{
  "id": "96-869",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "96-869",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 100611,
      "date": "1999-06-29",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:44:02.943941",
      "title": "Crime and Forfeiture: The Innocent Third Party",
      "summary": "Forfeiture has survived through time in American law, and since 1984, the use of forfeiture\nstatutes\nto divest felons of their spoils has increased substantially. The fact that property has been used\nillegally does not automatically give the government the right to take and confiscate it. The criminal\nbehavior must violate a federal statute that specifically authorizes the forfeiture or condemns the\nproperty involved in the offense.\n  As a result of the increased volume of forfeiture activity, numerous third parties have been\ndrawn into forfeiture litigation. Coupled with the complexities of forfeiture litigation and the\ninconsistencies in the judicial decisions, it has been difficult for the innocent-third-party to justify\nhis/her rights in seized property.\n  The judicial analyses of innocent owner defenses in 21 U.S.C. Section 881(a)(6) and (7) reveal\ndisparate interpretations. There are two views (disjunctive and conjunctive) as to the correct\ninterpretation of the statute, and differences exist even within these two views. One school of\nthought contends that the term \"or\" must be read in a disjunctive way, holding that the innocent\nowner test requires a claimant to demonstrate either a lack of knowledge  or  a lack of\nconsent, but\nnot a lack of both knowledge  and  consent ( United States v. Parcel of Real Property\nKnown as 6109\nGrubb Road ). On the other hand, there are some courts which have followed the conjunctive\nschool\nof thought and have held that, in order to maintain the innocent owner defense, a claimant must\nestablish both lack of knowledge and lack of consent ( United States v. One Parcel of Land,\nKnown\nas Lot 111-B, Tax Map Key 4-4-03-71(4), Waipouli, Kapaa, Island and County of Kauai, State of\nHawaii ). Within the conjunctive view, some courts extend the defense further by stating that\nin\norder to meet the lack-of-consent test of the innocent-owner defense, the claimant must prove that\nhe \"had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property\"\n( Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. ).\n  In the cases of  Alexander v. United States  and  Austin v. United States ,\n the Supreme Court found\nthat in some instances, civil proceedings do constitute punishment and may violate the Eighth\nAmendment's excessive fines clause. However, the owner's innocence is only one of the factors that\nthe lower courts have included in their various  post-Austin/Alexander  tests for\ndetermining whether\na forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/96-869",
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "American Law"
  ]
}