{ "id": "97-231", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "97-231", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 101232, "date": "2000-01-14", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:39:44.251941", "title": "Iran: U.S. Policy and Options", "summary": "Iran and the United States have been adversaries, and have sometimes engaged in low-level\nmilitary\nhostilities, since Iran's Islamic revolution on February 11, 1979. During its first term, the Clinton\nAdministration sought to build on earlier policies designed to contain Iran and moderate its behavior. \nThe Clinton Administration initially placed its policy of containing Iran within a broader framework\nfor keeping both Iran and Iraq weak, terming the policy \"dual containment.\" The Administration\nmaintained that dual containment was a necessary departure from past Persian Gulf policies in which\nthe United States has alternately tilted toward either Iran or Iraq to maintain stability in the Persian\nGulf. \n In the absence of U.N. sanctions on Iran, as exist on Iraq, in 1995 and 1996, the Clinton\nAdministration and Congress undertook a number of new measures to contain Iran. Foremost\namong these steps were expanded U.S. economic sanctions, including a ban on U.S. trade and\ninvestment in Iran and sanctions on foreign firms that make substantial investments in Iran's energy\nsector. U.S. military assets, in addition to those needed to deter Iraq, were sent to the Gulf to\nmonitor Iran's growing naval capabilities and to help deter Iranian consideration of coercive\nmaritime adventures. Similarly, U.S. arms sales and advice to the Persian Gulf states were designed\nto help the Gulf states defend themselves against potential attacks by Iran as well as by Iraq.\n \n In late 1996, a debate began to develop over Clinton Administration policy toward Iran. \n Several\nprominent foreign policy experts maintained that the United States and Iran have some interests in\ncommon, such as containing Iraq and ending the continuing conflict in Afghanistan. Others noted\nthat differences over how to deal with Iran had become a serious irritant in U.S.-European relations. \nThis debate accelerated following the upset victory by a relative moderate in Iran's May 23, 1997\npresidential election. By early 1998, following the unexpected election of a relative moderate as\nIran's president, a consensus emerged within the Administration to try to engage Iran in a political\ndialogue or in mutual confidence-building measures that could eventually lead to normal relations. \nAdministration officials maintain that discussions with Iran could yield progress in key areas of U.S.\nconcern, which include: Iran's attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, its support for\ninternational terrorism, and its backing for groups opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process.\n The Administration's apparent policy shift has created concern among some groups and\nMembers of Congress that the Administration will make substantive concessions to Iran in advance\nof clear changes in Iran's international behavior. Although some Members now appear to accept the\nconcept of U.S. dialogue with Iran, some Members are concerned that Iran would try to take\nadvantage of any easing of U.S. containment policy to accelerate a strategic buildup and fund Middle\nEastern terrorist groups.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/97-231", "sha1": "03b8e3e9d8fce4ed454a966b2ffcd52b246eeb0d", "filename": "files/20000114_97-231_03b8e3e9d8fce4ed454a966b2ffcd52b246eeb0d.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20000114_97-231_03b8e3e9d8fce4ed454a966b2ffcd52b246eeb0d.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Economic Policy", "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "Middle Eastern Affairs", "National Defense" ] }