{
  "id": "97-20",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "97-20",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 100637,
      "date": "1996-12-16",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T21:00:55.465941",
      "title": "Economic Sanctions and the Former Yugoslavia: Current Status and Policy Considerations Through 1996",
      "summary": "In November and December 1996, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Serbia-\nMontenegro\n(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-FRY) rallied daily in the capital in protest of attempts by the\nSerbian government under President Slobodan Milosevic to annul the electoral victories of the\nopposition in the municipal elections. Some international policymakers have threatened the Serbian\nleadership with sanctions should it resort to violent means of quelling the protests. In Bosnia,\nviolations, of lack of satisfactory compliance with, aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement have\nperiodically prompted calls for the re-imposition of sanctions against the offending partyies. In\nparticular, extremely limited progress has been evident in the return of refugees to their homes or\nthe turning over of indicted war criminals to the international tribunal.\n  During the course of the Bosnian war from 1992 to 1995, an extensive sanctions regime was\nconstructed by the international community primarily against Serbia-Montenegro for its role in the\nBosnian conflict. The United States imposed several implementing measures in compliance with\nthe U.N. sanctions. After conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995, the U.N.\nSecurity Council suspended sanctions. Sanctions were terminated in October 1996, after Bosnia held\nits first national elections. \n  Since Dayton, the United States has maintained a unilateral policy of upholding a so-called\n\"outer wall\" of sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro that holds full diplomatic relations and U.S.\neconomic benefits, as well as U.S. support of FRY membership in international organizations or of\neconomic assistance from international financial institutions. These limited sanctions are to remain\nuntil the FRY demonstrates further progress in cooperation with the war crimes tribunal and with\nrespect to the situation in Kosovo. In December 1996, in response to the political crisis in Serbia,\nthe State Department emphasized that this policy would remain in place until the Serbian leadership\nreversed its anti-democratic practices.\n  At the end of 1996, the sanctions debate was focused on two related but distinguishable policy\nobjectives: to respond to and possibly affect the internal political crisis in Serbia-Montenegro; and,\nto press for greater compliance with aspects of the peace accord in Bosnia. For the first objective,\npolicymakers were able to consider various forms of sanctions in order to support democratic\nmovements in Serbia-Montenegro and to condemn the repressive government under Slobodan\nMilosevic. For the latter objective, economic sanctions that had been in place would have been\ndifficult to restore. Rather, the international community or individual countries used international\nreconstruction aid as an economic lever to influence compliance with the peace process in Bosnia.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/97-20",
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          "filename": "files/19961216_97-20_92de1e618a5d683521ce8f1eb5d8f7cbf212d9c8.pdf",
          "images": null
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      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}