



Ecuador's April 2024 Plebiscite on Security Measures: Implications for Congress

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On April 21, 2024, Ecuador is scheduled to hold a plebiscite on 11 proposed reforms that seek to address Ecuador's ongoing security crisis. President Daniel Noboa, who took office for a 17-month term in November 2023 following a snap election, has proposed five measures that would make changes to the country's constitution and six measures that would prompt legal reforms to be made through Ecuador's parliament. A majority of the questions are aimed at increasing the government's ability to fight organized crime and corruption, including whether to formalize the armed forces' role in public security functions and enable the extradition of Ecuadorian citizens.

Congress has acted to strengthen security cooperation and broader bilateral ties with Ecuador, including through the United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-263, Division E, Subtitle B). Some Members of Congress also have expressed concern about the deteriorating security climate in Ecuador and offered statements of support to the Ecuadorian government. As Congress continues to monitor the U.S.-Ecuador partnership, it may assess the results of the upcoming plebiscite and their implications for bilateral security cooperation.

Ecuador's Security Situation

Since 2020, Ecuador has experienced a surge in organized crime-related violence as local gangs affiliated with Mexican, Colombian, and Balkan transnational criminal organizations have competed for control of drug trafficking routes to ship cocaine to markets outside South America. The homicide rate in Ecuador reportedly increased by over 500% from 2019 to 2023, reaching 44.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, amid a historic increase in cocaine seizures. Some political figures and government officials have been assassinated, including a 2023 presidential candidate, an anti-crime prosecutor, and local politicians.

In January 2024, President Noboa declared a state of emergency and "internal armed conflict," limiting some constitutional rights, designating 22 criminal groups as terrorist organizations, and enabling the armed forces to carry out law enforcement operations, among other actions. The state of emergency expired on April 8, ending some extraordinary measures, but a court order determined the armed forces may continue to perform public security functions indefinitely. During the state of emergency, security forces conducted over 272,000 operations, resulting in over 18,700 arrests. Some analysts assess these

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https://crsreports.congress.gov IN12348 efforts have had mixed results, as homicide rates have declined while other crimes (such as kidnapping) have increased; some local human rights groups have accused security personnel of using excessive force.

The Noboa administration is seeking additional policy changes through the plebiscite to increase the government's ability to counter organized crime. The constitutional and legal reforms under consideration include whether to formalize the armed forces' role in public security functions; enable the extradition of Ecuadorian citizens; and increase sentencing for crimes such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and others. Some critics have argued that the proposed measures would not alleviate the country's problems and the plebiscite does not justify its estimated \$60 million cost. An opinion poll conducted in early April 2024 found that 67% of those surveyed approved of the Noboa administration and 43% planned to support the plebiscite's proposed reforms, while 28% of voters remained undecided.

Implications for U.S. Policy and Congress

Ecuador's plebiscite could have several implications for U.S. policy goals and bilateral relations. For example, a proposed measure that would allow for the extradition of Ecuadorian nationals wanted for crimes in other countries could enhance U.S.-Ecuadorian law enforcement cooperation. The United States and Ecuador agreed to bilateral extradition treaties in 1872 and 1939, but Ecuador prohibited the extradition of its nationals when the current constitution was adopted in 2008. A similar proposal failed in a 2023 plebiscite, which some analysts attributed in part to the previous administration's political standing. Enabling extradition could increase the likelihood that criminals wanted in the United States are brought to justice, given that Ecuador's security forces have struggled to control the country's prisons, resulting in several high-profile prisoner escapes. If the reform passes, Congress could monitor how the Biden Administration approaches extradition activities with Ecuador and assess whether the U.S.-Ecuador extradition treaty framework should be updated.

Other proposed measures could lead U.S. agencies to reexamine how they engage with their Ecuadorian counterparts. For example, one reform would formalize the Ecuadorian armed forces' role in supporting the national police to counter organized crime, terrorism, and other crimes. Similar policy changes elsewhere in Latin America allegedly have been followed by human rights abuses in some cases. If adopted, Congress could monitor implementation of the reform and consider policy options to enhance the capacity of Ecuador's security forces while safeguarding human rights.

Congress could evaluate how the plebiscite results might affect the objectives of the U.S.-Ecuador Partnership Act. Among other actions, the act directed the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, to develop and implement a strategy and related programs "to increase the capacity of Ecuador's justice system and law enforcement authorities to combat illicit economies, corruption, transnational criminal organizations, and the harmful influence of malign foreign and domestic actors." The act directed the agencies to report to selected congressional committees on their progress "no[t] later than 2 years and 4 years after submitting" the strategy.

Congress also could consider the results of the plebiscite and the broader security situation in Ecuador when making funding decisions. Consecutive U.S. presidential Administrations have sought to increase U.S. support to strengthen Ecuador's security forces and counter organized crime in the country. According to a joint statement following the U.S.-Ecuador High-Level Dialogue in March 2024, the United States has provided Ecuador with over \$42 million in "capacity building, training, and equipment" since 2019 and plans to provide an additional \$10 million in "counternarcotics, civilian security, and rule of law programming," subject to completion of congressional notification procedures." In addition to evaluating potential executive branch obligations, Congress may assess the Biden Administration's FY2025 budget request for Ecuador, which would provide \$49.2 million in bilateral assistance, including \$15 million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding to build Ecuador's

capacity to fight transnational organized crime. Some experts have called for a more robust U.S. assistance plan for Ecuador.

Author Information

Joshua Klein Analyst in Foreign Affairs

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