{
  "id": "96-767",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "96-767",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 102666,
      "date": "1996-09-13",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T21:01:30.871941",
      "title": "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis",
      "summary": "To assist congressional deliberations, this report sets forth the background on and analysis of\nChinese technology transfers suspected of contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass\ndestruction. For a discussion of policy options and approaches, see the related Issue Brief 92056,\n Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues .\n  The issue of Chinese proliferation involves three aspects: China's support for nonproliferation\nefforts, China's transfers that promote proliferation, and vertical proliferation (modernization of\nChina's WMD and missile programs).\n  Since 1992, China has responded to U.S. and other pressures to participate in some parts of\ninternational nonproliferation regimes. China promised to abide by the Missile Technology Control\nRegime (MTCR), which is not a treaty, but a set of guidelines. China also acceded to the Nuclear\nNonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). However,\nit is not a member of the MTCR, Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group,\nor the Wassenaar Arrangement. The pressures to join nonproliferation efforts that China faced in\nthe early 1990s have weakened, while its commitment to nonproliferation is unclear.\n  Chinese missile-related transfers have not violated any international treaties, since the MTCR\nis not a treaty, but have violated Chinese pledges and U.S. laws. In 1991 and 1993, the U.S.\ngovernment twice determined Chinese violations of the MTCR guidelines, and determined both\ncases to have involved transfers of Category II missile components for the M-11 short range ballistic\nmissile to Pakistan. The Administration has not determined violations for Chinese missile-related\nsales to Syria or Iran. Since the 1987 sale of CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles to Saudi\nArabia, the executive branch has not determined that China supplied complete missiles to another\ncountry. Nevertheless, concerns remain about Chinese missile technology transfers.\n  Although the NPT does not ban peaceful nuclear projects, certain Chinese nuclear transfers to\nPakistan and Iran may have violated the NPT and/or U.S. laws. In 1995, China reportedly sold\nunsafeguarded ring magnets to Pakistan. The Clinton Administration decided that U.S. sanctions\nwere not warranted.\n  Chemical weapon-related transfers would not violate any treaty, since the CWC has not entered\ninto force. However, they may defy U.S. laws which may require sanctions. Transfers of biological\nagents for weapon programs would violate the Biological Weapons Convention and U.S. laws.\n  China's acquisition of Russian or other advanced technology or Chinese development of new\nmissiles and WMD would challenge efforts to stem their proliferation. There are concerns about\npossible re-transfers of advanced Russian technology as well as transfers of new technology\ndeveloped in China.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/96-767",
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}