{
  "id": "97-359",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "97-359",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 100652,
      "date": "2000-04-17",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:37:07.308941",
      "title": "START II Debate in the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects",
      "summary": "The 1993 START II Treaty would limit the United States and Russia to 3,500 warheads on their\nstrategic offensive forces. It would also ban all land-based missiles with multiple warheads\n(MIRVed ICBMs). In September 1997, the United States and Russia signed a Protocol extending\nthe elimination deadlines in START II from the beginning of the year 2003 to the end of the year\n2007. The two nations also agreed that they would begin negotiations on deeper reductions in a\nSTART III Treaty as soon as START II entered into force.\n  The United States Senate gave its consent to the ratification of START II in January 1996. The\nlower house of the Russian parliament, the Duma, began considering the treaty in 1995, but did not\nvote to approve it until April 14, 2000. During its efforts to win approval, officials in the Yeltsin\ngovernment stressed that START II would serve Russia's interests because Russia could not afford\nto retain its forces at START I levels. They argued that START II would allow Russia to maintain\nparity with the United States by reducing U.S. forces to levels that Russian forces may decline to\nduring the next decade, as Russia retires its older systems. \n  Duma members criticized many provisions in the treaty, arguing that they favored the United\nStates and would undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent by forcing Russia to eliminate its MIRVed\nICBMs. They believed Russia could maintain parity with the United States, without arms control\nreductions, if it retained a force of MIRVed ICBMs. Those who favored START II's ratification\nagreed that some provisions in the treaty may favor the United States, but they maintained that\nRussia could not afford to rebuild or retain its MIRVed ICBM force; instead, they argued that Russia\ncould use the prospective START III Treaty to correct problems in START II. Duma members have\nalso expressed concerns about the economic implications of START II, in particular, and Russia's\nstrategic offensive forces, in general. Many refused to support START II ratification until the\ngovernment presented a plan to maintain and finance Russia's nuclear forces until the year 2010. \n  Some in the Duma have linked START II to U.S. plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses. \nThey argue that these defenses would undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent, particularly if Russia\nhad eliminated its MIRVed ICBMs. The Federal Law on ratification links START II implementation\nto continued U.S. compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. Some in the Duma have also linked\nSTART II to NATO's inclusion of new members from the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. \nThey believe that U.S. and NATO nuclear weapons may move closer to Russia's borders, creating\na threat that Russia might counter with its own nuclear weapons.\n  After many delays in 1998 and 1999, the Duma finally voted to approve START II ratification\nin April 2000. However, the Treaty still has not entered into force. The U.S. Senate must give its\nconsent to ratification of a Protocol that extends the elimination time-lines in START II. In addition,\nthe Federal Law on ratification states that the Treaty cannot enter into force until the United States\napproves several 1997 agreements that modify the 1972 ABM Treaty. The U.S. Senate has not yet\ndebated these agreements, and some doubt that it will consent to their ratification.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
      "formats": [
        {
          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/97-359",
          "sha1": "34e34fbcb26cf28a4d21ca73ef5aa1f8c5155f23",
          "filename": "files/20000417_97-359_34e34fbcb26cf28a4d21ca73ef5aa1f8c5155f23.pdf",
          "images": null
        },
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "filename": "files/20000417_97-359_34e34fbcb26cf28a4d21ca73ef5aa1f8c5155f23.html"
        }
      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}