

Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress

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Summary

The emergence over the past decade of intensified U.S. competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Russian Federation (Russia)—often referred to as great power competition (GPC)—has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post–Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East—which had been more at the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—are now a less-prominent element in the conversation, and the conversation now focuses more on the following elements, all of which relate largely to China and/or Russia:

- grand strategy and geopolitics as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense issues;
- the force-planning standard, meaning the number and types of simultaneous or overlapping conflicts or other contingencies that the U.S. military should be sized to be able to conduct—a planning factor that can strongly impact the size of the U.S. defense budget;
- organizational changes within the Department of Defense (DOD);
- nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control;
- global U.S. military posture;
- U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region;
- U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;
- new U.S. military service operational concepts;
- capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare;
- maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies;
- innovation and speed of U.S. weapon system development and deployment;
- mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict;
- supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on foreign components, subcomponents, materials, and software; and
- capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics.

The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning and budgeting should respond to GPC and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration's defense strategy and proposed funding levels, plans, and programs for addressing GPC. Congress's decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. defense industrial base.

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Introduction

This report provides a brief overview of some implications for U.S. defense of intensified U.S. competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Russian Federation (Russia), often referred to as great power competition (GPC). The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning and budgeting should respond to GPC, and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration's defense strategy and proposed funding levels, plans, and programs for addressing GPC. Congress's decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. defense industrial base.

This report focuses on defense-related issues and does not discuss potential implications of GPC for other policy areas, such as foreign policy and diplomacy, trade and finance, energy, and foreign assistance.

Background

Great Power Competition

Overview

The post–Cold War era of international relations—which began in the early 1990s¹ and is generally characterized as having featured reduced levels of overt political, ideological, and military competition among major states—showed initial signs of fading in 2006-2008 and by 2014 had given way to a situation of intensified U.S. competition with China as well as Russia, as well as challenges by China and Russia to elements of the U.S.-led international order established after World War II.² For some observers, the ending of the post–Cold War era and emergence of GPC has been underscored by China and Russia's announced strategic partnership and by Russia's invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022.³

¹ As the term suggests, the post–Cold war era emerged following the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. As discussed in **Appendix A**, key events marking the end of the Cold War include the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the disbanding of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact military alliance in March 1991, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union into Russia and the former Soviet republics in December 1991. The post–Cold War era is sometimes referred to as the unipolar moment, with the United States as the unipolar power.

² For further discussion of the transition from the post–Cold War era of international relations to the current situation of great power competition, including initial signs of the fading of the post–Cold War era in 2006-2008, see **Appendix A**. The term *international order* is generally used to refer to the collection of organizations, institutions, treaties, rules, and norms that are intended to organize, structure, and regulate international relations during a given historical period. Key features of the U.S.-led international order established at the end of World War II—also known as the liberal international order, postwar international order, or open international order, and often referred to as a rules-based order—are generally said to include the following: respect for the territorial integrity of countries, and the unacceptability of changing international borders by force or coercion; a preference for resolving disputes between countries peacefully, without the use or threat of use of force or coercion; strong international institutions; respect for international law and human rights; a preference for free markets and free trade; and the treatment of international waters, international air space, outer space, and (more recently) cyberspace as international commons. For additional discussion of the term *international order*, see CRS Report R44891, *U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke and Michael Moodie.

³ See, for example, some of the articles dated from late February 2022 into March 2022 that are listed in **Appendix B**. Some observers, in discussing China and Russia's announced strategic partnership, use terms other than *partnership*, such as *alignment*, *convergence*, *coordination*, or *alliance*. For more China and Russia's announced strategic

For additional background information and a list of articles on the transition from the post–Cold War era to GPC, see **Appendix A** and **Appendix B**.

Obama Administration and Trump Administration Strategy Documents

The emergence of GPC was acknowledged alongside other considerations in the Obama Administration’s June 2015 National Military Strategy.⁴ It was placed at the center of the Trump Administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy⁵ and January 2018 National Defense Strategy,⁶ which formally reoriented U.S. national security strategy and U.S. defense strategy toward an explicit primary focus on GPC.

Biden Administration October 2022 National Security Strategy

The Biden Administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) states:

We face two strategic challenges. The first is that the post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next....

The second is that while this competition is underway, people all over the world are struggling to cope with the effects of shared challenges that cross borders—whether it is climate change, food insecurity, communicable diseases, terrorism, energy shortages, or inflation.⁷

Regarding competition with China and Russia and challenges to the international order, the NSS’s first part, entitled “The Competition for What Comes Next,” includes the following statements, among others:

- “The basic laws and principles governing relations among nations, including the United Nations Charter and the protection it affords all states from being invaded by their neighbors or having their borders redrawn by force, are under attack. The risk of conflict between major powers is increasing” (p. 7).
- “The most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy. It is their behavior that poses a challenge to international peace and stability—especially waging or preparing for wars of aggression, actively undermining the democratic political processes of other countries, leveraging technology and supply chains for coercion and repression, and exporting an illiberal model of international order. Many non-democracies join the world’s democracies in forswearing these behaviors. Unfortunately, Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) do not” (p. 8).

partnership, see CRS In Focus IF12100, *China-Russia Relations*, by Ricardo Barrios and Andrew S. Bowen; and CRS In Focus IF12120, *China’s Economic and Trade Ties with Russia*, by Karen M. Sutter and Michael D. Sutherland. See also CRS In Focus IF11885, *De-Dollarization Efforts in China and Russia*, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Karen M. Sutter; and CRS In Focus IF11514, *Power of Siberia: A Natural Gas Pipeline Brings Russia and China Closer*, by Michael Ratner and Heather L. Greenley.

⁴ Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015*, *The United States Military’s Contribution To National Security*, June 2015, pp. i, 1-4.

⁵ Office of the President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, 55 pp.

⁶ Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge*, undated but released January 2018, 11 pp.

⁷ White House, *National Security Strategy*, October 2022, p. 6.

- “Russia and the PRC pose different challenges. Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown. The PRC, by contrast, is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective” (p. 8).
- “In their own ways, [China and Russia] now seek to remake the international order to create a world conducive to their highly personalized and repressive type of autocracy” (pp. 8-9).
- The United States will, among other things, “modernize and strengthen [its] military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland” (p. 11).
- “[T]his strategy recognizes that the PRC presents America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge.... Russia poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and it is a source of disruption and instability globally but it lacks the across the spectrum capabilities of the PRC” (p. 8).
- “This decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our competition with the PRC, managing the acute threat posed by Russia, and in our efforts to deal with shared challenges, particularly climate change, pandemics, and economic turbulence” (pp. 12-13).

The NSS’s third part, entitled “Our Global Priorities,” includes a section entitled “Out-Competing China and Constraining Russia” that includes the following statements, among others:

- “The PRC and Russia are increasingly aligned with each other but the challenges they pose are, in important ways, distinct. We will prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over the PRC while constraining a still profoundly dangerous Russia” (p. 23).
- “The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power. It is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values” (p. 23).
- “Over the past decade, the Russian government has chosen to pursue an imperialist foreign policy with the goal of overturning key elements of the international order. This culminated in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to topple its government and bring it under Russian control. But, this attack did not come out of the blue; it was preceded by Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, its military intervention in Syria, its longstanding efforts to destabilize its neighbors using intelligence and cyber capabilities, and its blatant attempts to undermine internal democratic processes in countries across Europe, Central Asia, and around the world” (p. 25).

The NSS’s second part, entitled “Investing in Our Strength,” includes a section entitled “Modernizing and Strengthening Our Military” that includes the following statements, among others:

- “The military will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the PRC as its pacing challenge ” (p. 20).
- “The United States has a vital interest in deterring aggression by the PRC, Russia, and other states. More capable competitors and new strategies of threatening behavior below and above the traditional threshold of conflict mean we cannot afford to rely solely on conventional forces and nuclear deterrence. Our defense strategy must sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the PRC as our pacing challenge. Our National Defense Strategy relies on integrated deterrence: the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits” (p. 22).

Biden Administration October 2022 National Defense Strategy

The Biden Administration’s October 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that it “directs the Department [of Defense] to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the Department’s pacing challenge.” The NDS states further that it

advances a strategy focused on the PRC and on collaboration with our growing network of Allies and partners on common objectives. It seeks to prevent the PRC’s dominance of key regions while protecting the U.S. homeland and reinforcing a stable and open international system. Consistent with the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), a key objective of the NDS is to dissuade the PRC from considering aggression as a viable means of advancing goals that threaten vital U.S. national interests. Conflict with the PRC is neither inevitable nor desirable. The Department’s priorities support broader whole-of-government efforts to develop terms of interaction with the PRC that are favorable to our interests and values, while managing strategic competition and enabling the pursuit of cooperation on common challenges.

Even as we focus on the PRC as our pacing challenge, the NDS also accounts for the acute threat posed by Russia, demonstrated most recently by Russia’s unprovoked further invasion of Ukraine. The Department will support robust deterrence of Russian aggression against vital U.S. national interests, including our treaty Allies. We will work closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and our partners to provide U.S. leadership, develop key enabling capabilities, and deepen interoperability. In service of our strategic priorities, we will accept measured risk but remain vigilant in the face of other persistent threats, including those posed by North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations (VEOs). We will also build resilience in the face of destabilizing and potentially catastrophic transboundary challenges such as climate change and pandemics, which increasingly strain the Joint Force [i.e., U.S. military].⁸

Regarding China, the NDS states:

The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences. The PRC seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA)⁹ growing strength and military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and

⁸ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 2.

⁹ China’s military as a whole is referred to as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); the term thus refers not only to China’s army but to the various military services that constitute China’s military. For an overview of the PLA, see CRS

threaten their interests. The PRC's increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity towards Taiwan are destabilizing, risk miscalculation, and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive PRC behavior that stretches across the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and along the Line of Actual Control [between China and India]. The PRC has expanded and modernized nearly every aspect of the PLA, with a focus on offsetting U.S. military advantages. The PRC is therefore the pacing challenge for the Department.

In addition to expanding its conventional forces, the PLA is rapidly advancing and integrating its space, counterspace, cyber, electronic, and informational warfare capabilities to support its holistic approach to joint warfare. The PLA seeks to target the ability of the Joint Force [i.e., U.S. military] to project power to defend vital U.S. interests and aid our Allies in a crisis or conflict. The PRC is also expanding the PLA's global footprint and working to establish a more robust overseas and basing infrastructure to allow it to project military power at greater distances. In parallel, the PRC is accelerating the modernization and expansion of its nuclear capabilities. The United States and its Allies and partners will increasingly face the challenge of deterring two major powers with modern and diverse nuclear capabilities—the PRC and Russia—creating new stresses on strategic stability.¹⁰

The NDS also states:

Deterring PRC Attacks. The Department will bolster deterrence by leveraging existing and emergent force capabilities, posture, and activities to enhance denial, and by enhancing the resilience of U.S. systems the PRC may seek to target. We will develop new operational concepts and enhanced future warfighting capabilities against potential PRC aggression. Collaboration with Allies and partners will cement joint capability with the aid of multilateral exercises, codevelopment of technologies, greater intelligence and information sharing, and combined planning for shared deterrence challenges. We will also build enduring advantages, undertaking foundational improvements and enhancements to ensure our technological edge and Joint Force [i.e., U.S. military] combat credibility.¹¹

Regarding Russia, the NDS states:

Even as the PRC poses the Department's pacing challenge, recent events underscore the acute threat posed by Russia. Contemptuous of its neighbors' independence, Russia's government seeks to use force to impose border changes and to reimpose an imperial sphere of influence. Its extensive track record of territorial aggression includes the escalation of its brutal, unprovoked war against Ukraine. Although its leaders' political and military actions intended to fracture NATO have backfired dramatically, the goal remains. Russia presents serious, continuing risks in key areas. These include nuclear threats to the homeland and U.S. Allies and partners; long-range cruise missile threats; cyber and information operations; counterspace threats; chemical and biological weapons (CBW); undersea warfare; and extensive gray zone campaigns targeted against democracies in particular. Russia has incorporated these capabilities and methods into an overall strategy that, like the PRC's, seeks to exploit advantages in geography and time backed by a mix of threats to the U.S. homeland and to our Allies and partners.¹²

In Focus IF11719, *China Primer: The People's Liberation Army (PLA)*, by Caitlin Campbell, and CRS Report R46808, *China's Military: The People's Liberation Army (PLA)*, by Caitlin Campbell.

¹⁰ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 4.

¹¹ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 10. Italics as in original.

¹² Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 5.

The NDS also states:

Detering Russian Attacks. The Department will focus on deterring Russian attacks on the United States, NATO members, and other Allies, reinforcing our iron-clad treaty commitments, to include conventional aggression that has the potential to escalate to nuclear employment of any scale. We will work together with our Allies and partners to modernize denial capabilities, increase interoperability, improve resilience against attack and coercion, share intelligence, and strengthen extended nuclear deterrence. Over time, the Department will focus on enhancing denial capabilities and key enablers in NATO's force planning, while NATO Allies seek to bolster their conventional warfighting capabilities. For Ally and partner countries that border Russia, the Department will support efforts to build out response options that enable cost imposition.¹³

The NDS states that

in support of a stable and open international system and our defense commitments, the Department's priorities are:

- Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC;
- Detering strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners;
- Detering aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary—prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe; and,
- Building a resilient Joint Force [i.e., U.S. military] and defense ecosystem.¹⁴

Overview of Implications for Defense

The emergence of GPC has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post–Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East—which had been more at the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—are now a less-prominent element in the conversation, and the conversation now focuses more on the topics discussed briefly in the sections below, all of which relate largely to China and/or Russia.

Grand Strategy and Geopolitics

The emergence of GPC has led to a renewed emphasis on grand strategy and geopolitics¹⁵ as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs. A November 2, 2015, press report, for example, stated the following:

¹³ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 10. Italics as in original.

¹⁴ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 7. The document defines the defense ecosystem on page 2 as “the Department of Defense, the defense industrial base, and the array of private sector and academic enterprises that create and sharpen the Joint Force’s [i.e., U.S. military’s] technological edge.”

¹⁵ The term *grand strategy* generally refers to a country’s overall strategy for securing its interests and making its way in the world, using all the national tools at its disposal, including diplomatic, information, military, and economic tools (sometimes abbreviated in U.S. government parlance as DIME).

The term *geopolitics* is often used as a synonym for international politics or strategy relating to international politics. More specifically, it refers to the influence of basic geographic features on international relations, and to the analysis of international relations from a perspective that places a strong emphasis on the influence of such geographic features. Basic geographic features involved in geopolitical analysis include things such as the relative sizes and locations of

The resurgence of Russia and the continued rise of China have created a new period of great-power rivalry—and a corresponding need for a solid grand strategy, [then-]U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work said Monday at the Defense One Summit in Washington, DC.

“The era of everything [i.e., multiple international security challenges] is the era of grand strategy,” Work said, suggesting that the United States must carefully marshal and deploy its great yet limited resources.¹⁶

For the United States, grand strategy can be viewed as strategy at a global or interregional level, as opposed to U.S. strategies for individual regions, countries, or issues. From a U.S. perspective on grand strategy and geopolitics, it can be noted that most of the world’s people, resources, and economic activity are located not in the Western Hemisphere, but in the other hemisphere, particularly Eurasia. In response to this basic feature of world geography, U.S. policymakers for the last several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U.S. national strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia. Although U.S. policymakers do not often state explicitly in public the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, U.S. military operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—appear to have been carried out in no small part in support of this goal.

The goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia is a major reason why the U.S. military is structured with force elements that enable it to deploy from the United States, cross broad expanses of ocean and air space, and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival in Eurasia or the waters and airspace surrounding Eurasia. Force elements associated with this goal include, among other things, an Air Force with significant numbers of long-range bombers, long-range surveillance aircraft, long-range airlift aircraft, and aerial refueling tankers, and a Navy with significant numbers of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines, large surface combatants, large amphibious ships, and underway replenishment ships.¹⁷

The U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, though long-standing, is not written in stone—it is a policy choice reflecting two judgments: (1) that given the amount of people, resources, and economic activity in Eurasia, a regional hegemon in Eurasia would represent a concentration of power large enough to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests; and (2) that Eurasia is not dependably self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons, meaning that the countries of Eurasia cannot be counted on to be able to prevent, though their own actions, the emergence of regional hegemons, and may need assistance from one or more countries outside Eurasia to be able to do this dependably.

An emergence of GPC does not require an acceptance of both of these judgments as guideposts for U.S. defense in coming years—one might accept that there has been an emergence of GPC but nevertheless conclude that one of these judgments or the other, while perhaps valid in the past, is no longer valid. A conclusion that one of these judgments is not valid could lead to a potentially major change in U.S. grand strategy that could lead to large-scale changes in U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs. By the same token, an emergence of GPC does not by itself suggest that these two judgements—and the consequent U.S. goal of preventing the

countries or land masses; the locations of key resources such as oil or water; geographic barriers such as oceans, deserts, and mountain ranges; and key transportation links such as roads, railways, and waterways. For further discussion, see Daniel H. Deudney, “Geopolitics,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, June 12, 2013, accessed November 17, 2021, at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/geopolitics>.

¹⁶ Bradley Peniston, “Work: ‘The Age of Everything Is the Era of Grand Strategy’,” *Defense One*, November 2, 2015.

¹⁷ For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10485, *Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design*, by Ronald O’Rourke.

emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia—are not valid as guideposts for U.S. defense in coming years.

For a list of articles pertaining to the debate over U.S. grand strategy, see **Appendix C**.

Force-Planning Standard

Related to the above issue concerning U.S. grand strategy, the emergence of GPC has prompted renewed discussion of the force-planning standard,¹⁸ meaning the number and types of simultaneous or overlapping conflicts or other contingencies that the U.S. military should be sized to be able to conduct—a planning factor that can strongly impact the size of the U.S. defense budget.

The U.S. military is currently sized to be able to conduct something less than two simultaneous or overlapping major conflicts. At a May 12, 2022, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, for example, Admiral Michael Gilday, the Chief of Naval Operations, was asked what the impact would be on the Navy’s ability to meet its operational requirements in Europe if Navy forces were withheld from Europe for the purpose of deterring Chinese aggression in the Pacific. Gilday replied:

I think we’d be challenged. We’d have to take a look at how you squeeze the most out of the joint force [i.e., the overall U.S. military] you have and use it in the best—best possible way. But I think we’d be challenged. You know, right now the force is not sized to handle two simultaneous conflicts. It’s—it’s sized to fight one and to keep—keep a second adversary in check. But in terms of a two—two all-out conflicts, we are not sized for that.¹⁹

One observer stated in 2019:

During the post-Cold War era, the U.S. military had a force-planning construct (a scheme that matches the size and capabilities of the force to the key scenarios it is likely to face) focused on fighting two major regional contingencies more or less simultaneously. The idea was that the U.S. should be able to decisively defeat an adversary in the Middle East—Iraq or Iran—without fatally compromising its ability to take on North Korea. This two-war capability was deemed critical to preventing opportunistic aggression by one adversary while the U.S. was engaged with another, and thereby upholding a grand strategy premised on deterring war in multiple regions at once. The two-war strategy, Pentagon officials wrote in 1997, “is the sine qua non of a superpower.”

After the onset of budgetary austerity in 2011, the two-war strategy gradually eroded as defense cuts made it harder to handle two regional adversaries at once. And after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, it was clear that the U.S. was facing a fundamentally different world, in which the country’s foremost adversaries were not inferior rogue states but major powers fielding formidable military capabilities. Add in that any war against Russia or China is likely to occur in their geopolitical backyards, and that both rivals have spent considerable time, money and intellectual effort seeking to neutralize America’s ability to project power, and the U.S. military would have enormous difficulty in winning even a single war against a great-power challenger.

In the 2018 National Defense Strategy and subsequent statements, the Pentagon thus outlined a significantly different force-planning construct. It announced that the fully mobilized American military would be capable of *defeating* aggression by a great-power

¹⁸ Other terms for referring to the force-planning standard use *force-sizing* instead of *force-planning*, and *construct* or *metric* instead of *standard*.

¹⁹ Source: CQ transcript of hearing.

adversary, while also *detering* (not necessarily defeating) aggression in a second theater. In other words, the U.S. is now building a force not around the demands of two regional conflicts with rogue states, but around the requirements of winning a high-intensity conflict with a single, top-tier competitor—a war with China over Taiwan, for instance, or a clash with Russia in the Baltic region.²⁰

The emergence of GPC has prompted some observers to ask whether the force-planning standard should be changed to being able to fight two simultaneous or overlapping major conflicts with adversaries such as China and Russia—a so-called two-war or two-major-war standard.²¹ Adopting and implementing a two-war standard relating to potential conflicts with adversaries such as China and Russia could entail substantially expanding the size of the U.S. military and the size of the U.S. defense budget. Whether the United States should adopt or could afford such a two-war force-planning standard is a potentially major issue in U.S. defense planning.

The Biden Administration's October 2022 NDS does not include an explicit statement about the force-planning standard. One observer writing about the October 2022 NDS states:

What is the force sizing construct? The Trump administration said it was one major conflict and “detering” a second conflict. It is not clear how the demonstration [*sic*: Biden Administration?] is sizing its forces. What size are the services aiming for? Budget documents give some indication ... but budget numbers are not necessarily long-term strategic goals. It may be that the classified version of the [2022] NDS, which went to Congress in the spring [of 2022], has answers to all these questions. However, that does not help the public discussion about defense and strategy.²²

Organizational Changes within DOD

The emergence of GPC has led to increased discussion about whether and how to make organizational changes within the Department of Defense (DOD) to better align DOD's activities with those needed to counter Chinese and, secondarily, Russian military capabilities. Among changes that have been made, among the most prominent have been the creation of the U.S. Space Force²³ and the elevation of the U.S. Cyber Command to be its own combatant command.²⁴

Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Deterrence, and Nuclear Arms Control

The emergence of GPC has led to a renewed emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense on nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control. Russia's reassertion of its status as a

²⁰ Hal Brands, “What If the U.S. Could Fight Only One War at a Time?,” *Bloomberg*, June 11, 2019. (Also published as Hal Brands, “What If the US Could Fight Only One War at a Time?,” American Enterprise Institute, June 11, 2019.) Italics as in original. See also Dakota L. Wood, editor, *2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength*, Heritage Foundation, 2023 (released October 18, 2022), p. 323; Mark Gunzinger and Kamilla Gunzinger, “Ukraine Makes Clear the US Must Reconsider Its One-War Defense Strategy,” *Defense News*, March 14, 2022.

²¹ See, for example, Dakota L. Wood, ed., *2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength*, Heritage Foundation, 2023 (released October 18, 2022), pp. 3, 10, 326, 330, 332; Kori Schake, “America Must Spend More on Defense, How Biden Can Align Resources and Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 5, 2022; Mark Gunzinger and Kamilla Gunzinger, “Ukraine Makes Clear the US Must Reconsider Its One-War Defense Strategy,” *Defense News*, March 14, 2022; Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery, “One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition,” *Texas National Security Review* (Spring 2020), pp. 80-92. See also Hal Brands, “Can the US Take on China, Iran and Russia All at Once?,” *Bloomberg*, October 16, 2022.

²² Mark F. Cancian, “Force Structure in the National Defense Strategy: Highly Capable but Smaller and Less Global,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 31, 2022.

²³ See CRS In Focus IF11495, *Defense Primer: The United States Space Force*, by Stephen M. McCall.

²⁴ See CRS In Focus IF10537, *Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations*, by Catherine A. Theohary.

major world power has included, among other things, recurring references by Russian officials to Russia's nuclear weapons capabilities and Russia's status as a major nuclear weapon power. China's nuclear-weapon capabilities are currently much more modest than Russia's, but China reportedly is now modernizing and rapidly increasing its nuclear forces as part of its overall military modernization effort.²⁵

The increased emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense and security on nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control comes at a time when DOD is in the early stages of a multiyear plan to spend scores of billions of dollars to modernize U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent forces.²⁶ DOD, for example, currently has plans to acquire a new class of ballistic missile submarines²⁷ a next-generation long-range bomber,²⁸ and a next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile.²⁹

The Biden Administration's October 2022 NSS states:

Nuclear deterrence remains a top priority for the Nation and foundational to integrated deterrence. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear force undergirds our defense priorities by deterring strategic attacks, assuring allies and partners, and allowing us to achieve our objectives if deterrence fails. Our competitors and potential adversaries are investing heavily in new nuclear weapons. By the 2030s, the United States for the first time will need to deter two major nuclear powers, each of whom will field modern and diverse global and regional nuclear forces. To ensure our nuclear deterrent remains responsive to the threats we face, we are modernizing the nuclear Triad, nuclear command, control, and communications, and our nuclear weapons infrastructure, as well as strengthening our extended deterrence commitments to our Allies. We remain equally committed to reducing the risks of nuclear war. This includes taking further steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy and pursuing realistic goals for mutual, verifiable arms control,

²⁵ See, for example, Tara Copp, "US Military 'Furiously' Rewriting Nuclear Deterrence to Address Russia and China, STRATCOM Chief Says," *Defense One*, August 11, 2022; Francis Gavin, "Time to Rethink America's Nuclear Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, September 5, 2022; Jeffrey Lewis and Aaron Stein, "Who Is Deterring Whom? The Place of Nuclear Weapons in Modern War," *War on the Rocks*, June 16, 2022; Michael Auslin, "Learning to Think Nuclearly Again, A New Nuclear Era Demands Strategy, Not Just Arms Control," *Foreign Policy*, June 11, 2022; Shlomo Ben-Ami, "Russia's Nuclear Threat Has Worked," *Strategist (ASPI)*, June 8, 2022; Tom Nichols, "We Have No Nuclear Strategy, The U.S. Can't Keep Ignoring the Threat These Weapons Pose," *Atlantic*, June 1, 2022; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Putin's Threats Highlight the Dangers of a New, Riskier Nuclear Era," *New York Times*, June 1, 2022; David Ignatius, "The Pentagon Plans Anew to Head Off an Old Worry: Nuclear War," *Washington Post*, April 28, 2022; Max Hastings, "With Nuclear Threat, Putin Makes the Unthinkable a Possibility, Most Westerners Thought the Peril of Apocalypse Disappeared with the 1991 Collapse of the Soviet Union. They Were Wrong," *Bloomberg*, March 27, 2022; Andreas Kluth, "When, Why and How Putin Might Use Nukes, The Newly Prominent Role of So-Called Tactical Nuclear Weapons Puts the World in the Greatest Danger Since the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Bloomberg*, March 23, 2022; David C. Gompert, "How Putin Exploits America's Fear of Nuclear War," *Wall Street Journal*, March 22, 2022; Patty-Jane Geller, "Putin's Nuclear Threats against Ukraine Demand a NATO Response, Once a Relic of the Cold War, Nuclear Weapons Are Salient Once Again," *Fox News*, March 16, 2022; Sarah Bidgood, "A New Nuclear Arms Race Is a Real Possibility: History Suggests the War in Ukraine Could Put an End to Arms Control As We Know It," *Foreign Policy*, March 15, 2022; Andrew Jeong, "Putin Has Brought Threat of Nuclear Conflict 'Back Within the Realm of Possibility,' U.N. Chief Says," *Washington Post*, March 15, 2022; Patty-Jane Geller, "It's Time to Reconsider Our Nuclear Forces," *Fox News*, March 14, 2022; John D. Maurer, "Maintaining America's Nuclear Deterrent," *War on the Rocks*, March 10, 2022.

²⁶ See CRS Report RL33640, *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues*, by Amy F. Woolf, and Congressional Budget Office, *Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2021 to 2030*, May 2021, 12 pp.

²⁷ CRS Report R41129, *Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

²⁸ See CRS Report R44463, *Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber*, by Jeremiah Gertler.

²⁹ See, for example, "Sentinel ICBM," Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, undated, accessed November 4, 2022.

which contribute to our deterrence strategy and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.³⁰

The Biden Administration’s October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in conjunction with its October 2022 NDS, states:

In large part due to the actions of our strategic competitors, the international security environment has deteriorated in recent years. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the overall pacing challenge for U.S. defense planning and a growing factor in evaluating our nuclear deterrent. The PRC has embarked on an ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces and established a nascent nuclear triad. The PRC likely intends to possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade.

While the end state resulting from the PRC’s specific choices with respect to its nuclear forces and strategy is uncertain, the trajectory of these efforts points to a large, diverse nuclear arsenal with a high degree of survivability, reliability, and effectiveness. This could provide the PRC with new options before and during a crisis or conflict to leverage nuclear weapons for coercive purposes, including military provocations against U.S. Allies and partners in the region.

Russia continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in its strategy, modernize and expand its nuclear forces, and brandish its nuclear weapons in support of its revisionist security policy. Its modern nuclear arsenal, which is expected to grow further, presents an enduring existential threat to the United States and our Allies and partners. For more than twenty years, Russia has pursued a wide-ranging military modernization program that includes replacing legacy strategic nuclear systems and steadily expanding and diversifying nuclear systems that pose a direct threat to NATO and neighboring countries.... Similarly, Russia is pursuing several novel nuclear-capable systems designed to hold the U.S. homeland or Allies and partners at risk, some of which are also not accountable under New START.

By the 2030s the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries. This will create new stresses on stability and new challenges for deterrence, assurance, arms control, and risk reduction.³¹

The NPR also states:

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underscores that nuclear dangers persist, and could grow, in an increasingly competitive and volatile geopolitical landscape. The Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unlawful invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a stark reminder of nuclear risk in contemporary conflict. Russia has conducted its aggression against Ukraine under a nuclear shadow characterized by irresponsible saber-rattling, out of cycle nuclear exercises, and false narratives concerning the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In brandishing Russia’s nuclear arsenal in an attempt to intimidate Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia’s leaders have made clear that they view these weapons as a shield behind which to wage unjustified aggression against their neighbors. Irresponsible Russian statements and actions raise the risk of deliberate or unintended escalation. Russia’s leadership should have no doubt regarding the resolve of the United States to both resist nuclear coercion and act as a responsible nuclear power.³²

The NPR further states:

The current and growing salience of nuclear weapons in the strategies and forces of our competitors heightens the risks associated with strategic competition and the stakes of

³⁰ White House, *National Security Strategy*, October 2022, p. 21.

³¹ *2022 Nuclear Posture Review*, p. 4. The 2022 NPR was released as part of the same document that presents the October 2022 NDS.

³² *2022 Nuclear Posture Review*, pp. 1-2.

crisis and military confrontation. As the NDS notes, we must be able to deter conventional aggression that has the potential to escalate to nuclear employment of any scale. Russia presents the most acute example of this problem today given its significantly larger stockpile of regional nuclear systems and the possibility it would use these forces to try to win a war on its periphery or avoid defeat if it was in danger of losing a conventional war. Deterring Russian limited nuclear use in a regional conflict is a high U.S. and NATO priority.

The PRC's nuclear expansion and the changes this could bring to its strategy present new complexities. In the near-term, we must factor this into our arms control and risk reduction approaches with Russia. We also recognize that as the security environment evolves, it may be necessary to consider nuclear strategy and force adjustments to assure our ability to achieve deterrence and other objectives for the PRC—even as we continue to do so for Russia. Our plans and capabilities must also account for the fact that the PRC increasingly will be able to execute a range of nuclear strategies to advance its goals.³³

A current question regarding U.S. nuclear force modernization is whether to develop and procure a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) for placement on U.S. Navy attack submarines.³⁴ The Biden Administration's proposed FY2023 defense budget and its October 2022 NPR propose canceling the SLCM-N program.³⁵ Whether to cancel or continue the SLCM-N program is an issue in Congress's review and markup of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2023 DOD appropriations act.³⁶

Regarding nuclear arms control,³⁷ GPC was an apparent key factor in connection with the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.³⁸ The Trump Administration invited China to be a third participant, along with the United States and Russia, in negotiations on future limitations on nuclear arms.³⁹ China has reportedly refused to join such

³³ 2022 *Nuclear Posture Review*, p. 5. Italics as in original. See also page 11.

³⁴ For an overview, see CRS In Focus IF12084, *Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N)*, by Amy F. Woolf.

³⁵ Regarding the October 2022 NPR, see 2022 *Nuclear Posture Review*, pp. 3, 20.

³⁶ See, for example, Valerie Insinna, "STRATCOM Nominee to 'Assess' Controversial Sea-Launched Nuke Before Cancellation," *Breaking Defense*, September 15, 2022; Kevin Knodell (Honolulu Star-Advertiser), "Congress Quietly Debates New Sea-Based Nuclear Weapons amid China Tensions," *Stars and Stripes*, September 6, 2022; Bill Gertz, "Congress to Restore Nuclear Cruise Missile Funds," *Washington Times*, June 22, 2022; Valerie Insinna, "House Authorizers Approve \$45m to Keep Sea-Launched Nuke on Life Support," *Breaking Defense*, June 22, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, "Lawmakers Question Navy's Decision to Abandon Nuclear Cruise Missile," *USNI News*, June 10 (updated June 11), 2022; Bryant Harris, "US Nuclear Commander Backs Sea-Launched Cruise Missile Biden Would Cancel," *Defense News*, June 7, 2022; Megan Eckstein, "The Navy Doesn't Want Nukes on Ships, Despite Interest from Some Combatant Commanders," *Defense News*, May 13, 2022; John Grady, "Joint Chiefs Vice Chair, STRATCOM CO Still In Favor of Navy Nuclear Cruise Missile," *USNI News*, May 5, 2022; Joe Gould, "US Strategic Command Chief: Sea Missile Cancellation Opens 'Deterrence and Assurance Gap,'" *Defense News*, April 5, 2022; Aaron Mehta, "Milley Breaks with Cancellation of New Nuclear Cruise Missile," *Breaking Defense*, April 5, 2022; Joe Gould, "Biden Plan to Shelve Trump-Era Sea Nuke Comes Under Fire," *Defense News*, April 1, 2022.

³⁷ For discussions on arms control in the context of GPC, see, for example, Rebecca K. C. Hersman, Heather Williams, and Suzanne Claeys, *Integrated Arms Control in an Era of Strategic Competition*, CSIS, January 2022, 65 pp.; Jeffrey Lewis, "China Is Radically Expanding Its Nuclear Missile Silos, With More Weapons Likely, It's Time to Go Back to Arms Talks," *Foreign Policy*, June 30, 2021; John Maurer, "Arms Control Among Rivals," American Enterprise Institute, February 11, 2021.

³⁸ For additional discussion, see CRS Insight IN10985, *U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty*, by Amy F. Woolf.

³⁹ See, for example, Jack Detsch, "Trump Wants China on Board With New Arms Control Pact," *Foreign Policy*, July 23, 2020; Jeff Mason, Arshad Mohammed, Vladimir Soldatkin, and Andrew Osborne, "Trump Stresses Desire for Arms Control with Russia, China in Putin Call," *Reuters*, May 7, 2020; Emma Farge, "U.S. Urges China to Join Nuclear Arms Talks with Russia," *Reuters*, January 21, 2020; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Invites China for Talks on

negotiations,⁴⁰ unless the United States agrees to reduce its nuclear forces to China's much-lower level.⁴¹

On November 16, 2021, following a virtual meeting the previous day between China's President Xi Jinping and President Biden, White House national security advisor Jake Sullivan stated that "the two leaders agreed that we would look to begin to carry forward discussions on strategic stability," and that "it is now incumbent on us to think about the most productive way to carry it forward from here."⁴² A November 17, 2021, press report stated

The United States and China will aim to have 'conversations' on arms control, 'not formal talks', the White House National Security Council said on Wednesday [November 17], downplaying contact on the issue following a meeting between the two countries' leaders.

U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping agreed this week to "look to begin to carry forward discussions on strategic stability," national security advisor Jake Sullivan said on Tuesday [November 16], in a reference to U.S. concerns about China's nuclear and missile buildup. read more

Following Sullivan's remarks, the NSC cautioned in a statement against "overstating" the status of those conversations, emphasizing that they were not at the same level on which the United States and Russia have engaged for decades.

"It should be clear, as National Security Advisor Sullivan said, this is not the same as the talks we have with Russia, which are mature and have history," an NSC spokesman said.

"These are not arms control talks, but rather conversations with empowered interlocutors," he said without giving details on the format for future contact on the matter.⁴³

Nuclear Arms," *Wall Street Journal*, December 20, 2019; David Wainter, "Chinese Nuclear Stockpile Clouds Prospects for U.S.-Russia Deal," *Bloomberg*, October 18, 2019. See also Christian Le Miere, "How China Can Benefit from Joining US, Russia in Nuclear Arms Talks," *South China Morning Post*, July 9, 2021.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Kathrin Hille, "US and China Are Not Ready to Talk About Nuclear Arms Controls, China Wants to Tackle Growing Risk of Nuclear Conflict but Is Reluctant to Curb Its Nuclear Weapons Programme," *Financial Times*, January 11, 2022; Emma Frage, "U.S. Says China Is Resisting Nuclear Arms Talks," *Reuters*, May 18, 2021; John Dotson, "Beijing Rejects Any Involvement in Nuclear Arms Limitation Talks," Jamestown Foundation, October 30, 2020; Associated Press, "China Calls US Invite to Nuclear Talks a Ploy to Derail Them," *Associated Press*, July 8, 2020; Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, "Trump Fixates on China as Nuclear Arms Pact Nears Expiration," *Foreign Policy*, April 29, 2020; Hal Brands, "China Has No Reason to Make a Deal on Nuclear Weapons," *Bloomberg*, April 29, 2020; Cheng Hanping, "US Attempt to Rope China into New START Negotiations Won't Succeed," *Global Times*, February 12, 2020; Steven Pifer, "Trump's Bid to Go Big on Nuclear Arms Looks Like a Fizzle," *Defense One*, February 5, 2020; Samuel Osborne, "China Refuses to Join Nuclear Talks with US and Russia in Blow for Trump," *Independent (UK)*, May 7, 2019; Ben Blanchard, "China Says It Won't Take Part in Trilateral Nuclear Arms Talks," *Reuters*, May 6, 2019; Ben Westcott, "China 'Will Not Participate' in Trump's Proposed Three-Way Nuclear Talks," *CNN*, May 6, 2019.

⁴¹ See, for example, Yew Lun Tian, "China Challenges U.S. to Cut Nuclear Arsenal to Matching Level," *Reuters*, July 7, 2020.

⁴² As quoted in Alex Leary, Lingling Wei, and Michael R. Gordon, "Biden, Xi Open to Nuclear-Arms Talks, White House Says," *Wall Street Journal*, November 16, 2021. See also Patrick Tucker, "Biden Launches Arms-Control Talks with China, Warns Xi on Taiwan," *Defense One*, November 16, 2021.

⁴³ Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom, "U.S. Says It Is Not Engaged in Formal Arms Control Talks with China," *Reuters*, November 17, 2021. See also David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "As China Speeds Up Nuclear Arms Race, the U.S. Wants to Talk," *New York Times*, November 28, 2021; Chao Deng and Alastair Gale, "U.S. Pushes Arms-Control Talks as China's Nuclear Arsenal Grows," *Wall Street Journal*, November 18, 2021; Demetri Sevastopulo and Tom Mitchell, "Xi-Biden agreement on nuclear talks clouded by 'deep distrust,'" *Financial Times*, November 17, 2021; Demetri Sevastopulo and Tom Mitchell, "US and China Agree to Hold Talks on Nuclear Arsenals," *Financial Times*, November 16, 2021.

A February 25, 2022, blog post stated: “The Biden administration has cut off arms control talks with Russia, sources familiar with the decision told Foreign Policy. The move came after Russian President Vladimir Putin sent troops into Ukraine’s breakaway regions but before he launched the full-scale invasion of the country.”⁴⁴

A November 1, 2022, press report stated that

China has shown no interest in discussing steps to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons, senior U.S. officials said on Tuesday [November 1]....

Alexandra Bell, deputy assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, told an Atlantic Council [forum] that despite U.S. efforts, Washington and Beijing still had not begun engagement on the issue....

Richard Johnson, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy, told the forum the United States was looking to begin exchanges with China on “more basic things” than the number of warheads.

“If that’s the argument that Beijing is giving, we’re not asking to have a discussion about numbers. We’re saying, let’s talk about putting some guardrails into the relationship so that we don’t have unnecessary crises,” he said.

Johnson added that if Beijing preferred to not engage bilaterally, it could “demonstrate some transparency” about its nuclear build-up through the International Atomic Energy Agency by declaring its plutonium stocks for civilian purposes.

“The Chinese have stopped doing that, and that’s a real concern,” he said.⁴⁵

Global U.S. Military Posture

Overview

The emergence of GPC has led to increased discussion about global U.S. military posture, including discussion regarding

- the portion of U.S. forces that are forward-deployed to distant regions on a sustained basis for purposes such as deterring potential regional aggressors, reassuring allies and partners, and rapidly responding to crises; and
- the day-to-day global distribution of U.S. military capabilities and force deployments across regions such as the Indo-Pacific (for countering Chinese and North Korean military capabilities), Europe (for countering Russian military capabilities), the Middle East (for countering Iranian military capabilities and addressing other security concerns), and other regions (such as Africa, Latin America, and the Arctic).

The benefits, costs, and risks of forward-deploying U.S. forces to distant regions on a sustained basis rather than basing them in the United States and deploying them to distant regions in response to specific contingencies is a long-standing issue in U.S. defense planning.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Biden Halts Russian Arms Control Talks Amid Ukraine Invasion,” *Foreign Policy*, February 25, 2022. See also Peter Huessy, “Have Russia and China Killed Nuclear Arms Control?” *National Interest*, February 20, 2022.

⁴⁵ Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom, “U.S. Says China Resisting Nuclear Talks after Xi Vow to Boost Deterrent,” *Reuters*, November 1, 2022.

⁴⁶ See, for example, Billy Fabian, “Overcoming the Tyranny of Time: The Role of U.S. Forward Posture in Deterrence

Regarding the regional distribution of U.S. military capabilities and force deployments, U.S. officials since at least 2006 have expressed desires (or announced plans) for bolstering U.S. military capabilities and force deployments in the Indo-Pacific region so as to counter China's growing military capabilities. On the other hand, Russia's actions in Europe and developments in the Middle East pose their own security challenges, and some observers express concern about a scenario in which the United States could face major military contingencies in multiple parts of Eurasia in rapid succession or simultaneously⁴⁷—a consideration that can complicate plans for shifting U.S. military capabilities from Europe or the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific.

Key issues observers are debating include how much priority U.S. defense planning should give to Europe (to deter or respond to Russian actions) versus the Indo-Pacific (to deter China); how the U.S. response to Russia's invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022, might influence China's calculations regarding potential actions it might take toward Taiwan; and whether the tension about how to address concerns about both China and Russia should lead to changes in U.S. grand strategy or defense strategy and/or the size of the U.S. defense budget.⁴⁸

and Defense,” CSIS, September 21, 2020. As another example, see CRS In Focus IF11280, *U.S. Military Presence in Poland*, by Andrew Feickert, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Derek E. Mix.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Thomas G. Mahnken, “Could America Win a New World War? What It Would Take to Defeat Both China and Russia,” *Foreign Affairs*, October 27, 2022; Hal Brands, “Can the US Take on China, Iran and Russia All at Once?” *Bloomberg*, October 16, 2022; Sebastian Sprenger and Joe Gould, “US Military Readies to ‘Walk and Chew Gum’ as Multiple Crises Loom,” *Defense News*, January 28, 2022.

⁴⁸ See, for example, Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, “Ukraine War Should Slow But Not Stop the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” *Bloomberg*, March 8, 2022; John Ferrari, “Tear Up the National Defense Strategy and Start Again, Recognizing Reality,” *Breaking Defense*, March 8, 2022; Editorial Board, “Rebuilding U.S. Defenses After Ukraine, Biden Needs to Pivot to Meet Growing Threats as Jimmy Carter Did,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 7, 2022; Catie Edmondson, “War in Ukraine Rallies Support in Congress for More Military Spending,” *New York Times*, March 7, 2022; Glenn Hubbard, “NATO Needs More Guns and Less Butter, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Will Require a Jolting Shift in the West’s Spending Priorities,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 7, 2022; Thomas Spoehr, “The Biden Administration Needs to get Serious About National Defense,” *Newsweek*, March 7, 2022; Bradley Thayer, “Russia’s War In Ukraine: A Balance Of Power Problem For America?” *19FortyFive*, March 7, 2022; Sebastian Sprenger, Joe Gould, Vivienne Machi, and Tom Kington, “Stunned by Putin’s War, Nations Rewrite Their Playbooks on Defense,” *Defense News*, March 4, 2022; Robert M. Gates, “We Need a More Realistic Strategy for the Post-Cold War Era,” *Washington Post*, March 3, 2022; Connor O’Brien, Paul McLeary, and Lee Hudson, “Russia Crisis Forces Pentagon to Rework Defense Strategy on the Fly,” *Politico Pro*, March 3 (updated March 4), 2022; John Ferrari and Elaine McCusker, “The Ukraine Invasion Shows Why America Needs to Get Its Defense Budget in Order,” *Breaking Defense*, March 2, 2022; Tony Bertuca, “DOD official: New National Defense Strategy Will Keep China First, But Reflect New Reality with Russia,” *Inside Defense*, February 28, 2022; Mackenzie Eaglen, “How the Ukraine Crisis Could Make the US Military Stronger,” *American Enterprise Institute*, March 1, 2022; Joe Gould, “Pentagon Revisiting Long-Term US Troop Levels in Eastern Europe,” *Defense News*, March 1, 2022; John M. Donnelly, “Russian Threat Is Forcing a Rewrite of US Defense Plans,” *CQ*, February 25, 2022; Raphael S. Cohen, “The False Choice Between China and Russia,” *The Hill*, February 21, 2022; Matthew Kroenig, “Washington Must Prepare for War With Both Russia and China, Pivoting to Asia and Forgetting About Europe Isn’t an Option,” *Foreign Policy*, February 18, 2022; Michael J. Green, and Gabriel Scheinmann, “Even an ‘Asia First’ Strategy Needs to Deter Russia in Ukraine, There Is No Indo-Pacific Strategy Without U.S. Pushback Against Russia,” *Foreign Policy*, February 17, 2022; Barry Pavel, “Biden Should Shift US Troop Positions Worldwide, The Crisis in Europe Makes Clear that Biden’s Team Should Rethink Their First National Defense Strategy, Quickly,” *Defense One*, February 17, 2022; John Bolton, “Entente Multiplies the Threat From Russia and China, The Misguided Idea that the U.S. Needs to Ignore One to Focus on the Other Intensifies the Danger,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 15, 2022; Walter Russell Mead, “‘Asia First’ Misses the Point, The U.S. Needs a Coherent Strategy for Both Security and Economic Policy,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 14, 2022; Elbridge Colby and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Ukraine Is a Distraction From Taiwan, Getting Bogged Down in Europe Will Impede the U.S.’s Ability to Compete with China in the Pacific,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 13, 2022; Ashley Townsend, “U.S. Indo-Pacific Power Depends on Restraint in Ukraine, Washington Must Reassure Quad Partners That It Won’t Be Distracted in Europe,” *Foreign Policy*, February 9, 2022; Walter Russell Mead, “Time to Increase Defense Spending, The U.S. Will Face Challenges from the New Alliance between China and Russia,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 7, 2022; Seth Cropsey, “Double-Down on the Indo-Pacific in the Midst of a Ukraine Crisis,” *The*

Obama Administration Strategic Rebalancing (Strategic Pivot) to Asia-Pacific

The Obama Administration, as part of an initiative it referred to as strategic rebalancing or the strategic pivot, sought to reduce U.S. force deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, in part to facilitate an increase in U.S. force deployments to the Asia-Pacific region for countering China.⁴⁹

Trump Administration Planned Actions

The Trump Administration stated that a reduction of U.S. military personnel in Germany that it planned was intended, at least in part, to facilitate a reallocation of additional U.S. forces to the Indo-Pacific region.⁵⁰ In addition, President Trump expressed a desire to reduce U.S. military deployments to the Middle East, and Trump Administration officials stated that the Administration was considering reducing U.S. military deployments to Africa and South America, in part to facilitate an increase in U.S. force deployments to the Indo-Pacific region for countering China.⁵¹ The Trump Administration's proposals for reducing force deployments to Africa and South America became a subject of debate, in part because they were viewed by some observers as creating a risk of leading to increased Chinese or Russian influence in those regions.⁵²

Hill, February 1, 2022; Dov S. Zakheim, "The Biden Administration Faces a Dangerous Anti-American Triad," *The Hill*, January 28, 2022; Josh Rogin, "Putin Is Threatening to Wreck Biden's Asia Strategy," *Washington Post*, January 27, 2022; Simon Jackman, "Putin Tries to Trump Indo-Pacific," United States Studies Centre, January 26, 2022. See also some of the articles dated from January 2022 onward that are listed in **Appendix C**.

⁴⁹ For more on the Obama Administration's strategic rebalancing initiative, which included political and economic dimensions as well as planned military force redeployments, see CRS Report R42448, *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia*, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin, and CRS In Focus IF10029, *China, U.S. Leadership, and Geopolitical Challenges in Asia*, by Susan V. Lawrence.

⁵⁰ Robert C. O'Brien, "Why the U.S. Is Moving Troops Out of Germany, Forces Are Needed in the Indo-Pacific. And Berlin Should Contribute More to European Security," *Wall Street Journal*, June 21, 2020; Jamie McIntyre, "Polish Leader Leaves with No New Commitment of US Troops as Pentagon Shifts Focus Away from Europe and Toward Countering China," *Washington Examiner*, June 25, 2020; Tsuyoshi Nagasawa and Shotaro Miyasaka, "Thousands of US Troops Will Shift to Asia-Pacific to Guard Against China, German Contingent to Redeploy to Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, Japan and Australia," *Nikkei Asian Review*, July 5, 2020. See also CRS In Focus IF11280, *U.S. Military Presence in Poland*, by Andrew Feickert, Kathleen J. McNinis, and Derek E. Mix.

⁵¹ See, for example, Glen Carey, "U.S. Pentagon Chief Wants to Reallocate Forces to Indo-Pacific," *Bloomberg*, December 7, 2019; Shawn Snow, "Esper Wants to Move Troops from Afghanistan to the Indo-Pacific to Confront China," *Military Times*, December 18, 2019; Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, and Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Eyes Africa Drawdown as First Step in Global Troop Shift," *New York Times*, December 24, 2019; Robert Burns, "Pentagon Sees Taliban Deal as Allowing Fuller Focus on China," *Associated Press*, March 1, 2020. See also Kyle Rempfer, "Soldiers Will Spend Longer Deployments in Asia," *Army Times*, February 20, 2020; Mike Sweeney, "Considering the 'Zero Option,' Cold War Lessons on U.S. Basing in the Middle East," *Defense Priorities*, March 2020.

⁵² See, for example, Scott D. Adamson, "Don't Discount America's Interest in Keeping Africa Safe," *Defense One*, December 21, 2020; Diana Stancy Correll, "Lawmakers Voice Concern About a Potential Troop Reduction in Africa," *Military Times*, January 14, 2020; Joe Gould, "Esper's Africa Drawdown Snags on Capitol Hill," *Defense News*, January 16, 2020; Ellen Mitchell, "Lawmakers Push Back at Pentagon's Possible Africa Drawdown," *The Hill*, January 19, 2020; K. Riva Levinson, "Broad, Bipartisan Rebuke for Proposal to Pull Troops from Africa," *The Hill*, January 21, 2020; Carley Petesch (Associated Press), "Allies Worry as US Ponders Cutting Military Forces in Africa," *Military Times*, January 29, 2020; Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer, "Pentagon Debates Drawdown in Africa, South America," *Foreign Policy*, January 30, 2020; "Jacqueline Feldscher, 'Esper Says Troop Presence in Africa, South America Could Grow,'" *Politico Pro*, January 30, 2020; Joe Gould, "Expect Congress to Block Africa Troop Cuts, Says Defense Panel Chairman," *Defense News*, February 27, 2020; Eric Schmitt, "Terrorism Threat in West Africa Soars as U.S. Weighs Troop Cuts," *New York Times*, February 27, 2020; Matthew Dalton, "The US Should Send More, Not Fewer, Troops to West Africa," *Defense One*, March 3, 2020; Robbie Gramer, "U.S. Congress Moves to Restrain Pentagon Over Africa Drawdown Plans," *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2020; Sam Wilkins, "Does America Need an Africa Strategy?" *War on the Rocks*, April 2, 2020; Herman J. Cohen, "Pulling Troops Out of Africa Could Mean Another Endless War," *War on the Rocks*, May 13, 2020; Samuel Ramani, "France and the United States Are Making West

Biden Administration Global Posture Review

On February 4, 2021, President Biden announced that “Defense Secretary Austin will be leading a Global Posture Review of our forces so that our military footprint is appropriately aligned with our foreign policy and national security priorities.”⁵³ A DOD news report the next day that

The global posture review will examine the U.S. military’s footprint, resources and strategies. “This review will help inform the secretary’s advice to the commander-in-chief about how we best allocate military forces in pursuit of our national interests,” [Pentagon Press Secretary John F.] Kirby said.

The global posture review will be led by the acting undersecretary of defense for policy in close coordination with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

U.S. officials will consult often with allies and partners around the world as they perform the review, Kirby said. The review should be finished by mid-year.

The review will use American defense strategy and look where service members are based, and if this is the best place to be based. This will, of course, take into consideration any treaty or agreement. Commitments—like the rotational forces in Poland and Korea—will be considered and those deployments will continue even as the review goes on. President Biden said the movement of U.S. forces from Germany will stop until the review is completed.

It is not just forward-deployed land or air forces that will be considered. Naval forces and where they operate will be part of the equation, Kirby said.⁵⁴

On November 29, 2021, DOD announced that

President Joe Biden has accepted the recommendations formed by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the global posture review, Mara Karlin, performing the duties of deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, announced today....

It is no surprise that the Indo-Pacific is the priority region for the review, given the secretary’s focus on China as America’s pacing challenge. The review directs additional cooperation with allies and partners to advance initiatives that contribute to regional stability and deter Chinese military aggression and threats from North Korea, Karlin said.

These initiatives include seeking greater regional access for military partnership activities, enhancing infrastructure in Guam and Australia and prioritizing military construction across the Pacific Islands. They also include new U.S. rotational aircraft deployments and logistics cooperation in Australia, which DOD announced in September.

Africa’s Security Situation Worse, France’s Unilateralism and the United States’ Wavering Are Destabilizing the Sahel—and Creating An Opening for Russia and China,” *Foreign Policy*, September 12, 2020; John Turner, “In America’s Absence, China Is Taking Latin America By Storm,” *National Interest*, September 21, 2020; Will Reno and Jesse Humpal, “As the US Slumps Away, China Subsumes African Security Arrangements,” *Defense One*, October 21, 2020; Warren P. Strobel and Gordon Lubold, “Pentagon Draw-Down at U.S. Embassies Prompts Concern About Ceding Field to Global Rivals,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 1, 2020; Samuel Ramani, “Trump’s Plan to Withdraw From Somalia Couldn’t Come at a Worse Time,” *Foreign Policy*, November 2, 2020.

⁵³ White House, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” February 4, 2021.

⁵⁴ Jim Garamone, “Global Posture Review Will Tie Strategy, Defense Policy to Basing,” *DOD News*, February 5, 2021. See also Lolita C. Baldor, “Biden Halts Trump-Ordered US Troops Cuts in Germany,” *Associated Press*, February 4, 2021; Ed Adamczyk, “Defense Secretary Austin Announces Global Force Posture Review,” *United Press International*, February 5, 2021; Robert Burns, “Pentagon Rethinking How to Array Forces to Focus on China,” *Associated Press*, February 17, 2021; Christopher Woody, “Biden Wants the Military’s Footprint to be ‘Correctly Sized,’ and It May Mean Deciding Which Bases Really Matter,” *Business Insider*, March 18, 2021.

The review also approved the stationing of a previously rotational attack helicopter squadron and an artillery division headquarters in the Republic of Korea.

More initiatives are forthcoming in the region, but these require more discussions among the allies and remain classified, Karlin said.

In Europe, the review looks to strengthen the U.S. combat deterrent against Russia, and enable NATO forces to operate more effectively, she said. DOD has already instituted a couple of recommendations including lifting the 25,000-man cap on active duty troops in Germany imposed by the previous administration and the decision to permanently base a multi-domain task force and theater fires command—a total of 500 U.S. Army personnel—in Wiesbaden, Germany. DOD will also retain seven sites previously designated for return to Germany and Belgium under the European infrastructure consolidation plan. The review identified additional capabilities that will enhance U.S. deterrence posture in Europe, and these will be discussed with allies in the near future, Karlin said.

In the Middle East, again, there have already been some posture review changes including the redeployment of critically strained missile defense capabilities, and reallocation of certain maritime assets back to Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In Iraq and Syria, the review indicates that DOD posture will continue to support the defeated Islamic State campaign and build the capacity of partner forces, Karlin said.

“Looking ahead, the global posture review directs the department to conduct an additional analysis on enduring posture requirements in the Middle East,” she said. “As Secretary Austin noted ... we have global responsibilities and must ensure the readiness and modernization of our forces. These considerations require us to make continuous changes to our Middle East posture, but we always have the capability to rapidly deploy forces to the region based on the threat environment.”

In considering forces in Africa, analysis from the review supports several ongoing interagency reviews to ensure DOD has an appropriately scoped posture to monitor threats from regional violent extremist organizations, support American diplomatic activities and enable allies and partners, according to the official.

Finally, in Central and South America and the Caribbean, the review looks at DOD posture in support of national security objectives, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and counterdrug missions. “The GPR directs that DOD posture continue to support U.S. government efforts on the range of transnational challenges and to add to defense partnership activities in the region,” the official said.⁵⁵

Details on the results of the global posture review are largely classified.⁵⁶ One press report stated that the review “plans to make improvements to airfields in Guam and Australia to counter China but contains no major reshuffling of forces as the U.S. moves to take on Beijing while deterring Russia and fighting terrorism in the Middle East and Africa.”⁵⁷ Some observers criticized the review for apparently not recommending larger-scale changes, particularly for strengthening U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific region for countering China.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Jim Garamone, “Biden Approves Global Posture Review Recommendations,” *DOD News*, November 29, 2021.

⁵⁶ See, for example, Meghann Myers, “Pentagon’s Military Presence Review Done, but Details Lacking on New Deployments, Troop Plus-Ups or Home-Port Shifts,” *Military Times*, November 29, 2021.

⁵⁷ Gordon Lubold, “Pentagon Plans to Improve Airfields in Guam and Australia to Confront China,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 29, 2021.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, “Spiking the Problem: Developing a Resilient Posture in the Indo-Pacific with Passive Defenses,” *War on the Rocks*, January 10, 2022; Becca Wasser, “The Unmet Promise of the Global Posture Review,” *War on the Rocks*, December 30, 2021; Dakota Wood, “Joe Biden’s Global Posture Review Was a Nothingburger,” Heritage Foundation, December 13, 2021; Dov S. Zakheim, “A Disappointing Global Posture Review

Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Complicates Plans for Shift to Indo-Pacific

As mentioned above, Russia's invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022, has prompted increased discussion of how much priority U.S. defense planning should give to Europe (to deter and respond to Russian actions) versus the Indo-Pacific (to deter China), how the U.S. response to Russia's actions in Ukraine might influence China's calculations regarding potential actions it might take toward Taiwan, and whether the tension about how to address concerns about both China and Russia should lead to changes in U.S. grand strategy or defense strategy, and/or the size of the U.S. defense budget.⁵⁹

In the past, discussions within NATO about the so-called burden-sharing issue—which focuses on comparisons of U.S. versus allied contributions toward the common defense of NATO—have centered to a large degree on U.S. concerns about equity within the alliance and whether some of the NATO allies are free riding within the alliance. In a context of GPC, and particularly in light of Russia's invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022, discussions about whether NATO allies should increase their contributions toward the common defense of NATO could additionally focus on a question of compensating for potential limits on U.S. defense resources that are available for Europe.⁶⁰ The announced strategic partnership between China and Russia has led some U.S. observers to argue that avoiding unwanted tradeoffs between U.S. military investments for countering China and those for countering Russia could require increasing U.S. defense spending above current levels.⁶¹

Developments in Middle East Complicate Plans for Shift to Indo-Pacific

Developments in the Middle East affecting U.S. interests are viewed as complicating plans or desires that U.S. leaders might have for reducing U.S. force deployments to that region so as to make them available for deployment elsewhere.⁶² In April and June 2021, it was reported that the

from Defense," *The Hill*, December 3, 2021; Jack Detsch, "'No Decisions, No Changes': Pentagon Fails to Stick Asia Pivot, The Long-Anticipated Review Was, for Some, a 'Complete Waste of time.'" *Foreign Policy*, November 29, 2021; Editorial Board, "The Pentagon's Bureaucratic Posture Review," *Wall Street Journal*, December 1, 2021; Daniel DePetrìs, "Biden's Pentagon Wants to Keep the Military Overstretched," *Spectator World*, November 30, 2021. See also Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, "Pentagon: U.S. Military Footprint Staying Right Where It Is," *Responsible Statecraft*, November 30, 2021.

⁵⁹ See the sources cited in footnote 48.

⁶⁰ If observers assess that, in light of finite U.S. defense resources and the scale of the security challenge posed in the Indo-Pacific by China's growing military capabilities, the United States might not have sufficient resources to adequately counter China's growing military capabilities while at the same time maintaining historic U.S. levels of investment for countering Russian forces in Europe, then adequately countering China could require reducing U.S. expenditures for countering Russia, which in turn could require NATO allies to compensate by increasing their own investments within the NATO alliance for countering Russia. See, for example, Robert Kelly, "America's Great Security Challenge Is China. Why Can't Europe Handle Ukraine?" *19FortyFive*, February 7, 2022; Dov S. Zakheim, "The Biden Administration Faces a Dangerous Anti-American Triad," *The Hill*, January 28, 2022.

⁶¹ See the sources cited in footnote 48.

⁶² See, for example, Jon B. Alterman, "The Middle East's Coming Centrality," CSIS, September 20, 2022; Danielle Pletka, "The U.S. Can't Just Quit the Middle East, We Have Genuine Geopolitical Interests in the Region, and So We Must Repair the Relationships We've Damaged," *Dispatch*, March 30, 2022; Saeed Ghasseminejad, "Is the Future of the Persian Gulf Chinese?" *National Interest*, February 2, 2022; Edward White and Andrew England, "China Pours Money into Iraq as US Retreats from Middle East," *Financial Times*, February 2, 2022; Ben Hubbard and Amy Qin, "As the U.S. Pulls Back From the Mideast, China Leans In," *New York Times*, February 1 (updated February 2), 2022; Jane Arraf and Ben Hubbard, "As Islamic State Resurges, U.S. Is Drawn Back Into the Fray," *New York Times*, January 25, 2022; Bradley Bowman, "Biden Can No Longer Ignore Growing Iran-China Ties, Washington May Be Tired of the Middle East, But Beijing Is Just Getting Started," *Foreign Policy*, January 13, 2022; Aaron David Miller, "Israel and the Gulf States Are Becoming Closer. But It Won't Make Biden's Life Much Easier. The Thaw Between Israel and

Biden Administration had decided to withdraw certain U.S. forces, including fighter squadrons and Patriot and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense batteries, from the Middle East, so that some of them could be redeployed elsewhere.⁶³

U.S. and Allied Capabilities in Indo-Pacific Region

The emergence of GPC with China has led to a major U.S. defense-planning focus on strengthening U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. officials since 2006 have expressed desires (or announced plans) for bolstering U.S. military capabilities and force deployments in the Indo-Pacific region for the purpose of countering China's growing military capabilities. Strengthening U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific is a key component of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), an overarching U.S. policy construct for the region that emerged during the Trump Administration⁶⁴ and has continued during the Biden Administration.⁶⁵ As mentioned earlier, the Biden Administration's October 2022 NDS states that DOD's priorities include "Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary—

Gulf States Is Rare Welcome News in the Region. But Don't Expect America's Perpetual Iran Headache to Ease Up," *Politico*, December 16, 2021; Mike Watson, "Is the U.S. Repeating the Error of the Iraq Withdrawal? Regional Stability Declined after the 2011 Pullout, and the 'Pivot To Asia' Failed. Sounds Awfully Familiar," *Wall Street Journal*, December 16, 2021; Hal Brands, "Putin Isn't the Only Reason Biden's 'Pivot to Asia' Is Doomed, Three Consecutive Presidents Have Tried to Stabilize the World and Focus on China. But Reality Keeps Getting in the Way," *Bloomberg*, December 7, 2021; Bilal Y. Saab and Barry Pavel, "Diplomacy Is the Key to Reducing US Forces in the Mideast, The Pacific Pivot Need Not Reduce Middle East Security—If the U.S. Can Get Its Partners on Board," *Defense One*, December 6, 2021; Yonah Jeremy Bob, "Biden Won't Be Able to Pull US Forces from Middle East—Ex-Mossad Chief," *Jerusalem Post*, September 12, 2021; Hal Brands, "Biden Can Leave Afghanistan But Not the Middle East," *Bloomberg*, August 26, 2021; Michael Hirsh, "Raisi Will Yank Biden Back Into the Middle East," *Foreign Policy*, August 4, 2021; Bradley Bowman and Mark Montgomery, "Biden Gets It Wrong in the Pacific and Afghanistan," *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, May 28, 2021; Lolita C. Baldor, "US General: As US Scales Back in Mideast, China May Step In," *Associated Press*, May 23, 2021; Anne Gearan, "Biden Wants to Focus on Asia. The Mideast Has Other Ideas," *Washington Post*, May 14, 2021; Ali Wyne, "Biden's Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Push," *Lawfare*, April 25, 2021; John W. Miller, "Biden's Mideast Drawdown Poses Perils," *Defense News*, April 15, 2021; Paul Gadalla, "Congress Should Know There Are No Quick Fixes in the Middle East, Americans on Both Sides of the Political Spectrum Must Realize That the United States, One Way or Another, Will Continue to Be Involved in the Middle East for the Foreseeable Future," *National Interest*, April 1, 2021; Hal Brands, "Biden Isn't Ignoring the Middle East, and That's Good," *Bloomberg*, March 18 (updated March 21), 2021; Elise Labott, "Can Biden Finally Put the Middle East in Check and Pivot Already?" *Foreign Policy*, March 2, 2021; Joshua Keating, "Biden Just Can't Quit the Mideast," *Slate*, February 26, 2021; Lolita C. Baldor, "Defense Head Austin Weighs Warship Needs in Pacific, Mideast," *Associated Press*, February 25, 2021; Steven Stashwick, "The Asia-Pacific is Biden's Top Security Priority, But the U.S. Would Find It Difficult to Disentangle from Legacy Commitments in Middle East," *Diplomat*, February 23, 2021; Jon B. Alterman, "The Smart Way out of the Middle East," *The Hill*, February 22, 2021.

⁶³ See Gordon Lubold and Warren P. Strobel, "Biden Trimming Forces Sent to Mideast to Help Saudi Arabia," *Wall Street Journal*, April 1, 2021; Oren Liebermann, "Pentagon Pulls Missile Defense, Other Systems from Saudi Arabia and Other Middle East Countries," *CNN*, June 18, 2021; Gordon Lubold, Nancy A. Youssef, and Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Military to Withdraw Hundreds of Troops, Aircraft, Antimissile Batteries From Middle East," *Wall Street Journal*, June 18, 2021; Stephen Losey, "US to Pull Some Patriot Missile Batteries, Fighter Squadrons Out of Middle East," *Military.com*, June 21, 2021.

⁶⁴ See CRS Report R45396, *The Trump Administration's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific": Issues for Congress*, coordinated by Bruce Vaughn; and CRS Report R46217, *Indo-Pacific Strategies of U.S. Allies and Partners: Issues for Congress*, coordinated by Ben Dolven and Bruce Vaughn. See also White House, "President Donald J. Trump's Administration Is Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," July 20, 2018, Department of State, "Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," July 30, 2018, Department of State, "Briefing on the Indo-Pacific Strategy," April 2, 2018, Department of State, "Remarks on 'America's Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,'" remarks by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Indo-Pacific Business Forum, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC, July 30, 2018.

⁶⁵ See, for example, White House, *National Security Strategy*, October 2022, pp. 37-38.

prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe.”⁶⁶ The NDS also states:

The Indo-Pacific Region. The Department will reinforce and build out a resilient security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region in order to sustain a free and open regional order, and deter attempts to resolve disputes by force. We will modernize our Alliance with Japan and strengthen combined capabilities by aligning strategic planning and priorities in a more integrated manner; deepen our Alliance with Australia through investments in posture, interoperability, and expansion of multilateral cooperation; and foster advantage through advanced technology cooperation with partnerships like AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific Quad. The Department will advance our Major Defense Partnership with India to enhance its ability to deter PRC aggression and ensure free and open access to the Indian Ocean region. The Department will support Taiwan’s asymmetric self-defense commensurate with the evolving PRC threat and consistent with our one China policy. We will work with the ROK to continue to improve its defense capability to lead the Alliance combined defense, with U.S. forces augmenting those of the ROK. We will invigorate multilateral approaches to security challenges in the region, to include by promoting the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in addressing regional security issues. The Department will work with Allies and partners to ensure power projection in a contested environment. The Department will also support Ally and partner efforts, in accordance with U.S. policy and international law, to address acute forms of gray zone coercion from the PRC’s campaigns to establish control over the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and disputed land borders such as with India. At the same time, the Department will continue to prioritize maintaining open lines of communication with the PLA and managing competition responsibly.⁶⁷

In discussions about strengthening U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region for countering China, actual or potential U.S. measures that are frequently mentioned include

- shifting to more distributed force architectures;⁶⁸
- shifting to new operational concepts (i.e., ways of employing military forces) that are more distributed, make greater use of unmanned vehicles, and employ a higher degree of integration of operating domains (i.e., space, cyberspace, air, land, sea, and undersea);
- increasing numbers of longer-ranged aircraft and missiles;
- hardening air bases and other facilities in the Indo-Pacific that are within range of Chinese weapons;
- exploiting areas (such as undersea warfare) where the United States has an advantage that China cannot quickly overcome; and
- making U.S. C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and logistics capabilities more resilient against attack by Chinese weapons, and more quickly reconstitutable.

⁶⁶ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 7.

⁶⁷ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, pp. 14-15.

⁶⁸ In general, more distributed force architectures would include a smaller portion of larger and individually more expensive platforms (such as larger ships) and a larger proportion of smaller and individually less expensive platforms, including unmanned vehicles. A primary aim in shifting a force to a more distributed architecture is to reduce the force’s vulnerability to attack by complicating the adversary’s task of detecting, identifying, and tracking the force’s components and avoiding a situation of having “too many eggs in one basket.”

As one service-oriented example of DOD actions to strengthen U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, the Navy has shifted a greater part of its fleet to the region; is assigning its most capable new ships and aircraft and its best personnel to the Pacific; is maintaining or increasing general presence operations, training and developmental exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the Indo-Pacific; has increased the planned future size of the Navy; has initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and weapons; is developing new operational concepts; and has signaled that the Navy in coming years will shift to a more distributed fleet architecture.⁶⁹ As another example, the Marine Corps' current plan to redesign its forces, called Force Design 2030, is driven primarily by a need to better prepare the Marine Corps for potential operations against Chinese forces in a conflict in the Western Pacific.⁷⁰

Day-to-day DOD activities in the Indo-Pacific region include those for competing strategically with China in the South and East China Seas.⁷¹ They also include numerous activities to help strengthen the military capabilities of U.S. allies in the region, particularly Japan and Australia, and also South Korea, the Philippines, and New Zealand, as well as activities to improve the ability of forces from these countries to operate effectively with U.S. forces (referred to as military interoperability) and activities to improve the military capabilities of emerging security partners in the region, such as Vietnam.

Much of the conversation about strengthening U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region revolves around the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), which is a term used to refer to a collection of DOD investments that DOD officials and policymakers have identified as important for bolstering U.S. military capabilities in the region. The PDI is broadly modeled after the European Deterrence Initiative (or EDI—see the next section). Some PDI items are new initiatives, while others are existing DOD programs that have been brought under the PDI rubric. Some have been funded or are requested for funding in the Administration's proposed defense budget, while others have not yet been funded or had funding requested for them in the Administration's proposed budget (but might have been included in DOD's unfunded priority lists [UPLs]).⁷²

⁶⁹ For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

⁷⁰ For additional discussion, see CRS Insight IN11281, *New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Force Design 2030*, by Andrew Feickert. See also CRS Report RL32665, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R46374, *Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

⁷¹ For more on this competition, see CRS Report R42784, *U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

⁷² UPLs are lists of programs that DOD officials submit to Congress in conjunction with each year's defense budget submission to show what additional programs those officials would like to see funded, if additional funding could be made available.

Regarding the origin of the PDI, in April 2020, it was reported that Admiral Philip (Phil) Davidson, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), had submitted to Congress a \$20.1 billion plan for investments for improving U.S. military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. Davidson submitted the plan, entitled *Regain the Advantage*, in response to Section 1253 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 of December 20, 2019), which required the Commander of INDOPACOM to submit to the congressional defense committees a report providing the Commander's independent assessment of the activities and resources required, for FY2022-FY2026, to implement the National Defense Strategy with respect to the Indo-Pacific region, maintain or restore the comparative U.S. military advantage relative to China, and reduce the risk associated with executing DOD contingency plans. Davidson's plan requested about \$1.6 billion in additional funding suggestions for FY2021 above

As noted earlier, given finite U.S. defense resources, strengthening U.S. military force deployments in the Indo-Pacific region could involve reducing U.S. force deployments to other locations.

U.S. and NATO Capabilities in Europe

The emergence of intensified competition with Russia—which was made more observable by Russia’s seizure and announced annexation of Ukraine in March 2014 (which the United States does not recognize)⁷³ and Russia’s subsequent actions in eastern Ukraine, and then further underscored by Russia’s invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022—has led to a renewed focus in U.S. defense planning on strengthening U.S. and NATO military capabilities for countering potential Russian aggression in Europe.⁷⁴ Some observers have expressed particular concern about the ability of the United States and its NATO allies to defend the Baltic members of NATO in the event of a fast-paced Russian military move into one or more of those countries. The Biden Administration’s October 2022 NDS states:

Europe. The Department will maintain its bedrock commitment to NATO collective security, working alongside Allies and partners to deter, defend, and build resilience against further Russian military aggression and acute forms of gray zone coercion. As we continue contributing to NATO capabilities and readiness—including through improvements to our posture in Europe and our extended nuclear deterrence commitments—the Department will work with Allies bilaterally and through NATO’s established processes to better focus NATO capability development and military modernization to address Russia’s military threat. The approach will emphasize ready, interoperable combat power in contested environments across NATO forces, particularly air forces and other joint precision strike capabilities, and critical enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare platforms. The Department will collaborate with Allies and partners to build capacity along Europe’s eastern flank, strengthening defensive anti-area/access-denial capabilities and indications

what the Pentagon was requesting in its proposed FY2021 budget, and about \$18.5 billion in investments for FY2022–FY2026. Observers used the term Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) or Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative (IPDI)—a Pacific or Indo-Pacific analog to the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) discussed in the next section—to refer to proposals for making various investments for strengthening U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Pacific region. Section 1251 of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of January 1, 2021) directed DOD to establish a Pacific Deterrence Initiative “to carry out prioritized activities to enhance the United States deterrence and defense posture in the Indo-Pacific region, assure allies and partners, and increase capability and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region.” The provision authorized \$2.235 billion to carry out the initiative in FY2021; directed DOD to submit a report not later than February 15, 2021, on future-year activities and resources for the initiative; directed DOD’s annual budget submissions, starting with the submission for FY2022, to include a detailed budget display for the initiative; and directed DOD to brief Congress not later than March 1, 2021, and annually thereafter, on the budget proposal and programs for the initiative. Section 1251 of P.L. 116-283 also repealed Section 1251 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017), as most recently amended by Section 12534 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018). Section 1251 of P.L. 115-91 directed DOD to establish an Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, and Section 1253 of P.L. 115-232 modified the initiative’s name to Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative and made other changes to the initiative.

⁷³ The State Department states that “the United States does not, and will never, recognize Russia’s purported annexation of Crimea.” (State Department, “Crimea Is Ukraine,” press statement, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, February 25, 2021.)

⁷⁴ See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11130, *United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues*, by Kathleen J. McInnis.

and warning; expanding readiness, training, and exercises; and promoting resilience, including against hybrid and cyber actions.⁷⁵

The United States has taken a number of steps to strengthen the U.S. military presence and U.S. military operations in and around Europe. In mainland Europe, these actions have included steps to reinforce Army and Air Force capabilities and operations in central Europe, including actions to increase the U.S. military presence in countries such as Poland.⁷⁶ In northern Europe, U.S. actions have included presence operations and exercises by the Marine Corps in Norway and by the U.S. Navy in northern European waters. In southern Europe, the Mediterranean has re-emerged as an operating area of importance for the Navy. Some of these actions, particularly for mainland Europe, are assembled into an annually funded package within the overall DOD budget originally called the European Reassurance Initiative and now called the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).⁷⁷ In response to Russia's invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022, the United States has deployed additional Army and Air Force units to locations in NATO allied countries in Europe.

Renewed concern over NATO capabilities for deterring potential Russian aggression in Europe has been a key factor in U.S. actions intended to encourage the NATO allies to increase their own defense spending levels. NATO leaders since 2014 have announced a series of initiatives for increasing their defense spending and refocusing NATO away from “out of area” (i.e., beyond-Europe) operations, and back toward a focus on territorial defense and deterrence in Europe itself.⁷⁸ Following Russia's invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022, some NATO allies have announced steps to increase their defense budgets or otherwise bolster their military capabilities.

New Operational Concepts

The emergence of GPC has led to a focus by U.S. military services on the development of new operational concepts—that is, new ways of employing U.S. military forces—particularly for countering improving Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces⁷⁹ in the Indo-Pacific region. These new operational concepts include Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) for the Army and Air Force, Agile Combat Employment for the Air Force, Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) for the Navy and Marine Corps, and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) for the Marine Corps.⁸⁰ In general, these new operational concepts are more distributed and networked, make greater use of unmanned vehicles, and employ a higher degree of integration between operating domains (i.e., space, cyberspace, air, land, sea, and undersea).

⁷⁵ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 15.

⁷⁶ See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11280, *U.S. Military Presence in Poland*, by Andrew Feickert, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Derek E. Mix.

⁷⁷ For further discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10946, *The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview*, by Paul Belkin and Hibbah Kaileh.

⁷⁸ For additional discussion, see CRS Report R45652, *Assessing NATO's Value*, by Paul Belkin. See also CRS Report R46066, *NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress*, by Paul Belkin.

⁷⁹ The term *anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces* generally refers to military forces that are intended to keep opposing military forces from entering and operating within certain areas or regions, particularly areas or regions that are inside or adjacent to the homeland of the country deploying the A2/AD forces. In discussions of naval forces, such forces in the past have been referred to as sea-denial forces.

⁸⁰ For more on EABO and DMO, see CRS Report RL32665, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

Capabilities for High-End Conventional Warfare

The emergence of GPC has led to a renewed emphasis in U.S. defense planning on capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare, meaning large-scale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated conventional warfare against adversaries with similarly sophisticated military capabilities.⁸¹ Capabilities for high-end conventional warfare can differ, sometimes significantly, from capabilities required or optimized for the kinds of counterterrorism or counter-insurgency operations that were more at the center of U.S. defense planning and operations following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Many current DOD acquisition programs, exercises, and warfighting experiments have been initiated, accelerated, increased in scope, given higher priority, or had their continuation justified as a consequence of the renewed U.S. emphasis on high-end conventional warfare.

Weapon acquisition programs that can be linked to preparing for high-end warfare include (to mention only a few examples) those for procuring advanced aircraft such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)⁸² and the next-generation B-21 long-range bomber,⁸³ highly capable warships such as the Virginia-class attack submarine⁸⁴ and DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer,⁸⁵ ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities,⁸⁶ longer-ranged land-attack and anti-ship weapons,⁸⁷ new types of weapons such as lasers,⁸⁸ new C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities,⁸⁹ military space capabilities,⁹⁰

⁸¹ See, for example, Connie Lee, “ASC NEWS: U.S. Military Re-Emphasizing Large Warfighting Exercises (UPDATED),” *National Defense*, September 14, 2020. See also Christopher Layne, “Coming Storms, The Return of Great-Power War,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2020.

⁸² See CRS Report RL30563, *F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program*, by Jeremiah Gertler.

⁸³ See CRS Report R44463, *Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber*, by Jeremiah Gertler.

⁸⁴ See CRS Report RL32418, *Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

⁸⁵ See CRS Report RL32109, *Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

⁸⁶ See CRS In Focus IF10541, *Defense Primer: Ballistic Missile Defense*, by Stephen M. McCall; CRS In Focus IF11623, *Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress*, by Kelley M. Sayler and Stephen M. McCall; and CRS Report RL33745, *Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

⁸⁷ See CRS In Focus IF11353, *Defense Primer: U.S. Precision-Guided Munitions*, by John R. Hoehn.

⁸⁸ See CRS In Focus IF11882, *Defense Primer: Directed-Energy Weapons*, by Kelley M. Sayler and John R. Hoehn; CRS Report R46925, *Department of Defense Directed Energy Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress*, coordinated by Kelley M. Sayler; CRS Report R45098, *U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for Congress*, by Andrew Feickert; and CRS Report R44175, *Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

⁸⁹ CRS In Focus IF11493, *Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)*, by John R. Hoehn; CRS Report R46725, *Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress*, by John R. Hoehn; and CRS In Focus IF11866, *Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS)*, by John R. Hoehn. See also Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Reja Younis, *The Adversary Gets a Vote, Advanced Situational Awareness and Implications for Integrated Deterrence in an Era of Great Power Competition*, CSIS, September 2021 (posted online September 27, 2021), 10 pp.

⁹⁰ See CRS In Focus IF11895, *Space as a Warfighting Domain: Issues for Congress*, by Stephen M. McCall; CRS In Focus IF10337, *Challenges to the United States in Space*, by Stephen M. McCall; CRS In Focus IF11531, *Defense Primer: National Security Space Launch*, by Stephen M. McCall; CRS Report R46211, *National Security Space Launch*, by Stephen M. McCall; and CRS Report R46211, *National Security Space Launch*, by Stephen M. McCall.

electronic warfare capabilities,⁹¹ military cyber capabilities,⁹² hypersonic weapons,⁹³ and the military uses of robotics and autonomous unmanned vehicles, quantum technology, and artificial intelligence (AI).⁹⁴ Preparing for high-end conventional warfare could also involve making changes in U.S. military training and exercises⁹⁵ and reorienting the missions and training of U.S. special operations forces.⁹⁶

Maintaining U.S. Superiority in Conventional Weapon Technologies

As part of the renewed emphasis on capabilities for high-end conventional warfare, DOD officials have expressed concern that U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies has narrowed

⁹¹ See CRS In Focus IF11118, *Defense Primer: Electronic Warfare*, by John R. Hoehn; and CRS Insight IN11705, *FY2022 Electronic Warfare Funding Trends*, by John R. Hoehn.

⁹² See CRS In Focus IF11995, *Use of Force in Cyberspace*, by Catherine A. Theohary; CRS In Focus IF10537, *Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations*, by Catherine A. Theohary; and CRS In Focus IF11292, *Convergence of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare*, by Catherine A. Theohary and John R. Hoehn.

⁹³ See CRS In Focus IF11459, *Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons*, by Kelley M. Sayler and Amy F. Woolf; CRS Report R45811, *Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Kelley M. Sayler; and CRS In Focus IF11991, *The U.S. Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW)*, by Andrew Feickert.

⁹⁴ See CRS In Focus IF11105, *Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies*, by Kelley M. Sayler; CRS Report R46458, *Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Kelley M. Sayler; CRS In Focus IF11150, *Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems*, by Kelley M. Sayler; CRS Report R46458, *Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Kelley M. Sayler; CRS In Focus IF11836, *Defense Primer: Quantum Technology*, by Kelley M. Sayler; and CRS Report R45178, *Artificial Intelligence and National Security*, by Kelley M. Sayler.

⁹⁵ See, for example, Tom Greenwood and Owen Daniels, “The Pentagon Should Train for—and Not Just Talk About—Great-Power Competition,” *War on the Rocks*, May 8, 2020.

⁹⁶ See, for example, Stavros Atlamazoglou, “US Special Operators Are Picking Up a Softer Skill as They Refocus on Countering China,” *Business Insider*, June 28, 2022; Tom Hammerle and Mike Pultusker, “Special Operations Are Deterrence Operations: How United States Special Operations Forces Should Be Used in Strategic Competition,” *Small Wars Journal*, May 24, 2022; Stew Magnuson, “Special Ops Tech Pivots to Indo-Pacific Challenges,” *National Defense*, May 20, 2022; Stephen Watts et al., *Countering Russia, The Role of Special Operations Forces in Strategic Competition*, RAND, 2021, 95 pp.; Meghann Myers, “How Army Special Ops Can Push Back Against Russian Aggression,” *Military Times*, November 9, 2021; Valerie Insinna, “As the US Air Force Looks to the Future of Special Operations, Vertical Lift Takes Center Stage,” *Defense News*, September 17, 2021; Stavros Atlamazoglou, “To Take on Russia and China, the US Navy Is Standing Up a New Unit to Do the Missions That Only SEALs Can Do,” *Business Insider*, September 15, 2021; Stavros Atlamazoglou, “Taking on Russia and China Means US Special Operations Command Is Rethinking How It Fights the Propaganda War,” *Business Insider*, August 12, 2021; Stavros Atlamazoglou, “Navy SEALs Have to Go ‘Back to the Future’ to Help US Warships Survive a Future Fight with Russia or China,” *Business Insider*, July 28, 2021; Gidget Fuentes, “Naval Special Warfare in a ‘Race for Relevancy’ as Mission Shifts to High-End Conflict,” *USNI News*, June 30, 2021; Hal Brands, “Pentagon’s Special Forces Need to Go Back to the Future,” *Bloomberg*, May 24, 2021; Barnett S. Koven and Chris Mason, “Back to the Future: Getting Special Forces Ready for Great-Power Competition,” *War on the Rocks*, May 4, 2021; Lolita C. Baldor, “Navy SEALs to Shift from Counterterrorism to Global Threats,” *Associated Press*, April 28, 2021; Stavros Atlamazoglou, “The US Military Is Turning to Special Operators to Fend off Russian and Chinese Influence in Its Neighborhood,” *Business Insider*, April 22, 2021; Sandor Fabian, “Building and Enabling Urban Resistance Networks In Small Countries—A Crucial Role For U.S. Special Forces In Great Power Competition,” *Small Wars Journal*, April 11, 2021; John Grady, “SOCOM Shifting to Great Power Competition Strategy, but Needs More ISR Capabilities, Commander Says,” *USNI News*, March 25, 2021; Stavros Atlamazoglou, “A Historic Exercise Shows How Navy SEALs Will Keep Aircraft Carriers in a High-End Fight,” *Business Insider*, March 22, 2021; Kris Osborn, “Air Force Special Operations Forces: Ready for a Russia or China War? The Rise of Great Power Competition Means That the Entire Military Is Spending Less Time Training and Planning for Nation Building and Counter-Insurgency,” *National Interest*, March 11, 2021.

For more on U.S. special operations forces, see CRS In Focus IF10545, *Defense Primer: Special Operations Forces*, by Barbara Salazar Torreon and Andrew Feickert; and CRS Report RS21048, *U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress*, by Andrew Feickert.

or in some cases been eliminated by China and (in certain areas) Russia. In response, DOD has taken a number of actions that are intended to help maintain or regain U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies, including increased research and development funding for new militarily applicable technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous unmanned weapons, hypersonic weapons, directed-energy weapons, biotechnology, and quantum technology. Controls on exports to China, Russia, and other countries of advanced technologies with potential military uses form another part of this effort.⁹⁷ The Biden Administration's October 2022 NDS states:

Make the Right Technology Investments. The United States' technological edge has long been a foundation of our military advantage. The Department will support the innovation ecosystem, both at home and in expanded partnerships with our Allies and partners. We will fuel research and development for advanced capabilities, including in directed energy, hypersonics, integrated sensing, and cyber. We will seed opportunities in biotechnology, quantum science, advanced materials, and clean-energy technology. We will be a fast-follower where market forces are driving commercialization of militarily-relevant capabilities in trusted artificial intelligence and autonomy, integrated network system-of-systems, microelectronics, space, renewable energy generation and storage, and human-machine interfaces. Because Joint Force operations increasingly rely on data-driven technologies and integration of diverse data sources, the Department will implement institutional reforms that integrate our data, software, and artificial intelligence efforts and speed their delivery to the warfighter.⁹⁸

A February 2, 2022, press report stated

The Pentagon's research and engineering chief is crafting a new strategy for investment in 14 critical technology areas, writing in a new memo that "creative application" of emerging concepts is key to maintaining an edge over adversaries.

The Feb. 1 memo, first reported by *Inside Defense*, does not lay out a timeline for when the strategy will be complete, but notes the work will be informed by the 2022 National Defense Strategy and structured around three pillars: Mission focus, foundation building and succeeding through teamwork.

"Successful competition requires imagining our military capability as an ever-evolving collective, not a static inventory of weapons in development or sustainment," Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu wrote in the memo, obtained by C4ISRNET. "In many cases, effective competition benefits from sidestepping symmetric arms races and instead comes from the creative application of new concepts with emerging science and technology."

The technologies identified in the memo ranges from "seed areas"—like quantum science, biotechnology, advanced materials and future-generation wireless technology—to commercially available capabilities such as artificial intelligence, space, microelectronics, integrated networks, renewable energy, human-machine interfaces and advanced computing and software.

The memo also highlights technology needs that are specific to the Defense Department, including hypersonic weapons, directed energy, cyber and integrated sensing.

⁹⁷ For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11627, *U.S. Export Controls and China*, by Karen M. Sutter and Christopher A. Casey; CRS In Focus IF11154, *Export Controls: Key Challenges*, by Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report R46814, *The U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018*, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson.

⁹⁸ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 19.

“By focusing efforts and investments into these 14 critical technology areas, the department will accelerate transitioning key capabilities to the military services and combatant commands,” Shyu writes. “As the department’s strategy evolves and technologies change, the department will update its critical technology priorities.”⁹⁹

Innovation and Speed of U.S. Weapon System Development and Deployment

In addition to the above-mentioned efforts for maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies, DOD is placing new emphasis on innovation and speed in weapon system development and deployment, so as to more quickly and effectively transition new weapon technologies into fielded systems.¹⁰⁰ The Biden Administration’s October 2022 NDS states:

Transform the Foundation of the Future Force. Building the Joint Force [i.e., U.S. military] called for by this strategy requires overhauling the Department’s force development, design, and business management practices. Our current system is too slow and too focused on acquiring systems not designed to address the most critical challenges we now face. This orientation leaves little incentive to design open systems that can rapidly incorporate cutting-edge technologies, creating longer-term challenges with obsolescence, interoperability, and cost effectiveness. The Department will instead reward rapid experimentation, acquisition, and fielding. We will better align requirements, resourcing, and acquisition, and undertake a campaign of learning to identify the most promising concepts, incorporating emerging technologies in the commercial and military sectors for solving our key operational challenges. We will design transition pathways to divest from systems that are less relevant to advancing the force planning guidance, and partner to equip the defense industrial base to support more relevant modernization efforts.¹⁰¹

The individual military services have taken various actions to increase innovation and speed in their weapon acquisition programs. Some of these actions make use of special acquisition authorities provided by Congress that are intended in part to reduce the time needed to transition new weapon technologies into fielded systems, including Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and what is known as Section 804 Middle Tier authority.¹⁰²

On January 23, 2020, DOD released a new defense acquisition framework, called the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, that is intended to substantially accelerate the DOD’s process for developing and fielding new weapons.¹⁰³ In previewing the new framework in October 2019,

⁹⁹ Courtney Albion, “New Strategy Will Harness Emerging Tech to Beat Adversaries,” *Defense News*, February 2, 2022. See also the CRS report cited in footnote 94.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, Briana Reilly, “With Rapid Experimentation Effort, DOD Looks to Build Up Tech Transition Pathways,” *Inside Defense*, April 13, 2022; Matthew Beinart, “Hicks Says RDER Will Help Address DoD’s ‘Complicated System’ for Advancing Promising Tech,” *Defense Daily*, April 12, 2022.

¹⁰¹ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 19.

¹⁰² See, for example, CRS Report R45521, *Department of Defense Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress*, by Heidi M. Peters; Government Accountability Office, *Defense Acquisitions[:] DOD’s Use of Other Transactions for Prototype Projects Has Increased*, GAO-20-84, November 2019, 31 pp.; Matt Donovan and Will Roper, “Section 804 Gives the US an Advantage in Great Power Competition with China and Russia,” *Defense News*, August 7, 2019; Justin Doubleday, “Section 809 Panel Chair Warns Against ‘Abuse’ of Other Transaction Agreements,” *Inside Defense*, October 3, 2019; Aaron Greg, “Seeking an Edge over Geopolitical Rivals, Pentagon Exploits an Obscure Regulatory Workaround,” *Washington Post*, October 18, 2019; Scott Maucione, “Special Report: Failure Is an Option for DoD’s Experimental Agency, But How Much?” *Federal News Network*, October 30, 2019; Colin Clark, “OTA Prototyping Nearly Triples To \$3.7B: GAO,” *Breaking Defense*, November 26, 2019; Eric Lofgren, “Too Many Cooks in the DoD: New Policy May Suppress Rapid Acquisition,” *Defense News*, January 2, 2020.

¹⁰³ See, for example, Tony Bertuca, “Pentagon releases New Guidelines to Accelerate Acquisition,” *Inside Defense*,

DOD described it as “the most transformational acquisition policy change we’ve seen in decades.”¹⁰⁴

Some observers argue that DOD is not doing enough or moving quickly enough to generate and implement innovations in response to GPC, and have proposed steps for doing more or moving more quickly.¹⁰⁵ A January 2020 GAO report on weapon system reliability in defense acquisition, however, states

DOD has taken steps to accelerate weapon system development, and decision-making authority has been delegated to the military services. In an environment emphasizing speed, without senior leadership focus on a broader range of key reliability practices, DOD runs

January 24, 2020. The operation of the framework is set forth in DOD Instruction (DODI) 5000.02, *Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework*, January 23, 2020, 17 pp.

¹⁰⁴ See, for example, Tony Bertuca, “[Ellen] Lord: Pentagon Is ‘On the Brink’ of Acquisition Transformation,” *Inside Defense*, October 18, 2019. See also Richard Sisk, “Pentagon Debuts Yet Another Plan to Speed Up Weapons Buys,” *Military.com*, October 8, 2020.

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, Jules Hurst, “Fixing Defense Innovation: Rewriting Acquisition and Security Regulations,” *War on the Rocks*, October 7, 2022; Melissa Flagg, “No Time to Waste: The Pentagon Needs an Innovation Overhaul, A Technological Transition Will Take Time, but the United States Cannot Fight and Win in This New Multipolar World Unless It Begins Today,” *National Interest*, August 21, 2022; Thomas Newdick, “China Acquiring New Weapons Five Times Faster Than U.S. Warns Top Official,” *The Drive*, July 6, 2022; Dan Ward and Matt MacGregor, *Arming the Eagle, Outpacing the Dragon: Understanding and Out Competing China’s Defense Acquisition And Innovation*, Mitre Corporation, June 2022, 29 pp.; Elaine McCusker and Emily Coletta, “Is the U.S. Military Ready to Defend Taiwan?” *National Interest*, February 6, 2022; Christopher Zember, “Change How OTAs Are Used to Make Them an Essential Tool Against China,” *Breaking Defense*, February 3, 2022; Robert A. McDonald Sr., M. Sam Araki, and Robert Wilkie, “These Seven Principles Could Help DoD Acquisition in the Face of the China Threat,” *Defense News*, February 1, 2022; Daniel K. Lim, “Startups and the Defense Department’s Compliance Labyrinth,” *War on the Rocks*, January 3, 2022; Mike Brest, “Chinese Military Progress ‘Stunning’ While US Slowed by ‘Brutal’ Bureaucracy, Joint Chief Warns,” *Washington Examiner*, October 28, 2021; Sandra Erwin, “Hyten Blasts ‘Unbelievably’ Slow DoD Bureaucracy as China Advances Space Weapons,” *Space News*, October 28, 2021; Alex Marquardt and Oren Liebermann, “Senior US General Warns China’s Military Progress Is ‘Stunning’ as US Is Hampered by ‘Brutal’ Bureaucracy,” *CNN*, October 28, 2021; Meghann Myers, “Risk Aversion and Secrecy Are Costing US Its Military Advantage, No. 2 General Says,” *Military Times*, October 8, 2021; Ryan Tracy, “As Google, Microsoft and Amazon Seek Bigger Defense Role, Some Are Leery,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 7, 2021; Peter Spiegel, “How America Found Itself Fighting the Last War—Again,” *Financial Times*, August 18, 2021; Arnold Punaro, “Book Excerpt: Pruning The Acquisition Kudzu,” *Breaking Defense*, July 29, 2021; Mike Glenn, “Pentagon Must Pick Up the Pace to Counter China, Top General Warns,” *Washington Times*, July 26, 2021; Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “Give Combatant Commanders the Tools to Innovate,” *Defense News*, July 13, 2021; Elaine McCusker and Dan Patt, “Faster Weapon Buys: Try Evolutionary Innovation,” *Breaking Defense*, July 2, 2021; Melissa Flagg and Jack Corrigan, “Ending Innovation Tourism, Rethinking the U.S. Military’s Approach to Emerging Technology Adoption,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), July 2021, 22 pp.; Michèle A. Flournoy, “America’s Military Risks Losing Its Edge, How to Transform the Pentagon for a Competitive Era,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2021; Missy Ryan, “The U.S. System Created the World’s Most Advanced Military. Can It Maintain an Edge?” *Washington Post*, April 1, 2021; Chris Dougherty, “Want an Agile Pentagon? Don’t Go Chasing ‘Waterfalls,’ Four-Year Strategy Reviews Aren’t Good Enough. Biden’s Pentagon Should Take a Page from Software Firms,” *Defense One*, March 22, 2021; Matthew Beinart, “Pentagon Needs New Acquisition Authorities To Stay Ahead In AI Tech Race, Commission Officials Say,” *Defense Daily*, March 12, 2021; Joe Gould, “Pentagon Processes ‘Antithetical’ to AI Development, Former Google CEO Warns,” *CAISRNet*, March 12, 2021; Bill Greenwalt, “Competing in Time: How DoD Is Losing The Innovation Race To China, Despite Reforms, the Pentagon and Congress Have Failed to Break Out of a Cold War, Central-Planning Model That’s Stifled Innovation,” *Breaking Defense*, March 9, 2021; Joe Gould, “Pentagon’s Dated Budget Process Too Slow to Beat China, New Report Says,” *Defense News*, February 25, 2021; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Experts Tell Congress How To Turn Innovation Into Reality,” *Breaking Defense*, February 23, 2021; Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, “The Pentagon Needs Budget Agility to Compete with China,” *Defense One*, February 12, 2021; Nate Ashton, “Urgently Needed: Tech-Savvy Defense Leaders,” *Defense News*, February 10, 2020; William Greenwalt and Dan Patt, *Competing in Time: Ensuring Capability Advantage and Mission Success through Adaptable Resource Allocation*, Hudson Institute, February 2021, 64 pp.

the risk of delivering less reliable systems than promised to the warfighter and spending more than anticipated on rework and maintenance of major weapon systems.¹⁰⁶

DOD officials and other observers argue that to facilitate greater innovation and speed in weapon system development and deployment, U.S. defense acquisition policy and the oversight paradigm for assessing the success of acquisition programs will need to be adjusted to place a greater emphasis on innovation and speed as measures of merit in defense acquisition policy, alongside more traditional measures of merit such as minimizing cost growth, schedule delays, and problems in testing. As a consequence, they argue, defense acquisition policy and the oversight paradigm for assessing the success of acquisition programs should place more emphasis on time as a risk factor and feature more experimentation, risk-taking, and tolerance of failure during development, with a lack of failures in testing potentially being viewed in some cases not as an indication of success, but of inadequate innovation or speed of development.¹⁰⁷

Mobilization Capabilities for Extended-Length Conflict

The emergence of GPC has led to an increased emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense on U.S. mobilization capabilities for an extended-length conflict.¹⁰⁸ The term *mobilization* is often used to refer specifically to preparations for activating U.S. military reserve force personnel and inducting additional people into the Armed Forces. In this report, it is used more broadly, to refer to various activities, including those relating to the ability of the industrial base to support U.S. military operations in a larger-scale, extended-length conflict against China or Russia. Under this broader definition, mobilization capabilities include but are not limited to capabilities for

- inducting and training additional military personnel to expand the size of the force or replace personnel who are killed or wounded;
- producing new weapons and supplies to replace those expended in the earlier stages of a conflict, and delivering those weapons and supplies to distantly deployed U.S. forces in a timely manner;
- repairing battle damage to ships, aircraft, and vehicles;

¹⁰⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Defense Acquisitions[:] Senior Leaders Should Emphasize Key Practices to Improve Weapon System Reliability*, GAO-20-151, January 2020, summary page.

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, Joel Gehrke, “China’s Military Planners Move Faster Than Pentagon Bureaucrats, Official Says,” *Washington Examiner*, May 3, 2022; Sean Carberry, “Air Force Must Embrace Risk to Counter China,” *National Defense*, May 2, 2022; Tate Nurkin, “To Catch China and Russia in Hypersonic Race, US Must Embrace Risk Now,” *Breaking Defense*, February 9, 2022; Corey Dickstein, “Vice Chairman Nominee Says US Military Must Adapt New Tech Faster to Compete with China, Russia,” *Stars and Stripes*, December 8, 2021; Sam LaGrone, “Eliminating ‘Risk Aversion’ Key to Weapons Development, Says Vice Chair Nominee Grady,” *USNI News*, December 8, 2021; Bryan Clark, “Pentagon And Congress Risk Bungling Drive To Modernize U.S. Military,” *Forbes*, July 8, 2020; John Grady, “Officials: U.S. Must Move Faster in Testing and Fielding Hypersonics, 5G Networks,” *USNI News*, June 30, 2020; Michèle A. Flournoy and Gabrielle Chefetz, “Breaking the Logjam: How the Pentagon Can Build Trust with Congress,” *Defense News*, April 1, 2020; Ankit Panda, “Getting Critical Technologies Into Defense Applications,” *National Interest*, February 1, 2020; Ankit Panda, “Critical Technologies and Great Power Competition,” *Diplomat*, January 29, 2020; Michael Rubin, “The Simple Reason Why America Could Lose the Next Cold War to Russia or China,” *National Interest*, January 14, 2020; George Franz and Scott Bachand, “China and Russia Beware: How the Pentagon Can Win the Tech Arms Race,” *National Interest*, November 29, 2019; Scott Maucione, “Special Report: Failure Is an Option for DoD’s Experimental Agency, But How Much?” *Federal News Week*, October 30, 2019; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Stop Wasting Time So We Can Beat China: DoD R&D Boss, Griffin,” *Breaking Defense*, August 9, 2018.

¹⁰⁸ See, for example, Hal Brands, “Win or Lose, U.S. War Against China or Russia Won’t Be Short,” *Bloomberg*, June 14, 2021.

- replacing satellites or other support assets that are lost in combat; and
- manufacturing spare parts and consumable items.

Some observers have expressed concern about the adequacy of U.S. mobilization capabilities, particularly since this was not a major defense-planning concern during the 20 to 25 years of the post–Cold War era, and have recommended various actions to improve those capabilities.¹⁰⁹

Concerns over U.S. industrial mobilization capabilities have been reinforced by the U.S. and allied response to Russia’s invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022, which has spotlighted

- how rapidly certain weapons (particularly precision-guided munitions) can be expended in modern warfare;
- the finite U.S. and allied inventories of precision-guided munitions, air-defense systems, and other equipment; and
- limits on existing U.S. and allied industrial capacity for producing new weapons and equipment to replace those transferred to Ukraine and to increase the size of U.S. and allied inventories to levels higher than those that were planned prior to Russia’s invasion.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ See, for example, Maiya Clark, “Revitalizing the National Defense Stockpile for an Era of Great-Power Competition,” Heritage Foundation, January 4, 2022; Elbridge A. Colby and Alexander B. Gray, “America’s Industrial Base Isn’t Ready for War with China, Washington Must Invest Immediately in a Domestic Capacity to Build and Repair Military Hardware,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 18, 2022; Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, “Washington Is Preparing for the Wrong War With China, A Conflict Would Be Long and Messy,” *Foreign Affairs*, December 16, 2021; Seth Cropsey and Harry Halem, “The U.S. Is Wholly Unequipped to Resupply Forces in a Great-Power Conflict,” *Defense News*, October 21, 2021; Marcus Weisgerber, “Digital Engineering Could Speed Wartime Arms Production,” *Defense One*, June 8, 2021; Government Accountability Office, *Navy Ships[:] Timely Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Develop Capabilities for Battle Damage Repair*, GAO-21-246, June 2021, 46 pp.; Tristan Abbey, “America’s Stockpiles Are Hardly Strategic,” *Defense One*, February 9, 2021; Mark Cancian and Adam Saxton, “US War Surge Production Too Slow, CSIS Finds,” *Breaking Defense*, January 19, 2021; Robert “Jake” Bebb, “State of War, State of Mind: Reconsidering Mobilization in the Information Age, Pt. 1,” Center for International Maritime Security, January 11, 2021 (drawn from Robert “Jake” Bebb, “State of War, State of Mind: Reconsidering Mobilization in the Information Age,” *Journal of Political Risk*, October 20, 2020); Mark F. Cancian, Adam Saxton, Owen Helman, Lee Ann Bryan, and Nidal Morrison, *Industrial Mobilization: Assessing Surge Capabilities, Wartime Risk, and System Brittleness*, CSIS, January 2021, 57 pp.; Ryan Pickrell, “China Is the World’s Biggest Shipbuilder, and Its Ability to Rapidly Produce New Warships Would Be a ‘Huge advantage’ in a Long Fight with the US, Experts Say,” *Business Insider*, September 8, 2020; Marcus Weisgerber, “US Shipyards Lack Needed Repair Capacity, Admiral Says,” *Defense One*, August 27, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Lack of U.S. Warship Repair Capacity Worrying Navy,” *USNI News*, August 26, 2020; Paul McLeary, “Navy Plans For Wartime Ship Surge; Looks To Small Commercial Yards,” *Breaking Defense*, August 25, 2020; Patrick Savage, “What If It Doesn’t End Quickly? Reconsidering US Preparedness for Protracted Conventional War,” Modern War Institute, July 23, 2020; Elsa B. Kania and Emma Moore, “The US Is Unprepared to Mobilize for Great Power Conflict,” *Defense One*, July 21, 2019; Alan L. Gropman, “America Needs to Prepare for a Great Power War,” *National Interest*, February 7, 2018; Joseph Whitlock, “The Army’s Mobilization Problem,” U.S. Army War College War Room, October 13, 2017; Mark Cancian, “Long Wars and Industrial Mobilization,” *War on the Rocks*, August 8, 2017; David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Mirages of War: Six Illusions from Our Recent Conflicts,” *War on the Rocks*, April 11, 2017; Robert Haddick, “Competitive Mobilization: How Would We Fare Against China?” *War on the Rocks*, March 15, 2016; David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Preparing for the Next Big War,” *War on the Rocks*, January 26, 2016. See also William Greenwalt, *Leveraging the National Technology Industrial Base to Address Great-Power Competition: The Imperative to Integrate Industrial Capabilities of Close Allies*, Atlantic Council, April 2019, 58 pp.

¹¹⁰ See, for example, Mike Stone, “Pentagon, U.S. Arms Makers to Talk Russia, Labor and Supply Chain,” *Reuters*, November 4, 2022; Thomas G. Mahnken, “Could America Win a New World War? What It Would Take to Defeat Both China and Russia,” *Foreign Affairs*, October 27, 2022; John Ferrari, “Four Steps the Pentagon Can Take to Fix the Munitions Industrial Base,” *The Hill*, October 17, 2022; Bradley Bowman and Mark Montgomery, “America’s Arsenal Is in Need of Life Support,” *Defense News*, October 12, 2022; John Ferrari, “Cannibalizing the Arsenal of

On April 24, 2019, the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, a commission created by the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016),¹¹¹ held two hearings on U.S. mobilization needs and how to meet them.¹¹²

DOD officials have begun to focus more on actions to improve U.S. mobilization capabilities.¹¹³ A February 2, 2022, press report stated

If a war against a major adversary breaks out, it's going to require the military to resupply troops at a pace it hasn't seen in a long time, Air Force Gen. Jacqueline Van Ovost, head of U.S. Transportation Command, said on Wednesday [February 2].

And to keep up with that frenetic tempo, TRANSCOM is going to have to use machine learning and artificial intelligence to streamline its logistics operations, Van Ovost said in an online conversation hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"We can't afford to sift through reams and reams of data" in a major war, Van Ovost said. "We really do need to apply machine learning and artificial intelligence to turn that data into knowledge, for which we can make decisions. Creating that decision advantage is going to give us that time and space and options for senior leaders to come up with different options to reduce risk, to increase effectiveness."

Van Ovost said American allies and partners, as well as its potential competitors, are already making fast progress in these areas, and the U.S. must do the same at all levels to be more effective and efficient....

Van Ovost expressed interest in recent work studying the feasibility of using rockets to rapidly move large cargo loads anywhere in the world. TRANSCOM has signed research agreements with companies such as SpaceX and xArc to see how the technology might work, including cargo loading and determining flight frequency.¹¹⁴

Democracy in Turbulent Times," *Military Times*, October 12, 2022; John Ismay and Lara Jakes, "Meeting in Brussels Signifies a Turning Point for Allies Arming Ukraine, Defense Officials Responsible for Purchasing Weapons for More Than 40 Nations Discussed How to Ramp Up Production for a Potentially Yearslong War," *New York Times*, September 28, 2022; Andrew White, "Ukraine Shows Need for NATO 'Magazine Depth': Raytheon Exec," *Breaking Defense*, July 20, 2022; David Johnson, "A Modern-Day Frederick The Great? The End of Short, Sharp Wars," *War on the Rocks*, July 5, 2022; Daniel Michaels, "Lessons of Russia's War in Ukraine: You Can't Hide and Weapons Stockpiles Are Essential," *Wall Street Journal*, July 4, 2022; Alex Vershinin, "The Return of Industrial Warfare," *RUSI*, June 17, 2022; Trae Stephens, "Rebooting the Arsenal of Democracy," *War on the Rocks*, June 6, 2022; Conrad Crane, "Too Fragile to Fight: Could the U.S. Military Withstand a War of Attrition?," *War on the Rocks*, May 9, 2022; "Because of Ukraine, America's Arsenal of Democracy Is Depleting, The War Raises Worries about America's Ability to Arm Its Friends," *Economist*, May 7, 2022; Bill Greenwalt and Dustin Walker, "How Biden's 'Buy American' Is Undermining the Arsenal of Democracy," *Breaking Defense*, May 3, 2022; Thomas G. Mahnken, "The US Needs a New Approach to Producing Weapons. Just Look at Ukraine," *Defense News*, April 26, 2022.

¹¹¹ See Sections 551 through 557 of S. 2943/P.L. 114-328.

¹¹² The commission's web pages for the two hearings, which include links to the prepared statements of the witnesses and additional statements submitted by other parties, are at <https://inspire2serve.gov/hearings/selective-service-hearing-future-mobilization-needs-nation> (hearing from 9 am to 12 noon) and <https://inspire2serve.gov/hearings/selective-service-hearing-how-meet-potential-national-mobilization-needs> (hearing from 1 pm to 4 pm).

¹¹³ See, for example, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "WW II On Speed: Joint Staff Fears Long War," *Breaking Defense*, January 11, 2017; Department of Defense, *Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States*, September 2018, 140 pp.; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Mobilization Planning*, Joint Publication 4-05, 137 pp., October 23, 2018; Memorandum from Michael D. Griffin, Under Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering, for Chairman, Defense Science Board, Subject: Terms of Reference—Defense Science Board Task Force on 21st Century Industrial Base for National Defense, October 30, 2019. See also CRS In Focus IF11311, *Defense Primer: The National Technology and Industrial Base*, by Heidi M. Peters.

¹¹⁴ Stephen Losey, "Data and Rockets: US Military Eyes New Tech to Supply Far-Flung Forces," *Defense News*,

Supply Chain Security

The emergence of GPC has led to an increased emphasis in U.S. defense planning on supply chain security, meaning (in this context) awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on components, subcomponents, materials, and software from other countries, particularly China and Russia. An early example concerned the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine, which was incorporated into certain U.S. space launch rockets, including rockets used by DOD to put military payloads into orbit.¹¹⁵ More recent examples include the dependence of various U.S. military systems on rare earth elements from China, Chinese-made electronic components, software that may contain Chinese- or Russian-origin elements, DOD purchases of Chinese-made drones, and the use of Chinese-made surveillance cameras at U.S. military installations. The supply-chain impacts of Russia's invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022, have put an additional spotlight on the issue of supply chain security.¹¹⁶

A November 5, 2019, press report states:

The US navy secretary has warned that the “fragile” American supply chain for military warships means the Pentagon is at risk of having to rely on adversaries such as Russia and China for critical components.

Richard Spencer, [who was then] the US navy's top civilian, told the Financial Times he had ordered a review this year that found many contractors were reliant on single suppliers for certain high-tech and high-precision parts, increasing the likelihood they would have to be procured from geostrategic rivals.

Mr Spencer said the US was engaged in “great power competition” with other global rivals and that several of them—“primarily Russia and China”—were “all of a sudden in your supply chain, [which is] not to the best interests of what you're doing” through military procurement.¹¹⁷

In response to concerns like those above, DOD officials have begun to focus more on actions to improve supply chain security. On February 24, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order on strengthening the resilience of U.S. supply chains. The executive order directed a “complete a review of supply chain risks,” to be completed within 100 days of the date of the executive order, and several sectoral supply chain assessments to be submitted within one year of the date of the executive order, to be followed by reports “reviewing the actions taken over the previous year and making recommendations” for additional actions.¹¹⁸ In February 2022, the Biden Administration released a report on the results of the review.¹¹⁹

For a list of reports and articles on this issue, see **Appendix D**.

February 2, 2022. See also James Foggo, “How to Lose the Next War: Ignore the Supply Chain,” *The Hill*, January 25, 2022.

¹¹⁵ See CRS Report R44498, *National Security Space Launch at a Crossroads*, by Steven A. Hildreth.

¹¹⁶ See, for example, Christian Davenport, “Russia Cuts Off Rocket Engine Supply and Threatens Space Station Partnership,” *Washington Post*, March 3, 2022.

¹¹⁷ Peter Spiegel and Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, “US Navy Secretary Warns of ‘Fragile’ Supply Chain,” *Financial Times*, November 5, 2019. Material in brackets as in original.

¹¹⁸ White House, “Executive Order on America's Supply Chains,” February 24, 2021. The executive order was number 14017.

¹¹⁹ Department of Defense, *Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains, An Action Plan Developed in Response to President Biden's Executive Order 14017*, February 2022, 74 pp.

Capabilities for Countering Hybrid Warfare and Gray-Zone Tactics

Russia's seizure and purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as subsequent Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and Russia's information operations, have led to a focus among policymakers on how to counter Russia's so-called hybrid warfare or ambiguous warfare tactics. China's actions in the South and East China Seas have similarly prompted a focus among policymakers on how to counter China's so-called salami-slicing or gray-zone tactics in those areas.¹²⁰ The Biden Administration's October 2022 NDS states:

Competitors' Gray Zone Activities. Competitors now commonly seek adverse changes in the status quo using gray zone methods—coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for U.S. military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the U.S. Government. The PRC employs state-controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and economic coercion against the United States and its Allies and partners. Russia employs disinformation, cyber, and space operations against the United States and our Allies and partners, and irregular proxy forces in multiple countries. Other state actors, particularly North Korea and Iran, use similar if currently more limited means. The proliferation of advanced missiles, uncrewed aircraft systems, and cyber tools to military proxies allows competitors to threaten U.S. forces, Allies, and partners, in indirect and deniable ways.¹²¹

For a list of articles discussing this issue, see **Appendix E**.

Issues for Congress

Potential policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:

- **October 2022 NSS and NDS.** Do the Biden Administration's October 2022 NSS and NDS accurately describe GPC and place it in appropriate context relative to other U.S. national security concerns? Do the October 2022 NSS and NDS present an appropriate national security strategy and national defense strategy for responding to GPC?
- **U.S. grand strategy.** Should the United States continue to include, as a key element of U.S. grand strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another?¹²² If not, what grand strategy should

¹²⁰ See CRS Report R42784, *U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

¹²¹ Department of Defense, *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, cover letter dated October 27, 2022, p. 6.

¹²² One observer states that this question was reviewed in 1992, at the beginning of the post-Cold War era:

As a Pentagon planner in 1992, my colleagues and I considered seriously the idea of conceding to great powers like Russia and China their own spheres of influence, which would potentially allow the United States to collect a bigger "peace dividend" and spend it on domestic priorities.

Ultimately, however, we concluded that the United States has a strong interest in precluding the emergence of another bipolar world—as in the Cold War—or a world of many great powers, as existed before the two world wars. Multipolarity led to two world wars and bipolarity resulted in a protracted worldwide struggle with the risk of nuclear annihilation. To avoid a return such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ultimately agreed that our objective must be to prevent a hostile power to dominate a "critical region," which would give it the resources, industrial capabilities and population to pose a global challenge. This insight has guided U.S. defense policy throughout the post-Cold War era.

(Zalmay Khalilzad, "4 Lessons about America's Role in the World," *National Interest*, March 23,

the United States pursue? What is the Biden Administration’s position on this issue?¹²³

- **Force-planning standard.** What force-planning standard is the Biden Administration using to size U.S. military forces? Why does the October 2022 NDS not include an explicit statement of the Administration’s force-planning standard? Should the United States adopt a two-war force-planning standard relating to potential conflicts with China and Russia? What would be the potential benefits, costs, and risks of adopting and implementing such a standard?
- **DOD organization.** Is DOD optimally organized for GPC? What further changes, if any, should be made to better align DOD’s activities with those needed to counter Chinese and Russian military capabilities?
- **Nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control.** Are current DOD plans for modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, and for numbers and basing of nonstrategic (i.e., theater-range) nuclear weapons, aligned with the needs of GPC? What role can or should nuclear arms control play in a situation of GPC?
- **U.S. global military posture.** Should U.S. global military posture be altered, and if so, how? What are the potential benefits and risks of shifting U.S. military capabilities and force deployments out of some areas and into others? Should the Biden Administration’s proposals for the global distribution of U.S. military force deployments be approved, rejected, or modified?
- **U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.** Are the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region taking appropriate and sufficient steps for countering China’s military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region? To what degree will countering China’s military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region require reductions in U.S. force deployments to other parts of the world?
- **U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe.** Are the United States and its NATO allies taking appropriate and sufficient steps regarding U.S. and NATO military capabilities and operations for countering potential Russian military aggression in parts of Europe other than Ukraine? What potential impacts would a strengthened U.S. military presence in Europe have on DOD’s ability to allocate additional U.S. forces to the Indo-Pacific region? To what degree can or should the NATO allies in Europe take actions to strengthen deterrence against potential Russian aggression in parts of Europe other than Ukraine?
- **New operational concepts.** Are U.S. military services moving too slowly, too quickly, or at about the right speed in their efforts to develop new operational concepts in response to the emergence of GPC, particularly against improving Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces? What are the potential merits of these new operational concepts, and what steps are the services taking in terms of

2016.)

See also Hal Brands, “Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World, Spheres of Influence Are Unnecessary and Dangerous,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 20, 2020.

¹²³ The Biden Administration’s October 2022 NSS states: “If one region descends into chaos or is dominated by a hostile power, it will detrimentally impact our interests in the others.” Regarding the Middle East, it states that “the United States will not allow foreign or regional powers to jeopardize freedom of navigation through the Middle East’s waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, nor tolerate efforts by any country to dominate another—or the region—through military buildups, incursions, or threats” (White House, *National Security Strategy*, October 2022, pp. 11, 42).

experiments and exercises to test and refine these concepts? To what degree are the services working to coordinate and integrate their new operational concepts on a cross-service basis?

- **Capabilities for high-end conventional warfare.** Are DOD's plans for acquiring capabilities for high-end conventional warfare appropriate and sufficient? In a situation of finite defense resources, how should trade-offs be made in balancing capabilities for high-end conventional warfare against other DOD priorities?
- **Maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies.** Are DOD's steps for maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies appropriate and sufficient? What impact will funding these technologies have on funding available for nearer-term DOD priorities, such as maintaining U.S. force structure (i.e., numbers of military units) or redressing deficiencies in force readiness?
- **Innovation and speed in weapon system development and deployment.** To what degree should defense acquisition policy and the paradigm for assessing the success of acquisition programs be adjusted to place greater emphasis on innovation and speed of development and deployment, and on experimentation, risk taking, and greater tolerance of failure during development? Are DOD's steps for doing this appropriate and sufficient? What new legislative authorities, if any, might be required (or what existing provisions, if any, might need to be amended or repealed) to achieve greater innovation and speed in weapon development and deployment? What implications might placing a greater emphasis on speed of acquisition have on familiar congressional paradigms for conducting oversight and judging the success of defense acquisition programs?
- **Mobilization capabilities.** What actions is DOD taking regarding mobilization capabilities for an extended-length conflict against an adversary such as China or Russia, and are these actions appropriate? What are current industrial capacity limits for producing key weapons and equipment, including precision-guided munitions? How quickly could industrial capacity for producing key weapons and equipment be increased, and how much would it cost to create the additional production capacity? More generally, how much funding is being devoted to mobilization capabilities, and how are mobilization capabilities projected to change as a result of these actions in coming years?
- **Supply chain security.** To what degree are Chinese or Russian components, subcomponents, materials, or software incorporated into DOD equipment? How good of an understanding does DOD have of this issue? What implications might this issue have for the effectiveness, reliability, maintainability, and reparability of U.S. military systems, particularly in time of war? What actions is DOD taking or planning to take to address supply chain security, particularly with regard to Chinese or Russian components, subcomponents, materials, and software? What impact might this issue have on U.S.-content requirements (aka Buy America requirements) for U.S. military systems?
- **Hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics.** Do the United States and its allies and partners have adequate strategies for countering Russia's so-called hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine, Russia's information operations, and China's so-called salami-slicing tactics in the South and East China Seas?

Appendix A. Transition from Post–Cold War Era to GPC

This appendix presents additional background information on the transition from the post–Cold War era to GPC. For a list of articles on this shift, see **Appendix B**.

Previous International Security Environments

Cold War Era

The Cold War era of international relations is generally viewed as having lasted from the late 1940s until the late 1980s or early 1990s and is generally characterized as having been a strongly bipolar situation in which two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—engaged, along with their allies, in a political, ideological, and military competition for influence across multiple geographic regions. The military component of that competition was often most acutely visible in Europe, where the U.S.-led NATO alliance and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance faced off against one another with large numbers of conventional forces and theater nuclear weapons, backed by longer-ranged strategic nuclear weapons.

Post–Cold War Era

The post–Cold War era is generally viewed as having begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the disbanding of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact military alliance in March 1991, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union into Russia and the former Soviet republics in December 1991, which were key events marking the ending of the Cold War. Compared to the Cold War, the post–Cold War era is generally characterized as having featured reduced levels of overt political, ideological, and military competition among major states.

The post–Cold War era is also sometimes characterized as having tended toward a unipolar situation, with the United States as the world’s sole superpower. Neither Russia, China, nor any other country was viewed as posing a significant challenge to either the United States’ status as the world’s sole superpower or the U.S.-led international order. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (aka 9/11), the post–Cold War era was additionally characterized by a strong focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist organizations that had emerged as significant non-state actors, particularly Al Qaeda.

Great Power Competition

Overview

The post–Cold War era showed initial signs of fading in 2006–2008 (see “Markers of Shift to GPC” below). By 2014—following Chinese actions in the South and East China Seas¹²⁴ and Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea¹²⁵—the post–Cold War era was viewed as having

¹²⁴ For discussions of these actions, see CRS Report R42784, *U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R42930, *Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress*, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan.

¹²⁵ For discussion Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, see CRS Report R45008, *Ukraine: Background, Conflict*

given way to a new situation, often referred to as great power competition, of intensified U.S. competition with China and Russia, as well as challenges by those two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order established after World War II.

Some Key Apparent Features

Observers view GPC not as a bipolar situation (like the Cold War) or a unipolar situation (like the post–Cold War era) but as a situation characterized in substantial part by renewed competition among three major world powers—the United States, China, and Russia. Key apparent features of the current situation of GPC include (but are not necessarily limited to) the following:

- renewed ideological competition, this time against 21st-century forms of authoritarianism and illiberal democracy in Russia, China, and other countries;
- competition for allies and partner states;
- technological competition, particularly between the United States and China;
- the promotion by China and Russia of nationalistic historical narratives,¹²⁶ some emphasizing assertions of prior humiliation or victimization by Western powers, and the use of those narratives to support revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims;
- challenges by Russia and China to key elements of the U.S.-led international order, including the unacceptability of changing international borders by force or coercion and a preference for resolving disputes between countries peacefully without the use or threat of use of force or coercion;
- the use by Russia and China of new forms of aggressive or assertive military, paramilitary, information, and cyber operations—sometimes called hybrid warfare, gray-zone operations, or ambiguous warfare, among other terms, in the case of Russia’s actions and salami-slicing tactics or gray-zone operations, among other terms, in the case of China’s actions; and
- additional features alongside those listed above, including
 - continued regional security challenges from countries such as Iran and North Korea;
 - a continued focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist organizations that emerge as significant non-state actors; and
 - weak or failed states, and resulting weakly governed or ungoverned areas that can contribute to the emergence of (or serve as base areas or sanctuaries for) non-state actors, and become potential locations of intervention by stronger states, including major powers.

Markers of Shift to GPC

The sharpest single marker of the transition from the post–Cold War era to GPC arguably was Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014, which represented the first forcible seizure and annexation of one country’s territory by another country in Europe since World War

with Russia, and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt, and CRS Report R44775, *Russia: Background and U.S. Policy*, by Cory Welt.

¹²⁶ See for example, Jessica Chen Weiss, “The Stories China Tells: The New Historical Memory Reshaping Chinese Nationalism,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2021.

II. Other markers of the shift—such as China’s economic growth and military modernization and China’s actions in the South and East China Seas—were more gradual and cumulative.

The beginnings of the transition from the post–Cold War era to GPC can be traced to the period 2006–2008:

- Freedom House’s annual report on freedom in the world states that, by the organization’s own analysis, countries experiencing net declines in freedom have outnumbered countries experiencing net increases in freedom every year since in 2006.¹²⁷
- In February 2007, in a speech at an international security conference in Munich, Russian President Vladimir Putin criticized and rejected the concept of a unipolar power, predicted a shift to multipolar order, and affirmed an active Russian role in international affairs. Some observers view the speech in retrospect as prefiguring a more assertive and competitive Russian foreign policy.¹²⁸
- In 2008, Russia invaded and occupied part of the former Soviet republic of Georgia without provoking a strong cost-imposing response from the United States and its allies.¹²⁹ Also in that year, the financial crisis and resulting deep recessions in the United States and Europe, combined with China’s ability to weather that crisis and its successful staging of the 2008 Summer Olympics, are seen by observers as having contributed to a perception in China of the United States as a declining power, and to a Chinese sense of self-confidence or triumphalism.¹³⁰ China’s assertive actions in the South and East China Seas can be viewed as having begun (or accelerated) soon thereafter.

Other observers trace the roots of the transition to GPC further to years prior to 2006–2008.¹³¹

¹²⁷ See, for example, Sarah Repucci, General Editor, *Freedom in the World 2020, The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties*, Freedom House, 2021, p. 2.

¹²⁸ For an English-language transcript of the speech, see “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” *Washington Post*, accessed January 25, 2022, at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>. See also Ted Galen Carpenter, “Did Putin’s 2007 Munich Speech Predict the Ukraine Crisis?” *National Interest*, January 24, 2022; Rakesh Sood, “Putin is Forcing a Third Reordering of Europe,” *Observer Research Foundation*, February 9, 2022; Daniel Fried and Kurt Volker, “The Speech In Which Putin Told Us Who He Was, In His 2007 Munich Address, the Russian Leader Firmly Rejected the Post-Cold War System He’s Still Trying to Torpedo,” *Politico*, February 18, 2022; David Ignatius, “Putin Warned the West 15 Years Ago. Now, in Ukraine, He’s Poised to Wage War,” *Washington Post*, February 20, 2022; Michael R. Gordon, Stephen Fidler, and Alan Cullison, “How the West Misread Vladimir Putin, The Former KGB Officer Spent Years Assailing the Post-Cold War Order and Sent Repeated Signals He Intended to Widen Russia’s Sphere Of Influence,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 25, 2022. See also Kim Ghattas, “What a Decade-Old Conflict Tells Us About Putin, One Can Trace a Straight Line from the Overthrow of Libya’s Dictator Muammar Gaddafi to Today’s Devastating War in Ukraine,” *Atlantic*, March 6, 2022.

¹²⁹ See, for example, Robert Kagan, “Believe It or Not, Trump’s Following a Familiar Script on Russia,” *Washington Post*, August 7, 2018. For a response, see Condoleezza Rice, “Russia Invaded Georgia 10 Years Ago. Don’t Say America Didn’t Respond,” *Washington Post*, August 8, 2018. See also Mikheil Saakashvili, “When Russia Invaded Georgia,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 7, 2018; Lahav Harkov, “2 Years On, Georgian Ambassador Sees War with Russia as Warning to Europe,” *Jerusalem Post*, August 5, 2020; Rakesh Sood, “Putin is Forcing a Third Reordering of Europe,” *Observer Research Foundation*, February 9, 2022.

¹³⁰ See, for example, Howard W. French, “China’s Dangerous Game,” *Atlantic*, October 13, 2014.

¹³¹ See, for example, Paul Blustein, “The Untold Story of How George W. Bush Lost China,” *Foreign Policy*, October 2, 2019; Walter Russell Mead, “Who’s to Blame for a World in Flames?” *The American Interest*, October 6, 2014; Robert Kagan, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” *Policy Review (Hoover Institution)*, July 17, 2007. See also Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Treating the Pathologies of Victory: Hardening the Nation for Strategic Competition,” p. 23, in

Comparisons to Past International Security Environments

Some observers seek to better understand the current situation of GPC in part by comparing it to past international security environments. Each international security environment features its own combination of major actors, dimensions of competition and cooperation among those actors, and military and other technologies available to them. A given international security environment can have some similarities to previous ones, but it will also have differences, including, potentially, one or more features not present in any other international security environment. In the early years of a new international security environment, some of its features may be unclear, in dispute, not yet apparent, or subject to evolution. In attempting to understand an international security environment, comparisons to other ones are potentially helpful in identifying avenues of investigation. If applied too rigidly, however, such comparisons can act as intellectual straightjackets, making it more difficult to achieve a full understanding of a given international security environment's characteristic features, particularly those that differentiate it from previous ones.¹³²

Some observers are describing the current situation of GPC as a new Cold War (or Cold War II or 2.0), particularly since Russia's invasion of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022. That term may have utility in referring specifically to current U.S.-Russian or U.S.-Chinese relations. The original Cold War, however, was a bipolar situation with the United States and Russia, while the current situation of GPC is a three-power situation involving the United States, China, and Russia. The bipolarity of the Cold War, moreover, was reinforced by the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, whereas in contrast, neither Russia nor China today lead an equivalent of the Warsaw Pact. And while terrorists were a concern during the Cold War, the U.S. focus on countering transnational terrorist groups was not nearly as significant during the original Cold War as it has been since 9/11.

Other observers, viewing the emergence of GPC, have drawn comparisons to the multipolar situation that existed in the 19th century or the years prior to World War I. Still others, observing the promotion in China and Russia of nationalistic historical narratives supporting revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims, as well as China's military modernization, have drawn comparisons to the 1930s. The military and other technologies available in those earlier situations, however, differ vastly from those available today. The current situation of GPC may be similar in some respects to previous situations, but it also differs from previous situations in certain respects, and might be best understood by direct observation and identification of its key features.

Naming the Current Situation

Observers viewing the current situation have given it various names, but names using some variation of great power competition or renewed great power competition appear to have become the most commonly used in public policy discussions. As noted earlier, some observers are using the term Cold War (or New Cold War, or Cold War II or 2.0), particularly since Russia's invasion

2020 *Index of U.S. Military Strength*, Heritage Foundation, 2020; Michael Rubin, "Russia Was a Rogue State Long Before Ukraine and Georgia," American Enterprise Institute, February 18, 2022; Jade McGlynn, "Why Putin Keeps Talking About Kosovo, For the Kremlin, NATO's 1999 War Against Serbia Is the West's Original Sin—and a Humiliating Affront that Russia Must Avenge," *Foreign Policy*, March 3, 2022.

¹³² See, for example, Christopher David LaRoche, "Ukraine Isn't Munich—or Vietnam or Berlin," *Foreign Policy*, October 15, 2022; Josh Kerbel, "By Calling It a 'Cold War' We Risk Containing Ourselves," *The Hill*, October 3, 2022; Jonah Goldberg, "A Tale of Two Cold Wars, The Differences between the Cold War Era and Today Are Profound," *Dispatch*, March 16, 2022; Ross Douthat, "The Ukraine War and the Retro-Future," *New York Times*, March 12, 2022.

of multiple parts of Ukraine starting on February 24, 2022. Other terms that have been used include competitive world order, multipolar era, tripolar era, and disorderly world (or era), and strategic competition.

Congress and the Previous Shift

The previous major change in the international security environment—the transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s from the Cold War to the post–Cold War era—prompted a broad reassessment by DOD and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. Many of these changes were articulated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR),¹³³ a reassessment of U.S. defense plans and programs whose very name conveyed the fundamental nature of the reexamination that had occurred.¹³⁴ In general, the BUR reshaped the U.S. military into a force that was smaller than the Cold War U.S. military, and oriented toward a planning scenario being able to conduct two major regional contingencies (MRCs) rather than the Cold War planning scenario of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.¹³⁵ For additional discussion of Congress’s response to the shift from the Cold War to the post–Cold War era, see **Appendix F**.

¹³³ See Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, October 1993, 109 pp.

¹³⁴ Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s introduction to DOD’s report on the 1993 BUR states the following:

In March 1993, I initiated a comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. I felt that a department-wide review needed to be conducted “from the bottom up” because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world as a result of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes in the international security environment have fundamentally altered America’s security needs. Thus, the underlying premise of the Bottom-Up Review was that we needed to reassess all of our defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up.

(Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, October 1993, p. iii.)

¹³⁵ For additional discussion of the results of the BUR, see CRS Report 93-839 F, *Defense Department Bottom-Up Review: Results and Issues*, October 6, 1993, 6 pp., by Edward F. Bruner, and CRS Report 93-627 F, *Defense Department Bottom-Up Review: The Process*, July 2, 1993, 9 pp., by Cedric W. Tarr Jr. (both nondistributable and available to congressional clients from the author of this report).

Appendix B. Articles on Transition to GPC and GPC in General

This appendix presents citations to articles about the transition from the post–Cold War era to GPC and about GPC in general.

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This appendix presents citations for further reading on the issue of supply chain security.

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Appendix F. Congress and the Late 1980s/Early 1990s Transition to Post–Cold War Era

This appendix provides additional background information on the role of Congress in responding to the transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s from the Cold War to the post–Cold War era.

This transition prompted a broad reassessment by DOD and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. Many of these changes were articulated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR),¹³⁶ a reassessment of U.S. defense plans and programs whose very name conveyed the fundamental nature of the reexamination that had occurred.¹³⁷ In general, the BUR reshaped the U.S. military into a force that was smaller than the Cold War U.S. military, and oriented toward a planning scenario being able to conduct two major regional contingencies (MRCs) rather than the Cold War planning scenario of a NATO–Warsaw Pact conflict.¹³⁸

Through both committee activities and the efforts of individual Members, Congress played a significant role in the reassessment of defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs that was prompted by the end of the Cold War. In terms of committee activities, the question of how to change U.S. defense plans and programs in response to the end of the Cold War was, for example, a major focus for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in holding hearings and marking up annual national defense authorization acts in the early 1990s.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ See Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, October 1993, 109 pp.

¹³⁷ Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s introduction to DOD’s report on the 1993 BUR states

In March 1993, I initiated a comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. I felt that a department-wide review needed to be conducted “from the bottom up” because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world as a result of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes in the international security environment have fundamentally altered America’s security needs. Thus, the underlying premise of the Bottom-Up Review was that we needed to reassess all of our defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up.

(Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, October 1993, p. iii.)

¹³⁸ For additional discussion of the results of the BUR, see CRS Report 93-839 F, *Defense Department Bottom-Up Review: Results and Issues*, October 6, 1993, 6 pp., by Edward F. Bruner, and CRS Report 93-627 F, *Defense Department Bottom-Up Review: The Process*, July 2, 1993, 9 pp., by Cedric W. Tarr Jr. (both nondistributable and available to congressional clients from the author of this report).

¹³⁹ See, for example, the following:

the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 101-665 of August 3, 1990, on H.R. 4739), pp. 7-14;

the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1991 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 101-384 of July 20 (legislative day, July 10), 1990, on S. 2884), pp. 8-36;

the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1992 and FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 102-60 of May 13, 1991, on H.R. 2100), pp. 8 and 13;

the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1992 and FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 102-113 of July 19 (legislative day, July 8), 1991, on S. 1507), pp. 8-9;

the House Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 102-527 of May 19, 1992, on H.R. 5006), pp. 8-10, 14-15, and 22;

the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY1993 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 102-352 of July 31 (legislative day, July 23), 1992, on S. 3114), pp. 7-12;

In terms of efforts by individual Members, some Members put forth their own proposals for how much to reduce defense spending from the levels of the final years of the Cold War,¹⁴⁰ while others put forth detailed proposals for future U.S. defense strategy, plans, programs, and spending. Senator John McCain, for example, issued a detailed, 32-page policy paper in November 1991 presenting his proposals for defense spending, missions, force structure, and weapon acquisition programs.¹⁴¹

Perhaps the most extensive individual effort by a Member to participate in the reassessment of U.S. defense following the end of the Cold War was the one carried out by Representative Les Aspin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. In early 1992, Aspin, supported by members of the committee's staff, devised a force-planning standard and potential force levels and associated defense spending levels U.S. defense for the new post-Cold War era. A principal aim of Aspin's effort was to create an alternative to the "Base Force" plan for U.S. defense in the post-Cold War era that had been developed by the George H. W. Bush Administration.¹⁴² Aspin's effort included a series of policy papers in January and February 1992¹⁴³ that were augmented by press releases and speeches. Aspin's policy paper of February 25, 1992, served as the basis for his testimony that same day at a hearing on future defense spending before the House Budget Committee. Although DOD and some other observers (including some Members of Congress)

the House Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 103-200 of July 30, 1993, on H.R. 2401), pp. 8-9 and 18-19;

the House Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 103-499 of May 10, 1994, on H.R. 4301), pp. 7 and 9;

the Senate Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1995 National Defense Authorization Act (S.Rept. 103-282 of June 14 (legislative day, June 7), 1994, on S. 2182), pp. 8-9; and

the House Armed Services Committee's report on the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 104-131 of June 1, 1995, on H.R. 1530), pp. 6-7 and 11-12.

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, Clifford Krauss, "New Proposal for Military Cut," *New York Times*, January 7, 1992: A11 (discussing a proposal by Senator Phil Gramm for reducing defense spending by a certain amount); "Sen. Mitchell Proposes \$100 Billion Cut in Defense," *Aerospace Daily*, January 17, 1992: 87; John Lancaster, "Nunn Proposes 5-Year Defense Cut of \$85 Billion," *Washington Post*, March 25, 1992: A4.

¹⁴¹ Senator John McCain, *Matching A Peace Dividend With National Security, A New Strategy For The 1990s*, November 1991, 32 pp.

¹⁴² See, for example, "Arms Panel Chief Challenges Ending Use of Threat Analysis," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, January 13, 1992: 28; Patrick E. Tyler, "Top Congressman Seeks Deeper Cuts in Military Budget," *New York Times*, February 23, 1991: 1; Barton Gellman, "Debate on Military's Future Crystallizes Around 'Enemies List,'" *Washington Post*, February 26, 1992: A20; Pat Towell, "Planning the Nation's Defense," *CQ*, February 29, 1992: 479. For more on the Base Force, see CRS Report 92-493 S, *National Military Strategy, The DoD Base Force, and U.S. Unified Command Plan*, June 11, 1992, 68 pp., by John M. Collins (nondistributable and available to congressional clients from the author of this report).

¹⁴³ These policy papers included the following:

- National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces, Representative Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, Before the Atlantic Council of the United States, January 6, 1992, 23 pp.;
- An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era, Representative Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, January 24, 1991, 20 pp.;
- Tomorrow's Defense From Today's Industrial Base: Finding the Right Resource Strategy For A New Era, by Representative Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, Before the American Defense Preparedness Association, February 12, 1992, 20 pp.; and
- An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era, Four Illustrative Options, Representative Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1992, 27 pp.

criticized Aspin's analysis and proposals on various grounds,¹⁴⁴ the effort arguably proved consequential the following year, when Aspin became Secretary of Defense in the new Clinton Administration. Aspin's 1992 effort helped inform his participation in DOD's 1993 BUR. The 1993 BUR in turn created a precedent for the subsequent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process (renamed Defense Strategy Review in 2015) that remained in place until 2016.

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¹⁴⁴ See, for example, "Aspin Defense Budget Plans Rebuffed By Committee," *Defense Daily*, February 24, 1992: 289; "Pentagon Spurns Aspin's Budget Cuts as 'Political,'" *Washington Post*, February 28, 1992: A14.