



# **U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine**

The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, particularly since Russia launched its renewed and expanded invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through October 14, 2022, the United States has provided more than \$20.3 billion in security assistance "to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO." Of this amount, the Biden Administration has committed about \$17.6 billion in security assistance since the start of the 2022 war.

FY2022 and FY2023 security assistance packages are mostly being funded via almost \$28 billion in supplemental appropriations (P.L. 117-103, Div. N; P.L. 117-128; and P.L. 117-180, Div. B). FY2022 and FY2023 appropriations include a total of \$14.05 billion to replenish Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks sent to Ukraine via presidential drawdown authority; \$9.3 billion for DOD's Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI; P.L. 114-92, \$1250); and \$4.65 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF; 22 U.S.C. \$2763) for Ukraine and "countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine." Supplemental appropriations also have included funds for U.S. European Command operations and related support for the U.S. military.

### **Overview of Programs Since 2014**

The United States has used a variety of security assistance programs and authorities to help build the defensive capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through train, equip, and advise efforts across multiple spending accounts.

Especially since 2021, the United States has been providing defense items to Ukraine via Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), by which the President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks, up to a funding cap established in law, in response to an "unforeseen emergency" (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)). Since August 2021, the Biden Administration has authorized 23 drawdowns valued at \$10.6 billion (**Table 1**).

USAI and FMF packages have included training, equipment, and advisory efforts to enhance Ukraine's defensive capabilities (see **Table 2**). FY2022 appropriations also directed that USAI funds be provided for logistics support, supplies, and services; salaries and stipends; sustainment; weapons replacement; and intelligence support. Prior to FY2022, a portion of annual USAI funds was contingent on DOD and the Department of State certifying Ukraine's progress on key defense reforms.

Ukraine also has received assistance pursuant to DOD's security cooperation authorities, notably Building Partner Capacity (10 U.S.C. §333) and Defense Institution Building (10 U.S.C. §332), as well as International Military Education and Training, which has provided professional military education at U.S. defense institutions for Ukrainian military officers. Other State Department- and DOD-funded

security assistance has supported conventional weapons destruction, border security, law enforcement training, and counter-weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

# Table I. Presidential Drawdowns for Ukraine, FY2021-FY2023

(in millions of dollars)

(		,				
#	Authorized	Value	#	Authorized	Value	
Ι	Aug 27, 2021	60.0	13	June 23, 2022	450.0	
2	Dec 28, 2021	200.0	14	July 1, 2022	50.0	
3	Feb 25, 2022	350.0	15	July 8, 2022	400.0	
4	Mar 12, 2022	200.0	16	July 22, 2022	175.0	
5	Mar 16, 2022	800.0	17	Aug I, 2022	550.0	
6	Apr 5, 2022	100.0	18	Aug 8, 2022	1,000.0	
7	Apr 13, 2022	800.0	19	Aug 19, 2022	775.0	
8	Apr 21, 2022	800.0	20	Sep 8, 2022	675.0	
9	May 6, 2022	150.0	21	Sep 15, 2022	600.0	
10	May 19, 2022	100.0	22	Oct 4, 2022	625.0	
П	June 1, 2022	700.0	23	Oct 14, 2022	725.0	
12	June 15, 2022	350.0				
			•	Total	10.635.0	

**Sources:** Department of State and Department of Defense.

Through the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, established in 2015, the U.S. Army and National Guard, together with military trainers from U.S. allies, provided training, mentoring, and doctrinal assistance to the UAF before the war. This training mission was suspended at the outset of Russia's invasion. In April 2022, DOD announced it would resume training Ukrainian personnel, outside Ukraine, specifically to operate U.S. and allied systems. Separately, U.S. Special Operations Forces have trained and advised Ukrainian special forces.

### **Provision of Defense Equipment**

After Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, the Obama Administration provided Ukraine nonlethal security assistance, such as body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents, counter-mortar radars, uniforms, medical kits, and other related items. In 2017, the Trump Administration announced U.S. willingness to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine.

Since 2018, Ukraine has used FMF, as well as some of its national funds, to procure U.S. defense equipment, including Javelin anti-armor missiles and Mark VI patrol boats purchased through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Ukraine also has used a combination of FMF and national funds to refurbish former U.S. Coast Guard Island-class patrol boats provided through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA; 22 U.S.C. §2321j) program. In addition, Ukraine has purchased firearms; ammunition; ordnance;

and other laser, imaging, or guidance equipment directly from U.S. suppliers via Direct Commercial Sales.

#### Table 2. Selected U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, FY2016-FY2022

(selected account allocations, in millions of dollars)

							FY22	FY22	FY23
	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20	FY21	(P.L. 117-103)	(P.L. 117-128)	(P.L. 117-180)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	85.0	99.0	95.0	115.0	115.0	115.0	322.0 (obl.)*	l,000.0 (obl.)*	_
Ukraine Security Assistance	226.5	148.6	195.5	214.8	256.7	275.7	300.0 (obl.)	5,595.0 (obl.),	3,000.0 (appr.)
Initiative (USAI)								out of 6,000.0 (appr.)	

Sources: State Department congressional budget justifications, Department of Defense budget requests, P.L. 117-103, P.L. 117-128, P.L. 117-180.

**Notes:** \*P.L. 117-103 included \$650 million in FMF for Ukraine and other countries, of which about \$322 million was obligated for Ukraine. P.L. 117-128 included \$4 billion in FMF for Ukraine and other countries, of which \$1 billion to date has been obligated for Ukraine. According to DOD, USAI packages prior to FY2022 funding cap (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)) from \$100 million up rovided sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers

provided sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, counter-artillery radars, Mark VI patrol boats, electronic warfare detection and secure communications, satellite imagery and analysis capability, counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS), air surveillance systems, night vision devices, and equipment to support military medical treatment and combat evacuation procedures.

In 2022, the United States has provided more advanced defense equipment to Ukraine, as well as greater amounts of previously provided equipment. According to DOD, U.S. security assistance committed to Ukraine as of October 14, 2022, has included the following:

- 20 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition (+18 more via longer-term procurement);
- 2 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) (+6 more via longer-term procurement);
- 1,400+ Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
- 8,500+ Javelin anti-armor systems and 32,000+ other anti-armor systems;
- 700+ Phoenix Ghost Tactical UAS, 700+ Switchblade Tactical UAS, and other UAS;
- 142 155 mm and 36 105 mm Howitzers with more than 1 million artillery rounds;
- 20 120 mm mortar systems and 115,000 mortar rounds;
- 1,500 Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles, high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs), and laser-guided rocket systems;
- 20 Mi-17 helicopters;
- hundreds of Armored Humvee Vehicles and 440 mine resistant vehicles;
- 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
- 10,000+ grenade launchers and small arms; and
- communications and intelligence equipment.

In addition, the Biden Administration has authorized thirdparty transfers of U.S. defense articles and equipment from several NATO and EU members to Ukraine. According to the Kiel Institute's Ukraine Support Tracker, NATO allies, EU members, and the EU have committed at least \$13.5 billion worth of military assistance to Ukraine (and some countries do not fully disclose their military assistance).

#### **Recent Legislation**

Prior to and immediately following Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine, Congress authorized or proposed increased funding levels for existing security assistance authorities. For FY2022, Congress increased the PDA funding cap (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)) from \$100 million up to \$200 million via P.L. 117-70; up to \$300 million via P.L. 117-86; up to \$3 billion via P.L. 117-103; and up to \$11 billion via P.L. 117-128. For FY2023, Congress established a PDA funding cap of \$3.7 billion via P.L. 117-180.

Similarly, for FY2022, Congress increased a special authority (22 U.S.C. §2364) used to overcome PDA caps from \$250 million to \$500 million via P.L. 117-103 and up to \$1 billion via P.L. 117-128.

P.L. 117-128 requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to report on measures being taken to account for the enduse of U.S. weapons transferred to Ukraine. The act also requires monthly descriptions of U.S. security assistance provided to Ukraine since February 24, 2022, including a comprehensive list of the defense articles and services provided, as well as the associated authority and funding.

Additionally, the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-118) modifies provisions in the FAA and Arms Export Control Act to bypass bureaucratic barriers for leasing or lending U.S. defense articles to Ukraine and neighboring countries.

#### **Discussion on Future Assistance**

U.S. policy increasingly has recognized the UAF's ability to employ and operate advanced weaponry, including systems capable of supporting offensive operations to liberate Ukrainian territory. Much of U.S. assistance has been focused on providing systems and capabilities that Ukraine's domestic defense industry cannot produce, as well as those that can be immediately deployed on the battlefield to increase the UAF's resilience and ability to sustain combat operations. In addition to advanced rocket and missile systems, these include protected mobility assets (such as armored vehicles), artillery and ammunition, communication, and intelligence support.

Ukrainian officials have sought to acquire other advanced systems, including fighter aircraft, anti-ship, and additional air defense and anti-missile capabilities. Increasingly, the provision of security assistance to Ukraine also is focused on improving the UAF's medium- to long-term capabilities, including transitioning towards more NATO-standard weaponry and improving the UAF's ability to service and repair defense equipment provided.

Concerns remain about the potential for escalation. In June 2022, the Biden Administration first announced the provision to Ukraine of more advanced HIMARS systems but without their longest-range rockets. The Administration reportedly received Ukrainian assurances that the UAF will not use these weapons to attack Russian territory.

**Christina L. Arabia**, Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European Affairs Cory Welt, Specialist in Russian and European Affairs

IF12040

## Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS's institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.