INSIGHTi
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of
U.S. Sanctions and Other Responses
Updated April 22, 2022
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched an undeclared war against Ukraine. The United States and
countries around the world have condemned Russia’s “unprecedented military aggression” as
“unprovoked and unjustified.” Members of legislatures, local governments, businesses, and publics in the
United States and elsewhere have expressed support for Ukraine and have condemned Russia’s invasion.
Hundreds of U.S. and other companies have withdrawn, suspended, or curtailed operations in Russia. On
March 2, 2022, the U.N. General Assembly voted 141-5 to demand Russia “immediately, completely and
unconditionally withdraw” from Ukraine (34 countries, including China and India, abstained).
Since December 2021, the United States and others have warned Russia’s leadership that severe sanctions
would follow a new attack on Ukraine, which Russia first invaded and partially occupied in 2014. The
United States pledged to provide increased security assistance to Ukraine if Russia were to launch a new
attack. After Russia launched its war in February 2022, the United States, the EU, and others imposed a
series of increasingly severe sanctions and substantially increased military, humanitarian, and economic
assistance to Ukraine. The United States alone has committed more than $3.4 billion in security assistance
to Ukraine since the start of the war (see CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine).
Congress has provided financial support for Ukraine since the start of the war and supported sanctions
and related measures against Russia. The Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103,
Division N) provides $13.6 billion “in humanitarian, security, and economic assistance for Ukraine and
neighboring countries.” Congress also passed legislation prohibiting the import to the United States of
Russian oil and other energy products (P.L. 117-109) and suspending normal trade relations with Russia
and Belarus (P.L. 117-110). In addition, the Senate passed the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease
Act of 2022 (S. 3522), which would expedite the leasing or lending of U.S. defense articles to Ukraine,
and the House passed the Ukraine Invasion War Crimes Deterrence and Accountability Act (H.R. 7276),
which would direct the President to submit a report to Congress on efforts to collect evidence related to
war crimes and other atrocities (also see H.Res. 956 and S.Res. 546).
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U.S. Sanctions
U.S. sanctions and related actions since February 2022 are likely to have a greater impact on Russia than
sanctions the United States has imposed previously (see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia).
Sanctions and related actions the Biden Administration has imposed since February 21, 2022, include the
following (also see CRS In Focus IF12062, New Financial and Trade Sanctions Against Russia).
Full blocking sanctions (including restrictions on transactions and access to U.S.-based
property or interests in property) on
Russian President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and
members of Russia’s Security Council, including Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff
Valery Gerasimov;
The State Duma (the lower house of Russia’s legislature) and most of its
members;
Six of Russia’s largest banks, including state-owned Sberbank (one of
Russia’s top five companies) and VTB Bank and privately held Alfa Bank
(with exceptions, among others, for energy-related transactions through June
24, 2022);
VEB, a large state development bank, and the Russian Direct Investment
Fund, a sovereign wealth fund;
Nord Stream 2 AG, the parent company for a natural gas pipeline project, and
Alrosa, the world’s largest diamond-mining company;
Members of Russia’s Kremlin-connected business elite (sometimes referred
to as oligarchs) and family members. In coordination with partners, the U.S.
government has established an interagency Task Force KleptoCapture to
strengthen enforcement of sanctions and other measures and a Kleptocracy
Asset Recovery Rewards Program;
Dozens of defense-industrial companies, disinformation operations, sanctions
evaders, and virtual currency mining companies; and
Belarusian individuals and entities in response to Belarus’s support for
Russia’s invasion.
Restrictions on transactions with Russia’s central bank, limiting its ability to draw on
dollar-denominated foreign reserves, and transactions with Russia’s Ministry of Finance
and National Wealth Fund.
Export controls on trade with Russia and Belarus, including restrictions on “sensitive
U.S. technologies produced in foreign countries using U.S.-origin software, technology,
or equipment” and oil and gas extraction equipment.
Suspension of normal trade relations with Russia and Belarus.
Ban on the U.S. import of Russian crude oil, petroleum products, liquefied natural gas,
coal, seafood, alcoholic beverages, and nonindustrial diamonds.
Ban on the export of U.S. luxury goods and dollar-denominated banknotes.
Ban on new U.S. investment in Russia, including the energy sector.
Ban on Russian aircraft entering and using U.S. airspace.
Ban on Russian-affiliated vessels entering U.S. ports.
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Ban on “any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee” of transactions by foreign
persons that would be prohibited to U.S. persons or in the United States.
Restrictions on secondary-market transactions by U.S. financial institutions in Russian
sovereign debt (previous restrictions applied to primary-market transactions).
Restrictions against new equity investment and financing for companies including
Gazprom, a state-owned energy company and Russia’s largest firm;
Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest maritime and freight shipping firm; and
Russian Railways.
Visa restrictions on 635 Russian nationals.
Prohibitions on U.S. trade or investment in Russia-occupied areas of eastern Ukraine and
sanctions against those operating in those areas.
International Sanctions
The EU, the United Kingdom (UK), other non-EU countries in Europe (including Switzerland), Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, among others, have imposed
sanctions, export controls, or both in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Many of these sanctions are identical or similar to U.S. sanctions, although the EU has not imposed a ban
on Russian oil or gas imports or full blocking sanctions on Sberbank or Alfa-Bank. The EU has prohibited
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and other specialized
financial messaging services from serving seven other Russian financial institutions.
The EU and the UK have suspended broadcasting of Russian state-owned network RT; the EU suspended
Sputnik, another state-owned network; and the UK has imposed sanctions on parent companies of RT and
Sputnik. Two days before Russia’s attack, the German government suspended certification of the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline, preventing it from becoming operational.
For more, see CRS Insight IN11897, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: European Union Responses and
Implications for U.S.-EU Relations.
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Author Information
Cory Welt
Specialist in Russian and European Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
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