{
  "id": "97-1022",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "97-1022",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 100618,
      "date": "1997-11-14",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:57:17.168941",
      "title": "Chinese Nuclear Testing and Warhead Development",
      "summary": "Several rationales may explain the development of Chinese nuclear weapons. These include\n international  benefits (nuclear weapons may enhance security, influence, and prestige);\n technology \n(warhead development is constrained to certain paths by technological imperatives regardless of\nleadership or doctrinal preferences);  doctrine  (recent Chinese thinking may envision\nbroadening\nnuclear weapons' role); and others. These rationales may have shifted in salience, with international\nbenefits dominant early on and doctrine becoming more influential over time.\n  Data on China's nuclear test program reveal several points about China's approach to testing\nand goals for it. First, China conducted few tests compared to the other nuclear weapon states, and\ntested at a stable rate. Second, its highest-yield tests were conducted early in its test program, after\nwhich time the yield dropped sharply. Third, for tests with a yield of roughly 100 kilotons or less,\nyield dropped in 1972-1992. Thereafter, though, it increased, possibly in support of development\nof new warheads for new forces. Fourth, an analysis of the locations of Chinese underground tests,\nand the geology of those sites, casts little light on the purpose of tests prior to 1990 but strongly\nimplies that the purpose of subsequent tests was weapons development.\n  China has reportedly embarked on a major program to upgrade its nuclear forces. Most analysts\nanticipate advances in missile accuracy, mobile ballistic missiles, and missile submarine forces, as\nwell as deployment of multiple-warhead missiles. These advances hinge on warhead advances. In\nparticular, increasing a warhead's so-called yield-to-weight ratio, i.e., the amount of explosive yield\nper unit of warhead weight, allows key improvements in China's nuclear forces that enable a role\nfor these forces consistent with a doctrine more ambitious than minimum deterrence. Specifically,\nadvances in yield-to-weight extend missile range, enable deployment of multiple warheads on a\nmissile, facilitate submarine-launched ballistic missiles and mobile missiles, aid penetration of\nballistic missile defenses, and contribute to accuracy. These advances together would make China's\nnuclear forces more survivable while increasing their offensive potential. China is likely to produce\nnew warheads for these forces for some time, as well as to conduct maintenance and modification\nof existing warheads on an ongoing basis.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/97-1022",
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          "filename": "files/19971114_97-1022_192bb0f10895f24ad60d9a4eea7328e049d7aa2c.pdf",
          "images": null
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      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}