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## Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues

U.S. policy toward Taiwan (which officially calls itself the Republic of China or ROC, Taiwan) has long prioritized the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The United States supports Taiwan’s efforts to deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) from using force to gain control of the archipelago, which the PRC claims as its territory. Increasingly, the U.S. government has sought to strengthen its own ability to deter PRC military aggression in Asia. Congress has passed several laws aimed at strengthening U.S.-Taiwan defense ties. A key challenge for U.S. policymakers is supporting Taiwan’s defense without triggering the conflict that U.S. policy seeks to prevent. For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10275, *Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations*.

with the United States also confers political and military advantages.

Taiwan faces an increasingly asymmetric power balance across the Strait, however. The Communist Party of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has undergone a decades-long modernization program focused primarily on developing the capabilities needed to annex Taiwan. Some observers assess that the PLA is, or soon will be, able to execute a range of military campaigns against Taiwan. The PLA trains for operations such as missile strikes, seizures of Taiwan’s small outlying islands, blockades, and—the riskiest and most challenging campaign for the PLA—an amphibious landing and takeover of Taiwan’s main island.

Figure 1. Taiwan



Source: Graphic by CRS.

### Taiwan’s Security Situation

Taiwan’s technologically-advanced military is tasked with deterring—and if necessary, defeating—PRC military aggression. Taiwan enjoys strategic advantages, including geography and climate. The Taiwan Strait is 70 nautical miles (nm) wide at its narrowest point, and 220 nm wide at its widest. Weather conditions make the Strait perilous to navigate at certain times of the year. Taiwan’s mountainous terrain and densely populated coast are largely unsuitable for amphibious landing and invasion operations. Taiwan’s leaders since 2017 have grown the defense budget; from 2019 to 2023, spending increased by an average of nearly 5% per year, and as a percentage of GDP increased from 2% to 2.5%. Defense spending is set to increase again in 2024, albeit at a slower rate. To increase readiness, Taiwan’s leaders announced plans to extend compulsory military service from four months to a year and to expand civil defense capabilities. Taiwan’s defense relationship

Taiwan also faces defense challenges at home. Civil-military relations are strained for historical, political, and bureaucratic reasons. The archipelago’s energy, food, water, internet, and other critical infrastructure systems are vulnerable to external disruption. According to some observers, Taiwan’s civil defense preparedness is insufficient, and its military struggles to recruit, retain, and train personnel. At a societal level, it is not clear what costs—in terms of economic security, physical safety and security, and lives—Taiwan’s people would be willing or able to bear in the face of possible PRC armed aggression.

U.S. officials have said a PRC invasion of Taiwan is “neither imminent nor inevitable.” In 2023, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Burns said PRC leader Xi Jinping had instructed the PLA “to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion. Now that does not mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion in 2027 or any other year. But it’s a reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition.” Previously, some U.S. officials had cited specific years in the mid-2020s as possible target dates for an attack, renewing U.S. debates about how to allocate limited resources to shore up Taiwan’s resilience.

### PRC Gray Zone Pressure Against Taiwan

The PLA engages in persistent non-combat operations that some analysts say are eroding Taiwan’s military advantages and readiness. Such “gray zone” actions include:

- large and increasingly complex exercises near Taiwan;
- near-daily air operations in the vicinity of Taiwan, including frequent sorties across the so-called “median line,” an informal north-south line bisecting the Strait that PLA aircraft rarely crossed prior to 2022;
- routine naval patrols across the median line, some as close as 24 nm from Taiwan’s main island; and
- unmanned combat aerial vehicle flights near and encircling Taiwan, and reported flights of unmanned

aerial vehicles in the airspace of Kinmen, an outlying island administered by Taiwan near the PRC coast.

The PRC government often ramps up such activities following high-profile engagements between senior U.S. policymakers (including Members of Congress) and Taiwan leaders. The PRC claims that the United States uses Taiwan as a “pawn” to undermine and contain China.

The normalization of PLA operations ever closer to Taiwan’s islands in peacetime could undermine Taipei’s ability to assess whether the PLA is using “routine” operations or exercises to obscure preparations for an attack. PLA use of such operations as cover for an attack could significantly shorten the time Taiwan has to respond.

Gray zone activities also provide the PLA with training and intelligence gathering opportunities. They strain Taiwan’s forces, which face growing operational and maintenance costs associated with responding to PLA activities. Beijing also could be using coercive but nonviolent operations to sow doubt in Taiwan’s people about Taiwan’s military capabilities and to create political pressure for Taipei to acquiesce to Beijing’s insistence on unification.

## U.S. Support for Taiwan’s Defense

The United States has maintained unofficial defense ties with Taiwan since 1980, when President Carter terminated a 1954 U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty. (The United States agreed to withdraw its military personnel from Taiwan the year before). The robust defense relationship includes arms transfers; routine bilateral defense dialogues and planning; and training activities in both the United States and Taiwan. Experts assess that U.S.-Taiwan defense relations have substantially contributed to Taiwan’s ability to deter PRC military aggression.

### U.S. Strategy and Policy

The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §3301 et seq.) was the first law to provide a legal basis for U.S. support for Taiwan’s defense following the termination of diplomatic relations. Among other things, the TRA states that it is U.S. policy to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”

The TRA does not require the United States to defend Taiwan, but by stating it is U.S. policy to maintain the capacity to do so, the TRA creates “strategic ambiguity” about potential U.S. actions in the event of a PRC attack. Some observers, including some Members of Congress, advocate making a formal commitment to defend Taiwan. Supporters of a shift to “strategic clarity” argue such clarity is necessary to deter an increasingly capable and assertive PRC. Supporters of strategic ambiguity argue the long-standing policy encourages restraint by Beijing and Taipei and incentivizes Taipei to invest more in its own defense.

Successive U.S. administrations have encouraged Taiwan to pursue an “asymmetric” strategy to make it prohibitively costly for the PRC to annex Taiwan by force. This approach envisions Taiwan investing in capabilities intended to

cripple an amphibious invasion through a combination of anti-ship missiles, naval mines, and other similarly small, distributable, and relatively inexpensive weapons systems. Taiwan’s government has adopted this approach to some extent, but some (including many stakeholders in Taiwan’s defense establishment) argue that Taiwan must continue to invest in conventional capabilities (e.g., fighter jets and large warships) to deter PRC gray zone coercion short of an invasion. Uncertainty as to whether, how, and for how long Washington might aid Taiwan in the event of an attack informs these debates.

### Arms Transfers

Over the past seven decades, Taiwan has consistently been one of the largest purchasers of U.S. defense equipment through the **Foreign Military Sales** (FMS) process. For the period FY2020-FY2022, Taiwan was the largest purchaser of U.S. defense equipment through FMS.

Some observers argue Taiwan’s military is insufficiently equipped to defeat a PRC armed attack. Further, some observers argue the war in Ukraine has revealed problems with the U.S. defense industrial base, raising concerns about defense suppliers’ ability to produce and deliver weapons to Taiwan in a timely fashion. In part as a response to these concerns, Congress recently took steps to increase and expedite arms transfers to Taiwan, including:

- The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA; Title LV, Subtitle A of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263) for the first time authorized the provision of **Foreign Military Financing** (FMF; essentially, loans or grants a foreign government may use to purchase U.S. arms) for Taiwan: up to \$2 billion a year in direct loans and loan guarantees and up to \$2 billion a year in grant assistance through FY2027. Although the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328) did not appropriate funds for the grant assistance (and Taiwan declined the loan), the State Department in 2023 notified Congress of its intent to obligate \$135 million for FMF programs for Taiwan from other authorizations.
- TERA amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(3)) to make **Presidential Drawdown Authority** available to Taiwan, authorizing the provision to Taiwan of up to \$1 billion annually in defense articles, services, and education and from U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) stocks. In July 2023, the Biden Administration notified Congress of its intent to exercise this authority to transfer \$345 million of defense equipment to Taiwan.
- The FY2024 NDAA (Sec. 1242) authorized **temporary acquisition flexibilities** to streamline DOD’s and the defense industrial base’s procurement and replenishment of certain munitions bound for Taiwan.

Senate-passed H.R. 815 and House-introduced H.R. 7372 would appropriate \$1.9 billion for the replacement of DOD stocks and reimbursement of DOD military education and training provided to Taiwan or to countries that “provided support to Taiwan at the request of the United States.”

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