{ "id": "96-261", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "96-261", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 104350, "date": "1996-03-20", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T21:03:09.469941", "title": "Russia and U.S. Foreign Assistance: 1992-1996", "summary": "This report, written in 1996, provides historical background that may be useful to Congress as\nit\nconsiders funding levels, types of programs, and problems in implementation of U.S. assistance to\nother countries. \n As defined by Congress in the FREEDOM Support Act and the pronouncements of two\nAdministrations, among key objectives of U.S. foreign policy toward Russia are the promotion of\na democratic system and a free market economy. Foreign assistance has been a prominent tool of\nthat policy.\n Many factors in the United States and Russia have affected the course of the U.S. program of\nassistance to Russia. In the United States, there has been some expectation that the program would\nsucceed quickly. When that did not happen and Russian government behavior did not meet\nexpectations, some sought to cut the program. U.S. budget pressures also have affected the Russia\nprogram. Although Russia has experienced much economic and political progress in a relatively\nshort time, this has been accompanied by an uncertain political situation exacerbated by growing\neconomic inequality. Nevertheless, supporters of reform are reportedly emerging in all corners of\nRussia and these appear very pro-United States.\n Criticisms raised regarding the assistance program during its first years are being addressed by\nthe Administration. Interagency coordination has improved, problem programs cut or eliminated,\nreformers targeted, and assistance funds leveraged to bring in other donors. Large contractors and\ngrantees have improved their operations, but some observers still feel that while small U.S.\norganizations can best implement the program, they are the most threatened by cuts.\n The assistance program is seeking to engage all levels of private sector and democratic system\ndevelopment -- at the top to promote policy reform, at the institutional level helping to strengthen\ngovernment and private sector organizations, and at the grassroots to help individual businesses and\nNGOs (non-governmental organizations). In order to expedite the reform process and help them\navoid mistakes, a major focus of assistance activity is the transfer of information to reformist\nRussians who want to know how things are done elsewhere.\n The budget for Russia has gone from $1.3 billion in FY1994 to $341 million in FY1995 and\nan estimated $168 million in FY1996. Many programs are ending earlier than originally anticipated\nand new ones not starting up. The consequences of such an abrupt decrease in funding are not clear\nwith regard to Russian development in general but some fear that U.S. objectives in the country will\nbe retarded. \n In 1994, the Administration informed Congress that technical assistance requests would largely\nend after the FY1998 appropriation. Realizing that U.S. interests regarding Russia would also not\nend at that point, individuals in the State Department have begun to ponder the shape of\nU.S.-Russian relations in the future and a \"baseline\" program of assistance that might be considered\nin the long term.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/96-261", "sha1": "930d2bc94f8f9468327e90db27e9b974e0c0a5d3", "filename": "files/19960320_96-261_930d2bc94f8f9468327e90db27e9b974e0c0a5d3.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/19960320_96-261_930d2bc94f8f9468327e90db27e9b974e0c0a5d3.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Economic Policy", "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security" ] }