{
  "id": "95-560",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "95-560",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 316356,
      "date": "1995-05-01",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T21:04:02.023941",
      "title": "Intelligence Implications of the Military Technical Revolution",
      "summary": "This document also available in  PDF Image .\n  The availability of precision guided munitions (PGMs) and precise intelligence transmitted in\n\"real time\" lies at the center of a military technical revolution that is changing the ways in which\nfuture military operations are likely to be planned and conducted. This revolution requires changes\nin the functions and organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community.\n  During the decades of the Cold War, intelligence agencies were organized around collection\ndisciplines,  e.g.,  signals intelligence, photographic intelligence, and human intelligence. \nCollection\nefforts were managed by Washington-based agencies, principally, the National Security Agency, the\nNational Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence\nAgency. Their efforts were largely (but by not means exclusively) directed towards supporting\nsenior policymakers in dealing with the threat from the Soviet Union. Support to military operations\nwas provided by service intelligence organizations using information that became available from\nnational-level agencies.\n  The Persian Gulf War, which occurred just as the Soviet Union was collapsing, saw the\ndispatch of PGMs to destroy specific targets without extensive collateral damage and injuries to\nnoncombatants. This capability stands in sharp contrast to the area bombing campaigns of World\nWar II and Vietnam. This success occurred even though many intelligence systems and\ncommunications links were not designed to provide extensive real-time support to lower echelons\nof military commands. It was possible in large measure because analysts in Washington and military\nstaffs in the Gulf commands devised innovative uses of existing intelligence and communications\nsystems.\n  Subsequently, the Intelligence Community, with congressional support and encouragement, is\nbeing restructured to ensure that support to military commanders assigned regional and peacekeeping\nmissions has a high priority. Relationships between national and tactical systems are being\nrationalized. New surveillance equipment and communications links are being procured. Personnel\nare being trained to draw upon all the resources of the Intelligence Community to provide real-time\nsupport to military operations.\n  There are major challenges remaining, however, to ensure that this process of intelligence\n\"tacticalization\" goes smoothly, that interoperability among equipment used by different services and\nintelligence agencies is achieved, and that a reasonable relationship between force structure,\nintelligence and communications \"architectures,\" and likely operational missions in the uncertain\npost-Cold War world is maintained. Some observers have also expressed concern that national\nintelligence not be neglected as necessary adaptations to the military technical revolution are\nimplemented.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/95-560",
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      "topics": []
    }
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  "topics": []
}