{ "id": "96-723", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "96-723", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 102658, "date": "1997-01-06", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T21:00:32.595941", "title": "Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR): Activities of the 104th Congress", "summary": "U.S. military forces have been serving as peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina since shortly\nafter\nthe signing of the Dayton peace agreement in late 1995. The mission of the NATO multinational\nImplementation Force (IFOR) was to carry out the military provisions of the peace agreement,\nbrokered under U.S. leadership, under a one-year mandate. In December 1996, NATO countries\nagreed to deploy a smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR. SFOR will continue to\ndeter a resumption of hostilities and lend selective support to civilian peace efforts. Other\ninternational organizations and agencies continue to be responsible for assisting the Bosnian parties\nfulfill the non-military tasks of the accords, and for providing reconstruction assistance.\n In late 1995, the Clinton Administration faced heavy skepticism in Congress over the issue of\nU.S. participation in IFOR. The Administration maintained that formal congressional authorization\nwas not required for U.S. armed forces to be deployed in IFOR, although it did request an expression\nof congressional support for such deployment after a peace agreement was concluded. On the whole,\nmany in Congress remained unconvinced that any vital U.S. interests were directly at stake in\nBosnia. Opponents to U.S. participation explored various legislative options based on Congress' role\nin authorizing the deployment of U.S. forces overseas and appropriating or withholding the necessary\nfunds for any such deployment.\n At the end of the first session, legislation that would have barred funds for U.S. troops en route\nto Bosnia was narrowly defeated in the House. The Senate approved a resolution expressing support\nfor the men and women of the United States armed forces who were to be deployed to Bosnia and\nset conditions on U.S. participation in IFOR. However, no measure passed either chamber that\nendorsed the President's policy or expressed the support of the Congress for IFOR's mission. \n IFOR's performance and achievements were widely lauded throughout the year following\nDayton. However, by mid-1996 some Members of Congress expressed concerns relating to IFOR's\nscheduled mission completion date by December, problems in peace implementation on the civilian\nside which could negatively affect IFOR's withdrawal, and the prospects for a successor military\nmission to IFOR. It became increasingly apparent that some sort of successor mission might need\nto remain in Bosnia after December if peace efforts were to continue and take firmer hold in Bosnia. \nThe Administration eschewed any formal decision on or commitment to a follow-on force until\nmid-November 1996. It has asserted that the follow-on Stabilization Force represents a separate and\ndistinct operation from IFOR. Congressional committees launched numerous hearings on the issue\nin the final weeks of the 104th Congress, with some critics in Congress lambasting Administration\nofficials for supposedly reneging on the commitment to have U.S. forces leave Bosnia after one year. \nHowever, Congress adjourned in October 1996 without taking any specific action on the issue.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/96-723", "sha1": "eff9a37154be266f1d988edf898620163a872291", "filename": "files/19970106_96-723_eff9a37154be266f1d988edf898620163a872291.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/19970106_96-723_eff9a37154be266f1d988edf898620163a872291.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "National Defense" ] }