{
  "id": "97-586",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "97-586",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 316310,
      "date": "1997-05-23",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:58:49.853941",
      "title": "Russia's Nuclear Forces: Doctrine and Force Structure Issues",
      "summary": "This document also available in  PDF Image .\n  In 1991, the Russian Federation inherited most of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons, nuclear\ncommand and control system, and nuclear doctrine and employment strategy. It has altered both the\nnuclear doctrine and force structure in response to domestic economic pressures and its evolving\nposition in the international environment.\n  Russia has placed a greater reliance on nuclear weapons than did the Soviet Union, both as a\nmeasure of its superpower status and as a deterrent to a wide range of challenges and conflicts. \nWhere the Soviet Union focussed on the prospects of a global conflict, Russia focuses more on\nemerging regional threats and challenges. And, although the Soviet Union stated that it  would\nnot \nuse nuclear weapons first, it did plan to use these weapons early and offensively if a conflict\noccurred. Russia, in contrast, has stated that it  would  consider first use of nuclear\nweapons if its\nconventional forces were inadequate for its defense. This is worrisome because severe financial\nshortages have undermined the combat capabilities of Russia's conventional forces. Many in Russia\nbelieve that the threat to use nuclear weapons as a last resort will deter regional adversaries and\nprotect Russia's national security interests.\n  Russia has continued a process begun by the Soviet Union to reduce and consolidate its nuclear\nforces. It has removed all the former Soviet nuclear weapons from the non-Russian former Soviet\nrepublics and it has proceeded with the reductions mandated by the START I Treaty. Russia has\ncontinued to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, although at a slower rate than did the Soviet\nUnion, by producing new single-warhead ICBMs, a new ballistic missile submarine, and new\nsubmarine launched ballistic missiles. It has also continued work on some Soviet-era underground\ndefense facilities. Russia has also continued to exercise and test its strategic forces and troops. \nRussian officials claim that the results of these exercises demonstrate that Russia's nuclear forces\nremain potent and reliable. Nevertheless, sharp economic constraints have slowed Russia's\nmodernization programs and raised questions about the future viability of Russia's nuclear forces. \nNumerous concerns have surfaced about the status and reliability of Russia's nuclear command and\ncontrol system.\n  The economic pressures on Russia's forces may increase the prospects for further negotiated\nreductions in strategic offensive forces. Russia would find it difficult to maintain its forces at\nSTART I levels for any length of time because many of its existing systems have neared the end of\ntheir service lives. But Russia might also find it difficult to keep its forces at START II levels, if that\ntreaty enters into force, unless it keeps some of its missiles with multiple warheads. This would\nviolate the terms of the treaty but would be far less costly than an effort to produce hundreds of new\nsingle-warhead ICBMs. On the other hand, if the United States and Russia agree to further\nreductions under a START III treaty, Russia could retire its older weapons systems and deploy a\ntreaty-compliant force without producing large numbers of new missiles.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
      "formats": [
        {
          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/97-586",
          "sha1": "603ef013a8803f9857525249f837924791a44958",
          "filename": "files/19970523_97-586_603ef013a8803f9857525249f837924791a44958.pdf",
          "images": null
        },
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "filename": "files/19970523_97-586_603ef013a8803f9857525249f837924791a44958.html"
        }
      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": []
}