{ "id": "96-844", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "96-844", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 100609, "date": "1996-10-21", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T21:01:11.483941", "title": "Covert Action: An Effective Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy?", "summary": "Of all the functions of the United States Intelligence Community, covert actions tend to receive\nthe\ngreatest attention, even though they consume only a small proportion of intelligence budgets. They\nare often controversial and have on several occasions figured prominently in major political scandals. \nAlmost inevitably, they intrude upon another country's internal affairs and can result in the loss of\nhuman life. They are by definition secret and thus do not undergo the public review and debate that\nis a hallmark of democratic society.\n Most covert actions undertaken in the four decades after World War II were part of larger\npolicies designed to contain the Soviet Union and other communist countries. With the end of the\nCold War, the role of covert actions is being reassessed. Some observers have called for a halt to\nsuch efforts, while others have advocated different types of covert capabilities to counter the designs\nof rogue states, international terrorist groups, and narcotics smugglers. \n For many years covert actions were often undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)\nwithout congressional approval or notification, but since the mid-1970s the executive branch has\nbeen required to provide increasingly detailed information to congressional intelligence committees\non planned and ongoing covert actions. Some Members have sought to require congressional\nnotification prior to the initiation of any covert action (or, in emergencies, within 48 hours of\ninitiation), but presidents have thus far successfully resisted such a requirement. Congress can\nnonetheless use the power of the purse to halt covert actions and, on several occasions, has done so. \n A number of proposals have been offered to improve U.S. capabilities to plan and undertake\ncovert actions in the post-Cold War world. Most address the complicated relationship between CIA's\nDirectorate of Operations and the rest of the Intelligence Community. Attention is also being given\nto the difficulties involved in maintaining capabilities for conducting covert actions against myriad\ntargets in disparate locales. At present, however, no clearcut consensus for changes has emerged.\n A review of covert actions suggests that most were not isolated initiatives, but components of\nlarger U.S. policies. The extent to which they contributed to making those policies effective is\nsubject to debate in almost all cases. Some observers continue to be concerned that covert actions\nare not adequately considered in the context of their place within a larger policy framework.\n Covert actions are usually undertaken in peacetime by the CIA, but the Defense Department and\nthe military services often provide important support. (Covert actions by law enforcement agencies\nsuch as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency are excluded from\nthis discussion.) The line between special operations conducted by military personnel and covert\nactions is not always clear and a potential exists for misunderstandings between Congress and the\nexecutive branch regarding reporting requirements for each.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/96-844", "sha1": "a3fe515109001b58e7be8b2af3841f9e91066400", "filename": "files/19961021_96-844_a3fe515109001b58e7be8b2af3841f9e91066400.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/19961021_96-844_a3fe515109001b58e7be8b2af3841f9e91066400.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "American Law", "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }