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Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin
American and Canadian
Affairs

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The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as well as countering illicit narcotics, since the 1990s. Over the past decade, top U.S. funding priorities for foreign assistance in the region have included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America, combatting drug production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and strengthening security and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have dedicated significant resources to combatting HIV/AIDS and fostering long-term stability in Haiti, addressing security concerns in the Caribbean, and responding to the political and humanitarian crises in Venezuela and their impact on the broader region. Since 2020, U.S. policymakers have taken steps to readjust U.S. assistance efforts to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and its secondary socioeconomic effects in Latin America and the Caribbean.

FY2023 Budget Request

The Biden Administration requested more than \$2.4 billion in foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2023, which (in current dollars) would be the largest annual budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. If enacted, the request would increase the total funding for the region managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) by \$369.9 million (18.2%) compared with the FY2022 estimated level. The Administration's FY2023 budget request also would provide \$38.0 million to the Inter-American Foundation (IAF)—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that supports community-led development in Latin America and the Caribbean. That figure would be the same amount the IAF received in FY2022.

Much of the increased funding for Latin America and the Caribbean would support continued implementation of the Administration's four-year, \$4 billion plan to foster systemic reform and address drivers of irregular migration from Central America. The FY2023 request would provide \$986.8 million for bilateral and regional programs in the seven Central American countries, increasing aid to the subregion by at least \$282.8 million (41.8%) compared with the FY2022 estimate. The Administration also has sought increased funding for Haiti to help the country restore democratic institutions, improve security, and foster stability in the aftermath of the 2021 assassination of its president and recurrent natural disasters. The FY2023 request would provide \$274.8 million for Haiti, which is \$55.6 million (25.4%) more than the estimated FY2022 allocation for the country. With regard to other regional priorities in FY2023, the Administration requested \$462.9 million to support counternarcotic efforts, peace accord implementation, and rural security and development in Colombia; \$141.6 million to strengthen the rule of law in Mexico; \$63.5 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI); and \$55.0 million for democracy, human rights, and health activities in Venezuela.

Legislative Developments

As of early December 2022, Congress has not concluded action on FY2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. In July 2022, the House Appropriations Committee reported its FY2023 SFOPS bill (H.R. 8282/H.Rept. 117-401) and a separate FY2023 SFOPS bill was introduced in the Senate (S. 4662). Congress has not taken further action on either bill. It passed a continuing resolution (H.R. 6833) on September 30, 2022, that largely funds foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2022 level until December 16, 2022.

Congress may draw from H.R. 8282 and S. 4662 as it considers final FY2023 appropriations. Neither measure would specify comprehensive appropriations levels for Latin America and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, both measures would provide more funding than the Administration requested for Colombia, the CBSI, and the IAF, and less funding than the Administration requested for Venezuela. Both measures also would place conditions on some aid to Central America, Colombia, and Haiti and would direct funding to various initiatives and objectives throughout the region.

Looking ahead to the 118th Congress, in addition to determining aid levels and objectives for Latin America and the Caribbean, Members could consider authorization legislation or use their various oversight mechanisms to help guide U.S. foreign assistance policy in the region.

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Introduction

Foreign assistance (also referred to as *foreign aid* in this report) is one of the tools the United States employs to advance U.S. interests and policy goals in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹ The focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with broader U.S. objectives. Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries in the region, as well as the broad range of these countries' ties to the United States (see **Figure 1** for a map of Latin America and the Caribbean). Some countries receive U.S. assistance across many sectors to address political, socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in consolidating democratic governance and improving living conditions; these countries no longer receive traditional U.S. development assistance but typically receive some U.S. support to address shared security challenges, such as transnational crime. Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funds for Latin America and the Caribbean and conducts oversight of aid programs and the executive branch agencies that administer them.

Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean



Source: Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

¹ For more information on foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, *Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, by Emily M. McCabe and Nick M. Brown.

This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It assesses trends in aid to the region and the Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request for aid administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF). It also examines congressional action on FY2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations and raises potential legislative and oversight activities that Congress could consider in the remainder of the 117th Congress or in future years. The **Appendix** provides detailed aid allocations by foreign assistance account and country or regional program for FY2021, FY2022, and the FY2023 request.

Report Notes

To compare the Biden Administration’s FY2023 foreign assistance request with previous years’ appropriations, most aid figures in this report refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is requested for individual countries or regional programs. Such assistance accounted for 62.8% of the total aid obligated by all U.S. agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2019 (the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available).

Several other sources of U.S. assistance to the region exist. Many Latin American and Caribbean countries have received assistance through a series of supplemental appropriations bills Congress enacted in FY2020 and FY2021 to help countries worldwide respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Some countries in the region also receive U.S. assistance to address humanitarian needs through USAID- and State Department-managed foreign assistance accounts, such as Food for Peace Act Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Migration and Refugee Assistance. Likewise, some countries receive assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the Department of Defense, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and Peace Corps, or from multilateral organizations that the United States supports financially, such as the Organization of American States, Inter-American Development Bank, and Pan American Health Organization. This report examines some of these assistance sources briefly in text boxes but otherwise excludes them from the analysis due to data inconsistencies.


Sources: USAID and U.S. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at <https://foreignassistance.gov/>.

Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Between FY1946 and FY2019, the United States provided \$93.8 billion (\$194.5 billion in constant 2019 dollars) of assistance to the region.² U.S. assistance to the region spiked in the early 1960s, following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S. assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided considerable support to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American civil conflicts (see **Figure 2**).

² These totals include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies to the 33 independent Latin American and Caribbean countries (identified in **Figure 1**) and regional programs. Certain agencies, such as the Department of Defense, have not yet reported their final assistance obligations for FY2020 or more recent years. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Department of State, at <https://foreignassistance.gov/>.

Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2019
(obligations in constant 2019 dollars)



Sources: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Department of State, [ForeignAssistance.gov](https://foreignassistance.gov/), at <https://foreignassistance.gov/>.

Notes: Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies. Comprehensive data for FY2020, FY2021, and FY2022 are not yet available.

U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase again in the late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through FY2010. The higher levels of assistance were partially the result of increased spending on humanitarian and development assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The establishment of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004 also provided many countries in the region with new sources of U.S. assistance.³ In addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the aftermath of a massive earthquake in 2010.

Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S. assistance. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive Administrations and Congresses provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking and end Colombia’s long-running internal armed conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined with his Mexican counterpart, Felipe Calderón, to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a

³ For more information on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, see CRS In Focus IF10797, *PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities*, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther; and CRS Report RL32427, *Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues*, by Nick M. Brown.

similar program for the countries of the Caribbean, known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).

Although U.S. assistance levels for Latin America and the Caribbean have remained elevated over the past two decades compared with the 1990s, the U.S. government has increasingly concentrated those resources in fewer countries and sectors, in light of significant development progress in much of the region. Between 2002 and 2019, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin America decreased from 45.3% to 30.4%, largely due to stronger economic growth and the implementation of more effective social policies.⁴ Health and education indicators also improved significantly during that period. Some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, began to provide assistance to others in the region based on their own development experiences.

Trends have reversed in the last decade, however, as countries in the region have struggled to address a series of challenges.⁵ Socioeconomic conditions began to stagnate in many Latin American and Caribbean countries around 2015 amid a decline in global commodity prices. These conditions deteriorated sharply in 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic swept away more than a decade of development gains.⁶ Political conditions also have deteriorated as Venezuela and Nicaragua have entrenched authoritarian rule and widespread corruption and violence have eroded the quality of democracy elsewhere. These challenges have contributed to political unrest and large-scale migration flows throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.⁷

Biden Administration’s FY2023 Foreign Assistance Budget Request⁸

The Biden Administration requested more than \$2.4 billion of State Department- and USAID-managed foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2023, which (in current dollars) would be the largest annual budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. The Administration also requested \$38.0 million for the Inter-American Foundation (IAF)—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that supports community-led development in the region. If enacted, funding for Latin America and the Caribbean would increase by \$369.9 million, or 18.2%, compared with the FY2022 estimate (see **Table 1**). The Administration’s proposed increase for the region exceeds the 17.2% increase requested for SFOPS globally in FY2023.⁹

⁴ U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Social Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean 2022*, November 24, 2022, p. 19.

⁵ For more information on recent challenges in the region, see CRS Report R46781, *Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress*, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.

⁶ ECLAC, *Social Panorama of Latin America 2021*, January 2022.

⁷ See, for example, Moisés Naím, “Why Hard-Liners Are Gaining Steam in Latin America,” *Politico Magazine*, July 12, 2022; and Michael Stott, “Repression and Poverty Trigger Record Migration in the Americas,” *Financial Times*, September 11, 2022.

⁸ Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2023*, May 9, 2022, at <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/FY-2023-Congressional-Budget-Justification-Appendix-2-final-5-9-2022.pdf>; and U.S. Department of State, FY2022 estimate data, August 16, 2022.

⁹ For more information on the global foreign operations request, see CRS Report R47070, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2023 Budget and Appropriations*, by Emily M. McCabe and Cory R. Gill.

U.S. Assistance to Respond to the COVID-19 Pandemic¹⁰

In addition to regular foreign assistance funds appropriated through annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations legislation, Congress has enacted supplemental appropriations measures to support the international response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. These measures include the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), which provided \$10.8 billion for health interventions, humanitarian assistance, and contributions to multilateral response efforts, and two FY2020 supplemental appropriations measures (P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136), which provided nearly \$2.3 billion in international affairs funding for pandemic response. The FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260) also included \$4.0 billion in emergency foreign assistance funds to support global vaccination efforts. As of June 2022, the U.S. Agency for International Development had provided at least \$539.0 million of supplemental pandemic response aid to Latin America and the Caribbean. As of December 2022, the United States had provided more than 70 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to countries in the region. These supplemental funds are not included in the country or regional totals found in **Table 1**, **Table 2**, or the **Appendix** of this report.

Major Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts¹¹

The Administration's FY2023 foreign aid budget proposal for Latin America and the Caribbean requests \$865.9 million (36.0% of the total) through the Development Assistance (DA) account, which seeks to foster broad-based economic growth and social welfare in low- and middle-income countries. USAID typically uses DA funding for long-term projects in areas such as agriculture, democracy and governance, economic reform, education, and environmental protection. The FY2023 request would continue to support long-term development efforts while seeking to address the negative effects the COVID-19 pandemic has had on many of those sectors. Compared with the FY2022 estimate, DA funding for the region would increase by \$209.4 million (31.9%), with the majority of the additional funding allocated to activities intended to address root causes of migration from Central America and to restore democratic institutions and support resilience and development in Haiti.

Another \$535.5 million (22.2%) of the Administration's request for the region would be provided through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, the primary purpose of which is to promote special U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, ESF programs generally aim to promote political and economic stability and often are indistinguishable from programs funded through the DA account. If enacted, ESF assistance for the region would increase by \$103.1 million (23.8%) compared with the FY2022 estimate. Among other activities, the additional resources would support rule of law, crime and violence prevention, and climate mitigation and adaptation programs in Central America and Mexico, as well as democracy and human rights programs in Venezuela.

The FY2023 request for Latin America and the Caribbean would provide \$303.5 million (12.6% of the total) through the Global Health Programs (GHP) account. This amount includes \$190.0 million requested for the State Department, primarily to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, and \$113.5 million requested for USAID to combat malaria and support maternal and child health, nutrition, and family planning programs. USAID also would implement global health security programs

¹⁰ For more information on the pandemic response and assistance allocations for particular countries, see USAID, "COVID-19 – Latin America and the Caribbean," Fact Sheet #5, Fiscal Year 2022, June 30, 2022, at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/COVID_Regional_Fact_Sheet_5_-_LAC.pdf; U.S. Department of State, "COVID-19 Vaccine Donations," at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#map_western; and CRS In Focus IF11581, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19*, by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer.

¹¹ For more information on the various foreign assistance accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report R40482, *Department of State, Foreign Operations Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts*, by Nick M. Brown and Cory R. Gill.

intended to prevent, detect, and respond to disease outbreaks, building on the pandemic response aid provided to the region using FY2020 and FY2021 supplemental appropriations (see text box, “U.S. Assistance to Respond to the COVID-19 Pandemic,” above). Under the FY2023 GHP request for the region, funding for the State Department-managed subaccount would decline by \$1.3 million (0.7%) and funding for the USAID-managed subaccount would increase by \$22.0 million (24.0%) compared with the FY2022 estimate.

The remaining \$702.5 million (29.2%) of the Administration’s FY2023 request for Latin America and the Caribbean would support security assistance programs, including the following:

- \$582.9 million requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account for counternarcotics, civilian law enforcement efforts, and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. INCLE funding for the region would increase by \$41.4 million (7.6%) compared with the FY2022 estimate, with decreased aid to Colombia offset by increased aid to Central America.
- \$32.1 million requested through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account to help countries in the region carry out humanitarian demining programs, strengthen conventional weapons stockpile management, develop strategic trade controls and border security measures, and enhance their counterterrorism capacities. NADR funding for the region would remain flat compared with the FY2022 estimate.
- \$14.0 million requested through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) account to train Latin American and Caribbean military personnel. IMET funding would increase by \$229,000 (1.7%) compared with the FY2022 estimate.
- \$73.5 million requested through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account to provide U.S. military equipment and services to partners in the region. FMF funding for the region would decline by \$5.0 million (6.3%) compared with the FY2022 estimate, with decreased aid to Costa Rica, Peru, and Colombia partially offset by increased funding for regional programs.

Table 1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account: FY2019-FY2023 Request

(millions of current U.S. dollars)

Foreign Assistance Account	FY2019	FY2020 ^a	FY2021 ^a	FY2022 (est.)	FY2023 (req.)	% Change: FY22-FY23
Development Assistance	385.3	457.8	490.6	656.5	865.9	+31.9%
Economic Support Fund	402.3 ^b	377.6 ^b	378.5 ^b	432.4 ^b	535.5	+23.8%
Global Health Programs (USAID)	53.3	53.3	55.5	91.5	113.5	+24.0%
Global Health Programs (State)	170.5	157.7	195.0	191.3	190.0	-0.7%
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	564.3	555.2	553.0	541.5	582.9	+7.6%

Foreign Assistance Account	FY2019	FY2020 ^a	FY2021 ^a	FY2022 (est.)	FY2023 (req.)	% Change: FY22-FY23
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs	25.8	27.3	31.0	32.1	32.1	—
International Military Education and Training	9.9	13.1	13.8	13.7	14.0	+1.7%
Foreign Military Financing	82.8	79.7	76.9	78.5	73.5	-6.3%
Total	1,694.1	1,721.7^a	1,794.3^a	2,037.5	2,407.4	+18.2%

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2021-FY2023*, at <https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/>; and U.S. Department of State, FY2022 estimate data, August 16, 2022.

Notes: USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State = U.S. Department of State.

- a. FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include assistance made available through supplemental emergency appropriations (P.L. 116-123, P.L. 116-136, or P.L. 117-2) to respond to COVID-19. For information on supplemental aid, see the text box, “U.S. Assistance to Respond to the COVID-19 Pandemic,” above.
- b. Congress appropriated an additional \$9.0 million of Economic Support Funds for the region in FY2019 and an additional \$5.0 million for the region annually in FY2020, FY2021, and FY2022. Those funds are not included in this table because they were appropriated as multilateral assistance for the Organization of American States.

Major Country and Regional Programs

Although the Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request would increase overall State Department- and USAID-managed assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean, proposed allocation changes would vary considerably by country or regional program (see **Table 2**).

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Since FY2010, the CBSI has funded maritime and aerial security cooperation, law enforcement support, border and port security, justice sector reform, and crime prevention programs in the Caribbean.¹² The FY2023 request would provide \$63.5 million for the CBSI, which would be a \$16.5 million (20.6%) cut compared with the FY2022 appropriation.

Central America. Addressing the underlying drivers of irregular migration from Central America to the United States has been a top U.S. policy priority in the region since an unexpected surge of unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the “Northern Triangle”) arrived at the U.S. border in 2014. However, specific policy approaches have shifted from one Administration to another. The Biden Administration developed a new U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America intended to support improved governance, security, and broad-based economic growth in the subregion.¹³ The Biden Administration also has allocated increased humanitarian assistance to Central America intended to stabilize populations with acute needs, in line with its Collaborative Migration Management Strategy (see text box, “U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Central America,” below).¹⁴

¹² For more information on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10789, *Caribbean Basin Security Initiative*, by Mark P. Sullivan.

¹³ For more information on U.S. policy toward Central America, see CRS In Focus IF11151, *Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy*, by Peter J. Meyer.

¹⁴ White House, *Collaborative Migration Management Strategy*, July 2021, p. 7, at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp->

To implement the root causes strategy in FY2023, the Administration requested \$986.8 million, \$959.0 million of which falls within the Latin America and Caribbean regional request.¹⁵ The Administration requested 44.4% of the FY2023 funding for the subregion as bilateral assistance for the seven Central American nations (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama), with the vast majority allocated to the Northern Triangle countries. It requested the other 55.6% through State Department- and USAID-managed regional programs. If fully funded, aid to Central America would increase by at least \$282.8 million (41.8%) compared with the FY2022 estimate.¹⁶

U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Central America¹⁷

Since 2020, a series of tropical storms and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have contributed to sharp increases in food insecurity and other humanitarian challenges in Central America. The Biden Administration has sought to address these challenges and stabilize populations in Central America as part of its broader Collaborative Migration Management Strategy. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department allocated \$272.2 million of humanitarian assistance to support vulnerable populations in Central America and Mexico in FY2021, and \$295.6 million for such purposes in FY2022. These assistance funds, which U.S. agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from global humanitarian accounts, are not included in the country or regional totals found in **Table 1**, **Table 2**, or the **Appendix** of this report.

Colombia. Colombia has been among the top recipients of U.S. assistance worldwide since the launch of Plan Colombia, a counternarcotics program, in FY2000. The focus of U.S. assistance efforts has evolved over time, responding to changes in Colombia’s long-running internal conflict and Colombian government priorities.¹⁸ The Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget proposal—released prior to Colombia’s August 2022 change in government—requested \$462.9 million for Colombia, primarily to support the Colombian government’s counternarcotics strategy and the continued implementation of its peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The request also included some funding to support environmental conservation efforts and the socioeconomic integration of Venezuelan migrants into their Colombian host communities. The Administration’s request is \$21.8 million (4.5%) less than the estimated amount allocated to Colombia in FY2022, with the largest proposed reductions falling under the INCLE and NADR accounts.

Haiti. The United States has provided Haiti significant aid to support the country’s recovery from recurrent natural disasters and foster long-term stability, with a particular spike in assistance in the aftermath of a massive 2010 earthquake. The Administration’s FY2023 request proposed increased funding to help Haiti restore democratic institutions and address the deterioration in the security situation that has occurred since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse.¹⁹ The request included \$274.8 million to address health challenges (particularly HIV/AIDS), strengthen

content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf.

¹⁵ \$27.8 million of the \$986.8 million requested for Central America would be provided through global accounts that are not included in the regional total for Latin America and the Caribbean.

¹⁶ This comparison excludes assistance requested for Central America through global accounts because FY2022 estimate data for such assistance is not available.

¹⁷ For more information on the humanitarian response and allocations for particular countries, see USAID, “El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—Regional Response,” fact sheets, at <https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/el-salvador/El-Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras-Regional-Response-Archive>.

¹⁸ For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Report R43813, *Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations* and CRS Insight IN1955, *Colombia: Presidential Elections in 2022*, by June S. Beittel.

¹⁹ For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS In Focus IF12182, *Haiti: Political Conflict and U.S. Policy Overview*, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Maureen Taft-Morales.

government and police capacity, increase agricultural production and other economic development, and support natural resource management. The Administration's request would increase U.S. assistance to Haiti by \$55.6 million (25.4%) compared with the FY2022 estimate.

Mexico. Mexico traditionally was not a major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status, but it began receiving larger amounts of counternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the Mérida Initiative in FY2008. Bilateral security cooperation efforts have shifted along with the priorities of U.S. and Mexican administrations and now are guided by the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities, launched in October 2021.²⁰ The Biden Administration's FY2023 request included \$141.6 million for Mexico, primarily to strengthen the rule of law; secure borders and ports; and combat transnational organized crime, including opium poppy cultivation and heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine production. The request also included some funding to help Mexico protect human rights and improve environmental conservation. The Administration's request for Mexico is \$13.4 million (10.4%) higher than the estimated FY2022 allocation due to a proposed ESF increase. However, according to the Administration's budget proposal, \$17.0 million of the ESF requested for Mexico would support Mexico's efforts to implement aid projects in Central America.

Venezuela. The United States has provided democracy assistance to Venezuelan civil society for two decades and has increased such assistance over the past five years in response to the increasingly authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro. The United States also has provided humanitarian support for those who have fled the country's humanitarian crisis (see the text box, "U.S. Assistance to Respond to Venezuela's Humanitarian Crisis," below).²¹ The Administration requested \$55.0 million in FY2023 to support democratic actors, human rights advocates, and other civil society organizations; strengthen small businesses; and reduce maternal and child mortality in Venezuela. The request would increase U.S. aid to Venezuela by \$6.4 million (13.2%) compared with the FY2022 estimate.

U.S. Assistance to Respond to Venezuela's Humanitarian Crisis²²

According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, an estimated 7.1 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees have fled the country's political and humanitarian crisis since 2015, approximately 6.0 million of whom are residing in other Latin American and Caribbean countries. From FY2017 to FY2022, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department provided more than \$2.3 billion of humanitarian assistance—including \$656.3 million in FY2022—to help countries in the region respond to Venezuelan migrant and refugee flows, support host communities, and assist those who remain in Venezuela. These assistance funds, which U.S. agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from global humanitarian accounts, are not included in the country or regional totals found in **Table 1**, **Table 2**, or the **Appendix** of this report.

²⁰ For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS Report R42917, *Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Joshua Klein.

²¹ For more information on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, *Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations*, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.

²² For more information on the humanitarian response and allocations for particular countries, see USAID, "Venezuela Regional Crisis – Complex Emergency," fact sheets, at <https://www.usaid.gov/humanitarian-assistance/venezuela/venezuela-regional-crisis-archive>.

Table 2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Country or Regional Program: FY2019-FY2023 Request

(thousands of current U.S. dollars)

	FY2019	FY2020 ^a	FY2021 ^a	FY2022 (est.)	FY2023 (req.)	% Change: FY22-FY23
Argentina	3,089	3,061	700	650	650	—
Bahamas	196	197	200	200	200	—
Belize	235	1,179	1,250	250	250	—
Brazil	11,619	20,060	19,450	29,800	40,800	+36.9%
Chile	487	553	455	450	450	—
Colombia	421,180	460,183	465,092	484,711	462,875	-4.5%
Costa Rica	8,180	8,225	8,225	8,225	600	-92.7%
Cuba	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	—
Dominican Republic	36,777	28,569	29,405	39,835	37,500	-5.9%
Ecuador	12,000	19,450	23,750	45,562	35,300	-22.5%
El Salvador	39,533	78,865	78,790	99,052	124,800	+26.0%
Guatemala	80,351	95,887	98,049	117,860	162,800	+38.1%
Guyana	176	140	200	200	200	—
Haiti	193,752	172,361	189,577	219,188	274,755	+25.4%
Honduras	56,906	73,365	74,002	108,306	133,450	+23.2%
Jamaica	1,598	8,206	18,071	19,803	7,600	-61.6%
Mexico	162,410	157,910	158,910	128,205	141,575	+10.4%
Nicaragua	11,610	11,323	11,592	16,960	15,000	-11.6%
Panama	1,162	10,131	11,769	12,507	1,225	-90.2%
Paraguay	4,397	4,227	4,400	3,400	4,400	+29.4%
Peru	75,396	78,342	85,535	109,159	109,870	+0.7%
Suriname	195	178	200	200	200	—
Trinidad and Tobago	326	2,058	2,874	1,742	300	-82.8%
Uruguay	385	377	400	350	350	—
Venezuela	22,500	38,452	38,000	48,600	55,000	+13.2%
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean	3,456	5,854	7,700	5,744	19,720	+243.3%
USAID Caribbean Development	4,000	10,000	13,300	14,098	12,000	-14.9%
USAID Central America Regional	4,600	5,000	5,000	35,000	73,085	+108.8%
USAID South America Regional	18,000	15,000	15,000	27,000	28,000	+3.7%

	FY2019	FY2020 ^a	FY2021 ^a	FY2022 (est.)	FY2023 (req.)	% Change: FY22-FY23
USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional	68,300	36,978	45,540	60,447	46,178	-23.6%
State Central America Regional ^b	—	—	—	278,000 ^b	447,765	+61.1%
State Western Hemisphere Regional ^b	431,313	355,610	366,909	102,044 ^b	150,510	+47.5%
[Caribbean Basin Security Initiative]	[58,000]	[60,000]	[74,800]	[80,000]	[63,500]	[-20.6%]
Total	1,694,129	1,721,741^a	1,794,345^a	2,037,548	2,407,408	+18.2%

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2021-FY2023*, at <https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/>; and U.S. Department of State, FY2022 estimate data, August 16, 2022. Caribbean Basin Security Initiative totals for FY2021 and FY2022 are drawn from “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,” *Congressional Record*, vol. 166, no. 218—Book IV (December 21, 2020), p. H8794; and “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. DeLauro, Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 2471, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022,” *Congressional Record*, vol. 168, no. 42—Book IV (March 9, 2022), p. H3007.

Notes: USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives, including the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, as well as activities that cross borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the vast majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries.

- a. FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include assistance made available through supplemental emergency appropriations (P.L. 116-123, P.L. 116-136, or P.L. 117-2) to respond to COVID-19. For information on supplemental aid, see the text box, “U.S. Assistance to Respond to the COVID-19 Pandemic,” above.
- b. The Biden Administration created a new State Department-managed Central America Regional Program in FY2022, which funds the Central America Regional Security Initiative and other activities that were funded through the State Department’s Western Hemisphere regional program in prior years.

Inter-American Foundation

In addition to State Department- and USAID-managed assistance for the region, the Biden Administration requested \$38.0 million for the IAF for FY2023 (see **Table 3**). The IAF is an independent U.S. foreign assistance agency established through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 (22 U.S.C. §290f) to provide grants and other targeted assistance for community-led development efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. Congress created the agency after conducting a comprehensive review of previous assistance activities in the region and determining that programs at the government-to-government level had not promoted significant social and civic change despite fostering economic growth.²³ The IAF is active in 26 countries, including several countries where USAID no longer has field missions.²⁴ The Administration’s FY2023 request would support the IAF’s ongoing efforts to address the root causes of Central American migration, integrate Venezuelans into host communities, spur local economic activity,

²³ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Report on H.R. 14580 to Promote the Foreign Policy, Security, and General Welfare of the United States by Assisting Peoples of the World to Achieve Development Within a Framework of Democratic, Economic, Social, and Political Institutions, and for Other Purposes*, 91st Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1969, H.Rept. 91-611 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), p. 57.

²⁴ Inter-American Foundation (IAF), “Where We Work,” at <https://www.iaf.gov/where-we-work/>.

strengthen food security, promote civic engagement, mitigate chronic violence, build resilience to natural disasters and extreme weather, and advance the social and economic inclusion of historically marginalized populations.

Table 3. Inter-American Foundation (IAF) Appropriations: FY2019-FY2023 Request

(millions of current U.S. dollars)

FY2019	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022 (est.)	FY2023 (req.)	% Change FY22-FY23
22.5	37.5	38.0	38.0	38.0	—

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2021-FY2023*, at <https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/>.

Note: The IAF received an additional \$10.0 million in FY2019 via congressionally directed interagency transfers from USAID for programs in Central America.

Legislative Developments

As of early December 2022, Congress has not concluded action on FY2023 appropriations. In July 2022, the House Appropriations Committee reported its FY2023 SFOPS bill (H.R. 8282/H.Rept. 117-401) and Senator Coons introduced a separate SFOPS bill (S. 4662) in the Senate. Congress has not taken further action on either bill. It passed a continuing resolution (H.R. 6833) on September 30, 2022, that funds foreign aid programs in the region largely at the FY2022 level until December 16, 2022.

Congress may draw from H.R. 8282 and S. 4662 as it considers appropriations for the remainder of the fiscal year. Neither measure would specify comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean country. Nevertheless, the measures would include funding directives (see **Table 4**) and/or restrictions for some U.S. initiatives in the region.

Table 4. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Selected Countries and Initiatives: FY2023 Appropriations Legislation

(millions of current U.S. dollars)

	FY2022 (est.)	FY2023 (req.)	H.R. 8282 and H.Rept. 117-401	S. 4662 and explanatory statement
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative	80.0	63.5	82.0	80.0
Central America	676.2 ^a	986.8 ^a	NA	NA
Colombia	484.7	462.9	487.4	471.4
Haiti	219.2	274.8	NA	NA
Inter-American Foundation	38.0	38.0	47.0	47.0
Mexico	128.2	141.6	NA	NA
Venezuela	48.6	55.0	50.0	40.0

Sources: U.S. Department of State, FY2022 estimate data, August 16, 2022; U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2023, May 9, 2022*; H.R. 8282; H.Rept. 117-401; S. 4662; and the explanatory statement released by the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, at <https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFOPSFY23RPT.pdf>.

Note: NA indicates that comprehensive appropriation totals are not available.

- a. The FY2023 request figure for Central America includes \$27.8 million that would be provided through global accounts. The FY2022 estimate figure for Central America does not include any global funding.

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Both measures would provide more funding for the CBSI than the Administration requested. H.R. 8282 would provide “not less than” \$82.0 million for the CBSI, and the Senate Appropriations Committee chairman’s explanatory statement would recommend “not less than” \$80.0 million for the initiative. H.Rept. 117-401 would direct the Secretary of State to consider Caribbean nations’ equipment needs for responding to natural disasters and combatting transnational crime in the implementation of the initiative. The report also would direct the Secretary to consider using the authority granted under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. §2321j) to transfer excess defense articles to meet such needs.

Central America. Neither bill would stipulate an overall assistance level for Central America. However, H.R. 8282 would designate “not less than” \$100.0 million for locally led development programs in the Northern Triangle, \$75.0 million to reduce violence against women and girls in Central America, \$65.0 million for anti-corruption entities and activities in Central America, and \$15.0 million for democracy programs in Nicaragua. The accompanying report would designate \$126.7 million for Honduras and \$40.7 million for Costa Rica. It also would designate \$50.0 million for the Central America Youth Empowerment Program, which Congress established in FY2022 SFOPS legislation (P.L. 117-103, Division K, §7045(a)(1)(C)) and the Biden Administration rebranded as the Central American Service Corps.²⁵ Some of these activities may overlap. Similar to other SFOPS measures enacted in recent years, the bill would prohibit FMF for the Northern Triangle countries. It also would require the State Department to withhold 60% of ESF and security assistance to support the central governments of the Northern Triangle countries until the Secretary of State certifies that those governments have met a series of conditions related to corruption, human rights, migration, and other congressional concerns.

S. 4662 would designate “not less than” \$70.0 million to reduce violence against women and girls in Central America, \$61.5 million for anti-corruption entities and activities in Central America, and \$15.0 million for democracy programs in Nicaragua. The accompanying explanatory statement would designate \$50.0 million for the Central American Service Corps. The bill would impose aid restrictions similar to those in H.R. 8282, but it would reduce the withholding requirement on aid to the central government of Honduras to 45% and would allow the provision of FMF to the Northern Triangle countries to support disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and maritime security.

Colombia. Both bills would provide slightly more funding for Colombia than the Administration requested. H.R. 8282 would provide \$487.4 million for Colombia, and S. 4662 would provide \$471.4 million. Both measures would designate “not less than” \$40.0 million of the total aid to support activities intended to improve rural security in municipalities with high levels of illicit activities, including coca production.

As in prior years, both bills would require the State Department to withhold some security assistance until the Colombian government meets certain conditions. H.R. 8282 would require the State Department to withhold 30% of INCLE and FMF aid for Colombia until the Secretary of State certifies that the Colombian government has met several human rights conditions. S. 4662 would require the State Department to withhold 20% of INCLE aid to Colombia until the Secretary certifies that the Colombian government is implementing certain counternarcotics

²⁵ White House, “Fact Sheet: Vice President Harris Announces the Central American Service Corps (CASC),” June 7, 2022.

policies and to withhold 20% of FMF and 5% of INCLE to Colombia until the Secretary certifies the Colombian government has met certain human rights conditions.

Haiti. Neither measure would specify a comprehensive appropriation level for Haiti. H.R. 8282 and the accompanying report do not include any Haiti-related funding directives. The Senate Appropriations Committee chairman’s explanatory statement to S. 4662 would designate \$8.5 million for reforestation efforts and “not less than” \$5.0 million to help meet the sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of Haitian prisoners. The explanatory statement also would recommend “not less than” the FY2022 allocation for law enforcement programs for Haiti.

Both bills would require the State Department to withhold aid to the Haitian government until a new president and parliament take office following free and fair elections or a broadly representative transitional government is in place. However, both bills include exceptions for aid to support free and fair elections; disaster relief and recovery; anti-gang police and justice sector activities; and public health, education, and other programs to meet basic human needs.

Inter-American Foundation. Both bills would provide \$47.0 million for the IAF, which would exceed the Administration’s request and prior year appropriations. H.Rept. 117-401 would designate \$1.7 million of the total to expand an economic exchange program between Indigenous IAF grantees and Native American tribes. The report also would recommend that the IAF use the increased funding to address the impacts of COVID-19, facilitate pandemic recovery, and strengthen resilience to future shocks in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mexico. Neither bill would specify a comprehensive appropriation level for Mexico, though H.Rept. 117-401 would designate \$55.0 million of ESF for Mexico. According to H.Rept. 117-401 and the explanatory statement released by the Senate Appropriations Committee chairman, neither measure would provide FMF aid for Mexico and both measures would require the State Department to report to the Appropriations Committees on the extent to which the Mexican government is meeting various human rights conditions prior to obligating any INCLE aid for Mexico.

Venezuela. H.R. 8282 and S. 4662 would designate \$50.0 million and \$40.0 million of ESF, respectively, for democracy programs in Venezuela. Both bills also would direct U.S. agencies to continue providing support to other Latin American and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Neither bill would specifically fund the Administration’s \$5.0 million GHP request for Venezuela.

Looking Ahead

The COVID-19 pandemic eroded more than a decade of development gains in Latin America and the Caribbean, and many countries in the region continue to contend with its direct health impact and related socioeconomic effects. This deterioration in living conditions has contributed to increased political instability and irregular migration throughout the Western Hemisphere, leading the Biden Administration to assert in its National Security Strategy that there is a “direct link between the region’s prosperity and security and that of our own.”²⁶ Congressional decisions regarding foreign assistance appropriations will help determine how the United States responds to challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean and the relative prioritization of U.S. objectives in the region. Congress also could help guide U.S. foreign assistance policy in the region by enacting authorization legislation or using its various oversight mechanisms.

²⁶ White House, *National Security Strategy*, October 2022, p. 40.

Appropriations. In the final weeks of the 117th Congress, Members may conclude action on FY2023 SFOPS appropriations, pass another short-term continuing resolution (or multiple continuing resolutions)—deferring final funding decisions to the 118th Congress—or enact a long-term continuing resolution that would maintain FY2022 funding levels through the end of FY2023. A final FY2023 SFOPS bill would allow Congress to alter foreign assistance funding priorities, directives, and reporting requirements for Latin America and the Caribbean to reflect changes in the region and in U.S. policy over the past year. It also would provide clarity to U.S. agencies on funding levels as they plan and implement activities over the remaining nine months of the fiscal year. A continuing resolution would be less likely to modify funding levels or policy toward the region but could keep existing programs running in the absence of congressional agreement on potential changes.

Authorizations. In addition to appropriating assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean, Congress could shape longer-term U.S. foreign assistance policy toward the region with authorization legislation. Although Congress has not enacted a comprehensive foreign assistance authorization since 1985 (P.L. 99-83), it occasionally has authorized specific aid programs or initiatives. In the 117th Congress, the House approved the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act (H.R. 4133), which would authorize \$74.8 million to be appropriated for the CBSI annually in FY2022 through FY2026 and would establish specific objectives, priorities, and reporting requirements for the initiative; the Senate has not considered the measure. A variety of other bills introduced in the 117th Congress would authorize funding and/or set policy objectives for U.S. foreign assistance programs in Central America (e.g., H.R. 1177/S. 348; H.R. 4017/S. 2003; and H.R. 6637); no legislative action has been taken on those measures.

Oversight. Looking ahead, the 118th Congress could consider whether to exercise increased oversight of U.S. assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as of the executive branch agencies that administer those programs. If Congress chooses to pursue increased oversight of this aid, committees could hold hearings and Members could conduct fact-finding missions to the region to assess major U.S. initiatives, such as the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America; the CBSI; the evolving U.S. security partnership with Colombia; and the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities. Such efforts could examine the extent to which those initiatives are meeting their stated objectives and what changes, if any, could make them more effective.

Appendix. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Account and by Country or Regional Program: FY2021-FY2023 Request

Table A-1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021

(millions of current U.S. dollars)

	DA	ESF	GHP- USAID	GHP- State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
Argentina	—	—	—	—	0.1	—	0.6	—	0.7
Bahamas	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Belize	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	1.0	1.3
Brazil	17.0	—	—	1.8	—	—	0.7	—	19.5
Chile	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.5	—	0.5
Colombia	70.0	141.0	2.0	1.7	189.0	21.0	1.9	38.5	465.1
Costa Rica	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	7.5	8.2
Cuba	—	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	20.0
Dominican Republic	5.6	—	—	23.3	—	—	0.5	—	29.4
Ecuador	11.5	—	—	—	7.0	—	0.3	5.0	23.8
El Salvador	70.0	—	—	8.1	—	—	0.7	—	78.8
Guatemala	65.7	—	13.0	18.6	—	—	0.8	—	98.0
Guyana	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Haiti	52.0	—	24.5	99.8	13.0	—	0.3	—	189.6
Honduras	65.0	—	—	8.3	—	—	0.8	—	74.0
Jamaica	2.0	—	—	15.5	—	—	0.6	—	18.1
Mexico	—	50.0	—	—	100.0	1.2	1.8	6.0	158.9
Nicaragua	10.0	—	—	1.6	—	—	—	—	11.6
Panama	—	—	—	8.6	—	0.5	0.7	2.0	11.8
Paraguay	4.0	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	4.4
Peru	43.0	—	—	1.9	39.0	1.0	0.6	—	85.5
Suriname	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Trinidad and Tobago	—	—	—	2.6	—	—	0.3	—	2.9
Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	0.4
Venezuela	—	33.0	5.0	—	—	—	—	—	38.0
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean	7.0	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	—	7.7
USAID Caribbean Development ^a	13.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13.3

	DA	ESF	GHP- USAID	GHP- State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
USAID Central America ^a	5.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.0
USAID South America ^a	15.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15.0
USAID Latin America and Caribbean ^a	34.5	—	11.0	—	—	—	—	—	45.5
State Western Hemisphere ^a	—	134.5	—	3.2	204.9	7.4	—	16.9	366.9
[Caribbean Basin Security Initiative] ^a	[—]	[32.3]	[—]	[—]	[35.0]	[—]	[—]	[7.5]	[74.8]
Total	490.6	378.5^b	55.5	195.0	553.0	31.0	13.8	76.9	1,794.3^b

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2023, May 9, 2022.*

Notes: These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; GHP = Global Health Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = U.S. Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development.

- a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
- b. This amount does not include an additional \$5.0 million of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in FY2021 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.

Table A-2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Estimate
(millions of current U.S. dollars)

	DA	ESF	GHP- USAID	GHP- State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
Argentina	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	—	0.7
Bahamas	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Belize	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	0.3
Brazil	25.0	—	4.0	—	—	—	0.8	—	29.8
Chile	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.5	—	0.5
Colombia	80.0	141.0	9.0	2.9	189.0	21.0	1.9	40.0	484.7
Costa Rica	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	7.5	8.2
Cuba	—	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	20.0
Dominican Republic	18.0	—	—	21.3	—	—	0.5	—	39.8
Ecuador	27.0	—	—	—	13.3	—	0.3	5.0	45.6
El Salvador	84.0	—	4.0	10.3	—	—	0.8	—	99.1
Guatemala	85.5	—	19.0	12.6	—	—	0.8	—	117.9

	DA	ESF	GHP- USAID	GHP- State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
Guyana	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Haiti	56.0	5.5	24.5	103.1	30.0	—	0.1	—	219.2
Honduras	95.0	—	5.0	7.5	—	—	0.8	—	108.3
Jamaica	2.0	—	4.0	13.2	—	—	0.6	—	19.8
Mexico	4.0	57.8	—	—	64.0	1.2	1.3	—	128.2
Nicaragua	15.0	—	—	2.0	—	—	—	—	17.0
Panama	—	—	—	11.3	—	0.5	0.7	—	12.5
Paraguay	3.0	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	3.4
Peru	45.7	—	6.0	2.0	47.8	1.0	0.7	6.0	109.2
Suriname	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Trinidad and Tobago	—	—	—	1.4	—	—	0.3	—	1.7
Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	0.4
Venezuela	—	40.0	5.0	3.6	—	—	—	—	48.6
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean	5.0	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	—	5.7
USAID Caribbean Development ^a	7.6	6.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	14.1
USAID Central America ^a	33.0	2.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	35.0
USAID South America ^a	27.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	27.0
USAID Latin America and Caribbean ^a	43.8	5.7	11.0	—	—	—	—	—	60.4
State Central America ^a	—	111.0	—	—	155.0	2.0	—	10.0	278.0
State Western Hemisphere ^a	—	43.0	—	0.2	42.4	6.5	—	10.0	102.0
<i>[Caribbean Basin Security Initiative]^a</i>	<i>[—]</i>	<i>[35.0]</i>	<i>[—]</i>	<i>[—]</i>	<i>[35.0]</i>	<i>[—]</i>	<i>[—]</i>	<i>[10.0]</i>	<i>[80.0]</i>
Total	656.5	432.4^b	91.5	191.3	541.5	32.1	13.7	78.5	2,037.5^b

Source: U.S. Department of State, FY2022 estimate data, August 16, 2022.

Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; GHP = Global Health Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = U.S. Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development.

- a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
- b. This amount does not include an additional \$5.0 million of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in FY2022 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.

Table A-3. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2023 Request

(millions of current U.S. dollars)

	DA	ESF	GHP- USAID	GHP- State	INCLE	NADR	IMET	FMF	Total
Argentina	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	—	0.7
Bahamas	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Belize	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	0.3
Brazil	35.0	—	5.0	—	—	—	0.8	—	40.8
Chile	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.5	—	0.5
Colombia	72.0	156.0	10.0	—	175.0	10.0	1.9	38.0	462.9
Costa Rica	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.6	—	0.6
Cuba	—	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	20.0
Dominican Republic	17.0	—	—	20.0	—	—	0.5	—	37.5
Ecuador	16.0	—	—	—	13.0	1.0	0.3	5.0	35.3
El Salvador	119.0	—	5.0	—	—	—	0.8	—	124.8
Guatemala	138.0	—	24.0	—	—	—	0.8	—	162.8
Guyana	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Haiti	111.0	—	34.5	100.0	29.0	—	0.3	—	274.8
Honduras	126.7	—	6.0	—	—	—	0.8	—	133.5
Jamaica	2.0	—	5.0	—	—	—	0.6	—	7.6
Mexico	—	75.0	—	—	64.0	1.0	1.6	—	141.6
Nicaragua	15.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15.0
Panama	—	—	—	—	—	0.5	0.7	—	1.2
Paraguay	4.0	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	4.4
Peru	53.0	—	8.0	—	46.2	2.0	0.7	—	109.9
Suriname	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.2
Trinidad and Tobago	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	0.3
Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	0.4
Venezuela	—	50.0	5.0	—	—	—	—	—	55.0
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean	19.0	—	—	—	—	—	0.7	—	19.7
USAID Caribbean Development ^a	12.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12.0
USAID Central America ^a	73.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	73.1
USAID South America ^a	28.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	28.0
USAID Latin America and Caribbean ^a	25.2	10.0	11.0	—	—	—	—	—	46.2

State Central America ^a	—	169.0	—	43.6	219.7	5.0	—	10.5	447.8	
State Western Hemisphere ^a	—	55.5	—	26.4	36.0	12.6	—	20.0	150.5	
[Caribbean Basin Security Initiative] ^a	[—]	[27.0]	[—]	[—]	[29.0]	[—]	[—]	[7.5]	[63.5]	
Total		865.9	535.5	113.5	190.0	582.9	32.1	14.0	73.5	2,407.4

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2023, May 9, 2022.*

Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; State = U.S. Department of State; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development.

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Author Information

Peter J. Meyer
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs

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