{
  "id": "97-356",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "97-356",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 316318,
      "date": "1997-04-11",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:59:00.244941",
      "title": "The U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Accord of October 1994: Background, Status, and Requirements of U.S. Nonproliferation Law",
      "summary": "This document also available in  PDF Image .\n  Congress plays a critical role in the ability of the Clinton Administration to carry out an October\n21, 1994, executive agreement between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of\nKorea (DPRK) that defused a confrontation over the latter's suspected nuclear weapons program. \nUnder the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, North Korea pledged to freeze its existing nuclear\nprogram and eventually to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out\ninspections designed to account for all of its nuclear material, after which its graphite-moderated\nreactors and related facilities are to be dismantled. The United States, in return, agreed to lead in\narranging for the replacement of North Korea's existing nuclear reactors with two 1,000 megawatt\nlight-water power reactors (LWRs) that would be less useful for obtaining weapons grade material. \nOther provisions include the progressive normalization of U.S.-DPRK political and economic\nrelations and the initiation of a North-South dialogue. \n  Notwithstanding periodic deadlocks in what is a sequentially staged process, the nuclear-related\nparts of the agreement have moved forward. As provided for in the Agreed Framework, the United\nStates took the lead in setting up an international consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy\nDevelopment Organization (KEDO), to carry out the LWR project. A supply contract and five of\n14 required protocols have been negotiated. Construction activity could begin as early as April 1997. \nWhether this actually happens will likely depend as much on the state of North-South relations as\nany other issue, since South Korea is responsible for a major share of construction funding.\n  Congress, which generally has been highly skeptical of the Agreed Framework, has two\nprincipal sources of influence. First, U.S. contributions towards the cost of providing interim heavy\noil supplies and KEDO's administrative overhead are dependent on the willingness of Congress to\nappropriate the necessary funds -- about $30 million per year. Second, Congress has statutory\nauthority to disapprove or attach conditions to any nuclear cooperation agreement with North Korea\nvia a joint resolution, subject to normal veto and override procedures. Such an agreement is likely\nto be required because the South Korean prime contractor depends on a U.S. company, Combustion\nEngineering, Inc., for some critical components.\n  The viability of the nuclear accord and the achievement of its underlying objectives of ending\nthe nuclear proliferation threat and promoting the peaceful resolution of Korean Peninsula issues are\nthreatened by Pyongyang's continued refusal to enter into a dialogue with Seoul, and uncertainties\nabout its willingness to accept IAEA inspections of suspicious undeclared nuclear sites. North\nKorea's policies towards the South in particular are likely to be major determinants of whether South\nKorea and Japan will play the roles that are expected of them in underwriting most of the estimated\n$5-6 billion cost of constructing the LWRs.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/97-356",
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "National Defense"
  ]
}