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Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: In Brief

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Introduction

In 2022, the Biden Administration submitted to Congress four emergency supplemental funding requests to address the crisis caused by Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine. Congress, in turn, passed four emergency supplemental measures—the March 2022 Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (FY2022 USAA; P.L. 117-103, Div. N); the May 2022 Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (FY2022 AUSAA; P.L. 117-128); the September 2022 Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023 (FY2023 USAA; P.L. 117-180, Div. B); and the December 2022 Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023 (FY2023 AUSAA; P.L. 117-328, Div. M). In 2023, the Administration submitted to Congress two requests for FY2024 emergency supplemental funds for the U.S. response in Ukraine. Congress enacted the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, as Division B of P.L. 118-50 in April 2024.

In total, Congress has appropriated \$174.2 billion for supplemental funding for Ukraine in FY2022, FY2023, and FY2024. Such funding has supported foreign assistance for Ukraine and other countries affected by the war, U.S. European Command operations and related support for the U.S. military, and administration and operations of other U.S. government agencies that have responded to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, including funding for legal enforcement, sanctions implementation, and Ukrainian refugee and entrant assistance.

Of the total amount appropriated for supplemental funding for Ukraine since 2022, Congress has appropriated \$58.4 billion (approximately 34%) for Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) accounts. SFOPS funding has supported a range of activities, including direct financial support for the Government of Ukraine, humanitarian assistance, security assistance, and civilian agency operations in support of program administration and oversight.

This report focuses on requested and appropriated funding for SFOPS appropriations accounts and replaces CRS Insight IN11877, *Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)*.¹

For more information on security assistance to Ukraine, including the use of presidential drawdown authority, see CRS In Focus IF12040, *U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine*. For CRS coverage on other issues relating to Russia’s war against Ukraine, see CRS Report R47054, *Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Related CRS Products*.

FY2022 Emergency Supplemental Requests and Appropriations

March 2022 Request and FY2022 USAA

On March 2, 2022, the Biden Administration submitted to Congress a request for \$5 billion in emergency supplemental funding for SFOPS appropriations accounts to address the crisis caused by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.² Such funds were requested as part of a broader package

¹ For CRS coverage of regular SFOPS appropriations for FY2022, FY2023, and FY2024 see CRS Report R46935, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2022 Budget and Appropriations*, CRS Report R47070, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2023 Budget and Appropriations*, and CRS Report R47579, *Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2024 Budget and Appropriations*.

² See letter from OMB Acting Director Shalanda Young to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, at (continued...)

that would have provided a total of \$10 billion for Ukraine and \$22.5 billion for response activities related to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

The \$5 billion for SFOPS was requested among four appropriations accounts to “bolster U.S. security and economic assistance to Ukraine as well as regional allies and partners” and to “support lifesaving humanitarian assistance, including emergency food assistance, and additional support for vulnerable populations and communities.” The Administration also proposed increased flexibility for SFOPS funding through changes to existing authorities, new transfer authorities to move funds between SFOPS accounts, and authority to reprogram (i.e., to move funds within an account) both FY2022 and prior-year funds. The Administration asserted that these changes would afford it “maximum flexibility in supporting Ukraine, our European allies and partners, and other emergent global needs.”

Congress enacted the FY2022 USAA on March 15, 2022. The measure included a total of \$13.6 billion, \$6.8 billion of which was for 12 SFOPS appropriations accounts (**Table 1**).³ The legislation also included certain new authorities, primarily related to Presidential Drawdown Authority and other security assistance (**Table 2**).⁴ SFOPS funds were appropriated to support a range of activities in Ukraine and “in countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.” The majority of the \$6.8 billion (60%) was enacted for humanitarian assistance, including “the provision of emergency food and shelter,” both for displaced Ukrainians and “for other vulnerable populations and communities.”⁵ The remaining SFOPS funds comprised economic assistance—including direct financial support for the government of Ukraine—security assistance, and support to U.S. government agencies responding to the war.

April 2022 Request and FY2022 AUSAA

The Administration’s April 28 request to Congress called for \$14.76 billion in emergency supplemental funding for SFOPS accounts, out of a total of \$33 billion sought for Ukraine and the region.⁶ The SFOPS request included funding for purposes beyond the March 2 request, including to “help food insecure countries around the world” and to “work through the international financial institutions to support Ukraine and other countries impacted by the crisis.” As with the March 2 request, the Administration also proposed amending certain authorities.

Congress enacted the FY2022 AUSAA on May 21, 2022. The \$40.1 billion measure included \$18.946 billion for SFOPS appropriations accounts (**Table 1**), as well as certain new authorities, similar to those provided in the FY2022 USAA (**Table 2**).⁷ Nearly half of the appropriated

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/COVID-and-Ukraine-Supplemental-Funding-Request-Pelosi.pdf>.

³ The FY2022 USAA also included \$6.5 billion for Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations accounts, \$100 million for Food for Peace international food aid, and about \$172 million in funding for administration and operations of other U.S. government agencies that have responded to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

⁴ For more on Presidential Drawdown Authority and security assistance provided for Ukraine, see CRS In Focus IF12040, *U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine*, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt.

⁵ For more on the humanitarian and refugee crisis caused by the war, see CRS Insight IN11882, *Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis in Ukraine*, by Rhoda Margesson and Derek E. Mix.

⁶ See letter from OMB Acting Director Shalanda Young to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/FY_2022_Emergency_Supplemental_Assistance-to-Ukraine_4.28.2022.pdf.

⁷ The FY2022 AUSAA also included \$20.1 billion for DOD appropriations accounts, \$900 million for carrying out U.S. refugee and entrant assistance activities in support of Ukrainian nationals, and \$195 million in funding for administration and operations of other U.S. government agencies that have responded to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

SFOPS funds were for the Economic Support Fund (ESF), including direct financial support for the government of Ukraine.⁸ A portion of ESF was also designated “to prevent and respond to food insecurity,” in addition to emergency food assistance provided via humanitarian assistance accounts.⁹ Humanitarian and security assistance each comprised nearly a quarter of the appropriated SFOPS funds; the remaining funding was appropriated for U.S. government agencies responding to the war and selected multilateral efforts.

FY2023 Emergency Supplemental Requests and Appropriations

September 2022 Request and FY2023 USAA

In its September 2 Continuing Resolution (CR) Appropriations Issues transmittal to Congress, the Administration requested a total of \$13.7 billion for “Critical Needs in Ukraine,” including \$4.5 billion in SFOPS funding in the form of ESF for direct financial support to Ukraine.¹⁰ The transmittal also included requested anomalies for the potential CR, as well as supplemental funding for COVID-19, mpox, and domestic disaster assistance.¹¹ In addition to the proposed funding, the SFOPS request for Ukraine included amending certain authorities, such as a proposed expansion of countries eligible for Foreign Military Financing funding beyond NATO countries.

Congress enacted the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023 (FY2023 USAA; P.L. 117-180, Div. B), on September 30, 2022, as part of the FY2023 CR that funds the government through December 16, 2022. The measure provides the requested \$4.5 billion in ESF for direct financial support for Ukraine (**Table 1**),¹² out of a total of \$12.3 billion, as well as one of the requested authorities (**Table 2**).¹³

November 2022 Request and FY2023 AUSAA

On November 15, the Administration submitted to Congress a request for \$37.7 billion in FY2023 emergency supplemental funding for Ukraine.¹⁴ The transmittal also included a proposed \$10 billion for the COVID-19 pandemic and other public and global health activities. Of the

⁸ Unlike in the FY2022 USAA, which noted the use of direct financial support in the ESF appropriation itself, the FY2022 AUSAA made such funds available in the General Provisions: Section 507(a) stated that ESF funds “may be made available for direct financial support for the Government of Ukraine, and such funds shall be matched, to the maximum extent practicable, by sources other than the United States Government.”

⁹ In a June 2022 Fact Sheet, the State Department noted, “The U.S. Government is investing \$760 million to combat the effects of high food, fuel, and fertilizer prices – now being driven up by Putin’s war – in those countries that need it most.” U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, “President Biden and G7 Leaders Announce Further Efforts to Counter Putin’s Attack on Food Security,” press release, June 28, 2022.

¹⁰ Office of Management and Budget, *FY 2023 Continuing Resolution (CR) Appropriations Issues*, September 2, 2022.

¹¹ The World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention announced changing monkeypox terminology to mpox in November 2022.

¹² Notably, Section 1302(a) directs that ESF funds “shall” be made available for direct financial support for the Government of Ukraine. In the FY2022 USAA and AUSAA, Congress directed that such funds “may” be made available. According to the House Office of the Legislative Counsel, “The term ‘shall’ means that an action is required; the term ‘may’ means that it is permitted but not required.” House Office of the Legislative Counsel, Drafting Legislation, at <https://legcounsel.house.gov/holc-guide-legislative-drafting#VIIB>.

¹³ Additional funds were provided in the FY2023 USAA for DOD (\$7.8 billion) and Department of Energy (\$35 million) appropriations accounts.

¹⁴ See letter from OMB Director Shalanda Young to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Attachment 2. Ukraine Assistance Needs at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/FY-2023-Supplemental-funding-request-for-COVID-19-and-Ukraine.pdf>.

funds requested for the Ukraine response, the Administration requested \$14.5 billion for SFOPS accounts. The Administration requested the majority of SFOPS funding—\$13.045 billion—for the Economic Support Fund to support a range of activities. These activities include direct budget support (\$9.9 billion), economic stabilization and recovery (\$1.5 billion), and energy security (\$1.1 billion), among others. Other SFOPS funds were requested for security assistance (\$905 million), humanitarian assistance (\$500 million), and the Transition Initiatives program (\$50 million). As with prior requests, the Administration also proposed amending certain authorities, including those related to Presidential Drawdown Authority and other security assistance (**Table 2**). The Administration argued that such authorities would increase its flexibility to “match resources with evolving needs.”

Congress enacted the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023 (FY2023 AUSAA; P.L. 117-328, Div. M) as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023. The FY2023 AUSAA includes a total of \$47.3 billion, of which \$16.565 billion is for SFOPS accounts (**Table 1**). The legislation also included certain new authorities, primarily related to Presidential Drawdown Authority and other security assistance (**Table 2**). The majority (80%) of appropriated SFOPS funds were for economic assistance through the Economic Support Fund and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia accounts; Congress directed that such funds may be made available for direct financial support to the Government of Ukraine. The remaining SFOPS funds were for humanitarian and transition assistance (15%), security assistance (3%), and agency operations and oversight (1%).

In addition to amounts Congress has designated for Ukraine and countries and populations affected by the war in Ukraine, FY2023 AUSAA includes funds that may be used for other populations. For example, of the \$937.9 million appropriated for International Disaster Assistance, not less than \$300 million is to be made available “to respond to humanitarian needs in Ukraine and in countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine ... and for assistance for other vulnerable populations and communities.” Presumably, this structure would allow USAID to use the remaining funds in the account (up to \$637.9 million) for disaster responses not related to the war in Ukraine. A similar structure was used for the Diplomatic Programs, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement accounts.

FY2024 Emergency Supplemental Requests and Appropriations

August 2023 Request

On August 10, 2023, the Administration submitted to Congress a request for nearly \$24 billion in FY2024 emergency supplemental funding for Ukraine and other international needs, of which \$7.55 billion would be for SFOPS accounts to address Ukraine and countries affected by the war in Ukraine.¹⁵ The Administration noted that such funds would be critical to sustain the U.S. response in Ukraine through the first three months of the fiscal year. The transmittal also included proposed funds for other international needs, such as multilateral assistance, as well as those related to the U.S. border and migration, of which \$3.5 billion would be for SFOPS accounts. Of the SFOPS funds requested for the Ukraine response, the Administration requested nearly half—\$3.36 billion—for the Economic Support Fund for “three additional months of direct budget

¹⁵ See letter from OMB Director Shalanda Young to Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, Attachment 1. Ukraine and Other International Needs at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Final-Supplemental-Funding-Request-Letter-and-Technical-Materials.pdf>.

support to Ukraine, and \$50 million for global food security programming.”¹⁶ Other requested SFOPS funding for the Ukraine response would support the Administration’s humanitarian (\$2.0 billion), security assistance (\$1.16 billion), transition and development (\$804 million), and diplomatic (\$28 million) priorities. The Administration also requested a new Countering Russian Malign Actors in Africa Fund that would seek to increase security assistance, bolster democratic institutions, and counter disinformation in African countries deemed vulnerable to Russian influence, in particular that from the Wagner Group (**Table 1**). As with prior SFOPS supplemental requests for U.S. assistance for Ukraine, the Administration also proposed amending certain authorities, including those related to Presidential Drawdown Authority and other security assistance (**Table 2**).¹⁷

October 2023 Request and the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024

On October 20, the Administration submitted to Congress a request for \$106 billion in FY2024 emergency supplemental funding for four stated priorities: (1) supporting Israel in the wake of the Hamas attacks; (2) continuing U.S. support for Ukraine “as it defends its sovereignty”; (3) investing in deterrence in the Indo-Pacific; and (4) bolstering security at the U.S. Southwest border.¹⁸ Of the requested funds, \$16.30 billion was requested for SFOPS accounts to address Ukraine and countries affected by the war in Ukraine.¹⁹ The Administration also proposed a total of \$9.15 billion for humanitarian assistance accounts, but it did not designate how much of such funds would be used for Ukraine and vulnerable populations affected by the war in Ukraine versus needs related to “Israel and in areas impacted by the situation in the West Bank and Gaza” (**Table 1**).²⁰ Proposed funding would aim to provide support through the end of FY2024, though it was unclear whether the request was meant to replace or add to the August 10 request (FY2025 budget materials later referred only to the October request, suggesting it was a replacement).

As with the August 10 request, nearly half—\$11.78 billion—of the funds requested for the Ukraine response were for the Economic Support Fund for direct financial support for the Government of Ukraine. According to the Administration, the proposed funding would provide “a glidepath from \$1.1 billion per month in direct budget support to \$825 million per month,” which reflects an estimate of Ukraine’s financing gap for 2024 and takes into account contributions from other donors, including the European Union and Japan.²¹ Other requested SFOPS funding for the Ukraine response would support the Administration’s recovery and development (\$2.25 billion), security assistance (\$2.16 billion), and diplomatic priorities (\$60 million). As with prior SFOPS

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 31. The Administration also requested that \$10 million in ESF be made available for transfer to USAID’s Operating Expenses account “to support critical operational requirements, including staffing and associated support in Ukraine and the region.”

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 39-42.

¹⁸ See letter from OMB Director Shalanda Young to the Honorable Patrick McHenry, pp. 1-3, at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Letter-regarding-critical-national-security-funding-needs-for-FY-2024.pdf>.

¹⁹ Ibid, Attachment 3: Humanitarian Assistance.

²⁰ This approach is common for both Administration requests and appropriations for humanitarian assistance accounts. Funding for such accounts is historically requested and appropriated as a lump sum and is allocated by the Administration in consultation with Congress based on humanitarian need and U.S. priorities. The Administration requested a further \$850 million in MRA in Attachment 5 of the October request; such funds would be designated for “humanitarian needs in the Western Hemisphere to promote access to regular pathways to migration and international protection, including support for integration and regularization.” Letter from OMB Director Shalanda Young to the Honorable Patrick McHenry, Attachment 5, p. 65.

²¹ Ibid., p. 42.

supplemental requests for U.S. assistance for Ukraine, the Administration also proposed amending certain authorities, including those related to Presidential Drawdown Authority and other security assistance. The Administration also proposed legislative language that would allow for reprogramming FY2024 and prior year SFOPS appropriations notwithstanding existing legislative directives (**Table 2**).

Congress enacted the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, as Division B of P.L. 118-50 in April 2024. The bill included a total of \$60.8 billion, of which \$11.6 billion was for SFOPS accounts (**Table 1**). The legislation also included certain new authorities, primarily related to Presidential Drawdown Authority and other security assistance (**Table 2**). The majority (82%) of appropriated SFOPS funds were for economic assistance through ESF and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia accounts; Congress directed that up to \$7.8 billion in ESF funds may be made available for direct financial support to the Government of Ukraine.²² The remaining SFOPS funds were for foreign military financing (14%), other security assistance and transition assistance (3%), and agency operations and oversight (1%).

In Division A of P.L. 118-50—the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024—Congress enacted a further \$9.15 billion in humanitarian assistance accounts “to address humanitarian needs, including the provision of emergency food and shelter, of vulnerable populations and communities.” Congress did not make clear how much of this funding, if any, it intends to be made available for Ukraine and countries affected by the war in Ukraine.

Outlook

For FY2022 and FY2023, congressional support for emergency supplemental funding for Ukraine generally had been broad and bipartisan. Debate of each bill was largely affected by the legislative vehicle to which the measure had been attached and by selected domestic considerations. Congressional priorities for, and discourse surrounding, aid to Ukraine have in some ways shifted in during the 118th Congress, with greater differences of opinion regarding the provision of aid to Ukraine and a greater emphasis on oversight of funds previously appropriated for the Ukraine response. Such shifts have been particularly evident during consideration of FY2024 appropriations.

Congress debated the FY2022 USAA within the context of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103), as well as the Biden Administration’s request for supplemental funding to combat COVID-19. News organizations reported bipartisan congressional support for emergency supplemental funding for Ukraine, but there appeared to be disagreement over how such funds should be allocated.²³ Some Members advocated for more funding for defense purposes, while others recommended a greater emphasis on humanitarian and economic assistance for Ukrainians in need.²⁴ The requested funds to combat COVID-19 also affected consideration of the broader

²² Section 507 of Division B directs the President to “enter into an arrangement with the Government of Ukraine relating to the repayment by Ukraine to the United States of economic assistance provided to Ukraine by the United States to respond to the situation in Ukraine, and for related expenses, that are made available under the headings ‘Economic Support Fund’ and ‘Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia’ in title IV of this division.” Following provisions, though, outline processes through which the President may cancel such indebtedness.

²³ Catie Edmonson and Emily Cochrane, “The Biden administration asks Congress for \$10 billion to support Ukraine,” *New York Times*, March 3, 2022.

²⁴ Tony Romm, “Democrats, Republicans eye large Ukraine aid package, new punishments against Russia,” *Washington Post*, March 1, 2022.

appropriations measure; some lawmakers questioned the need and requested further justification for new COVID-19-related funding.²⁵

Considered as a stand-alone bill, the FY2022 AUSAA sparked debate, particularly in the Senate, about the measure's overall funding level and oversight mechanisms. Eleven Senators voted against the FY2022 AUSAA, with some citing concerns that the bill “neglects priorities at home”²⁶ or should be “offset with cuts”²⁷ to prioritize domestic concerns. Others raised concerns that the supplemental funds for Ukraine would not have adequate oversight and proposed amendments to the measure. One proposal would have expanded the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to become the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and Ukrainian Military, Economic, and Humanitarian Aid;²⁸ another proposal would have established a new Office of the Special Inspector General for Ukrainian Military, Economic, and Humanitarian Aid.²⁹ Neither amendment was adopted in the final law.

The FY2023 USAA was not a primary subject of debate as Congress considered the CR package. Members instead focused debate on the broader supplemental request, which included proposed funds for COVID-19, mpox (then referred to as monkeypox), and domestic disaster relief, as well as general government funding issues and the utility of continuing resolutions (CRs).³⁰ Similarly, as Congress considered the FY2023 AUSAA as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, it was not a primary focus of debate.³¹

In the 118th Congress, some Members have revived debate on oversight and accountability mechanisms that surfaced during consideration of the FY2022 AUSAA. Some Members have introduced legislation seeking to enhance oversight of U.S. funding for Ukraine, including through a Special Inspector General (H.R. 855/S. 541 and H.R. 2445/S. 651) and increased reporting from existing Offices of Inspector General (H.R. 4554). Others have sought further information through hearings on the topic,³² official travel,³³ and formal and informal communications with both executive branch agencies and oversight bodies such as the Offices of Inspector General and Government Accountability Office.

²⁵ See, for example, Letter from Sen. Mitt Romney et al. to President Joseph R. Biden, March 2, 2022.

²⁶ Sen. Josh Hawley, “Hawley Blasts \$40 billion in Ukraine Aid: ‘Not in America’s Interests,’” press release, May 16, 2022.

²⁷ Sen. Mike Braun, “Senator Braun Statement on \$40 Billion Ukraine Spending Package,” press release, May 18, 2022.

²⁸ S.Amdt. 5040.

²⁹ S.Amdt. 5041.

³⁰ See, for example, Kevin Freking and Lisa Mascaro, “GOP gives thumbs down to Biden’s \$47B emergency request,” Associated Press, September 7, 2022; Mychael Schnell, “House GOP calls for ‘no’ vote on CR,” *The Hill*, September 28, 2022.

³¹ Reportedly Congress primarily focused debate on domestic issues related to immigration (so-called Title 42 policy) and overall federal spending. See, for example, Aidan Quigley and Laura Weiss, “Schumer: Senate closing in on omnibus amendments deal,” CQ, December 21, 2022; Emily Brooks, “McCarthy dings omnibus in lengthy speech,” *The Hill*, December 23, 2022.

³² See, for example, the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing entitled *Oversight, Transparency, and Accountability of Ukraine Assistance*, March 29, 2023, at <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/oversight-transparency-and-accountability-of-ukraine-assistance/>.

³³ See, for example, Sen. Joe Manchin, “Manchin Leads Bipartisan Senate Delegation to Ukraine and Poland,” press release, April 12, 2023, at <https://www.manchin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/manchin-leads-bipartisan-senate-delegation-to-ukraine-and-poland#:~:text=Senators%20Manchin%2C%20Murkowski%20and%20Kelly%20visited%20Ukraine&text=The%20Congressional%20Delegation%20met%20with,and%20the%20rebuild%20of%20Ukraine>.

U.S. assistance for Ukraine was reportedly a point of contention as Congress approached the start of FY2024 with a number of Members signaling that they would not vote for any funding measure for FY2024 that included funding for Ukraine.³⁴ The October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas on Israel and its aftermath has also affected congressional discourse surrounding U.S. assistance for Ukraine. In the wake of the Administration’s request for supplemental funding, some Members had stated their support for an appropriations package that includes funding for both Israel and Ukraine, noting that addressing such conflicts “requires a worldwide approach rather than trying to take parts of it out.”³⁵ Others, however, suggested that the conflicts “are two distinct events that deserve two distinct responses.”³⁶ Similar debates may shape congressional consideration of future assistance for Ukraine.

With FY2024 supplemental appropriations enacted, Members may continue their oversight of U.S. support for Ukraine and countries affected by the war in Ukraine. Oversight agencies, including Offices of Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office, have published numerous reports relating to such assistance that may assist Members in their oversight. Members may also choose to hold hearings and pursue oversight through formal and informal communications, including letters to the Administration and meetings with agency principals, among others. Congress may also consider Ukraine funding and authorities as it begins work on FY2025 appropriations legislation.

³⁴ Alexander Bolton and Al Weaver, “Senate Republicans eye short-term funding bill without Ukraine money to avert shutdown,” *The Hill*, September 29, 2023.

³⁵ Kelly Garrity, “McConnell supports packaging aid to Ukraine and Israel together,” *Politico*, October 22, 2023.

³⁶ Kevin Roberts and J.D. Vance, “Don’t hold up Israel aid to further Ukraine War funding,” *The Hill*, October 19, 2023.

**Table I. SFOPS Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Ukraine:
Administration Requests and Enacted Appropriations**

(In millions of dollars of budget authority)

| Appropriations Account | FY2022 | | | | FY2023 | | | | FY2024 | | |
|---|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | March 2, 2022 Request | FY2022 USAA Enacted | April 28, 2022 Request | FY2022 AUSAA Enacted | Sept. 2, 2022 Request | FY2023 USAA Enacted | Nov. 15, 2022 Request | FY2023 AUSAA Enacted | Aug. 10, 2023 Request ^a | Oct. 20, 2023 Request ^b | FY2024 USSAA ^c Enacted |
| Dept. of State Diplomatic Programs | — | 125.0 | — | 190.0 | — | — | — | 147.1 ^d | 28.2 | 60.0 | 60.0 |
| Dept. of State Capital Investment Fund | — | — | — | 10.0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dept. of State Office of Inspector General | — | 4.0 | — | 4.0 | — | — | — | 5.5 | — | 5.0 | 8.0 |
| Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance | — | — | — | 110.0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| U.S. Agency for Global Media | — | 25.0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| USAID Operating Expenses | — | 25.0 | — | 17.0 | — | — | — | 5.0 | — | 39.0 | 39.0 |
| USAID Office of Inspector General | — | 4.0 | — | 1.0 | — | — | — | 8.0 | — | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| International Disaster Assistance | 2,000.0 | 2,650.0 | 700.0 | 4,348.0 | — | — | 250.0 | 937.9 ^d | 1,300.0 | 5,655.0 ^e | — ^f |
| Transition Initiatives | — | 120.0 | — | — | — | — | 50.0 | 50.0 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 25.0 |
| Economic Support Fund | 1,750.0 | 647.0 | 8,760.0 | 8,766.0 | 4,500.0 | 4,500.0 | 13,045.0 | 12,966.5 | 3,360.0 | 11,775.0 | 7,899.0 |
| Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia | — | 1,120.0 | — | — | — | — | — | 350.0 | 778.8 | 2,228.0 | 1,575.0 |
| Migration and Refugee Assistance | 750.0 | 1,400.0 | 150.0 | 350.0 | — | — | 250.0 | 1,535.1 ^d | 700.0 | 3,495.0 ^e | — ^f |

| Appropriations Account | FY2022 | | | | FY2023 | | | | FY2024 | | |
|--|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | March 2, 2022 Request | FY2022 USAA Enacted | April 28, 2022 Request | FY2022 AUSAA Enacted | Sept. 2, 2022 Request | FY2023 USAA Enacted | Nov. 15, 2022 Request | FY2023 AUSAA Enacted | Aug. 10, 2023 Request ^a | Oct. 20, 2023 Request ^b | FY2024 USSAA ^c Enacted |
| International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) | — | 30.0 | 400.0 | 400.0 | — | — | 300.0 | 375.0 ^d | 63.0 | 360.0 | 300.0 |
| Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) | — | — | 100.0 | 100.0 | — | — | 105.0 | 105.0 | 94.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Foreign Military Financing (FMF) | 500.0 | 650.0 | 4,000.0 | 4,000.0 | — | — | 500.0 | 80.0 | 1,000.0 | 1,700.0 | 1,600.0 |
| European Bank for Reconstruction and Development | — | — | 500.0 | 500.0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Global Agriculture and Food Security Program | — | — | 150.0 | 150.0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Countering Russian Malign Actors in Africa Fund | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 200.0 | — | — |
| Total | 5,000.0 | 6,800.0 | 14,760.0 | 18,946.0 | 4,500.0 | 4,500.0 | 14,500.0 | 16,565.0 | 7,549.0 | 25,452.0 | 11,616.0 |

Sources: Letter from OMB Acting Director Shalanda Young; P.L. 117-103; Addendum A: Detailed Funding Request, Assistance to Ukraine; P.L. 117-128; FY2023 Continuing Resolution (CR) Appropriations Issues; P.L. 117-180; Letter from OMB Director Shalanda Young, Attachment 2. Ukraine Assistance Needs; P.L. 117-328; Letter from OMB Director Shalanda Young, Attachment 1. Ukraine and Other International Needs; Letter from OMB Director Shalanda Young, Attachment 3: Humanitarian Assistance; P.L. 118-50.

- a. The request also included funds requested for three SFOPS accounts that were not specifically designated for the Ukraine response or broader Russian aggression. These included the International Infrastructure Fund, Contribution to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Contribution to the International Development Association.
- b. The request also included funds requested for SFOPS accounts that were not specifically designated for the Ukraine response. These included Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Services, Contribution to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Contribution to the International Development Association. Additional funds were also requested for the Diplomatic Programs, Migration and Refugee Assistance, Economic Support Fund, and Foreign Military Financing accounts for purposes not related to Ukraine or countries affected by the war in Ukraine.

- c. Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024.
- d. Four SFOPS accounts in the FY2023 AUSAA (P.L. 117-328, Div. M) included monies not specifically designated for Ukraine. Of the \$147.1 million for Diplomatic Programs, not less than \$60 million was designated to respond to the situation in Ukraine; of the \$937.9 million for International Disaster Assistance, not less than \$300 million was designated; of the \$1,535.0 million for Migration and Refugee Assistance, not less than \$620 million was designated; and of the \$375.0 million for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, not less than \$300 million was designated. Presumably the non-designated funds in each account may be used for purposes beyond the Ukraine response.
- e. For both International Disaster Assistance and Migration and Refugee Assistance requests in the October 20, 2023, request, the Administration notes that such funds would be to provide assistance for vulnerable people in Ukraine and those affected by the war in Ukraine as well as provide support for Israelis and “displaced and conflict-affected civilians, including Palestinian refugees in Gaza and the West Bank.” The request does not provide specific amounts for each of these priorities; as such, the total request for both IDA and MRA are included in the table.
- f. Division A of P.L. 118-50, the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, included a total of \$9.15 billion in humanitarian assistance accounts—\$5.655 billion for International Disaster Assistance and \$3.495 for Migration and Refugee Assistance—to address humanitarian needs, including the provision of emergency food and shelter, of vulnerable populations and communities.”

Table 2. Selected SFOPS Authorities: Administration Requests and Enacted

| March 2, 2022, Request | FY2022 USAA Enacted |
|---|--|
| Amend Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA; P.L. 87-195) to raise the maximum value of defense article drawdowns by \$1.2 billion (the original cap was \$100 million). | Amended Section 506(a)(1) to raise the drawdown authority to a total of \$3.0 billion. |
| Amend Section 614 of the FAA (special authority to provide assistance in situations of vital national security interest) to increase authority by \$250 million. | Amended Section 614(a)(4)(A)(ii) of the FAA to increase authority from \$250 million to \$500 million. Also amended Section 614(a)(4)(C) to adjust existing limitations to higher dollar amounts. |
| Amend Sections 516(f) and 516(g)(1) of the FAA (on excess defense articles [EDA]). (The Administration did not cite such sections specifically in its request but proposed waiving both the notification requirement and the \$500 million limit on the provision of EDA). | Allows for the President to transfer EDA to “Ukraine and to allies and partners in Europe” pursuant to Section 516 without regard to the notification requirements in Sections 516(f)(1) and 516(g). |
| Authority to “reprogram FY2022 and prior-year funds for Ukraine regardless of existing appropriations directives.” | Provides transfer authorities among accounts, which are “in addition to any other transfer authority provided by law.” |
| April 28, 2022, Request | FY2022 AUSAA Enacted |
| Amend Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to raise the drawdown maximum by \$5.0 billion. | Amends Section 506(a)(1) to raise the drawdown maximum to \$11.0 billion. |
| Amend Section 614 of the FAA to increase authority by \$500 million. | Amends Section 614(a)(4)(A)(ii) of the FAA to increase authority to \$1.0 billion. Also amends Section 614(a)(4)(C) to adjust existing limitations to higher dollar amounts. |
| Amend Section 7035(b)(5) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Div. K) to increase the Special Defense Acquisition Fund obligations cap by \$1.0 billion. | N/A |
| September 2, 2022, Request | FY2023 USAA Enacted |
| Amend Section 2606(a) of the FY2022 USAA to authorize FMF loans for “countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine” (an expansion from “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies”). | N/A |
| Amend Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to raise the drawdown maximum to \$3.7 billion for FY2023. | Amends Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to raise the drawdown maximum to \$3.7 billion for FY2023. |
| November 15, 2022, Request | FY2023 AUSAA Enacted |
| Amend Section 2606(a) of the FY2022 USAA to authorize FMF loans for “major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies” (an expansion from “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies”) and increase the authorization ceiling on loan and guaranteed loan gross principal obligations to \$8 billion. | N/A |
| Amend Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to raise the drawdown maximum to \$10.7 billion for FY2023. | Amends Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to raise the drawdown maximum to \$14.5 billion for FY2023. |

Amend Sections 614(a)(4)(A)(ii), 614(a)(4)(C), 552(c)(2), and 506(a)(2) of the FAA to increase respective funding caps. According to the request, such actions would increase flexibility for assistance to Ukraine.

Amends Sections 552(c)(2) and 506(a)(2) to increase respective funding caps. The act does not amend Sections 614(a)(4)(A)(ii) or 614(a)(4)(C) as was requested.

August 10, 2023, Request

Amend Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to raise the drawdown maximum to \$1.1 billion for FY2024.

Amend Section 2606(a) of the FY2022 USAA to authorize FMF loans for “major non-NATO allies” (an expansion from the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies”) and increase the authorization ceiling on loan and guaranteed loan gross principal obligations to \$8 billion.

Amend Section 614 of the FAA to increase authority by \$250 million.

October 20, 2023, Request

Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024

Amend Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to raise the drawdown maximum to \$7.0 billion for FY2024.

Amends Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to raise the drawdown maximum to \$7.8 billion for FY2024.

Amend Section 2606(a) of the FY2022 USAA to authorize FMF loans for “major non-NATO allies” (an expansion from the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] allies”) and increase the authorization ceiling on loan and guaranteed loan gross principal obligations to \$8 billion.

Amends Section 2606(a) of the FY2022 USAA to authorize FMF loans for “North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, major non-NATO allies, and the Indo-Pacific region” and increases the authorization ceiling on loan and guaranteed loan gross principal obligations to \$8 billion.

Amend Section 614 of the FAA to increase authority caps.

Authorize reprogramming FY2024 and prior year SFOPS appropriations for assistance for Ukraine “without regard to any minimum amounts specifically designated in such Acts.”

Sources: Letter from OMB Acting Director Shalanda Young; P.L. 117-103; Addendum A: Detailed Funding Request, Assistance to Ukraine; P.L. 117-128; FY2023 Continuing Resolution (CR) Appropriations Issues; P.L. 117-180; Letter from OMB Director Shalanda Young, Attachment 2. Ukraine Assistance Needs; P.L. 117-328; Letter from OMB Director Shalanda Young, Attachment 1. Ukraine and Other International Needs; Letter from OMB Director Shalanda Young, Attachment 3: Humanitarian Assistance; P.L. 118-50.

Note: For more information on the use of Sections 506(a)(1) and 614(a)(4)(A)(ii) of the FAA, see CRS In Focus IF12040, *U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine*, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt.

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