

# Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)

Updated May 2, 2022

As of April 28, 2022, the Biden Administration had submitted to Congress two emergency supplemental funding requests to address the crisis caused by [Russia's invasion of Ukraine](#). The first, submitted on March 2, 2022, included \$5 billion for Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations accounts, among other funding. On March 15, 2022, Congress enacted the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act (USAA, P.L. 117-103, Div. N), which provided \$6.8 billion for SFOPS accounts. The Administration's second supplemental funding request, submitted to Congress on April 28, called for an additional \$14.75 billion in SFOPS funding related to Ukraine. [Reports suggest](#) Congress will pursue another emergency supplemental funding package, though it remains to be seen what that package may include and whether domestic priorities affect its consideration.

## March 2 Emergency Supplemental Funding Request and USAA

The Administration's March 2 emergency supplemental funding request for Ukraine included [\\$5 billion for SFOPS accounts](#) as part of a broader package that would have provided a total of \$10 billion for Ukraine and \$22.5 billion for response activities related to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

According to the request, the \$5 billion for SFOPS would have been divided among four appropriations accounts to “bolster U.S. security and economic assistance to Ukraine as well as regional allies and partners” and “support lifesaving humanitarian assistance, including emergency food assistance, and additional support for vulnerable populations and communities.” The Administration also proposed increased flexibility for SFOPS funding through changes to existing authorities, new transfer authorities to move funds between SFOPS accounts, and the authority to reprogram (i.e., to move funds within an account) both FY2022 and prior-year funds. The Administration asserted in the request that these changes would afford it “maximum flexibility in supporting Ukraine, our European allies and partners, and other emergent global needs.”

Congress enacted the USAA on March 15, 2022. The measure included \$6.8 billion for SFOPS appropriations accounts (**Table 1**), out of a total of \$13.6 billion, as well as new authorities (**Table 2**).

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**Table 1. SFOPS Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Ukraine: March 2 Request and USAA**

(In millions of U.S. current dollars)

Appropriations Account	March 2 Request	USAA Enacted
Dept. of State Diplomatic Programs	—	125.00
Dept. of State Office of Inspector General	—	4.00
U.S. Agency for Global Media	—	25.00
USAID Operating Expenses	—	25.00
USAID Office of Inspector General	—	4.00
International Disaster Assistance	2,000.00	2,650.00
Transition Initiatives	—	120.00
Economic Support Fund	1,750.00	647.00
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia	—	1,120.00
Migration and Refugee Assistance	750.00	1,400.00
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)	—	30.00
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	500.00	650.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,000.00</b>	<b>6,800.00</b>

**Source:** [Letter from OMB Acting Director Shalanda Young](#), P.L. 117-103.**Table 2. Selected SFOPS Authorities: March 2 Request and USAA**

March 2 Request	USAA Enacted
Amend Section 506(a)(1) the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195) to raise the drawdown maximum by \$1.2 billion.	Amended Section 506(a)(1) to raise the drawdown authority to a total of \$3.0 billion.
Amend Section 614 of the FAA to increase authority by \$250 million.	Amended Section 614(a)(4)(A)(ii) of the FAA to increase authority from \$250 million to \$500 million. Also amended Section 614(a)(4)(C) to adjust existing limitations to higher dollar amounts.
Amend Sections 516(f) and 516(g)(1) of the FAA (on excess defense articles [EDA]). (The Administration did not cite such sections specifically in its request but proposed waiving both the notification requirement and the \$500 million limit on the provision of EDA).	Allows for the President to transfer EDA to “Ukraine and to allies and partners in Europe” pursuant to Section 516 without regard to the notification requirements in Sections 516(f)(1) and 516(g).
Reprogram regardless of Appropriations Directives. The Administration requested the authority to “reprogram FY2022 and prior-year funds for Ukraine regardless of existing appropriations directives.”	Provides transfer authorities among accounts, which are “in addition to any other transfer authority provided by law.”

**Source:** [Letter from OMB Acting Director Shalanda Young](#), P.L. 117-103.**Note:** For more information on the use of Sections 506(a)(1) and 614(a)(4)(A)(ii) of the FAA, see CRS In Focus IF12040, *U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine*, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt.

## April 28 Emergency Supplemental Funding Request

The Administration’s April 28 request to Congress calls for \$14.75 billion in emergency supplemental funding for SFOPS accounts, out of a total of \$33 billion requested for Ukraine and the region. The

request does not designate specific funding accounts for each proposal; in some instances, it notes only the purpose of requested funds. The SFOPS request includes

- \$7.5 billion for “direct macroeconomic support for the Government of Ukraine”;
- \$500 million for economic and development assistance;
- \$4.5 billion in security assistance, of which \$4.0 billion would be FMF, \$400 million would be INCLE, and \$100 million would be Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR);
- \$1.6 billion in humanitarian assistance, including global emergency food assistance; and
- \$650 million in the Department of the Treasury’s International Programs, of which \$500 million is requested for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and \$150 million for the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program.

As with the March 2 request, the Administration also proposes amending certain authorities, including raising Section 506(a)(1) drawdown authority by \$5.0 billion (to a total of \$8.0 billion) and increasing Section 614 authority by \$500 million (to a total of \$1.0 billion), among others.

## Outlook

Reports suggest there is relatively broad congressional support for further emergency supplemental funding for Ukraine but that [differing views](#) over proposed supplemental funding for COVID-19, as well as on other [domestic issues](#), may affect its consideration. Some Members may advocate for a stand-alone Ukraine emergency supplemental in an effort to pass the measure more quickly; others may see the bill’s urgency as creating an opportunity to provide emergency funding to address a broader range of issues.

A key consideration for Congress is how much funding and decisionmaking flexibility to grant the executive branch. Congress accepted the majority of the changes to SFOPS authorities requested by the Administration on March 2 in the USAA, and provided more funding than was requested. Whether or not lawmakers will respond in a similar manner to the April 28 request remains to be seen. Congress may choose to enact the additional supplemental funding but not any of the requested authorities, or, conversely, provide more flexible authorities for the use of previously appropriated funds without providing new funding. Congress also may choose to grant certain authorities on a time-limited basis, such that they apply only to the funds enacted in the supplemental package. This approach would grant executive agencies some additional flexibilities to address this crisis—and potentially set precedent for future such emergencies—but not change statute in the long term. Another possibility is that Congress may accept the proposed changes in full and without a time limitation, with potentially broader implications for the allocation and congressional oversight of assistance for years to come.

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