

FY2022 NDAA: Summary of Discretionary Authorizations

January 4, 2022

Of the [\\$768.3 billion](#) requested in the FY2022 President’s budget for national defense programs, [\\$743.1 billion](#) was for discretionary programs falling within the scope of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (NDAA; P.L. 117-81). The remainder of the national defense budget request was for discretionary programs that were not within the jurisdiction of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), discretionary programs that did not require additional authorization, or mandatory programs that were previously authorized.

In considering the FY2022 NDAA, Members of Congress debated various proposals to increase the amount of funding authorized in the legislation.

The House-passed version of the bill ([H.R. 4350](#)) would have authorized a total of \$768.1 billion for discretionary programs—\$25 billion (3.4%) more than the President’s request, according to H.Rept. 117-118. During the HASC markup of its version of the bill, Representative Mike Rogers, ranking member of the committee, offered an amendment to increase authorized appropriations by \$23.9 billion. He [said](#) the increase would “ensure defense spending grows by 3% above inflation, meeting the recommendations of the bipartisan [National Defense Strategy Commission](#).” Rogers also said the increase would support the unfunded priorities of the armed services and combatant commands, as well as provide the resources necessary to counter the growing threat from China and other strategic competitors. The committee voted to adopt the amendment [42-17](#). Among those on the committee who voted against the amendment was, for example, Chair Adam Smith, [who said](#) a smaller increase would encourage DOD to spend money more wisely, improve acquisition and procurement practices, and better anticipate threats. “If we give them another \$23.9 billion, it takes the pressure off,” he said. “It makes it easier for them to just keep doing what they’ve been doing.”

In response to the House-passed legislation, the White House [stated](#) it planned to work with Congress “to set an appropriate and responsible level of defense spending to support the security of the nation” while also providing “appropriate resources for non-security investments and security investments outside the Department of Defense (DOD).” The White House [argued](#), in part, “The Administration opposes the direction to add funding for platforms and systems that cannot be affordably modernized given the need to prioritize survivable, lethal, and resilient forces in the current threat environment and eliminate wasteful spending.”

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The SASC-reported version of the bill ([S. 2792](#)) would have authorized a similar level for discretionary programs, \$767.7 billion—\$25 billion (3.4%) more than the request, according to S.Rept. 117-39. In commenting on SASC’s completion of marking up its version of the bill, Senator Jim Inhofe, ranking member of the committee, [said](#), “... this year’s bipartisan National Defense Authorization Act increases the defense topline to the National Defense Strategy Commission’s recommendation of 3% to 5% real growth. This is a big win for our national security and sends a strong message to both our allies and adversaries that America is prepared to stand up for ourselves and our friends.” Among the senators who [opposed](#) the committee reporting the legislation to the Senate was, for example, Senator Elizabeth Warren. In speaking on the Senate floor in opposition to the legislation, she [argued](#), in part, “America’s spending priorities are completely misaligned with the threats Americans are actually facing, the things are quite literally endangering their lives—like COVID-19 and the climate crisis.”

The enacted legislation ([S. 1605](#)) authorized \$768.2 billion for discretionary programs—\$25.1 billion (3.4%) more than the request, according to the accompanying [explanatory statement](#). In terms of major titles in the bill, more than half of the overall increase was authorized for procurement programs (see [Table 1](#)).

Table 1. Summary of Discretionary Authorizations in FY2022 NDAA
(in billions of dollars)

Title	President's budget request	House-passed H.R. 4350	SASC-reported S. 2792	Enacted S. 1605	Difference (%) from request
Procurement	\$132.21	\$147.06	\$144.05	\$146.88	11.1%
Research and Development	\$111.96	\$118.07	\$116.11	\$117.73	5.1%
Operation and Maintenance	\$253.62	\$253.03	\$260.41	\$255.40	0.7%
Military Personnel	\$167.29	\$166.86	\$166.79	\$166.90	-0.2%
Defense Health Program and Other DOD	\$39.85	\$41.07	\$39.88	\$39.72	-0.3%
Military Construction and Family Housing	\$9.85	\$13.42	\$12.71	\$13.35	35.5%
Subtotal, Department of Defense-Military (051)	\$714.77	\$739.52	\$739.95	\$739.99	3.5%
Atomic Energy Defense Programs (053)	\$27.94	\$28.21	\$27.75	\$27.84	-0.3%
Defense-Related Activities (054)	\$0.38	\$0.38	\$0.00	\$0.38	0.0%
Total	\$743.09	\$768.11	\$767.70	\$768.21	3.4%

Source: HASC report ([H.Rept. 117-118](#); Part 1) accompanying its version of the FY2022 NDAA ([H.R. 4350](#)), pp. 346-349; SASC report ([S.Rept. 117-39](#)) accompanying its version of the FY2022 NDAA ([S. 2792](#)), pp. 378-381; and explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 NDAA (S. 1605) in Part 2 of the House section of the *Congressional Record*, December 7, 2021, pp. [H7362-H7364](#).

Notes: Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth.

Table 2 shows the difference between requested and authorized funding in the NDAA over the past decade.

Table 2. Requested and Authorized Funding in the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2013-FY2021

(in billions of dollars)

Fiscal Year	Public Law (P.L.) #	Requested	Authorized	Difference (%)
FY2013	P.L. 112-239	\$631.60	\$633.34	0.3%
FY2014	P.L. 113-66	\$625.15	\$625.14	0.0%
FY2015	P.L. 113-291	\$577.15	\$577.15	0.0%
FY2016	P.L. 114-92	\$604.21	\$599.21	-0.8%
FY2017	P.L. 114-328	\$607.98	\$611.17	0.5%
FY2018	P.L. 115-91	\$665.72	\$692.10	4.0%
FY2019	P.L. 115-232	\$708.11	\$708.10	0.0%
FY2020	P.L. 116-92	\$741.93	\$729.93	-1.6%
FY2021	P.L. 116-283	\$731.61	\$731.61	0.0%
FY2022	P.L. 117-81	\$743.09	\$768.21	3.4%

Source: CRS analysis of funding tables in conference reports or explanatory statements accompanying National Defense Authorization Acts. Amounts include funding for Department of Defense-Military, atomic energy defense programs, defense-related activities and, from FY2013 to FY2021, funding designated for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth.

Notes: Links to reports or explanatory statements are embedded in table figures.

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