information related to incidents involving law enforcement uses of force and no-knock warrants.
- [Section 105](#) would require recipients of certain federal funding to develop law enforcement agency policies “prohibit[ing] the use of chokeholds except when deadly force is authorized.” This section would also require the Attorney General to develop such a policy at the federal level.
- [Section 106](#) would create a new criminal offense of “knowingly and willfully falsify[ing] a report . . . in furtherance of the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States where death or serious bodily injury . . . occurs.” The penalty for violating this provision would be a fine and/or imprisonment for up to twenty years.
- [Title II](#) of the bill would provide grants to covered government agencies to support the use of body-worn cameras by law enforcement officials.
- [Title III](#) would require law enforcement agencies that receive certain federal funding to retain various disciplinary records and to search the records of prior employers before hiring a law enforcement officer.
- [Title IV](#), the Justice for Victims of Lynching Act, like the corresponding section of the Justice in Policing Act, would create a new criminal prohibition on lynching, defined as conspiracy to violate certain federal hate crime statutes.
- [Title V](#) would create a Commission on the Social Status of Black Men and Boys to “conduct a systematic study of the conditions affecting Black men and boys.”
- [Title VI](#) would direct the Attorney General to develop training on alternatives to use of force, de-escalation tactics, responding to behavioral health crises, and duty to intervene when another officer uses excessive force.
- [Titles VII](#) and [IX](#) would establish a temporary National Criminal Justice Commission and require the Commission to create best practices and conduct certain studies related to law enforcement oversight.
- [Title VIII](#) would provide for development of an educational curriculum for law enforcement personnel or candidates on the history of racism in the United States.
- [Title X](#) would impose criminal liability when a person “acting under color of law, knowingly engages in a sexual act” with a person in federal custody. Violation of this provision would be punishable by a fine and/or up to fifteen years in prison.

Additional Resources

The following recent CRS products provide further information related to federal oversight and reform of law enforcement agencies. This list may be updated as additional issues emerge.

- CRS In Focus IF10572, *What Role Might the Federal Government Play in Law Enforcement Reform?*, by Nathan James and Ben Harrington
- CRS In Focus IF11572, *Police Accountability Measures*, by Nathan James
- CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10487, *Congress and Law Enforcement Reform: Constitutional Authority*, by Whitney K. Novak
- CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10492, *Policing the Police: Qualified Immunity and Considerations for Congress*, by Whitney K. Novak
- CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10495, *Federal Police Oversight: Criminal Civil Rights Violations Under 18 U.S.C. § 242*, by Joanna R. Lampe
- CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10494, *Reforming Patterns of Unconstitutional Policing: Enforcement of 34 U.S.C. § 12601*, by April J. Anderson
- CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10498, *Comparing Police Reform Bills: the Justice in Policing Act and the JUSTICE Act*, by Joanna R. Lampe
- CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10499, *“No-Knock” Warrants and Other Law Enforcement Identification Considerations*, by Peter G. Berris and Michael A. Foster

Author Information

Joanna R. Lampe
Legislative Attorney

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