

Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2021

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Summary

This CRS report provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen, with summary tables providing information on various legislative proposals considered in the 114th, 115th, 116th, and 117th Congresses. These proposals have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including

- the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict;
- the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia;
- the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia;
- the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition;
- the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition's air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict;
- the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen;
- the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict;
- the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and
- the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement.

The 117th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; as of September 2021, the World Food Programme reported that 16.5 million Yemenis were food insecure, more than half the country's population. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) estimates that targeted airstrikes and drone attacks reportedly killed 8,478 civilians in Yemen from March 2015 to September 10, 2021, out of more than 14,280 civilians reported killed overall.

President Joseph Biden has ended some U.S. military support to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-led coalition and is engaged in efforts to secure a ceasefire agreement while Congress considers proposals that could further restrict U.S. military involvement. The Trump Administration opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to coalition operations in Yemen.

This report does not include Yemen-related Iran sanctions legislation, which is covered in CRS Report RS20871, *Iran Sanctions*. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS products:

CRS Report R43960, *Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention*.

CRS Report RL33533, *Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations*.

Contents

Overview	1
Congress, the Obama Administration, and Yemen (2015-2016)	4
2015.....	4
2016.....	5
Analysis.....	6
Congress, the Trump Administration, and Yemen (2017-2020)	7
2017.....	7
2018.....	10
2019.....	15
2020.....	18
Analysis.....	20
Congress, the Biden Administration, and Yemen (2021)	22
2021.....	22
Analysis.....	26

Tables

Table 1. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 117 th Congress.....	29
Table 2. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 116 th Congress.....	31
Table 3. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 115 th Congress.....	45
Table 4. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 114 th Congress.....	63

Contacts

Author Information.....	65
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Overview

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh (for background see text box below).¹ During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces reverse their unilateral military campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sana'a, but the rapid onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly.²

At the start of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that the United States would provide “logistical and intelligence support” to the coalition’s operations without taking “direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort.”³ Soon thereafter, a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the campaign, which eventually included refueling support for coalition air operations, weapons transfers, intelligence support, and training. At the United Nations Security Council, the United States supported the passage of Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, required member states to impose an arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all areas seized during the current conflict.

U.S. support for the coalition’s operations has been reduced since 2015, reflecting U.S. concerns about civilian casualties and goals of promoting a ceasefire. After six years of conflict, hundreds of thousands of Yemenis have been displaced, millions are in need of humanitarian assistance, and the Houthi movement controls most of northern Yemen. In September 2021, the Houthis continued to launch strikes across the border into Saudi Arabia, attack areas of Yemen loyal to the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), and press an offensive against the city of Marib, seat of the last ROYG stronghold in the north.

On June 8, 2021, President Joseph Biden reported to Congress “consistent with” the War Powers Resolution that,⁴

A small number of United States military personnel are deployed to Yemen to conduct operations against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS [the Islamic State, IS, aka ISIL]. The United States military continues to work closely with the Government of the Republic of Yemen and regional partner forces to degrade the terrorist threat posed by those groups.

I have directed an end to United States support for the Saudi-led Coalition’s offensive military operations against the Houthis in Yemen. United States Armed Forces, in a non-combat role, continue to provide military advice and limited information to regional forces for defensive and training purposes only as they relate to the Saudi-led Coalition’s campaign against the Houthis in Yemen. Such support does not involve United States Armed Forces in hostilities with the Houthis for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution.

¹ The Houthi-Saleh alliance later unraveled, culminating in the killing of former President Saleh on December 4, 2017.

² See, “How the War in Yemen Became a Bloody Stalemate and the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World,” *New York Times Magazine*, October 31, 2018.

³ Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 25, 2015.

⁴ Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, June 8, 2021.

United States Armed Forces are deployed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to protect United States forces and interests in the region against hostile action by Iran or Iran-backed groups. These forces, operating in coordination with the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, provide air and missile defense capabilities and support the operation of United States fighter aircraft. The total number of United States forces in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is approximately 2,742.

Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active role in debating and overseeing U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula.⁵ Members have considered legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition's operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the Bab al Mandab Strait; improve U.S. efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in Yemen; and/or support, condition, or end U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition.

Beyond Yemen, many Members have referred to the conflict as an element of a broader regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and discussed the conflict's implications for the U.S. effort to limit Iran's malign regional influence. Others lawmakers have described the Yemen conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, a concern that deepened after the 2018 killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel. Congress has considered and passed proposals to reject certain U.S. defense sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and to direct an end to U.S. military involvement in military operations related to the anti-Houthi campaign, but has not voted to override presidential vetoes of related legislation.

Mixed results from attempts to limit U.S. support for the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also appear to be reinvigorating some Members' interest in strengthening the role of Congress in foreign policy vis-à-vis the executive branch.⁶ Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured bipartisan statements of interest in asserting the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit executive branch power, specifically using war powers legislation and the appropriations and authorization processes to curb U.S. military involvement in support of coalition operations.

Congressional scrutiny of U.S. policy in Yemen has also led to enacted and proposed legislative changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense's authority to enter into and use acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries.⁷ The Trump Administration's invocation of emergency requirements to proceed with proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including sales of air-to-ground munitions scrutinized in the context of the Yemen war, has similarly led some in Congress to propose changes to underlying arms sales authorities granted to the executive branch.⁸

⁵ Congress periodically addressed Yemen-related issues in annual authorization and appropriations legislation prior to the 2015 Saudi-led intervention, such as providing security assistance to Yemeni government forces to counter terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); addressing Yemeni detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; overseeing the issuance of visas for Yemeni nationals traveling to the United States; countering human trafficking in Yemen; and prohibiting U.S. assistance from being provided to Yemeni security forces that use child soldiers.

⁶ See, for example, Senators Chris Murphy, Mike Lee, and Bernie Sanders, "Murphy, Lee, Sanders Introduce Sweeping, Bipartisan Legislation to Overhaul Congress's Role in National Security," July 20, 2021.

⁷ Section 1271 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232) modifies 10 U.S.C. 2342 to prohibit the use of such agreements to transfer support or services to third parties and to require annual reporting.

⁸ Section 1270 of the House-passed version of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2500, would have altered the authority granted to the President to determine that an emergency exists, which requires waiving congressional review requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776). Conferees did not include this

The Biden Administration has ended U.S. support to Saudi-led coalition offensive operations in Yemen and has expanded U.S. diplomatic support for efforts to negotiate a settlement to the Houthi-coalition conflict. Some legislative proposals in the 117th Congress have sought additional changes to U.S. policy.

Conflict Overview and Root Causes of Crisis

The United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and international relief agencies all have often described Yemen's ongoing humanitarian and food crisis as "man-made," meaning it is a direct result of the ongoing armed conflict that began in March 2015.⁹ More than six years ago, Saudi Arabia established a coalition (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition) and launched a military operation aimed at restoring the rule of Yemen's internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi's government was being gradually supplanted by an alliance comprised of the Iran-supported Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous President, Ali Abdullah Saleh (hereinafter referred to as Houthi-Saleh forces). The internationalization of Yemen's conflict reflects wider trends that have seen Iran seek to challenge the security of its regional rivals through the provision of material support to state and non-state actors.

Although the current conflict began in 2015, its root causes are much deeper. A major factor in the conflict is competition between political elites for primacy in Yemen and between sub-state actors and ruling elites for influence. For decades, the most powerful political actor in Yemen has been former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh ruled northern Yemen from 1978 to 1990 and unified Yemen from 1990 to 2012. His presidency began to unravel in 2011, when political unrest broke out throughout the Arab world. Popular youth protests in Yemen were gradually supplanted by political elites jockeying to replace then-President Saleh. Concerned that the political unrest and resulting security vacuum were strengthening terrorist elements, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other members of the international community attempted to broker a political compromise. A transition plan was developed, and in 2012 former Vice President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi became president.

With the support of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Nations Security Council, President Hadi attempted to reform Yemen's political system. Throughout 2013, key stakeholders convened a National Dialogue Conference aimed at reaching broad national consensus on a new political order. However, in January 2014 it ended without agreement.

One antigovernment group in particular, the northern Yemeni Houthi movement, sought to use violence to reshape the political order.¹⁰ Within weeks of the National Dialogue Conference concluding, it launched an armed offensive against various tribal allies of President Hadi. The Houthis were joined by the forces still loyal to former President Saleh, creating an alliance of convenience and emerging as a formidable opponent to President Hadi and his allies. Ultimately, Houthi militants took over the capital and advanced from the capital all the way to Aden. In March 2015, after President Hadi, who had fled to Saudi Arabia, appealed for international intervention, Saudi Arabia and a hastily assembled international coalition launched a military offensive aimed at restoring Hadi's rule and evicting Houthi fighters from the capital and other major cities. Both sides have been fighting ever since.

Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners' interest in developments in Yemen arguably reflects their concern about regional security and threats to their territory and populations. The Houthis and other Iran-aligned actors describe their cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia as retaliatory and tactical, but the attacks reinforce regional governments' strategic concerns about Iran-backed armed groups and may contribute to their reluctance to curtail their military intervention.

provision in the final enacted version of the bill, S. 1790/P.L. 116-92.

⁹ "'Man-Made Crisis' Has Robbed Millions of Hope, Dignity, Secretary-General Tells Yemen Pledging Conference, Stressing Urgent Need For Support," U.N. Secretary-General Press Release, April 25, 2017; and U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths, Briefing to United Nations Security Council, June 15, 2021.

¹⁰ The Houthi movement was formed in the northern Yemeni governorate of Sa'dah (in the mountainous district of Marran) in 2004 under the leadership of members of the Houthi family. Between 2004 and 2010, the central government and the Houthis fought six wars in northern Yemen. Saudi Arabia supported the central government of Yemen in these various military campaigns against a Houthi insurgency. With each successive round of fighting, the Houthis improved their position, as antigovernment sentiment became more widespread amidst an aggrieved population in a war-torn and neglected north. Although the Houthi movement originally sought an end to what it viewed as Saudi-backed efforts to marginalize Zaydi communities and beliefs, its goals grew in scope and ambition in the wake of the 2011 uprising and government collapse to embrace a broader populist, anti-establishment message.

Congress, the Obama Administration, and Yemen (2015-2016)

2015

In the months following the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had made modest but inconclusive gains on the ground, and civilian casualties from coalition air strikes were drawing increasing international criticism. In Congress, several lawmakers began to express concern through letters and statements about civilian casualties, the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, and U.S. policy.¹¹ In October 2015, 10 Members of Congress wrote a letter to President Obama urging him to “work with our Saudi partners to limit civilian casualties to the fullest extent possible.”¹²

By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration reportedly tried to balance its concern for adherence to the laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners,¹³ lawmakers began to express concern over U.S. involvement in the coalition’s intervention by scrutinizing U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia.¹⁴ When the Administration informally notified¹⁵ Congress of a proposed sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification.¹⁶ After the formal notification in November 2015,¹⁷ the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) chair and ranking member jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments, marking the first use of this prior-notification request authority.¹⁸ No related joint resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the delay and the request for additional notification arguably demonstrated congressional concern.¹⁹

¹¹ “Saudis Face Mounting Pressure over Civilian Deaths in Yemen Conflict,” *New York Times*, September 29, 2015.

¹² Letter from Representative Debbie Dingell et al. to President Barack Obama, October 14, 2015. Available from CRS to congressional clients.

¹³ “As Saudis bombed Yemen, U.S. worried about Legal Blowback,” *Reuters*, October 10, 2016.

¹⁴ See, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Call by Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, and Jeff Prescott, Senior Director for the Middle East, NSC, on the Upcoming Visit of King Salman of Saudi Arabia, September 2, 2015.

¹⁵ See CRS Report RL31675, *Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process*, by Paul K. Kerr.

¹⁶ “Senate Democrats hold up Arms Sales for Saudi war in Yemen,” *Al Monitor*, October 7, 2015.

¹⁷ Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 15-57, November 16, 2015.

¹⁸ The request marked the first time that Congress has invoked an authority it added to the Arms Export Control Act in December 2014 through an amendment included in the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276). Section 201 of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276) added Section 36(i) to the AECA. Potentially applicable to any foreign military sale requiring notification pursuant to Section 36(b) of the AECA, the 36(i) mechanism requires both the chair and ranking member of either of the two committees of jurisdiction (Senate Foreign Relations Committee/House Foreign Affairs Committee) to jointly request that the President provide such a “pre-shipment notification” 30 days prior to a shipment. The pre-shipment notification would inform Congress that a shipment was about to occur, but would not require or preclude Congress from taking further action to modify or block the shipment.

¹⁹ Although Congress has more than one legislative option it can use to block or modify an arms sale, one option explicitly set out in law for blocking a proposed arms sale is the use of a joint resolution of disapproval as provided for in Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). See, CRS Report RL31675, *Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process*, by Paul K. Kerr.

2016

By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition²⁰ to U.S. support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amid repeated international documentation of human rights abuses²¹ and errant coalition air strikes.²² In April 2016, legislation was introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia (**Table 4**).²³ Proposed amendments to FY2017 defense legislation²⁴ would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia.²⁵ The PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was defeated in a June 2016 House floor vote.²⁶

In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict. From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition largely spared Yemen's capital Sana'a from aerial strikes as part of its commitment to the cessation of hostilities. When U.N.-mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified.

During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some of the U.S. support for Saudi Arabia's air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U.S. personnel assigned to a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell.²⁷ Nevertheless, overall U.S.-Saudi cooperation continued and, in August 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi Arabia. In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the proposal, citing concerns about Yemen.²⁸ In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 39) and House (H.J.Res. 98). On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further consideration of S.J.Res. 39 (71-27, Record Vote 145).²⁹ During debate over the motion, many Senators argued in favor of continued U.S. support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey

²⁰ See, for example, Senator Chris Murphy's remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, January 29, 2016.

²¹ In April 2016, the "Saudi Arabia-led coalition" was listed alongside other parties to the conflict in Yemen in the annex of the annual report of United Nations Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict for attacks that resulted in the killing and maiming attacks of children in Yemen. In July 2016, then-U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon alleged that Saudi Arabia had threatened to reduce its funding for U.N. programs if the coalition was not removed from the report annex, an allegation that Saudi leaders denied. In August 2016, the Secretary General said "the Saudi Arabia-led coalition was removed from the annexes, pending the conclusions of a review. ... But I want to repeat: the content of the report stands." See, U.N. Blacklists Saudi-led Coalition for Killing Children in Yemen, *Reuters*, October 5, 2017.

²² For example, see, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O'Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, New York, February 16, 2016, and Press briefing note on Yemen and Honduras, Spokesperson for the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Rupert Colville, Geneva, Switzerland, March 4, 2016.

²³ In the 114th Congress, see, S.J.Res. 32—A joint resolution to provide limitations on the transfer of certain United States munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia and H.J.Res. 90, To provide limitations on the transfer of certain United States munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia.

²⁴ In the 114th Congress, see, S. 2943—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 which became P.L. 114-328.

²⁵ In the 114th Congress, see H.R. 5293—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017.

²⁶ See, H.R. 5293, Recorded Vote, June 16, 2016, available at <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll327.xml>.

²⁷ "U.S. withdraws staff from Saudi Arabia dedicated to Yemen planning," *Reuters*, August 19, 2016.

²⁸ See Hon. Lieu et al., Letter to President Barack Obama, August 29, 2016.

²⁹ Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, pp. S5921-S5935.

Graham remarking “To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people in Iran will cheer you on.”³⁰

In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi air strike on a funeral hall in Sana’a that killed 140 people, the Obama Administration initiated a review of U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia.³¹ Based on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and refueling for coalition aircraft.³²

In the final months of the Obama Administration, U.S. Armed Forces exchanged fire with Houthi-Saleh forces. In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at U.S. Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen. The attacks against the U.S. ships marked the first time U.S. Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war. The Obama Administration responded to the attacks against U.S. naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations. The Obama Administration described the U.S. strikes as self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the conflict.³³ In August and November 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry made several attempts to broker a peace initiative in Oman, but the parties rejected his efforts.

Leahy Law and Saudi-led Coalition Strikes in Yemen

Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, prohibits the furnishing of assistance authorized by the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act to any foreign security force unit where there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The State Department and U.S. embassies overseas implement Leahy vetting to determine which foreign security individuals and units are eligible to receive U.S. assistance or training. In October 2016, Senator Patrick Leahy remarked that “The humanitarian crisis in Yemen has received too little attention, and it directly, or indirectly, implicates us.... The reports of civilian casualties from Saudi air attacks in densely populated areas compel us to ask if these operations, supported by the United States, violate [that law].”³⁴

Analysis

By the end of the 114th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign policy issue for lawmakers. While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the U.S. role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, more lawmakers still seemed to view the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a localized affair.³⁵ Amid significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members described Iran’s support for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran’s malign regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA. When Houthis targeted Gulf state

³⁰ op.cit., Congressional Record.

³¹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on Yemen, October 8, 2016.

³² “U.S. Blocks Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia amid Concerns over Yemen War,” *New York Times*, December 13, 2016.

³³ Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 14, 2016.

³⁴ “U.S. Support for Saudi Strikes in Yemen Raises War Crime Concerns,” *Foreign Policy.com*, October 15, 2016.

³⁵ “Senate tacitly endorses US role in Yemen War,” *Al Monitor*, September 21, 2016.

infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, U.S. officials and nongovernment observers cited their behavior as evidence of Iran's growing capabilities to threaten U.S. and Gulf security.³⁶

While some Members described the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iran-backed Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others portrayed it as a test of long-standing U.S. commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security.³⁷ Supporters of the relationship, while acknowledging that Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to curtail U.S. arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that was under threat from a hostile nonstate actor on its southern border.³⁸

Others lawmakers charged that continued U.S. support for the coalition was not improving coalition behavior but was damaging the U.S. reputation for upholding commitments to international law and human rights.³⁹ The 114th Congress did not enact legislation to limit U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia, but these years marked the beginning of the broader congressional debate that has continued.⁴⁰

As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid groups were pressing Congress to pay more attention to the growing humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to limit U.S.-coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia, some nongovernmental groups deemed this insufficient. According to Human Rights Watch, "Whatever conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created—in holding up the transfer of precision munitions near the tail end of Obama's term and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians."⁴¹

Congress, the Trump Administration, and Yemen (2017-2020)

2017

In his first year in office, President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter Iran, and increase U.S. counterterrorism activity in Yemen, while at the same time his Administration also took strong positions at times on the need for the coalition to improve humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian casualties.

From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump signaled strong support for the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference.

³⁶ Congressional Record, November 15, 2016, pp. H6202-H6208.

³⁷ Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, pp. S5921-S5935.

³⁸ See colloquy between Senators Bob Corker and John McCain on Senate floor, September 21, 2016. Congressional Record, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 162, No. 143.

³⁹ See remarks by Senator Christopher Murphy and Senator Rand Paul on Senate floor, September 21, 2016. Congressional Record, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 162, No. 143.

⁴⁰ As one analyst described this trend in 2016, "We haven't seen this much anti-Saudi activity on the Hill in a quarter of a century.... Criticism of Saudi Arabia has come out of the closet, and I don't think it's going to go back in." "Saudi Arabia is Facing Unprecedented Scrutiny from Congress," *Washington Post*, September 21, 2016.

⁴¹ "Obama Officials' Incomplete Reckoning with Failure on Yemen," *Just Security*, November 19, 2018.

He initiated a review of U.S. policy toward Yemen, including President Obama's October 2016 restrictions on U.S. arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition.⁴² On March 19, 2017, just before his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the Obama Administration, subject to congressional review.⁴³

In May 2017, the Trump Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed with sales of precision-guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had deferred, while announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia's air force on both targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict.⁴⁴ Congress debated another resolution of disapproval (S.J.Res. 42) of these proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below). After completing the policy review in July 2017, President Trump directed his Administration "to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and commerce in the Red Sea."⁴⁵

U.S. Counterterrorism Policy in Yemen 2015-2020

During both the Obama and Trump Administrations, the United States sustained counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and various affiliates of the Islamic State in Yemen. Throughout the conflict in Yemen, the United States targeted high-value individuals successfully within terrorist organizations. For example, in 2015, a U.S. strike killed then-AQAP leader Nasser al Wuhayshi.

At the start of the Trump presidency, the United States markedly increased the tempo of strikes.⁴⁶ According to one report, in early 2017, the President declared parts of three Yemeni provinces to be an "area of active hostilities" where more permissive rules of engagement reportedly applied.⁴⁷ In January 2017, Ryan Owens, a Navy SEAL, died during a counterterrorism raid in which between 4 and 12 Yemeni civilians also were killed, including several children. One of the children was a U.S. citizen. The raid was the Trump Administration's first acknowledged counterterror operation.

In subsequent years, these operations intensified and reportedly killed a number of prominent AQAP targets. In 2018, U.S. officials claimed that one of the most high-value members in the AQAP organization, bomb-maker Ibrahim al Asiri, had been killed in a U.S. air strike.⁴⁸ On January 4, 2019, the Department of Defense announced that a U.S. precision strike had killed Jamal al Badawi, one of the primary Yemeni terrorists involved in the 2000 USS *Cole* bombing. In February 2020, the United States announced that it had killed AQAP leader Qassim al Raimi in a drone strike.

⁴² "Trump Administration Looks to Resume Saudi Arms Sale Criticized as Endangering Civilians in Yemen," *Washington Post*, March 8, 2017; and, "Trump Administration Weighs Deeper Involvement in Yemen War," *Washington Post*, March 26, 2017.

⁴³ DDTC Transmittals No. DDTC 15-132 (JDAM), No. DDTC 16-011 (FMU-152A/B bomb fuzes), No. DDTC 16-043 (Paveway II & III, Enhanced Paveway II & III, Paveway IV), May 19, 2017.

⁴⁴ A November 2017 report suggests that Saudi Arabia agreed to purchase \$7 billion in precision munitions from U.S. companies in agreements that would span a decade. See, "Saudi Arabia Agrees to buy \$7 billion in Precision Munitions from U.S. firms: Sources," *Reuters*, November 22, 2017.

⁴⁵ Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer, February 27, 2018.

⁴⁶ "2017: A Record Year for US Counterterrorism Strikes," *Long War Journal*, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, January 3, 2018. See also, U.S. Department of Defense, CENTCOM Officials Provide Update on Recent Counterterrorism Strikes in Yemen, Dec. 20, 2017.

⁴⁷ "Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules," *New York Times*, March 12, 2017.

⁴⁸ Asiri was a Saudi national who was believed to have created the explosive devices used in the 2009 Christmas Day attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253, in a 2009 attack against former Saudi Arabian intelligence chief Mohammed bin Nayef, and in the October 2010 air cargo packages destined for Jewish sites in Chicago.

As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the Saudi-led coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen's 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah (Yemen's highest capacity port). In early 2017, some Members of Congress responded to the coalition's gradual advance toward Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, by imploring the Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire. In March 2017, several House Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to "use all U.S. diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international humanitarian aid organizations."⁴⁹ A month later, another group of House Members wrote to President Trump stating that "any decision by the administration to engage in direct U.S. hostilities against Yemen's Houthis must be subject to a congressional debate and vote."⁵⁰

On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution (S.J.Res. 42) to disapprove of three direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. During Senate floor consideration over the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42, Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen. Some lawmakers suggested that U.S. arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that continuing U.S. support to the coalition improves its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties.

For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that "If we are worried about collateral damage in Yemen, I understand the concern. Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt it."⁵¹ Senator Murphy responded, saying "What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis."⁵² On June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42 (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion resolution was not taken up in the House (H.J.Res. 102).

Representative Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res. 81) pursuant to the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) in a bid to end U.S. support for the coalition's military intervention. After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until after the November 2018 election and then adopted a nonbinding alternative (H.Res. 599, 366-30, 1 Present, Roll no. 623).⁵³

In November 2017, the conflict deepened when a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia and the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen's ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis.⁵⁴ The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and

⁴⁹ "Reps Lieu & Conyers lead 52 Member Letter urging Tillerson to use Diplomacy to reopen Yemen Port," March 13, 2017.

⁵⁰ U.S. Representative Mark Pocan, "Bipartisan Effort: 55 U.S. Representatives Call on Trump to Come to Congress Before Taking Military Action in Yemen," April 11, 2017.

⁵¹ Congressional Record, June 13, 2017, Issue: Vol. 163, No. 100—Daily Edition.

⁵² *op.cit.*, Congressional Record.

⁵³ Congressional Record, November 13, 2017, Vol. 163, No. 185, pp. H9148-H9155.

⁵⁴ After the coalition's imposition of the port's total closure, food and fuel prices skyrocketed, leading international aid

December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to “completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it. This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately.”⁵⁵

On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U.S.-funded cranes to Yemen to increase the port’s capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods.⁵⁶ The next day, the White House issued a statement welcoming “Saudi Arabia’s announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict.”⁵⁷

2018

As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U.S. support for the coalition’s military intervention. On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.J.Res. 54, a joint resolution to “direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U.S. forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces).” The Senate continued considering proposals to direct the President to remove U.S. forces from Yemen (see **Table 3** below).

Throughout 2018, there was disagreement between Congress and the Trump Administration and within Congress itself, as to whether U.S. forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution. Some Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U.S. forces have been introduced into a “situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated” based on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution.⁵⁸ The Trump Administration disagreed. In February

agencies to warn of impending famine. The total closure of all Yemeni ports lasted 20 days; the Saudi-led coalition then announced that it would begin allowing humanitarian aid to resume entering Hudaydah port—but not commercial shipments of food and fuel. The Saudi-led coalition argued that the Houthis earn hard currency by taxing fuel imports. Yemen imports 80% of its food from commercial suppliers rather than from humanitarian sources.

⁵⁵ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Yemen, December 6, 2017. Other statements include the following: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, White House Statement on Iranian-Supported Missile Attacks Against Saudi Arabia, November 8, 2017; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement from the Press Secretary on the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, November 24, 2017; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary Regarding the Violence and Humanitarian Conditions in Yemen, December 8, 2017.

⁵⁶ In late 2017, Senators Todd Young and Christopher Murphy placed a hold on the confirmation of the State Department’s nominee for legal advisor, Jennifer Newstead, until the Administration took certain steps to address the coalition’s blockade of Yemen. Dan De Luce and Robbie Gramer, “GOP Senator Presses Trump Administration Over Deadly Saudi Blockade in Yemen,” *Foreign Policy*, December 4, 2017; and, Dan De Luce, “Trump Nominee Concedes Saudi Siege of Yemen Could Be Violating U.S. Law,” *Foreign Policy*, December 19, 2017. On December 14, Senator Young sent a letter to President Trump thanking the President for his December 6 statement, while asserting that, per the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a)), the coalition’s blockade triggers a prohibition on U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia. Newstead was confirmed by the Senate on December 19 after promising the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider evidence of any possible foreign government restriction of the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Yemen in determining whether to apply statutory prohibitions found in 22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a). See, Senator Todd Young, Young: Law Triggered by Saudi Arabia’s Actions in Yemen, December 14, 2017, and Newstead response online at <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4333104-20171114-Young-Newstead-QFRs-Round-3-1.html>.

⁵⁷ The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on Saudi Arabia and Yemen, December 21, 2017.

⁵⁸ For example, see remarks of Senator Mike Lee on the Senate floor, November 28, 2018. Congressional Record, 115th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 187.

2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of current U.S. support, and reported that “the United States provides the KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia]-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling,⁵⁹ certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties.”⁶⁰

On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S.J.Res. 54. During floor debate, arguments centered on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen’s humanitarian crisis to reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad. After then-Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and hold hearings scrutinizing U.S. policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54. Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker’s approach, a majority of committee members voted to table the motion.⁶¹

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later. In parallel testimony before Congress, U.S. defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets.⁶² Then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S. Karem testified that “It’s correct that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen.”⁶³ During the same hearing, U.S. officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration was dealing with the coalition over the Yemen conflict. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following:

Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen. And that

⁵⁹ Until November 2018, U.S. in-flight refueling to the militaries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was conducted pursuant to the terms of bilateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) between the Department of Defense and the respective ministries of each country. Some retransfers of fuel services were provided to Saudi-led coalition members, and in 2015, Saudi Arabia received general purpose bombs retransferred by the United Arab Emirates. ACSA agreements are governed by 10 U.S.C. 2341-2350. The U.S. agreement with Saudi Arabia was signed in May 2016. Prior to May 2016, a “Joint Staff Execute Order signed on March 27, 2015, directed DOD to provide aerial refueling support to the SLC [Saudi-led coalition], if requested, and stated that the support would be provided on a reimbursable basis either through foreign military sales (FMS) or an ACSA.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Logistics Agreements: DOD Should Improve Oversight and Seek Payment from Foreign Partners for Thousands of Orders It Identifies as Overdue*, GAO-20-309, March 20, 2020, Appendix IV.

⁶⁰ Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer, February 27, 2018.

⁶¹ Senator Menendez said, “Based upon Chairman Corker’s commitments to those hearings and future markups and based upon the totality of the situation, I will vote to table the motion to discharge from the committee because I am not ready to either abandon our partners that face an existential threat from Iran run amok in Yemen, but my support is not unconditional, and I will demand responsive actions.” Congressional Record, March 20, 2018, 115th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 48—Daily Edition.

⁶² Commander, U.S. Central Command Gen. Joseph Votel, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 18, 2018.

⁶³ Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Karem, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17, 2018.

messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is extremely important.⁶⁴

After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new legislation to place conditions on U.S. assistance to the coalition. In May, the committee reported S.J.Res. 58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained.⁶⁵

The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of S.J.Res. 58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 (S. 2987). The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA (H.R. 5515, see textbox below). It was signed into law as P.L. 115-232 in mid-August, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications. In a statement accompanying the President's signing of P.L. 115-232 into law, President Trump objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration's view that such provisions "encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent" with "[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs."⁶⁶

As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched "Operation Golden Victory," aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen. On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis saying, "We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure. We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict."⁶⁷

Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U.S. sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said,

I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates

⁶⁴ Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17, 2018.

⁶⁵ The joint resolution identified several certification criteria, although, reported as amended by the committee, it would have enabled the Secretary of State to waive the certification requirement for national security purposes if the Secretary provided an unclassified explanatory justification to the appropriate committees. The joint resolution also would have required a report on, among other things, U.S. objectives in Yemen and a detailed strategy to accomplish those objectives.

⁶⁶ White House, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on H.R. 5515, August 13, 2018.

⁶⁷ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member's Press, Menendez, Corker, Murphy, Young, Colleagues raise Concerns about Imminent Military Operations at Hudaydah, Yemen, June 12, 2018.

humanitarian suffering.... Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis.⁶⁸

Congress Restricts In-Flight Refueling for Coalition Aircraft

Section 1290 of P.L. 115-232 states that potential restrictions on the use of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft would not apply to certain types of operations, including missions related to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State or “related to countering the transport, assembly, or employment of ballistic missiles or components in Yemen.” Under the final version of the provision, the Administration was required to certify that the Saudi and Emirati governments were undertaking

- an urgent and good faith effort to support diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Yemen;
- appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access for Yemenis to food, fuel, medicine, and medical evacuation, including through the appropriate use of Yemen's Red Sea ports, including the port of Hudaydah, the airport in Sana'a, and external border crossings with Saudi Arabia; and
- demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations of the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen, including by (1) complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles purchased or transferred from the United States, and (2) taking appropriate steps to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure.

With specific regard to Saudi Arabia, the Administration also was required certify that “the Government of Saudi Arabia is undertaking appropriate actions to reduce any unnecessary delays to shipments associated with secondary inspection and clearance processes other than [the United Nations Verification and Inspections Mechanism].” The Administration could waive the certification requirement if certain explanatory submissions were made. Reporting and strategy submission requirements also were included in the final version.

After the Trump Administration issued a certification to allow continued in-flight refueling, it subsequently decided to end that type of support (see below). The next year, Congress moved to codify a prohibition on the provision of in-flight refueling for a two-year period (Section 1273 of P.L. 116-92). In the 117th Congress, the House approved an amendment to its version of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act that would extend this prohibition for two further years (H.R. 4350; see **Table 1**).

On August 9, the coalition conducted an air strike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen, in the northern Sa'ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border. The strike reportedly killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children. The coalition claimed that its air strike was a “legitimate military operation” conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a day earlier that had killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom. The U.S. State Department called on the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a “thorough and transparent investigation into the incident.”⁶⁹

Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information regarding U.S. operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan.⁷⁰ Several Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act (H.R. 6157) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to Congress that the coalition air campaign “does not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians.” The provision would not have applied to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen.

⁶⁸ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member's Press, Menendez Demands more Answers from Trump Admin before letting Arms Sales to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia move forward, June 28, 2018.

⁶⁹ State Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert, Press Briefing, August 9, 2018.

⁷⁰ “Congress, White House Reaching Breaking Point on Yemen?” *Lobe Log*, August 16, 2018.

On September 12, Secretary of State Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232). Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration's actions, asserting that the coalition had not met the act's specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian casualties in Yemen.⁷¹

On September 26, several House Members introduced H.Con.Res. 138, which sought to direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within 30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been enacted into law. In response to H.Con.Res. 138, the Administration referenced its earlier detailed argument in objecting to S.J.Res. 54, expressing the President's view that U.S. forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen.⁷²

By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen, coupled with international reprobation over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi officials, had created pressure on the Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks. On October 30, then-Secretary of Defense Mattis and Secretary of State Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-fire and resume negotiations. On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U.S. capabilities—to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen.⁷³

Though fighting continued along several fronts, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire on December 13, 2018, centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah.⁷⁴ As part of the U.N.-brokered deal (known as the Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port.⁷⁵ The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment. The Security Council praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement.⁷⁶

Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S.J.Res. 54 (56-41), which, among other things, directed the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U.S. forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces. In the House, lawmakers twice approved rules containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration (H.Res.

⁷¹ Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Statement Following Trump Administration's Certification in Support of Saudi-led Coalition, September 12, 2018.

⁷² Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck Schumer, February 27, 2018.

⁷³ White House, Statement of Administration Policy on S.J.Res. 54, November 28, 2018.

⁷⁴ The full text of the cease-fire agreements are available at <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/full-text-stockholm-agreement>.

⁷⁵ On December 6, 2018, the warring parties to the conflict in Yemen convened in Sweden under the auspices of the United Nations to discuss various de-escalation proposals and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement. The talks were the first formal negotiations since 2016. After a week of negotiations, all sides agreed to the Stockholm Agreement, which consists of three components: a cease-fire around the port city of Hudaydah, a prisoner swap, and a statement of understanding that all sides would form a committee to discuss the war-torn city Taiz.

⁷⁶ U.N. Document SC/13643, Security Council Authorizes Immediate Deployment of Advance Team to Monitor Force Withdrawals, Ceasefire in Yemen, Adopting Resolution 2451 (2018), December 21, 2018.

1142 and H.Res. 1176).⁷⁷ On December 13, the Senate also passed S.J.Res. 69, which, among other things, expressed the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there was no statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war.

2019

For the first several months of 2019, implementation of the Stockholm Agreement stalled. According to Special Envoy Griffiths, “the initial timelines were rather ambitious” and “a complex situation on the ground” was stalling U.N.-backed efforts.⁷⁸ The Stockholm Agreement did not specify which local actors were to assume responsibility for security in Hudaydah after both parties redeployed.⁷⁹ According to reporting by the United Nations, initial implementation of the Stockholm Agreement was hindered by an overall lack of trust and a reluctance to make operational concessions outside of a comprehensive political agreement. On February 17, 2019, the United Nations announced that “The parties reached an agreement on Phase 1 of the mutual redeployment of forces” whereby the Houthis would withdraw from Hudaydah port and the Saudi-led coalition would move out of the eastern outskirts of Hudaydah city.⁸⁰

At the February 2019 Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East in Warsaw, Poland, members of the self-described “quad” (United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) met to coordinate their policy toward the Yemen conflict. The quad emphasized the importance of implementing the Stockholm Agreement, the problematic role Iran plays in arming and financing the Houthis, and the need for additional humanitarian assistance. The foreign ministers comprising the quad also “expressed full support for Saudi Arabia and its legitimate national security concerns and called for an immediate end to such attacks by Houthi forces and their allies.”

In February 2019, CNN reported that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had provided U.S. military equipment (armored vehicles) to local Yemeni units fighting the Houthis in possible violation of end-user foreign military sale or direct commercial sale agreements.⁸¹ The coalition denied these charges, while the U.S. State Department said that it was “seeking additional information” on the issue.⁸² In Senate and House hearings in early February, some Members expressed concern about end-use monitoring of equipment provided to the coalition.⁸³

⁷⁷ See Section 2 of H.Res. 1176, Providing for consideration of the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 2) to provide for the reform and continuation of agricultural and other programs of the Department of Agriculture through fiscal year 2023, and for other purposes.

⁷⁸ “U.N. Envoy Urges Yemen Combatants to Withdraw from Lifeline Port,” *Reuters*, January 28, 2019.

⁷⁹ “Explainer: What’s So Hard About Implementing a Peace Deal in Yemen’s Main Port,” *Reuters*, February 26, 2019.

⁸⁰ “Yemen’s Parties Agree to Start Stalled Troop Withdrawal from Main Port,” *Reuters*, February 17, 2019.

⁸¹ Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Mohamed Abo El Gheit and Laura Smith-Spark, “Sold to an ally, lost to an enemy,” CNN.com, February 2019. Available at <https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/yemen-lost-us-arms/>.

⁸² In May 2020, CNN reported that the State and Defense departments concluded their investigation into the possible illegal transfer of U.S. equipment and determined that the UAE had been cleared, adding that the “State Department has told some leaders in Congress that it is ‘satisfied no actual transfers were made.’” See, Nima Elbagir, Alison Main, Salma Abdelaziz, Laura Smith-Spark and Jennifer Hansler, “The US Cleared the Way for a New Arms Sale to the UAE, Despite Evidence it Violated the Last One,” CNN, May 22, 2020.

⁸³ “Hearing to Receive Testimony on the United States Central Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program,” Senate Armed Services Committee, February 5, 2019; “Hearing on U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 6, 2019.

On February 7, 2019, Senator Robert Menendez, ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced S. 398, the Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act of 2019 (**Table 2**). This bill, which was originally introduced in the 115th Congress, would have, among other things, legislatively required an end to in-flight refueling for Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen, suspended certain arms sales to the kingdom, sanctioned persons blocking humanitarian access in Yemen, and sanctioned persons supporting the Houthis in Yemen. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the bill to the Senate in July 2019.

In response to reporting by the *New York Times* on the use of child soldiers by the Saudi-led coalition, 13 Members of Congress wrote to Secretary Pompeo on February 15, 2019, seeking information about the accuracy of the reports, and about whether these children had been provided U.S.-made weapons and uniforms. Coalition officials denied the reports. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were not included on the annual U.S. list of countries using child soldiers, although the 2019 Trafficking in Persons report detailed continuing concerns about the government of Yemen's willingness and ability to end child soldier use by its forces and others.⁸⁴

On February 13, 2019, the House passed H.J.Res. 37 (248-177), a joint resolution originally introduced in the 115th Congress (S.J.Res. 54), "Directing the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress." Prior to its passage by the House, the White House issued a State of Administration Policy in which the Administration argued that "the premise of the joint resolution is flawed" because the United States had provided only "limited support to member countries of the Saudi-led coalition" and U.S. forces providing such intelligence and logistics support were not engaged in hostilities. Section 4 of H.J.Res. 37 includes a rule of construction stating that "Nothing in this joint resolution may be construed to influence or disrupt any intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative activities conducted by, or in conjunction with, the United States Government."

In March, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 7 (54-46), the companion resolution to H.J.Res. 37. The House passed S.J.Res. 7 (247-175) on April 4. President Trump vetoed the resolution on April 16, citing a concern that the resolution would weaken his constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief, harm bilateral relationships, and negatively affect efforts to prevent civilian casualties and prevent the spread of terrorist organizations in the Arabian Peninsula.⁸⁵ House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer responded to the presidential veto message stating that "the fight is not yet over, and the House will explore further legislation and conduct rigorous oversight."⁸⁶

On May 2, 2019, the resolution failed to garner the 67 votes needed to override the veto in the Senate (53-45). Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell reiterated his opposition to what he referred to as the false premises of the measure: "We're not parties to the civil war in Yemen. We're no longer providing air-to-air refueling. More importantly, the measure would make it actually more difficult to prevent the loss of innocent lives."⁸⁷ Text from the House-passed version of H.J.Res. 37 subsequently was added to the House version of the FY2020 Defense appropriations act (Title X of H.R. 2968) and passed by the House, but not included in the final version of the act.

⁸⁴ State Department, 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 20, 2019. Yemen was listed as a "Special Case" for the fourth consecutive year.

⁸⁵ The White House, "Presidential Veto Message to the Senate to Accompany S.J. Res. 7," April 16, 2019.

⁸⁶ "Hoyer Statement on President Trump's Veto of the Bipartisan Yemen War Powers Resolution," Press Release, April 17, 2019.

⁸⁷ Marianne Levine, "Senate fails to override Trump's veto on Yemen," Politico, May 5, 2019.

Houthi forces began handing over control of Hudaydah and two other ports on the Red Sea on May 10, in accordance with the first phase of redeployment laid out in the Stockholm Agreement. Hadi government officials subsequently questioned the legitimacy of the withdrawal, with the Information Minister calling it a “theatrical play”; Special Envoy Griffiths stated in a briefing to the U.N. Security Council on May 15 that the Houthis had complied with the withdrawal.⁸⁸

Though mediators had expressed hope that the Stockholm Agreement would lead to broader peace negotiations, the Houthis escalated their drone and ballistic missile attacks against Saudi Arabia during the summer of 2019. The Houthis called these attacks their “airport for airport” campaign, stating that they would target Saudi civilian airports for as long as the Saudi-led coalition maintains its closure of Sana’a airport. The Houthis launched multiple unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks against regional airports in Saudi Arabia (Jizan, Najran, and Abha), forcing the suspension of flights, damaging runways, and killing several civilians. Iran is believed to be the original source of UAV technology and knowledge transfer to the Houthis.⁸⁹ However, the Houthis may have begun manufacturing their own UAVs. According to *Jane’s Defence*, “the available evidence suggests that *Ansar Allah* is increasingly making use of parts that are commercially available on the international market to develop new UAV designs.”⁹⁰

On May 24, 2019, the Trump Administration formally notified Congress of immediate foreign military sales and direct commercial sales of training, equipment, and weapons with a possible value of more than \$8 billion, including sales of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the gift transfer of PGMs by the UAE to Jordan. Other notified sales included, among others, F-15 engines and support for Saudi Arabia and AH-64 equipment, Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles, and Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missiles for the UAE. In the Administration’s justification for the emergency sales to Congress, it described a “rapidly-evolving security situation in the region” and noted, among others, the threat posed by Iranian-backed Houthis, who have “publicly threatened to increase operations targeting vital military targets in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-Led Coalition positions in Yemen.”⁹¹

On June 5, 2019, a group of seven Senators introduced 22 separate joint resolutions of disapproval against the sales. One cosponsor, Senator Lindsey Graham, expressed in a statement his concern about “the precedent these arms sales would set by having the Administration go around legitimate concerns of Congress.”⁹² The Senate adopted all 22 of the measures. Three of the measures focused on proposed sales of air-to-ground munitions were adopted by the House and Senate and vetoed by the President (see **Table 2**).

In summer 2019, the UAE unilaterally withdrew most of its forces from Yemen. The UAE had been Saudi Arabia’s primary partner in the coalition war against the Houthis. The UAE’s local partners in southern Yemen, the Transitional Political Council for the South (aka Southern Transitional Council, STC), attempted to seize more power in Aden from the Hadi government

⁸⁸ “Houthi withdrawal from Yemen ports going according to plan: UN,” Al Jazeera, May 12, 2019.

⁸⁹ In January 2018, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen identified military unmanned aerial vehicles that are of Iranian origin (Ababil-T/Qasef-1) and were brought into Yemen after the imposition of the targeted 2015 arms embargo. See, Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/68) [EN/AR].

⁹⁰ “Ansar Allah ‘Airport for Airport’ Strategy underlines Potential for Re-Escalation of Yemen Conflict,” *Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor*, June 21, 2019.

⁹¹ Congressional Record, June 4, 2019, pp. S3203-S3209.

⁹² Joe Gould, “Graham, Menendez offer action to thwart Trump arms sales to Saudi, UAE and Jordan,” *Defense News*, June 5, 2019.

following the UAE's withdrawal. Violent confrontations ensued between STC and pro-Hadi forces. Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE brokered a power-sharing agreement between Hadi's supporters and the STC in November 2019, implementation of that deal stalled, leaving the STC ensconced in the South, the Houthis controlling the north, and the Hadi government isolated.

Beyond the ground war in Yemen, the Houthis continued to launch missile, rocket, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)⁹³ attacks intermittently against Saudi Arabian population centers and energy infrastructure. After sophisticated air attacks against Saudi Arabian oil fields of Abqaiq and Khurais in September 2019, attacks widely attributed to Iran but claimed by the Houthis, the Houthis announced that they would suspend missile and UAV attacks against Saudi Arabia. Between September and December 2019, Saudi, Yemeni government, and Houthi representatives engaged in talks aimed at de-escalating the fighting. The talks were accompanied by several confidence-building measures, such as prisoner exchanges and medical evacuation flights from Sana'a to Amman, Jordan. However, in January 2020, the Houthis resumed their UAV and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia (see below).⁹⁴

Section 1273 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) codified (for a two-year period) an existing Department of Defense policy to end in-flight refueling of Saudi-led coalition aircraft engaged in hostile operations in Yemen. After President Trump signed the act, he issued a signing statement asserting that

Several provisions of the Act, including sections 1254, 1273, 1698(a), and 2810, purport to restrict the President's authority to manage personnel, materiel, and logistical matters in the manner the President believes to be necessary or advisable for the successful conduct of military missions and foreign affairs....My Administration will implement these provisions consistent with the President's authority as Commander in Chief....

Other provisions proposed, considered, and adopted in the House during 2019 debate over the National Defense Authorization Act were not included in the final enacted version. These provisions included language that would have prohibited all U.S. support to and participation in the Saudi-led coalition's military operations against the Houthis in Yemen and provided for a one-year ban on U.S. sales of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with some exceptions (see **Table 1** below).

2020

Saudi Arabia and the Houthis engaged for months during 2020 in negotiations⁹⁵ over how to deescalate their conflict, but to the contrary, conflict grew more intense.⁹⁶ During winter 2020, amidst the backdrop of fracturing in the anti-Houthi opposition, the Houthis launched a new offensive into Jawf governorate, where they succeeded in seizing the provincial capital. By April 2020, the Houthis were in position to threaten Marib governorate, one of the last Yemeni areas

⁹³ According to one analysis, "The Houthis have demonstrated that their UAV technology has greatly improved since the weapons were first introduced to their military arsenal. No other known non-state armed group (NSAG) across the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region and beyond has reached the same level of UAV technological sophistication." See, Ludovico Carlino, "Houthis Selecting More UAVs Over Ballistic Missiles in Arabian Peninsula Attacks," *Jane's Intelligence Weekly*, December 6, 2019.

⁹⁴ See, Missy Ryan and Kareem Fahim, "Saudi Arabia and Yemen's Rebels Were Making Rare Progress in Peace Talks. Then New Violence Flared," *Washington Post*, February 4, 2020.

⁹⁵ "Saudi, Yemen's Houthis hold 'Indirect Talks' in Oman to End War," *Al Jazeera*, November 13, 2019. See also, Colum Lynch, Lara Seligman, Robbie Gramer, "Can a Young Saudi Prince End the War in Yemen?" *ForeignPolicy.com*, November 20, 2019.

⁹⁶ "Saudi Arabia Looks for an Exit to the War in Yemen," *The Economist*, April 18, 2020, edition.

loyal to the Hadi government and where Yemen's modest oil and gas reserves are located. Throughout 2020, the Houthis pressed an offensive against Marib, and fighting continued in and around the northern port of Hudaydah and along an arc from Ta'izz governorate in the southwest through Bayda, Marib, and Al Jawf governorates.

Evidence of Iranian military support to the Houthis also manifested itself during the year. In February 2020, the USS *Normandy* intercepted a small *dhow* (trading vessel) while on patrol in the Arabian Sea and discovered a cache of Iranian weapons intended for delivery to Yemen; some of the items seized included Iranian-made copies of a Russian antitank guided missile, Iranian-designed and manufactured surface-to-air missiles, and components for unmanned maritime systems.⁹⁷ On March 28, 2020, the Houthis fired missiles at the Saudi capital Riyadh (and elsewhere in the kingdom), and Saudi air defenses reportedly intercepted the projectiles. The remnants of previous Houthi ballistic missile attacks against Saudi Arabia have proven to resemble Iran's Qiam missile, which itself is a modified short-range Scud missile.⁹⁸

In late April 2020, the STC declared self-administration in southern Yemen, upending a power-sharing agreement between it and the central Yemeni government signed in November 2019 in Riyadh. Violent clashes followed the STC's announcement, and the separatist group seized hundreds of millions in cash from the central bank in Aden. Saudi Arabia continued to broker STC-ROYG negotiations. In December 2020, the STC formally joined a unity government with the ROYG.

At the end of 2020, the Houthis retained control of Hudaydah, the Stockholm agreement remained unfulfilled, and the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) remained active. Food insecurity was increasing. As of December 2020, there were 4.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Yemen, among whom 1.7 million were children. According to the December 2020 United Nations' Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) projections for Yemen, 54% of the population (16.2 million) was seen as vulnerable to experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity in the first half of 2021. U.N. projections further estimated 11 million people would likely be in crisis (IPC Phase 3), 5 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and 47,000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5, famine-like conditions).⁹⁹

The COVID-19 Pandemic in Yemen

As the COVID-19 pandemic spread throughout Yemen, humanitarian workers accused the Houthis of covering up the extent of the outbreak in areas under their control.¹⁰⁰ Through the end of 2020, officially reported COVID-19 cases were low, as weak testing capacity masked the extent of infections and likely inflated the relative case fatality rate.¹⁰¹

As the pandemic escalated, United Nations officials called for worldwide humanitarian cease-fires in various conflict zones in order to respond. On April 8, 2020, Saudi Arabia unilaterally announced a two-week cease-fire in Yemen and a \$500 million pledge of humanitarian aid. At a June 2020 pledging conference hosted by Saudi Arabia,

⁹⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, Central Command Holds Defense Department Media Availability, February. 19, 2020.

⁹⁸ Jeremy Binnie and Mohammed Najib, "'New' Houthi Missile Appears to be Another Iranian Scud Derivative," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, March 30, 2020.

⁹⁹ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), "Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October - December 2020 and Projection for January - June 2021."

¹⁰⁰ "Rebel threats, secret burials and shuttered hospitals mask spread of Yemen's epidemic," *Washington Post*, June 3, 2020.

¹⁰¹ Mohammed Noushad and Inas Shakeeb Al-Saqqaf, "COVID-19 case fatality rates can be highly misleading in resource-poor and fragile nations: the case of Yemen," *Clinical Microbiology and Infection*, April 2021; 27(4): 509–510.

donors pledged an additional \$1.35 billion to support assistance programs in Yemen. The U.N.'s \$2.4 billion appeal remained underfunded throughout the year, and humanitarian services were scaled back.

International frustration over Houthi obstruction of humanitarian assistance mounted during the year. Donors and aid implementers warned that if the Houthis would not abide by the principles of international humanitarian law and allow for unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance, they would risk losing aid in areas under their control.¹⁰² The Trump Administration supported international attempts to pressure the Houthis to abide by international humanitarian law. On March 24, 2020, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) initiated a partial suspension of \$50 million in humanitarian programming in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, and maintained its partial suspension during the year due to continued “Houthi-imposed bureaucratic impediments.” USAID continued to fund more than \$13 million in humanitarian nongovernmental organization activities in northern Yemen for programs that could be conducted without Houthi interference.

Amid worsening humanitarian conditions and renewed conflict, some Members of Congress called on the Trump Administration to step up its role in resolving the standoff between the Houthis and international aid agencies. In February 2020, several Senators wrote a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo asking him to take a more active role in “ensuring the unimpeded, accountable, and impartial flow of assistance and commerce into Yemen.” A month later, a group of House Members urged Secretary Pompeo to not suspend aid in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and other humanitarian considerations, concerns about the Houthis notwithstanding.¹⁰³

In May 2020, six Senators wrote a letter to Secretary Pompeo and Acting USAID Administrator Barsa saying “We recognize the challenge that Houthi obstruction poses to relief efforts in Yemen....We must ensure that development dollars provided to Yemen actually benefit the people most in need of help, and do not enrich Houthi forces or their partners, who have regularly imposed unacceptable constraints on common-sense measures to track and account for funds and supplies.”¹⁰⁴ In June 2020, a bipartisan group of Senators wrote a letter to Secretary Pompeo seeking his leadership in resolving the conflict in Yemen, writing “Your interventions were important to securing past interim agreements. We now believe that sustained, high-level U.S. engagement is necessary to finally put an end to this devastating civil war.”¹⁰⁵

Analysis

The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive

¹⁰² Lisa Barrington, “Aid to Houthi-controlled Yemen to be cut back over risk it can be diverted –sources,” Reuters, February 6, 2020.

¹⁰³ Bryant Harris, “Intel: Democrats Warn Trump Administration against Cutting Yemen Aid,” *Al Monitor*, March 26, 2020.

¹⁰⁴ Letter from Senators Cardin, Young, Coons, Leahy, Sanders, and Reed to Secretary of State Pompeo and Acting Administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development John Barsa, May 12, 2020, available online at https://www.cardin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05122020%20State_USAID%20Yemen%20Letter%20Final.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ Letter from Senators Murphy, Young, Coons, Romney, Durbin, Sanders, Merkley, Cardin, and Warren to Secretary of State Pompeo, June 16, 2020, available online at <https://www.murphy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/20.6.16%20Yemen%20Letter%20Signed%20FINAL.pdf>.

Murphy, Young Lead Bipartisan Call for Pompeo to Facilitate Diplomatic Solution to End Yemen War, June 16, 2020.

Administrations were adhering to existing law related to providing security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human rights standards (e.g., 22 U.S.C. §2754 or 22 U.S.C. §2304). They also enacted new legislation that would condition or prohibit the use of U.S. funds for some activities related to Yemen and would extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen.

The House and Senate took different approaches to Yemen at the conclusion of the 115th Congress. The House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration.¹⁰⁶ The Senate passed S.J.Res. 54 at the conclusion of the 115th Congress demonstrating broader opposition in the Senate to U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years. Over time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or restrictive of U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight measures, and war powers measures.

The 116th Congress debated U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen throughout 2019 and 2020. Some Members continued to express dismay at the humanitarian situation in Yemen and called on relevant parties to implement the Stockholm Agreement and to establish and maintain a ceasefire. In hearings in both chambers, some Members raised concerns about the actions of the Saudi-led coalition, highlighting potential end-use monitoring violations of U.S. weapons provided to the coalition, civilian casualties from coalition air strikes, and reports of coalition use of child soldiers.

President Trump vetoed bipartisan efforts to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen (S.J.Res. 7) and to disapprove of sales of air-to-ground munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (S.J.Res. 36, S.J.Res. 37, and S.J.Res. 38). Both chambers' passage of the underlying measures demonstrated continued congressional opposition to aspects of U.S. policy.

Despite the passage of these measures, it remained difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen. Many in the House and Senate stated that they sought to preserve cooperative U.S.-Saudi relations in broad terms and expressed concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close. Some lawmakers expressed opposition to the Saudi intervention and U.S. involvement on moral grounds, citing errant coalition air strikes and the prospect of famine and mass displacement. Others argued that the conflict was creating opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their influence and operations in Yemen. Still others also referred to factors not directly related to conditions in Yemen, such as the mechanisms and authorities used by the executive branch to support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the 2018 killing of Jamal Khashoggi and other human rights issues, when discussing continued U.S. support for the coalition's operations.

Congressional consideration of Yemen legislation during the 115th and 116th Congresses also typified broader efforts by some Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U.S. foreign policy and to leverage legislative processes to enhance their effectiveness. Measures to expand oversight of U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition and U.S. strategy toward Yemen received broad bipartisan support, while proponents of other arms sales and war powers measures used legislative mechanisms to ensure prompt and/or privileged consideration of their proposals. The volume and frequency of expressions of congressional opposition and the passage of measures rejecting aspects of the Administration's policy by majorities in both chambers

¹⁰⁶ "House Republicans move to block Yemen War-Powers votes for rest of Congress," *The Hill*, December 11, 2018.

appeared to signal constraints on the choices available to the White House and governments in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

In considering the NDAA for 2021 (H.R. 6395), the House endorsed a Yemen-related provision directing a complete end of U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition airstrike operations, though House and Senate conferees removed the provision from the final version of the act. As the 116th Congress drew to a close, Members enacted the NDAA over the President's veto, including comprehensive reporting and oversight requirements related to Yemen. The act directed the Comptroller General to complete a report on all U.S. assistance to the coalition from the start of the conflict and to examine the relationship between U.S. support to the coalition and civilian casualties and humanitarian access restrictions.

Congress, the Biden Administration, and Yemen (2021)

2021

In January 2021, in the final weeks of the Trump Administration, President Trump designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity. In notifying Congress, then-Secretary of State Pompeo asserted that the Houthis were closely linked to Iran and that the designations were intended to hold the Houthis accountable for terrorist acts.¹⁰⁷ The designations reportedly had been under consideration for months, and aid organizations had repeatedly cautioned that designations would exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. On January 19, in concurrence with the FTO designation of the Houthis, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued four general licenses to allow humanitarian assistance and other commodities to reach Yemen even if a transaction involved the Houthis.

Congressional reactions to President Trump's actions in the final days of his Administration were mixed. Some Members wished to see the United States continue its maximum pressure campaign on Iran, while other Members called on the Biden Administration to reverse the designations. The terrorist designations of the Houthis also drew bipartisan congressional concern over their timing, efficacy, potential harm to any peace process, and possible humanitarian impact.¹⁰⁸

After President Biden took office, one of his first foreign policy priorities was to review the previous administration's recent actions on Yemen. On January 25, OFAC issued a new general license exempting nearly all transactions with the Houthis from sanctions restrictions until February 26, 2021, while the Yemen sanctions policy was reviewed.¹⁰⁹

On February 4, 2021, President Biden announced that his Administration would increase U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict in Yemen by (1) appointing a special envoy to Yemen; (2) ending U.S. support for offensive operations in the war, including relevant arms sales; and (3) continuing to help Saudi Arabia defend its territory from Houthi attacks. A week later, Secretary of State

¹⁰⁷ U.S. Department of State, "Terrorist Designation of Ansarallah in Yemen," Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, January 10, 2021.

¹⁰⁸ Jack Detsch, "Stop F—ing Lying": Congress, Trump Officials in Heated Exchange Over Terrorism Designations," *Foreign Policy*, January 11, 2021.

¹⁰⁹ U.S. Department of the Treasury, available online at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ct_gl13.pdf.

Antony Blinken revoked the FTO and SDGT designations of the Houthis.¹¹⁰ The Secretary retained the designations of three Houthi individuals as Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) under Executive Order (E.O.) 13611.¹¹¹ President Obama issued that order in 2012 to block property of persons threatening the peace, security, or stability of Yemen. On March 2, the Biden Administration designated two additional Houthi leaders under E.O. 13611.¹¹²

In February 2021, the Houthis resumed their offensive against Marib.¹¹³ As of early October 2021, that offensive has continued and expanded to new fronts in parts of southern Yemen, as the Houthis seek to cut off ROYG reinforcement of Marib. Houthi fighters have attacked in waves and used unmanned aerial vehicles to target ROYG fortifications. According to one report, as of October 1, 2021, 1,700 government troops in Marib province have been killed and around 7,000 wounded.¹¹⁴ The Houthis have endured high casualties as well as they made gains toward Marib city, as Saudi air strikes have targeted Houthi fighters advancing over open ground.¹¹⁵

Since February 2021, U.S. Special Envoy Lenderking has engaged in talks with key parties to the conflict through an ongoing series of visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and other regional countries. In March 2021, Saudi Arabia offered a nationwide ceasefire¹¹⁶ that Lenderking praised and said that “preconditions only prolong war and suffering and obstruct the kind of durable peace agreement that will bring true relief to Yemenis.”¹¹⁷ The Houthis almost immediately dismissed the Saudi proposal as “nothing new” and reiterated their demands for the Saudis unilaterally to lift their blockade of Sana’a airport and Hudaydah port.¹¹⁸

Between April and June 2021, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity around the Yemen conflict. In April, the Iraqi government announced that it had hosted talks between Saudi and Iranian officials over a range of issues, presumably including Yemen.¹¹⁹ Special Envoy Griffiths, in a final diplomatic push before his departure, traveled to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Iran where he continued to advocate for his four-point plan (agreeing to a nation-wide cease-fire, the opening of Sana’a airport, the lifting of shipping restrictions on Hudaydah port, and the restarting of a political process). However, by late June 2021, despite some reports that had indicated both sides

¹¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of Ansarallah, Press Statement Antony J. Blinken, Secretary Of State, February 12, 2021.

¹¹¹ Ibid., U.S. Department of State, February 12, 2021.

¹¹² U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, “Treasury Sanctions Key Military Leaders of the Ansarallah Militia in Yemen,” Press Release, March 2, 2021.

¹¹³ “Yemen’s Houthis Renew Offensive to Capture Government Stronghold Marib,” Middle East Eye, February 8, 2021.

¹¹⁴ Siobhán O’Grady and Ali Al Mujahed, “Battle for the Badlands: Yemen’s seven-year civil war could turn on fierce fighting in remote Marib province,” *Washington Post*, October 1, 2021.

¹¹⁵ Samy Magdy, “Grueling Battle for Key Yemeni City,” Associated Press, July 12, 2021.

¹¹⁶ Specifically, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan proposed that, if the Houthis agree to a nationwide ceasefire under U.N. supervision, Saudi Arabia would (1) adhere to a U.N.-supervised ceasefire, (2) reopen Sana’a International Airport to direct flights, (3) allow fuel into Hudaydah port with revenues deposited in a joint Houthi-ROYG bank account, and (4) restart political negotiations for a permanent settlement to the conflict.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, Briefing on Yemen with Timothy Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen; and Sarah Charles, USAID Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Assistance, August 9, 2021.

¹¹⁸ Reuters, “Houthis say nothing new in Saudi peace offer, will keep talking,” March 22, 2021.

¹¹⁹ Qassim Abdul Zahra, “Iran, Saudi Sides Continue Tension-Easing Talks in Baghdad,” Associated Press, September 27, 2021.

were close to a deal,¹²⁰ Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal Bin Farhan said that the Houthis had not responded to repeated Saudi peace proposals.¹²¹

The Biden Administration has welcomed the August 2021 appointment of Swedish diplomat Hans Grundberg as the new U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen. Grundberg told the Security Council in September 2021, “I will spare no effort in trying to bring together actors across conflict lines to engage Yemenis from all political perspectives and societal components and from all parts of the country to discuss, under United Nations auspices, how they can find common ground and resolve their differences without resorting to force.”¹²² As of October 1, 2021, the Houthis have continued to demand that the coalition agree to lift restrictions on access to airports and ports in northern Yemen prior to any ceasefire agreement.¹²³

By summer 2021, the Biden Administration had become more openly critical of the Houthis for rejecting repeated attempts at brokering a cease-fire while continuing their ground offensive in Yemen and their aerial assaults against civilian targets inside Saudi Arabia. According to State Department spokesperson Ned Price:

When it comes to Yemen, you asked if we are fed up with the Houthi attacks. The answer to that is yes. We are beyond fed up. We are horrified by the repeated attacks on Marib. We strongly condemn the Houthi missile attack on a residential neighborhood in Marib on June 29th. It took civilian lives, including the life of a child. We believe it is long past time to end the conflict in Yemen and to provide immediate relief to the Yemeni people.¹²⁴

Several months later, U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Richard Mills spoke before the Security Council, where he reiterated the Biden Administration’s view that the Houthis were obstructing the peace process. According to Ambassador Mills:

The parties must choose to lay down their arms, and sit across the table from other Yemenis, and discuss what Yemen will look like after the war. Sadly, the Houthis continue to undermine these efforts.... In 2021 alone, the Houthis have launched more than 240 attacks into Saudi Arabia, endangering civilians throughout the country, including the 70,000 American citizens who reside there.¹²⁵

Throughout 2021, the Biden Administration has continued the policy of successive administrations to thwart Iranian assistance to the Houthis. In May 2021, the USS *Monterey* seized hundreds of smuggled weapons inside a stateless dhow (fishing boat) in the Arabian Sea. U.S. officials noted that the illicit shipment originated in Iran and was most likely bound for the Houthis.¹²⁶ In another line of effort to curb Iranian influence in Yemen, on June 10, 2021, under the authority of Executive Order 13224, OFAC designated several members of a smuggling network that “helps fund Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and

¹²⁰ Aziz El Yaakoubi, “End of Yemen Quagmire? Saudi-led Coalition, Houthis Near Peace Deal,” Reuters, June 21, 2021.

¹²¹ “Saudi Minister says Houthis did not respond to ceasefire proposal,” Middle East Monitor, June 23, 2021.

¹²² U.N. Document S/PV.8854, U.N. Security Council Meeting, September 10, 2021.

¹²³ On August 8, Oman-based Houthi negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam said via Twitter, “There is no use in having any dialogue before airports and ports are opened as a humanitarian necessity and priority.” Reuters, “Top Houthi negotiator says no point in meeting new U.N. envoy now,” August 8, 2021.

¹²⁴ U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, July 1, 2021.

¹²⁵ United States Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills, U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations, New York, NY, September 10, 2021.

¹²⁶ John Gambrell, “US Navy Seizes Weapons in Arabian Sea Likely Bound for Yemen,” Associated Press, May 9, 2021.

the Houthis in Yemen.”¹²⁷ This designation came several weeks after the Biden Administration, pursuant to Executive Order 13611, designated two senior Houthi leaders as SDNs for their role in the offensive against Marib.¹²⁸

Since the President’s February 2021 policy pronouncement on Yemen, the United States has ceased support to offensive operations by Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners and made some changes to U.S. missile and air defense posture in Saudi Arabia. In April 2021, CENTCOM Commander General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. told one reporter that in Marib, “We’re not doing anything in terms of ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) ... on things happening in Marib or places like that.”¹²⁹ Nevertheless, Administration officials have reiterated U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s territorial defense. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Amanda Dory, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated:

Our second line of effort is to provide limited, non-combat support to the Saudi-led Coalition (SLC) focused on defending Saudi Arabia from external threats. This non-combat support is consistent with President Biden’s February 4, 2021 announcement to increase U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the war in Yemen and cease U.S. support to SLC offensive operations in Yemen. Continued U.S. assistance is designed to reassure U.S. partners of our commitment to their defense so that they can meaningfully engage in the United Nations political process to end the war. In support of the President’s policy, roughly 60 DoD military advisors are deployed to help Saudi Arabia’s Armed Forces defend their territory from threats emanating from Yemen.¹³⁰

Throughout 2021, the United States has remained the top single donor of humanitarian assistance for Yemen. In FY2021, the United States contributed \$805.8 million toward the crisis, bringing total U.S. contributions to nearly \$3.9 billion since the start of the crisis in 2014/2015. U.S. officials have called for restrictions on fuel imports through Hudaydah port to be “lifted immediately” and for Sana’a airport to be “opened and operational.”¹³¹ In September 2021, Acting U.S. Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Richard Mills said, “the violence in Yemen must stop. A broad and inclusive political process must resume, and we need to alleviate the humanitarian crisis.”¹³² COVID-19 testing capacity remains low; through October 18, 2021, Yemen had recorded more than 9,500 cases and more than 1,800 deaths.¹³³

In 2021, the crisis in Yemen has not been as prominent a matter before Congress as in previous years, when Congress considered and voted on war powers authorizations and possible emergency arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others. During the 117th Congress, as **Table 1** below indicates, Yemen has featured in House consideration of H.R. 4350,

¹²⁷ U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Network Financing Houthi Aggression and Instability in Yemen,” press release, June 10, 2021.

¹²⁸ U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Senior Houthi Military Official Overseeing Group’s Offensive Operations,” press release, May 20, 2021.

¹²⁹ “US-Made Drones Downed over Yemen weren’t Military’s, CENTCOM says,” *Al Monitor*, June 24, 2021.

¹³⁰ Testimony of Amanda Dory, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, Hearing entitled, “National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater Middle East and Africa,” House Armed Services Committee, April 20, 2021.

¹³¹ U.S. Department of State, Briefing on Yemen with Timothy Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen; and Sarah Charles, USAID Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Assistance, August 9, 2021.

¹³² U.N. Document S/PV.8854, U.N. Security Council Meeting, September 10, 2021.

¹³³ World Health Organization, Yemen: WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard With Vaccination Data, October 18, 2021.

the FY2022 National Defense Authorization bill. Provisions related to Yemen also are contained in House versions foreign operations and defense appropriations bills (H.R. 4373 and H.R. 4432).

One issue regarding Yemen that has received some bipartisan attention is the continued Saudi-led coalition restriction of access to some Yemeni ports. In April 2021, House Foreign Affairs Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee Chair Ted Deutch and Ranking Member Joe Wilson sent a letter to Secretary Blinken seeking U.S. support in ending the Saudi-led coalition's "continued obstruction of commercial and humanitarian imports to Yemen."¹³⁴ In the Senate, Democrats sent a similar letter to the President, seeking his support in demanding "that Saudi Arabia allow the unfettered delivery of food, fuel, and other humanitarian aid through the Hodeidah port, under United Nations auspices to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Yemeni people."¹³⁵

Analysis

The Biden Administration has made a number of changes in U.S. Yemen policy designed to emphasize its peacemaking role and prioritize efforts to resolve the humanitarian crisis.¹³⁶ Nevertheless, the Houthis have escalated their attacks in Yemen and across the border against Saudi Arabia since February 2021, perhaps in an effort to maximize their territorial gains and their leverage amid renewed international efforts, including by the Biden Administration, to broker a cease-fire to the conflict.

Saudi Arabia's intervention using air power appears more focused on supporting ROYG ground forces in Marib and, combined with other coalition support to the ROYG, may be pivotal to the outcome of fighting there. The Administration has not described publicly the extent of any Saudi-U.S. understandings over what type of coalition operations in Yemen constitute defensive versus offensive air strikes. U.S. officials have demanded a halt to the Houthi offensive in Marib, but the Administration has not indicated what specific military, advisory, or assistance steps, if any, it may be willing to take to attempt to ensure that outcome or compel the parties involved. Saudi Arabia has offered ceasefire terms to the Houthis and continues to engage U.S. and other international parties in peace talks, but ongoing Houthi cross-border attacks pose what Saudi officials regard as an unacceptable threat to their country. It could be likely that Saudi Arabia will continue to seek to disrupt transfers of weaponry and support from Iran and Iran-backed groups to the Houthis.

As of September 2021, reports of errant Saudi air strikes that have resulted in civilian casualties continue, though less frequently than in earlier periods of the war. While the Houthis do not possess manned aircraft, they are conducting mortar, missile, rocket, and unmanned drone attacks against their Yemeni adversaries and against Saudi territory, the latter of which they describe as a response to the Saudi-led coalition's maritime blockade of Yemen's west coast and closure of Sana'a airport.

¹³⁴ Congressman Ted Deutch, "US Reps. Send Bipartisan Letter to Sec. Blinken on Ending Yemen Blockade," press releases, Washington, DC, April 13, 2021.

¹³⁵ Available at [https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2021.05.19%20Letter%20to%20Biden%20re%20Saudi%20blockade%20of%20Yemen%20\(1\).pdf](https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2021.05.19%20Letter%20to%20Biden%20re%20Saudi%20blockade%20of%20Yemen%20(1).pdf).

¹³⁶ In August 2021, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Lenderking said that his "dual mandate" is "advancing a durable solution to the Yemen conflict, sometimes what we refer to as a political track, and then also [to] take immediate action to mitigate the dire humanitarian and economic crisis facing the country." U.S. Department of State, Briefing on Yemen with Timothy Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen; and Sarah Charles, USAID Assistant Administrator for Humanitarian Assistance, August 9, 2021.

According to the Yemen Data Project, a nongovernmental organization that compiles public reporting about the conflict in Yemen, Saudi and coalition airstrikes nearly doubled in volume during 2020 relative to 2019, and continued near the 2020 pace in the first three months of 2021. Overall civilian casualties in the conflict were highest in 2015, and continue to occur in connection with indiscriminate fire by Houthi forces, shelling by government of Yemen and allied local forces, and, to a less frequent extent than in the early years of the conflict, Saudi and coalition airstrikes.¹³⁷

The Administration's 2021 decision to withdraw U.S. missile and air defense assets from Saudi territory was coordinated with Saudi officials, who said it was "carried out through common understanding and realignment of defense strategies."¹³⁸ Current Saudi defense officials have stated that Saudi military capabilities are sufficient to defend the kingdom's territory, and they have welcomed additional missile defense support from U.S.-ally Greece.¹³⁹

As noted above, the conflict in Yemen has generally not been a major foreign policy issue of congressional consideration in the 117th Congress, but amendments considered and adopted to the House version of the FY2022 NDAA reflect continued concern about the conflict and U.S. policy toward it. Congress has allocated funds in recent foreign operations appropriations acts for stabilization purposes in Yemen and could consider additional requests from the Administration if mediation efforts produce a durable ceasefire and allow for stabilization operations to expand while intra-Yemeni political negotiations resume. Questions about the delivery of assistance in areas remaining under Houthi control are likely to remain relevant.

In light of the Houthis' cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia, their offensive operations against Yemeni rivals, and Saudi and coalition counter-operations, Congress also may continue to debate the extent to which U.S. support to Saudi and Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen should be conditioned or restricted by law. In light of expressed views in Congress and congressional voting patterns, unilateral escalation of the conflict by the coalition or coalition operations resulting in increased civilian casualties or harm could potentially generate additional opposition to U.S. involvement among Members. This might lead Congress to attempt to assert more influence over executive branch decisions and possibly override presidential preferences. Debate to date also suggests that, similarly, escalation attributable to the Houthis, closer overt coordination between the Houthis and Iran, and/or Houthi rejection of United Nations resolution efforts may lead some Members to support continued or more expansive U.S. cooperation with the coalition. Further Houthi successes on the battlefield could complicate congressional considerations on issues of legislative relevance, such as security assistance and humanitarian aid.

Looking ahead, lawmakers might broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the current conflict to address Yemen's chronic instability more fully. They also might focus on challenges to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism threats, or prospects for broader U.S. security cooperation with ROYG forces. Yemen has been devastated by years of war: in mid-2021, U.N. officials describe it as the world's "the world's worst man-made humanitarian crisis."¹⁴⁰ Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement. Thus, Congress may grapple with Yemen-related questions about the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, the

¹³⁷ Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) through September 2021, available at <https://www.acleddata.com>.

¹³⁸ Associated Press, "U.S. removes advanced missile defense system from Saudi Arabia," September 11, 2021.

¹³⁹ Ibid., and, Saudi-U.S. Trade Group, "After U.S. Withdrawal of Patriot Missiles, Greece Delivers System to Saudi," September 15, 2021.

¹⁴⁰ U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths, Briefing to United Nations Security Council, June 15, 2021.

provision of U.S. security support, and the investment of U.S. assistance and defense funds for years to come.

Table 1. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 117th Congress
 Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 117th Congress through September 30, 2021

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments			
H.Res. 175	Representative David Trone (D-MD)	The resolution would call on the U.S. government to cease all arms transfers to Saudi Arabia until the Saudi government among other things ends its military operations in Yemen.	Introduced 02/26/2021 Referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022			
H.R. 4373	Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA)	House Committee on Appropriations report on the bill (H.Rept. 117-84) would allocate \$500,000 in Diplomatic Programs funding made available by the bill to support the Special Envoy for Yemen. Report states Committee “supports the Administration’s ongoing efforts to press for full and consistent humanitarian access in northern and southern Yemen and a comprehensive nationwide ceasefire that guarantees lasting relief to the Yemeni people. The committee directs the Secretary of State to continue pressing government officials in Saudi Arabia to unconditionally ease all restrictions on Yemen’s ports and airports and to enable the free flow of fuel, food, and medicine into and throughout Yemen.”	Introduced and reported to the House 07/06/2021 (H.Rept. 117-84) Passed in the House on 07/28/2021 (Yeas and Nays 217-212, Roll no. 243)
National Defense Authorization Act, 2022			
H.R. 4350	Representative Adam Smith (D-WA)	Section 1288 (HASC Reported) —Would require regular reporting to Congress on improvements to the military capabilities of Iran-backed militias, including the Houthis.	Introduced 07/02/2021 and reported to the House 09/10/2021 (H.Rept. 117-118)
H.R. 4350	Representatives Meeks (D-NY), Lieu (D-CA), Deutch (D-FL), Smith (D-WA), Schiff (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 57 —Would require the suspension of U.S. sustainment and maintenance support to Saudi air force units determined to be responsible for airstrikes resulting in civilian casualties in Yemen with certain exemptions for territorial self-defense, counterterrorism operations, and defense of U.S. government facilities or personnel.	Made in order as Amendment 30 in H.Rept. 117-125 Agreed to 09/23/2021 as H.Amdt. 114 (Yeas and Nays: 223 – 204, Roll no. 279)

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.R. 4350	Representatives Khanna (D-CA), Jayapal (D-WA), Schiff (D-CA), Adam Smith (D-WA), DeFazio (D-OR), Porter (D-CA), Welch (D-VT), Johnson, Hank (D-GA), Schakowsky (D-IL), Connolly (D-VA), Lieu (D-CA), Himes (D-CT), Torres, Ritchie (D-NY), Tlaib (D-MI), Blumenauer (D-OR), Cohen (D-TN), Dingell (D-MI)	House Rules Committee Amendment 573 —Would prohibit the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the act for U.S. military logistical support, and the transfer of spare parts to Saudi warplanes conducting aerial strikes against the Houthis in Yemen and intelligence sharing that enables offensive strikes and any U.S. effort to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany Saudi-led coalition forces in the war in Yemen.	Made in order as Amendment 28 in H.Rept. 117-125 Agreed to 09/23/2021 as H.Amdt. 113 (Yeas and Nays: 219 – 207, Roll no. 278)
H.R. 4350	Representative Debbie Dingell (D-MI) and Representative Rashida Tlaib (D-MI)	House Rules Committee Amendment 550 —Would have stated that none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by the act were authorized to be made available for any U.S. governmental or private entity to participate in, or in any way assist, restrictions on imports, including humanitarian and civic assistance, or travel at Yemen's air or sea ports, including any communication, coordination, training, or any other interaction between the U.S. military and the members of an air force or navy that may enable, aid, or facilitate the enforcement of these restrictions.	Not made in order
H.R. 4350	Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 670 —Would have prohibited funds authorized to be appropriated by the act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2022 for the Department of Defense from being used to share intelligence with Saudi ships enforcing the blockade of the Port of Al Hodeidah, Yemen, and Saudi aircraft imposing a no-fly zone over the airport in Sana'a, Yemen.	Withdrawn
H.R. 4350	Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 852 —Would extend prohibition on in-flight refueling to non-United States aircraft that engage in hostilities in the ongoing civil war in Yemen enacted in Section 1273(a) of the FY2020 NDAA (Public Law 116-92) for two years.	Made in order as Amendment 247 in H.Rept. 117-125 Agreed to 09/23/2021 as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 123 (Yeas and Nays: 367 – 59, Roll no. 288)

Source: Congress.gov, Congressional Record, and U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules.

Table 2. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 116th Congress

Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 116th Congress

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments			
S.Res. 243	Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT)	Resolution requesting information on Saudi Arabia's human rights practices in Yemen pursuant to section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 06/10/2019
S.J. Res. 27-48	Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ)	22 separate resolutions providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed transfer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, certain defense articles and services described in the certification DDTC Transmittals No. 17-079, 17-094, 17-112, 17-126, 17-128, 18-029, 18-030, 18-050, 18-080, 18-103, 18-109, 18-110, 19-001 and DSCA Transmittals No. 17-0B, 17-39, 17-70, 17-73, 18-21, 18-31, 19-01, 19-18.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 06/05/2019 S.J.Res. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, and 48 agreed to en bloc in the Senate on 06/20/2019 (Yeas and Nays 51-45, Record Vote Number 179) See below for further consideration of S.J.Res. 37
S.J.Res. 36	Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ)	A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed transfer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Spain, and the Italian Republic of certain defense articles and services. Would have disapproved of the <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • coproduction and manufacture in Saudi Arabia of Paveway Pre-Amp Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA), Guidance Electronics Assembly (GEA) CCAs, and Control Actuator System (CAS) CCAs for all Paveway variants; • coproduction and manufacture in Saudi Arabia of Paveway II Guidance Electronics Detector Assemblies (GEDA) and Computer Control Groups (CCG); and • transfer of up to 64,603 additional kits, partial kits, and full-up-rounds. 	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 06/05/2019 Agreed to in the Senate on 06/20/2019 (Yeas and Nays 53-45, Record Vote Number 177) Passed in the House on 07/17/2019 (Yeas and Nays 238-190, Roll no. 486) Vetoed by President on 07/24/2019 Passage over veto failed in Senate on 07/29/2019 (Yeas and Nays 45-40, Record Vote Number 231)

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
S.J.Res. 37	Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ)	<p>A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed export to the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Republic of France of certain defense articles and services.</p> <p>Would have disapproved of the proposed transfer of 44,000 GBU-12 Paveway II Kits and the proposed transfer of 16,000 GBU-10 Paveway II Kits.</p>	<p>Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 06/05/2019</p> <p>Agreed to in the Senate on 06/20/2019 (Yeas and Nays 51-45, Record Vote Number 179)</p> <p>Passed in the House on 07/17/2019 (Yeas and Nays 238-190, Roll no. 487)</p> <p>Vetoed by President on 07/24/2019</p> <p>Failed of passage in Senate over veto on 07/29/2019 (Yeas and Nays 45-39, Record Vote Number 232)</p>
S.J.Res. 38	Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ)	<p>A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of certain defense articles and services.</p> <p>Would have disapproved of the proposed transfer of defense articles, defense services, and technical data to support the manufacture of the Aurora Fuzing System for the Paveway IV Precision Guided Bomb Program.</p>	<p>Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 06/05/2019</p> <p>Agreed to in the Senate on 06/20/2019 (Yeas and Nays 53-45, Record Vote Number 178)</p> <p>Passed in the House on 07/17/2019 (Yeas and Nays 237-190, Roll no. 488)</p> <p>Vetoed by President on 07/24/2019</p> <p>Passage over veto failed in Senate on 07/29/2019 (Yeas and Nays 46-41, Record Vote Number 233)</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
S.J.Res. 7	Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), and Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT)	<p>Would have directed the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces, by not later than the date that is 30 days after the date of the adoption of the joint resolution (unless the President requests and Congress authorizes a later date), and unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces has been enacted.</p> <p>For purposes of the resolutions' directive section, the term "hostilities" included in-flight refueling of non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the ongoing civil war in Yemen. Would have stated that nothing in the resolution shall have been construed to influence or disrupt cooperation with Israel.</p> <p>Also would have required reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and the civilian population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the risk of regional humanitarian crises if the United States were to cease support operations with respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen; and, the increased risk of terrorist attacks on United States Armed Forces abroad, allies, and to the continental United States if the Government of Saudi Arabia were to cease Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.</p> <p>As introduced in the 116th Congress, reflected provisions of S.J.Res. 54 from the 115th Congress, as amended in the Senate (see Table 3 below).</p> <p>Amended during Senate consideration on 03/13/2019 to include S.Amdt. 193 stating that nothing in the joint resolution should be construed as authorization for use of military force and S.Amdt. 195 stating that nothing in the joint resolution should be construed to "influence or disrupt" Yemen-related intelligence collection, analysis, or sharing deemed necessary for national security reasons by the President.</p>	<p>Introduced 01/30/2019</p> <p>Motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 7 agreed to on 03/13/2019 by voice vote</p> <p>Motion to table S.Amdt. 194 agreed to (Yeas and Nays 52-48, Record Vote Number 47)</p> <p>S.Amdt. 193 and S.Amdt. 195 agreed to by voice vote</p> <p>Agreed to in the Senate with amendments on 3/13/2019 (Yeas and Nays 54-46, Record Vote Number 48)</p> <p>Passed in the House on 04/04/2019 (Yeas and Nays 247-175, Roll no. 153)</p> <p>Vetoed by President on 04/16/2019</p> <p>Failed of passage in Senate over veto on 05/02/2019 (Yeas and Nays 53-45, Record Vote Number 94)</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.J.Res. 37	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA)	<p>Would have directed the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces, by not later than the date that is 30 days after the date of the adoption of the joint resolution (unless the President requests and Congress authorizes a later date), and unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces has been enacted.</p> <p>For purposes of the resolutions' directive section, the term "hostilities" included in-flight refueling of non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the ongoing civil war in Yemen. Would have stated that nothing in the resolution shall have been construed to influence or disrupt cooperation with Israel.</p> <p>Also would have required reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and the civilian population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the risk of regional humanitarian crises if the United States were to cease support operations with respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen; and, the increased risk of terrorist attacks on United States Armed Forces abroad, allies, and to the continental United States if the Government of Saudi Arabia were to cease Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.</p> <p>As introduced in the 116th Congress, reflected provisions of S.J.Res. 54 from the 115th Congress, as amended in the Senate (see Table 3 below).</p> <p>Amended during House consideration on 02/13/2019 to include H.Amdt. 41 stating that nothing in the joint resolution should be construed to "influence or disrupt" Yemen-related intelligence collection, analysis, or sharing deemed necessary by the President and H.Amdt. 42 regarding anti-Semitism.</p>	<p>Introduced 01/30/2019</p> <p>Reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 02/08/2019 (H.Rept. 116-7)</p> <p>Considered under the provisions of rule H.Res. 122 on 02/13/2019</p> <p>H.Amdt. 41 agreed to on 02/13/2019 (Yeas and Nays 252-177, Roll no. 81)</p> <p>H.Amdt. 42 agreed to on 02/13/2019 by voice vote</p> <p>Passed in the House on 02/13/2019 (Yeas and Nays 248-177, 1 Present, Roll no. 83)</p>
H.J.Res 56	Representative Justin Amash (R-MI)	<p>Would have directed the President to terminate the use of the United States Armed Forces with respect to the military intervention led by Saudi Arabia in the Republic of Yemen not later than the end of the period of 30 days beginning on the date of the enactment of the joint resolution unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of the Armed Forces had been enacted into law.</p>	<p>Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 04/10/2019</p>
H.Con.Res. 50	Representative Will Hurd (R-TX)	<p>Would have condemned human rights violations, violence against civilians, and cooperation with Iran by the Houthi movement and its allies in Yemen.</p>	<p>Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 07/17/2019</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
S.Con.Res. 21	Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR)	Would have condemned human rights violations, violence against civilians, and cooperation with Iran by the Houthi movement and its allies in Yemen.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 06/27/2019
S.Res. 169	Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR)	Would have requested a statement under section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 with respect to violations of human rights by the Government of Saudi Arabia, specifically regarding measures the Government of Saudi Arabia is taking to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations of that Government in Yemen.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 04/11/2019
H.R. 910	Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA), Representative Tom Malinowski (D-NJ), Representative Ted Yoho (R-FL)	Would have prohibited the use of federal funds to provide for in-flight refueling of Saudi or Saudi-led coalition aircraft conducting missions as part of the ongoing coalition intervention in Yemen.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services on 01/30/2019
S. 398	Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ)	<p>Would have revised and reintroduced provisions of S. 3652 from the 115th Congress (see below)</p> <p>The bill would have required additional reporting on Russia's activities and objectives in Yemen; the parties' implementation of the Stockholm Agreement; and U.S. in-flight refueling services for Saudi or Saudi-led coalition non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the civil war in Yemen between March 2015 and November 11, 2018. Also would have added emergency protections under U.S. law for Yemeni cultural property.</p>	<p>Introduced and referred to Committee on Foreign Relations on 02/07/2019</p> <p>Reported by Committee on Foreign Relations and placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders, Calendar No. 167 on 07/30/2019</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
S. 2066	Senator James Risch (R-ID), Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), and Senator Chris Coons (D-DE)	To review United States Saudi Arabia policy, and for other purposes. Would have required regular briefings on ending the war in Yemen from the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence. Would have required reporting on actions by Iranian individuals with regard to Yemen and related sanctions actions. Would have required reporting on the causes and consequences of civilian harm occurring in the armed conflict in Yemen, including war crimes and gross violations of human rights, as a result of the actions of all parties involved in hostilities in Yemen. Would have required reporting on illicit arms shipments to Yemen and U.S. and other interdiction efforts. Would have directed the President, subject to humanitarian exceptions and waiver authority, to enact sanctions against persons hindering humanitarian access and threatening the peace or stability of Yemen. Would have directed the President to impose sanctions on entities providing material and financial support to the Houthis if the President is unable to certify that the Houthis have “engaged meaningfully” with U.N.-led peace efforts. Would have authorized joint defense research and development efforts with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to protect against unmanned aerial systems. Would have authorized technical assistance to the Central Bank of Yemen. Would have expanded protections for Yemeni cultural property. Would have amended Section 1290 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232) to extend certification requirements regarding Saudi Arabia and UAE operations in Yemen.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 07/09/2019

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019			
H.R. 648	Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY)	<p>Explanatory statement for Division E on State Department and Foreign Operations states “Funds in the Act for assistance for Yemen shall be made available for stabilization and humanitarian assistance, including for United Nations stabilization and governance facilities.”</p> <p>Statement generally was to direct the Administration to comply with the directives, reporting requirements, and instructions contained in H.Rept. 115-829 accompanying H.R. 6385 and S.Rept. 115-282 accompanying S. 3108 from the 115th Congress unless specifically directed to the contrary.</p> <p>See Table 3 below for relevant comments on Yemen from these referenced reports. The statement notes that language expressing an opinion or making an observation in the House or Senate reports from the 115th Congress represents the view of the respective committee unless specifically endorsed in the explanatory statement.</p>	<p>Introduced 01/17/2019</p> <p>Passed in the House on 01/23/2019 (Yeas and Nays 234-180, Roll no. 49)</p> <p>Received in the Senate 01/24/2019 and placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders, Calendar No. 16 on 01/28/2019</p>
H.J.Res 31/P.L. 116-6	Representative Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA)	<p>Explanatory statement (H.Rept. 116-9) for Division F on State Department and Foreign Operations directs the Administration to comply with the directives, reporting requirements, and instructions contained in H.Rept. 115-829 accompanying H.R. 6385 and S.Rept. 115-282 accompanying S. 3108 from the 115th Congress unless specifically directed to the contrary.</p> <p>See Table 3 below for relevant comments on Yemen from these referenced reports. The statement notes that language expressing an opinion or making an observation in the House or Senate reports from the 115th Congress represents the view of the respective committee unless specifically endorsed in the explanatory statement.</p> <p>Division F, Sec. 7041(l) made funds under the heading Economic Support Fund available for stabilization assistance for Yemen.</p>	<p>Introduced 01/17/2019</p> <p>Passed in the House on 01/24/2019 (Yeas and Nays 231-180, Roll no. 51)</p> <p>Conference report H.Rept. 116-9 agreed to in the Senate on 02/14/2019 (Yeas and Nays 83-16, Record Vote Number 26)</p> <p>Became P.L. 116-6 on 02/15/2019</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020			
H.R. 2839	Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY)	<p>Sec. 7041(l) would have continued prior year language permitting funds under the heading Economic Support Fund to be made available for stabilization assistance for Yemen.</p> <p>H.Rept. 116-78 expresses Committee concern over “continued denial of humanitarian access to populations in need in Yemen.” Requires a report within 45 days of enactment from the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator that addresses delivery of humanitarian assistance, including access for humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance; the capacity of Yemeni ports to receive commercial and humanitarian goods; and the conditions required to transition from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development assistance.</p>	<p>Introduced 05/20/2019</p> <p>Reported from the Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 116-78) and placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 54 on 05/20/2019</p> <p>Incorporated into consolidated appropriations bill as Division D of H.R. 2740 by H.Res. 431</p> <p>Passed in the House 06/18/2019 (Yeas and Nays 226-203, Roll no. 367)</p>
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act 2020			
H. R. 1865/P.L. 116-94	Representative Bill Pascrell (D-NJ)	<p>Sec. 7041(l) of Division G (the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020) permits bilateral economic assistance funds from this act and prior Acts to be made available for stabilization assistance for Yemen.</p> <p>The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the act specifies that the agreement provides \$40,000,000 for stabilization assistance for Yemen, “including for a contribution for United Nations stabilization and governance facilities, and to meet the needs of vulnerable populations, including women and girls.”</p>	<p>Introduced in House 03/25/2019</p> <p>Passed/agreed to in House 10/28/2019</p> <p>Passed/agreed to in Senate 11/12/2019</p> <p>Became P.L. 116-94 12/20/2019</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
National Defense Authorization Act, 2020			
H.R. 2500	Representatives Kildee (D-MI), Speier (D-CA), Khanna (D-CA), and Malinowski (D-NJ)	House Rules Committee Amendment 285 —would have required the DoD to report to Congress on civilian casualties caused by Saudi air strikes in Yemen and whether the Saudi strikes would have complied with the DoD’s rules of engagement and interpretation of international law. Section 1270M in House-passed version of H.R. 2500. Revised version included in P.L. 116-92 as Section 1274 (see below).	Made in order as Amendment 221 in H.Rept. 116-143 Adopted by voice vote 07/11/2019 as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 543
H.R. 2500	Representatives Khanna (D-CA), Schiff (D-CA), Smith (D-WA), and Jayapal (D-WA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 339 —would have prohibited support to and participation in the Saudi-led coalition’s military operations against the Houthis in Yemen. Section 1270H in House-passed version of H.R. 2500. The House receded during conferee consideration of S. 1790. Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-333.	Made in order as Amendment 26 in H.Rept. 116-143 Agreed to 07/11/2019 as H.Amdt. 524 (Yeas and Nays 240-185, Roll no. 450)
H.R. 2500	Representative Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI) and Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 377 —would have prohibited funds from the Special Defense Acquisition Fund to aid Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates if such assistance could be used to conduct or continue hostilities in Yemen. Section 1270F in House-passed version of H.R. 2500. The House receded during conferee consideration of S. 1790. Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-333.	Made in order as Amendment 23 in H.Rept. 116-143 Agreed to 07/11/2019 as H.Amdt. 522 (Yeas and Nays 239-187 (Roll no. 448)
H.R. 2500	Representatives Ted Lieu (D-CA), Representative David Cicilline (D-RI), and Representative Tom Malinowski (D-NJ)	House Rules Committee Amendment 418 —prohibits in-flight refueling to non-United States aircraft that engage in hostilities in the ongoing civil war in Yemen for two years, or until a specific authorization has been enacted. Section 1270N in House-passed version of H.R. 2500. Enacted as Section 1273 of S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 (see below).	Made in order as Amendment 256 in H.Rept. 116-143 Adopted by voice vote 07/11/2019 as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 544

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.R. 2500	Representatives Malinowski (D-NJ), Cicilline (D-RI), Lieu (D-CA), Khanna (D-CA), Omar (D-MN), Trone (D-MD), Engel (D-NY), and Smith (D-WA)	<p>House Rules Committee Amendment 473—would have provided for a one-year prohibition on the sale of air-to-ground munitions used in the conflict in Yemen to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while providing an exemption for any export or license suspensions that would incur a cost to the United States Government.</p> <p>Section 1099X in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.</p> <p>The House receded during conferee consideration of S. 1790.</p> <p>Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-333.</p>	<p>Made in order as Amendment 438 in H.Rept. 116-143</p> <p>Agreed to 07/12/2019 as H.Amdt. 561 (Yeas and Nays 236-182, Roll no. 470)</p>
S. 1790/P.L. 116-92	Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)	<p>Section 1288 of S.1790 as reported to the Senate would have required regular reporting from the Secretary of Defense detailing the expenses incurred by the United States in providing in-flight refueling services for Saudi or Saudi-led coalition non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the civil war in Yemen during the period of March 1, 2015, through November 11, 2018, and the extent to which such expenses have been reimbursed by members of the Saudi-led coalition.</p> <p>As enacted, P.L. 116-92 includes:</p> <p>Section 1273, which prohibits in-flight refueling to non-United States aircraft that engage in hostilities in the ongoing civil war in Yemen for a two-year period following the enactment of this act, “unless and until a declaration of war or a specific statutory authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces has been enacted.” (Originally passed by House as Amendment 256 in H.Rept. 116-143.)</p> <p>Section 1274 requires reports from the Secretary of Defense on civilian casualties caused by the Saudi-led coalition strikes in Yemen, not later than 90 days after the enactment of this act and thereafter annually for two years. (Revised version of Amendment 221 in H.Rept. 116-143.)</p> <p>Section 1275 requires monthly reports on expenses incurred for in-flight refueling of Saudi coalition aircraft conducting missions relating to civil war in Yemen from March 2015 to November 2018, and the extent to which such expenses have been reimbursed. (Section 1288 in original Senate-passed version of S.1790.)</p>	<p>Introduced 06/11/2019</p> <p>Reported by Committee on Armed Services 06/11/2019 (S.Rept. 116-48)</p> <p>Agreed to in the Senate with amendments on 6/27/2019 (Yeas and Nays 86-8, Record Vote Number 188)</p> <p>Amended in House under unanimous consent to strike text of Senate-passed bill and substitute text of H.R.2500 as previously passed by the House. Agreed to in House 09/17/2019</p> <p>Conference report H.Rept. 116-333 filed 12/09/2019</p> <p>Conference report agreed to in the House, 12/11/2019</p> <p>Conference report agreed to in the Senate, 12/17/2019</p> <p>Became P.L. 116-92, 12/20/2019</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020			
H.R. 2968	Representative Peter J. Visclosky (D-IN)	<p>Title X incorporated language from S.J.Res. 7/H.J.Res. 37 that would have directed the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress, with rules of construction regarding continued military operations and cooperation with Israel, regarding intelligence sharing, and regarding no authorization for the use of military force. Would have required a report on increased risk of terrorist attacks to United States Armed Forces abroad, allies and the continental United States if Saudi Arabia ceases Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.</p> <p>This provision was not included in final FY2020 Defense Appropriations Act (Division A of P.L. 116-93). Joint explanatory statement for that act states that “the language contained in the House and Senate reports warrant full compliance and carry the same weight as language included in this explanatory statement unless specifically addressed to the contrary in the bill or this explanatory statement.”</p> <p>The House Appropriations Committee report on its version of the bill directed the Secretary of Defense to update the report required by H.Rept. 115-769 under the heading “Report on U.S. Defense Assistance to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates Coalition in Yemen” not later than 90 days after the enactment of this act. The committee further expressed concern about reports regarding allegations of torture by members of the United Arab Emirates security forces in Yemen and urges the Secretary of Defense to consider such reporting when making a determination on whether to prohibit assistance to units of foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights.</p>	<p>Reported by the House Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 116-84) and placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 59 on 05/23/2019</p> <p>Incorporated into consolidated appropriations bill as Division C of H.R. 2740 by H.Res. 431.</p> <p>Passed in the House 06/18/2019 (Yeas and Nays 226-203, Roll no. 367)</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021			
H.R. 7608	Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY)	<p>Sec. 7041(l) would have stated that certain economic support and humanitarian assistance funds made available by the act and previous acts shall be made available for global health, humanitarian, and stabilization assistance for Yemen.</p> <p>H.Rept. 116-444 expresses Committee concern over “continued denial of humanitarian access to populations in need in Yemen,” “recognizes the urgent demining need in Yemen,” and “directs the Secretary of State to conduct an assessment of the humanitarian demining needs and requirements.”</p> <p>The report on the bill requires a report within 45 days of enactment from the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator that addresses delivery of humanitarian assistance, including access for humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance; the capacity of Yemeni ports to receive commercial and humanitarian goods; and the conditions required to transition from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development assistance.</p>	<p>Introduced 07/13/2020</p> <p>Reported from the Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 116-444) on 07/13/2020</p> <p>Passed in the House 07/24/2020 (Yeas and Nays 224-189, Roll no. 166)</p>
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021			
H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260	Representative Henry Cuellar (D-TX)	<p>Sec. 7041(l) of Division K states that certain economic support, humanitarian assistance, international narcotics control and law enforcement, and non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs funds made available by the act and previous acts shall be made available for global health, humanitarian, and stabilization assistance for Yemen.</p> <p>The Joint Explanatory Statement for the act “includes \$37,000,000... for health, humanitarian, and stabilization assistance for Yemen.”</p>	<p>Introduced in House 01/03/2019</p> <p>Passed/agreed to in House 12/21/2020 (Yeas and Nays 359-53, Roll no. 251)</p> <p>Passed/agreed to in Senate 12/21/2020 (Yeas and Nays 92-6, Record Vote Number 289)</p> <p>Became P.L. 116-260, 12/27/2020</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021			
H.R. 6395	Representative Adam Smith (D-WA)	<p>Section 1271 (HASC Reported) - Would have prohibited the use of funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by the act to provide United States logistical support to the Saudi-led coalition's operations against the Houthis in Yemen for coalition strikes, specifically by providing maintenance or transferring spare parts to coalition members flying warplanes engaged in anti-Houthi bombings for coalition strikes.</p> <p>Further would have prohibited the use of funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for any civilian or military personnel of the Department of Defense or contractors of the Department to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of the Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led coalition forces engaged in hostilities against the Houthis in Yemen or in situations in which there exists an imminent threat that such coalition forces become engaged in such hostilities, unless and until the President has obtained specific statutory authorization, in accordance with section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1547(a)).</p> <p>Section 1272 in House-passed version of H.R. 6395.</p>	<p>Reported 07/09/2020</p> <p>Engrossed in the House on 07/21/2020</p> <p>Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-617</p> <p>The House receded during conferee consideration of H.R. 6395</p> <p>Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-617</p>
H.R. 6395	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA)	<p>House Rules Committee Amendment 459—Requires the Comptroller General of the United States to submit to Congress a report on U.S. military support for the Saudi-led coalition's war against the Houthis in Yemen, not later than one year after enactment.</p> <p>Section 1271 in House-passed version of H.R. 6395.</p> <p>As amended, enacted as Section 1296 of P.L. 116-283.</p>	<p>Made in order as Amendment 21 in H.Rept. 116-457</p> <p>Adopted as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 841 (Yeas and Nays 336-71, Roll no. 143)</p> <p>During conference committee consideration, the Senate receded with an amendment that modified the elements required by the report</p> <p>As amended, enacted as Section 1296 of P.L. 116-283</p> <p>Passed Senate over veto 01/01/2021 (Yeas and Nays 81-13, Record Vote Number 292)</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.R. 6395	Representative Ted Lieu (CA-D), Representative Ted Yoho (FL-R), and Representative Tom Malinowski (NJ-D)	<p>House Rules Committee Amendment 509—Requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, to submit a report to Congress on U.S. policy in Yemen, including diplomatic efforts, humanitarian assistance, and civilian protection. Requires the Comptroller General of the United States to report to Congress on U.S. military support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and expresses a Statement of Policy on the conflict.</p> <p>Section 1275 in House-passed version of H.R. 6395.</p> <p>As amended, enacted as Section 1295 of P.L. 116-283.</p>	<p>Made in order as Amendment 22 in H.Rept. 116-457</p> <p>Adopted as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 841 (Yeas and Nays 336-71, Roll no. 143)</p> <p>During conference committee consideration, the Senate receded with a technical amendment, and combined the Comptroller General reporting requirement with another reporting requirement</p> <p>As amended, enacted as Section 1295 of P.L. 116-283</p> <p>Passed Senate over veto 01/01/2021 (Yeas and Nays 81-13, Record Vote Number 292)</p>
H.R. 6395	Representatives Malinowski (NJ-D), McGovern (MA-D), Lieu (CA-D), Bera (CA-D), Sherman (CA-D), Deutch (FL-D), Cicilline (RI-D), Khanna (CA-D), Allred (TX-D), Spanberger (VA-D), and Dingell (MI-D)	<p>House Rules Committee Amendment 571—Would have paused the delivery of air-to-ground munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.</p>	<p>Submitted on 07/13/2020</p> <p>Not made in order by Rules Committee</p>

Source: Congress.gov, Congressional Record, and U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules.

Table 3. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 115th Congress

Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 115th Congress

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
Resolutions and Stand-alone Legislation			
S.Res. 114	Senator Todd Young (R-IN), and Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)	Among other things, would have stated the sense of the Senate that the United States should support efforts to hold accountable those responsible for deliberate restrictions on humanitarian access in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen.	Resolution agreed to in Senate with an amendment and an amended preamble by unanimous consent on 09/26/2017
S.J.Res. 40	Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT)	Would have prohibited the transfer to Saudi Arabia of U.S. air-to-ground munitions until the President certified to Congress that, among other things, Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners were taking all feasible precautions to reduce the risk of civilian harm and exercising proportional use of force in the course of military actions, and were making demonstrable efforts to facilitate the flow of critical humanitarian aid and commercial goods. The joint resolutions also would have required a briefing on U.S. government support for the Saudi-led coalition's military operations in Yemen, to include an assessment, among other things, of whether operations in Yemen constituted legitimate self-defense and whether operations had deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure in Yemen.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 04/06/2017
H.J.Res. 104	Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA)		H.J.Res. 104 referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 05/25/2017
S.J.Res. 42	Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT)	Would have disapproved of the transfer to Saudi Arabia of defense articles, including defense services and technical data, described in the certification Transmittal No. DDTC 15-132, Transmittal No. DDTC 16-011, and Transmittal No. DDTC 16-043 (JDAM, bomb fuzes, and Paveway Weapons Systems).	Motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42 not agreed to in the Senate on 06/13/2017 (Yeas and Nays 47-53, Record Vote Number 143)
H.J.Res. 102	Representative Justin Amash (R-MI)		
H.R. 2795	Representative Karen Bass (D-CA)	Would have required the Secretaries of State and Defense in coordination with the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development to provide Congress with a report on U.S. security and humanitarian interests in Yemen, including: the strategic objectives of the United States in Yemen, including humanitarian support to civilian populations under threat of famine, and the criteria for determining the success of such objectives; a description of efforts to coordinate civilian and military efforts with respect to Yemen; and a description of the diplomatic strategy with respect to regional partners seeking to end the civil war in Yemen.	Referred to the Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa, House Foreign Affairs Committee on 06/27/2017

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.R. 4603	Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)	Would, among other things, have required the President to impose sanctions on a foreign person that the President determines knowingly provided significant financial, material, or technological support for, among others, the Ansar Allah in Yemen (Houthis). The bill also would have required the President to report on Iranian activities in Yemen.	H.R. 4603 referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary on 12/07/2017 for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
H.Con.Res. 81	Representatives Khanna (D-CA), Massie (R-KY), Pocan (D-WI), and Jones (R-NC)	Would have directed the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen, except those engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, within 30 days after adoption of this concurrent resolution, unless the President requested and Congress authorized a later date, and unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for the use of U.S. Armed Forces had been enacted.	Unanimous consent agreed to without objection on 10/11/2017, that the provisions of Section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546) did not apply to H.Con.Res. 81 earlier than November 2, 2017, but on the same terms that would have adhered on October 13, 2017
H.Con.Res. 138	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA)	Would have directed the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), not later than 30 days after the date of the adoption of the concurrent resolution unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces had been enacted into law.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 09/26/2018

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.Con.Res. 142	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA)	Would have directed the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), not later than 30 days after the date of the adoption of the concurrent resolution unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces had been enacted into law.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 11/29/2018
H.J.Res 142	Representative Justin Amash (R-MI)	Would have directed the President to terminate the use of the United States Armed Forces with respect to the military intervention led by Saudi Arabia in the Republic of Yemen not later than the end of the period of 30 days beginning on the date of the enactment of the joint resolution unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of the Armed Forces had been enacted into law.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 11/29/2018
H.Res. 599	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA)	Among other things, expressed the urgent need for a political solution in Yemen consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216; denounced the conduct of activities in Yemen and areas affected by the conflict that were, directly or indirectly, inconsistent with the laws of armed conflict; and condemned Iranian activities in Yemen in violation of UNSCR 2216. Called on all responsible countries to take appropriate and necessary measures against the Government of Iran, including the interdiction of Iranian weapons to the Houthis, and the bilateral and multilateral application of sanctions against Iran for its violations of UNSCR 2216.	Unanimous consent that it be in order at any time to consider in the House H.Res. 599 with one hour of debate and that notwithstanding any previous order of the House, the provisions of Section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546) shall not apply to H.Con.Res. 81 Agreed to without objection on 11/01/2017 Passed in the House on 11/13/2017 (Yeas and Nays 366-30, 1 present, and 35 not voting, Roll no. 623)

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
S.J.Res. 54	Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), and Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT)	<p>As introduced, would have directed the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except U.S. Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces within 30 days of adoption unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of U.S. Armed Forces had been enacted.</p> <p>As amended and agreed to in the Senate, would have directed the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces, by not later than the date that is 30 days after the date of the adoption of the joint resolution (unless the President requested and Congress authorized a later date), and unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces had been enacted. For purposes of the resolution's directive section, the term "hostilities" included in-flight refueling of non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the ongoing civil war in Yemen.</p> <p>Would have stated that nothing in the resolution was to be construed to influence or disrupt cooperation with Israel.</p> <p>Also would have required reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and the civilian population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the risk of regional humanitarian crises if the United States were to cease support operations with respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen; and, the increased risk of terrorist attacks on United States Armed Forces abroad, allies, and to the continental United States if the Government of Saudi Arabia were to cease Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.</p>	<p>Motion to table a motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54 agreed to in the Senate on 03/20/2018 (Yeas and Nays 55-44, Record Vote Number 58)</p> <p>Motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54 agreed to in the Senate on 11/28/2018 (Yeas and Nays 63-37, Record Vote Number 250)</p> <p>Motion to proceed to consideration of S.J.Res. 54 agreed to in the Senate on 12/12/2018 (Yeas and Nays 60-39, Record Vote Number 261)</p> <p>Point of order that amendments offered under 50 U.S.C. 1546a be germane to the underlying joint resolution to which they are offered, considered well taken in the Senate on 12/12/2018 (Yeas and Nays 96-3, Record Vote Number 262)</p> <p>Agreed to in the Senate with amendments on 12/13/2018 (Yeas and Nays 56-41, Record Vote Number 266)</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
S.Amdt. 4080 to S.J.Res. 54	Senator Todd Young (R-IN)	Clarified that S.J.Res. 54 would have prohibited United States Armed Forces from refueling non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the civil war in Yemen.	Agreed to in the Senate on 12/13/2018 (Yeas and Nays 58-41, Record Vote Number 263)
S.Amdt. 4096 to S.J.Res. 54	Senator John Cornyn (R-TX)	Provided that nothing in S.J.Res. 54 was to be construed to influence or disrupt any military operations and cooperation with Israel.	Agreed to in the Senate on 12/13/2018 (Yeas and Nays 99-0, Record Vote Number 264)
S.Amdt. 4098 to S.J.Res. 54	Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR)	Would have clarified that the requirement in S.J.Res. 54 to remove United States Armed Forces would not have applied to forces engaged in operations to support efforts to disrupt Houthi attacks against locations outside of Yemen, such as ballistic missile attacks, unmanned aerial vehicle attacks, maritime attacks against United States or international vessels, or terrorist attacks against civilian targets.	Not agreed to in the Senate on 12/13/2018 (Yeas and Nays 45-54, Record Vote Number 265)
S.Amdt. 4090 to S.J.Res. 54	Senator John Cornyn (R-TX)	To require a report assessing risks posed by ceasing support operations with respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen.	Agreed to in the Senate by voice vote on 12/13/2018
S.Amdt. 4095 to S.J.Res. 54	Senator John Cornyn (R-TX)	To require a report assessing the increased risk of terrorist attacks in the United States if the Government of Saudi Arabia were to cease Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.	Agreed to in the Senate by voice vote on 12/13/2018
S.Amdt. 4097 to S.J.Res. 54	Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR)	Would have clarified that the requirement to remove United States Armed Forces would not have applied to the provision of materials and advice intended to reduce civilian casualties or further enable adherence to the Law of Armed Conflict.	Request for unanimous consent not agreed to in Senate by voice vote on 12/13/2018
S.J.Res. 55	Senator Todd Young (R-IN), and Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)	Would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select operations if certain certifications were not made and maintained at 30-, 180-, and 360-day intervals. Criteria included undertaking an urgent and good faith effort to conduct diplomatic negotiations to end the civil war in Yemen and appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access for all Yemenis to food, fuel, and medicine.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 03/08/2018 Elements incorporated into Section 1290 of the conference version of H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
S.J.Res. 58	Senators Young (R-IN), Shaheen (D-NH), Collins (R-ME), and Coons (D-DE)	Would have revised S.J.Res. 55 to add a reduction of civilian harm criterion to the initial certification, amend the description of operations not subject to restrictions in absence of certification, and to add a strategy submission requirement.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 04/11/2018 Elements incorporated into Section 1290 of the conference version of H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232
S.J.Res. 69	Senators Corker (R-TN), McConnell (R-KY), Rubio (R-FL), Portman (R-OH), Ernst (R-IA), Boozman (R-AR), Crapo (R-ID), Toomey (R-PA), Gardner (R-CO), Isakson (R-GA), Sanders (I-VT), Kaine (D-VA), and Reed (D-RI)	Stated, inter alia, that the Senate demanded that all parties seek an immediate cease-fire and negotiated political solution to the Yemen conflict and increased humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict; condemned the Government of Iran's provision of advanced lethal weapons to Houthi rebels; condemned Houthi rebels for egregious human rights abuses, including torture, use of human shields, and interference with, and diversion of, humanitarian aid shipments; demanded that the Saudi-led coalition and all parties to the Yemen conflict seek to minimize civilian casualties at all times; supported the peace negotiations being managed by United Nations Special Envoy Martin Griffiths and encouraged the United States Government to provide all possible support to these diplomatic efforts; declared that there was no statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war; and supported the end of air-to-air refueling of Saudi-led coalition aircraft operating in Yemen.	Introduced in the Senate on 12/13/2018 Agreed to by voice vote on 12/13/2018
S.Res. 714	Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC)	Would have stated that the Senate called on the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to negotiate directly with representatives of the Houthi movement in order to end the war in Yemen, agree on a political resolution, reverse the humanitarian crisis, and refocus efforts on defeating al Qaeda and ISIS in Yemen.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 12/05/2018
H.Res. 1142	Representative Dan Newhouse (R-WA)	<p>Provided for consideration of the bill (H.R. 6784) to provide for removal of the gray wolf in the contiguous 48 States from the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife published under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and providing for proceedings during the period from November 19, 2018, through November 26, 2018.</p> <p>House considered this rule with provision in Section 4 stating: "The provisions of section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546) shall not apply to House Concurrent Resolution 138."</p> <p>H.Con.Res. 138 would have directed the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress.</p>	<p>Motion in Rules Committee to strike Section 4 of the rule, not agreed to on 11/13/2018 (Yeas-Nays 2-6, Rules Committee Record Vote No. 281)</p> <p>Agreed to in the House on 11/14/2018 (Yeas and Nays 201-187, Roll no. 418)</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.Res. 1176	Representative Dan Newhouse (R-WA)	<p>Provided for consideration of the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 2) to provide for the reform and continuation of agricultural and other programs of the Department of Agriculture through fiscal year 2023, and for other purposes.</p> <p>House considered this rule with provision in Section 2 stating: “The provisions of section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546) shall not apply during the remainder of the One Hundred Fifteenth Congress to a concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544) with respect to the Republic of Yemen.”</p>	<p>Motion in Rules Committee to strike Section 2 of the rule, not agreed to on 12/11/2018 (Yeas-Nays 2-7, Rules Committee Record Vote No. 284)</p> <p>Agreed to in the House on 12/12/2018 (Yeas and Nays 206-203, Roll no. 432)</p>
S. 3623	Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA)	<p>Would have prohibited obligation or expenditure of funds available to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year beginning before the date of enactment for aerial refueling of aircraft owned or operated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.</p>	<p>Referred to the Committee on Armed Services on 11/14/2018.</p>
S. 3652	Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ)	<p>Would have stated the sense of the Senate on U.S. policy toward Yemen and required periodic briefings from the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence on the progress of the United States strategy to end the war in Yemen until a complete cessation of hostilities in the Yemen civil war.</p> <p>Would have required a report describing the causes and consequences of civilian harm occurring in the armed conflict in Yemen, including war crimes, and gross violations of human rights as a result of the actions of all parties to the conflict.</p> <p>Would have suspended weapons transfers to Saudi Arabia of items designated under Category III, IV, VII, or VIII on the United States Munitions List with the exception of ground-based missile defense systems. President could have waived this suspension if certification of specific Saudi-led coalition and Houthi activities were made.</p> <p>Would have prohibited the use of federal funds to provide in-flight refueling of Saudi or Saudi-led coalition non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the civil war in Yemen.</p> <p>Would have required the President to impose property and travel sanctions on individuals and entities the President determined inter alia were hindering or restricting humanitarian aid delivery or providing support to the Houthi movement.</p> <p>Would have directed the Comptroller General to review U.S. military support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.</p>	<p>Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 11/15/2018</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
National Defense Authorization Act, 2019			
H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232	Representative Mac Thornberry (R-TX)	Section 1286 (HASC Reported) —requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees not later than February 1, 2019, a report describing the strategy of the U.S. Armed Forces with respect to Yemen, including current activities, costs, interests, goals, success metrics, estimated resource needs through FY2022, and current legal authorities.	Reported to House on 05/15/2018 Conferees removed the report requirement from the bill text and in place made it a requirement of the conference report (H.Rept. 115-874) Conference report agreed to in the House on 07/26/2018 (Yeas and Nays 359-54, Roll no. 379) Conference report agreed to in the Senate on 08/01/2018 (Yeas and Nays 87-10, Record Vote Number 181) Became P.L. 115-232 on 08/13/2018
H.R. 5515	Representative Beto O'Rourke (D-TX), and Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 312 —would have required the Secretary of Defense to report every 90 days on any mid-air refueling for any non-U.S. aircraft of the Saudi-led coalition for any anti-Houthi missions in Yemen to include recipient aircraft information, targets struck by such aircraft, associated damage, and any records required by cross-servicing agreements.	Submitted on 05/17/2018 Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 5515	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA), and Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 323 —would have required the Secretary of Defense to issue a declassified report on the effect of the war in Yemen on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.	Submitted on 05/17/2018 Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 5515	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA), and Representative Walter Jones (R-NC)	House Rules Committee Amendment 325 —would have prohibited the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the act “for refueling non-United States military aircraft for missions conducted against the Houthi in Yemen.”	Submitted on 05/17/2018 Not made in order by Rules Committee

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA), and Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 338 —requires the Secretary of Defense to investigate whether coalition partners or U.S. military or intelligence personnel violated federal law or Department of Defense policy with regard to interrogations or gross violations of internationally recognized human rights while conducting operations in Yemen.	Submitted on 05/17/2018 Made in order as Amendment 120 in H.Rept. 115-702 Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 657 Engrossed in the House on 05/24/2018 In conference, an amendment was made by the Senate to require an additional review of U.S. Armed Forces and coalition partners conducting operations in Yemen along with a report on detention operations of allies and partners. All incorporated into Section 1274
H.R. 5515	Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA), and Representative Ted Yoho (R-FL)	House Rules Committee Amendment 367 —would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of federal funds for refueling of non-U.S. aircraft in Yemen with some exceptions unless the Department of State in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence certified that the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen was making a good-faith effort on diplomatic negotiations, not obstructing the flow of critical humanitarian aid, not supporting radical Salafi militias, and providing the U.S. Government with battle damage assessments of air strikes in Yemen for which the United States provided refueling. Would have required a briefing within 30 days on operations in Yemen and a range of civilian protection and other issues.	Submitted on 05/17/2018 Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 5515	Representative Rick Nolan (D-MN)	House Rules Committee Amendment 399 —Would have prohibited the use of funds authorized by the act “to deploy members of the Armed Forces to participate in the ongoing civil war in Yemen.”	Submitted on 05/17/2018 Not made in order by Rules Committee

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.R. 5515	Representative Pramila Jayapal (D-WA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 456 —Would have prohibited the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the act to refuel or assist in targeting of air strikes led by Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates against Houthi forces in Yemen or for Special Operations ground missions in support of anti-Houthi operations until the Secretary of Defense certified that Yemen’s Hudaydah port was “completely open to aid and commercial flow of food, fuel, and medicine.”	Submitted on 05/17/2018 Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 5515	Representative Mark Pocan (D-WI)	House Rules Committee Amendment 507 —Would have required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report within 120 days of enactment regarding all activities conducted by members of the U.S. Armed Forces and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense in providing assistance to the military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Houthi forces in Yemen.	Submitted on 05/17/2018 Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 5515	Representative Mark Pocan (D-WI), and Representative Justin Amash (R-MI)	House Rules Committee Amendment 508 —Would have prohibited the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the act to transfer precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia until the Secretary of Defense certified that U.S. Armed Forces had withdrawn from all forms of participation in the hostilities led by Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates against Houthi forces in Yemen, unless such participation had been specifically authorized by Congress.	Submitted on 05/17/2018 Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 5515	Representative Karen Bass (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 561 —Would have required a comprehensive report within 90 days by Department of State, Department of Defense, and USAID on U.S. security and humanitarian interests in Yemen.	Submitted on 05/17/2018 Made in order as Amendment 37 in H.Rept. 115-702 Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 645 Engrossed in the House on 05/24/2018 In conference, was removed by the House due to a prior provision that encompasses this amendment

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
S. 2987	Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)	Section 1266 (SASC Reported) —Prohibits the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that are not conducting select operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained at 30-, 180-, and 360-day intervals. Criteria include identifying whether the Government of Saudi Arabia is: undertaking an urgent and good faith effort to conduct diplomatic negotiations to end the civil war in Yemen; alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access (including through the port of Hudaydah) for all Yemenis to food, fuel, and medicine; reducing delays to shipments resulting from secondary Saudi coalition inspections other than those associated with the United Nations Verification and Inspections Mechanism (UNVIM); and reducing the risk of harm to civilians resulting from Saudi-led military operations. Enables the Secretary of State to waive the certification requirement for national security purposes if the Secretary provides an unclassified explanatory justification to the appropriate committees. Also requires a report on, among other things, U.S. objectives in Yemen and a detailed strategy to accomplish those objectives.	Reported to Senate on 06/05/2018 In conference, an amendment was made to require reporting and certification on the United Arab Emirates in addition to Saudi Arabia Incorporated as Section 1290 of the conference version of H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232
Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019			
H.R. 6157 S.Amdt. 3793	Senators Murphy (D-CT), Schatz (D-HI), Warren (D-MA), Feinstein (D-CA), Carper (D-DE), Blumenthal (D-CT), and Kaine (D-VA)	Senate Amendment 3793 to Senate Amendment 3695 —Would have amended the Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to prohibit the use of funds made available by the act for the Defense Department for U.S. support of the Saudi Arabia-led intervention in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certified, in writing, to Congress that the Saudi-led coalition air campaign did “not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians.” The provision would not have applied “to ongoing support for counterterrorism operations” against Al Qaeda or the Islamic State.	Submitted on 08/20/2018
H.R. 6157	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 79 —Would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to transfer munitions to Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates in missions against the Houthis in Yemen.	Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 6157	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA) and Representative Walter Jones (R-NC)	House Rules Committee Amendment 83 —Would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to transfer fuel to Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates in missions against the Houthis in Yemen.	Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.Rept. 115-769 on H.R. 6157	House Committee on Appropriations	Requests a classified report from the Secretary of Defense, no later than 120 days after the date of enactment of the act, submitted to the congressional defense committees detailing activities by the Department of Defense in providing assistance to the Saudi-led coalition beginning in March 2015.	Reflected in Division A of Conference Report H.Rept. 115-952 by reference

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019			
S.Rept. 115-282 on S. 3108	Senate Committee on Appropriations	<p>Noted that 22 million people were in need of assistance in Yemen and 8 million people were at risk of starvation.</p> <p>Urges the Administration to (1) work with all parties involved in the conflict to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law and take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure from the impact of hostilities; and (2) take steps to ensure that vital humanitarian aid and commercial goods can continue to flow through the port of Hudaydah and other key entry points.</p>	Reported to the Senate on 06/21/2018
H.Rept. 115-829 on H.R. 6385	House Committee on Appropriations	<p>Expresses Committee concern about “the significant humanitarian needs in Yemen and the lack of consistent access to allow relief to be provided in Yemen.”</p> <p>Requires a report within 45 days of enactment from the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Administrator, addressing humanitarian assistance delivery, humanitarian access, Yemeni port capacity, and “the conditions required to transition from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development assistance.”</p> <p>Report urges the Secretary of State “to press for access, including for food and fuel, into all Red Sea Ports, which are critical lifelines for the Yemeni population.”</p>	Reported to the House on 07/16/2018
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019			
H.Amdt. 865 to H.R. 6237	Representative Dan Lipinski (D-IL)	Would have required an annual report from the Director of National Intelligence describing Iranian expenditures on military and terrorist activities outside the country, such as on Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, and proxy forces in Iraq and Syria.	Approved in House by voice vote on 07/12/2018

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
National Defense Authorization Act, 2018			
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91	Representative Mac Thornberry (R-TX)	<p>Section 1277 (House-passed)—Would have required the President to provide the appropriate congressional committees with a report that contains a security strategy for Yemen, including, among other things, a discussion of the strategy’s compliance with applicable legal authorities and a detailed description of the roles of the U.S. Armed Forces in implementing the strategy.</p> <p>Section 1275 (Agreed to in Conference)—Requires the President to provide the appropriate congressional committees with a report that contains a security strategy for Yemen, including, among other things, “an explanation of the legal authorities supporting the strategy; a detailed description of the political and security environment in Yemen; a detailed description of the threats posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Yemen Province, including the intent, capabilities, strategic aims, and resources attributable to each organization; a detailed description of the threats posed to freedom of navigation through the Bab al Mandab Strait and waters in proximity to Yemen as well as any United States efforts to mitigate those threats; a detailed description of the threats posed to the United States and its allies and partners by the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons in Yemen; a detailed description of the threats posed to United States interests by state actors in Yemen; a discussion of United States objectives regarding long-term stability and counterterrorism in Yemen; a plan to integrate the United States diplomatic, development, military, and intelligence resources necessary to implement the strategy; and a detailed description of the roles of the United States Armed Forces in supporting the strategy.”</p>	<p>Engrossed in the House on 07/14/2017</p> <p>The Senate engrossed amendment contained no similar provision</p> <p>In conference, the prohibition on funds contained in Section 1277(e) [see below] was removed and conferees adopted the security strategy provisions contained in Section 1277 with clarifying changes and incorporated them into Section 1275 in P.L. 115-91</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91	Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA), Representative Ruben Gallego (D-AZ), and Representative Yvette Clarke (D-NY)	<p>House Rules Committee Amendment 274—Would have required the Secretaries of State and Defense to provide the appropriate congressional committees with a report on military action of Saudi Arabia and its coalitions partners in Yemen, including, among other things, the extent to which the Government of Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners in Yemen are abiding by their “No Strike List and Restricted Target List,” and the roles played by U.S. military personnel with respect to operations of such coalition partners in Yemen.</p> <p>Section 1265 (Agreed to in Conference)—Requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to provide the appropriate congressional committees with a report on military action of Saudi Arabia and its coalitions partners in Yemen, including, among other things, the extent to which the Government of Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners in Yemen are taking demonstrable actions to “reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects, in compliance with obligations under international humanitarian law; facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid and commercial goods into Yemen, including commercial fuel and commodities not subject to sanction or prohibition under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015); and target al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria as part of the coalition’s military operations in Yemen.” Would also require an assessment of “the role of United States military personnel with respect to operations of such coalition partners in Yemen” and “progress made by the Government of Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners in avoiding and investigating, if necessary, civilian casualties, including improvements to (A) targeting methodology; (B) the strike approval process; and (C) training of personnel, including by implementing the recommendations of the Joint Incident Assessment Team.”</p>	<p>Submitted on 07/12/2017</p> <p>Made in order as Amendment 93 in H.Rept. 115-217</p> <p>Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 195. Incorporated as Section 1293 and engrossed in the House on 07/14/2017</p> <p>Agreed to in conference (with clarifying changes) and incorporated as Section 1265 in P.L. 115-91</p> <p>The conference agreement changed the reporting requirement from an annual report with no time limit to an annual report issued for two years</p>

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)/P.L. 115-91	Representative Rick Nolan (D-MN)	House Rules Committee Amendment 159 —Would have prohibited the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the act to deploy members of the Armed Forces to participate in the civil war in Yemen.	Submitted on 07/12/2017 Made in order as Amendment 84 in H.Rept. 115-217 Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 194. Incorporated as Section 1277(e) and engrossed in the House on 07/14/2017 The Senate struck the prohibition on funds in conference
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 70 —Would have required certifications for provision of air-to-ground munitions to countries relating to the civil war in Yemen.	Submitted on 07/12/2017 Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 71 —Would have required an investigation to determine if employees of the Department of Defense violated federal law or Department of Defense policy while conducting operations in Yemen.	Submitted on 07/12/2017 Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)	Representatives Khanna (D-CA), Jones (R-NC), Conyers (D-MI), Pocan (D-WI), Lee (D-CA), Grijalva (D-AZ), and Clarke (D-NY)	House Rules Committee Amendment 73 —Would have prohibited the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the act for refueling for missions over northern and western Yemen and required a reoccurring report to Congress.	Submitted on 07/12/2017 Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)	Representative Warren Davison (R-OH)	House Rules Committee Amendment 386 —Would have prohibited the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the act or otherwise available to the Department of Defense for FY2018 to conduct military operations in Yemen with the exception of: Activities carried out in full compliance with the Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), the provision of humanitarian assistance, the defense of U.S. Armed Forces, and support for freedom of navigation operations.	Submitted on 07/12/2017 Made in order as Amendment 120 in H.Rept. 115-217 Adopted by voice vote as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 196. Incorporated as Section 1298 and engrossed in the House on 07/14/2017

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)	Representative Gwen Moore (D-WI) and Yvette Clarke (D-NY)	House Rules Committee Amendment 188 —Would have required the U.S. strategy on Yemen to also consider the political and humanitarian environment in Yemen, ways to mitigate harms to civilians caused by the ongoing conflict, and efforts to improve access to food, water, and health care. Would have required an assessment of how military and other support to regional allies will help to achieve this strategy, including how the United States will ensure that such aid is not used to harm civilians. Would have required that future budget requests specifically identify costs associated with implementing the required strategy.	Submitted on 07/12/2017 Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 2810 (NDAA) S.Amdt. 439	Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)	Senate Amendment 439 —Would have required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to provide Congress with a report assessing whether the use of air-to-ground munitions sold or otherwise supplied by the United States to the Government of Saudi Arabia have resulted in civilian casualties, and providing recommendations on actions to be taken to mitigate the incidence of civilian casualties in Yemen.	Submitted on 07/27/2017 Not considered
H.R. 2810 (NDAA) S.Amdt. 585	Senator Todd Young (R-IN)	Senate Amendment 585 —Would have prohibited the sale or export of any defense article to the government of Saudi Arabia during FY2018 until the Secretary of State certifies that, among other things, the Government of Saudi Arabia is complying fully with its obligations in Yemen under international law; and that the government of Saudi Arabia is facilitating the delivery and installation of cranes to the port of Hudaydah. Would also have required the Comptroller General to report on whether the conclusions in the certification are fully supported.	Submitted on 07/27/2017 Not considered
H.R. 2810 (NDAA) S.Amdt. 896	Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT)	Senate Amendment 896 —Would have required the Secretary of Defense to certify certain government of Saudi Arabia action before funds may be authorized by the act for the refueling of aircraft of Saudi Arabia or its military coalition partners in Yemen. The certification would not have applied for refueling missions related to counterterrorism operations. The Secretary of Defense would have the option to waive the certification requirement.	Submitted on 09/11/2017 Not considered
H.R. 2810 (NDAA) S.Amdt. 923	Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL)	Senate Amendment 923 —Would have required the Secretaries of State and Defense to jointly report on the military action of Saudi Arabia and its coalitions partners in Yemen, including, among other things, the extent to which the Government of Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners in Yemen are abiding by their “No Strike List and Restricted Target List” and the roles played by U.S. military personnel with respect to operations of such coalition partners in Yemen.	Submitted on 09/11/2017 Not considered

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
H.R. 2810 (NDAA) S.Amdt. 1081	Senator Todd Young (R-IN), Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT), and Senator Dean Heller (R-NV)	Senate Amendment 1081 —Similar to SA Amendment 896, would have required the Secretary of Defense to certify certain government of Saudi Arabia action before funds may be authorized by the act for the refueling of aircraft of Saudi Arabia or its military coalition partners in Yemen. This certification would have required, among other things, that the Government of Saudi Arabia facilitate the delivery and installation of cranes to the port of Hudaydah.	Submitted on 09/14/2017 Not considered
H.R.3219—Make America Secure Appropriations Act, 2018 (Defense Appropriations)			
H.R. 3219 (FY2018 Defense Appropriations)/ Division I, H.R. 3354	Representative Rick Nolan (D- MN)	House Rules Committee Amendment 35 —Would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to deploy members of the U.S. Armed Forces to participate in the ongoing civil war in Yemen.	Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 3219 (FY2018 Defense Appropriations)/ Division I, H.R. 3354	Representative Warren Davidson (R-OH)	House Rules Committee Amendment 104 —Would have prohibited the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by the act from being used with respect to Yemen in contravention of the War Powers Resolution.	Made in order as Amendment 45 in H.Rept. 115-261 Considered as H.Amdt. 268 on 07/27/2017 and failed by voice vote
H.R. 3219 (FY2018 Defense Appropriations)/ Division I, H.R. 3354	Representatives Khanna (D- CA), Jones (R-NC), Amash (R- MI), and Pocan (D-WI)	House Rules Committee Amendment 13 —Would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to transfer munitions to Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.	Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 3219 (FY2018 Defense Appropriations)/ Division I, H.R. 3354	Representative Ro Khanna (D- CA) and Representative Walter Jones (R-NC)	House Rules Committee Amendment 20 —Would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to transfer fuel to Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, except in connection with Operation Inherent Resolve and operations conducted by Special Operations Command-Central or under Operating Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa.	Not made in order by Rules Committee
H.R. 3219 (FY2018 Defense Appropriations)/ Division I, H.R. 3354	Representatives Amash (R- MI), Conyers (D-MI), Jones (R-NC), Pocan (D-WI), Lee (D-CA), McGovern (D-MA), and, Lieu (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 44 —Would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act from being used to transfer or authorize the transfer of cluster munitions to the Government of Saudi Arabia.	Not made in order by Rules Committee

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
Consolidated Appropriations FY2018			
H.R. 3354 ("minibus")	Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA)	House Rules Committee Amendment 45 —Would have reduced funds for the International Military Education & Training (IMET) program for Saudi Arabia and increased the State Department's international disaster assistance program for Yemen.	Submitted on 09/12//2017 Not made in order by Rules Committee
Joint Resolutions of Disapproval on U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia			
S.J.Res. 42	Senator Rand Paul, (R-KY)	Would have disapproved of the proposed export to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles, such as joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), Paveway laser-guided munitions kits, and programmable bomb fuzes.	Considered in the Senate on 06/13/2017
H.J.Res 102	Representative Justin Amash, (R-MI)		Motion to discharge resolution from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected (Yeas and Nays 47-53, Record Vote Number 143)

Source: Congress.gov, Congressional Record, and U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules.

Table 4. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 114th Congress

Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 114th Congress

Bill Number	Principal Sponsors	Summary	Status
Resolutions and Stand-alone Legislation			
S.J.Res. 32	Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT)	Would have prohibited the transfer to Saudi Arabia of United States air-to-ground munitions until the President certified to Congress that, among other things, Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners were taking all feasible precautions to reduce the risk of civilian harm and exercising proportional use of force in the course of military actions, and were making demonstrable efforts to facilitate the flow of critical humanitarian aid and commercial goods. The joint resolution also would have required a briefing on U.S. government support for the Saudi-led coalition's military operations in Yemen, to include an assessment, among other things, of whether operations in Yemen constituted legitimate self-defense and whether operations had deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure in Yemen.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 04/13/2016
H.J.Res 90	Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA)		Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs on 04/20/2016
S.Res. 524	Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT)	A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on the conflict in Yemen that, among other things, "all sides to the current conflict in Yemen should abide by international obligations to protect civilians; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief throughout the country; and respect negotiated cease-fires and work toward a lasting political settlement," and that, "United States-supported Saudi military operations in Yemen should take all feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects, in compliance with international humanitarian law; and increase prioritization of targeting of designated foreign terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant."	Introduced 07/11/2016 Reported to Senate without amendment by Committee on Foreign Relations on 07/14/2016
S. 2119	Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD)	Would have required regular reporting on, among other things, Iranian support to Houthi fighters in Yemen and assessment of Iranian strategy in Yemen. Incorporated into S. 3267.	Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 10/01/2015
S. 3267	Senator Bob Corker (R-TN)		Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 07/14/2016
National Defense Authorization Act, 2016			

H.R. 1735	Representative John Dingell (D-MI) and Representative John Conyers (D-MI)	House Rules Committee Amendment 103—would have expressed the Sense of Congress that the President should exercise his authorities to evacuate U.S. citizens and nationals from Yemen during the ongoing conflict. Section 1042 in House engrossed version of H.R. 1735. Removed by conferees. Conferees in H.Rept. 114-270 “encourage the President to work with international partners, to the extent practicable, to protect non-combatants and assist in the evacuation of U.S. citizens and nationals as well as the citizens and nationals of other states from Yemen.”	Made in order as Amendment 114 in H.Rept. 114-112 Agreed to by voice vote as part of en bloc H.Amdt. 236 on 05/15/2016
S. 1356/P.L. 114-92	Senator John McCain (R-AZ)	Section 1209 prohibits, subject to a “notice and wait” national security exception, amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2016 for the Department of Defense by the act to be used to provide security assistance to an entity in Yemen that is controlled by members of the Houthi movement.	Passed in the House 11/05/2015 (Yeas and Nays 370-58, Roll no. 618) Agreed to in Senate on 11/10/2015 (Yeas and Nays 91-3, Record Vote Number 301)

Source: Congress.gov, Congressional Record, and U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules.

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