{
  "id": "97-668",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "97-668",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 101230,
      "date": "1998-02-26",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:56:10.974941",
      "title": "NATO Expansion: Cost Issues",
      "summary": "During their December 1997 summit in Brussels, members of the North Atlantic Treaty\nOrganization\n(NATO) signed protocols that would add three countries -- Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary\n-- to the alliance; the national legislatures of the current 16 current member countries must now\napprove the enlargement; one major question being considered is how much expansion might cost. \n  Early in 1997, the Clinton Administration sent to Congress a report detailing its rationale and\ncost estimates for NATO enlargement. The report noted that, with the collapse of the Soviet threat,\nNATO has reoriented itself from a static defense posture suitable during the Cold War to a more\nflexible and mobile set of capabilities to respond to different types of threats. The Administration\nmaintains that this \"new strategic concept\" dovetails with the task of extending NATO membership\nto new entrants through measures that will permit them to defend themselves and integrate with\nNATO forces, and through enhancing the alliance's ability to project ground and air power. The\nreport estimated enlargement costs (between 1997 and 2009) at $27-35 billion. Of this, the U.S.\nshare is projected to be $1.5-2.0 billion. \n  Two other U.S. organizations, RAND and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), also\nestimated expansion costs, but used a wider range of threat assumptions and scenarios and came up\nwith different results. The RAND cost estimates ranged from $10-110 billion, while CBO costs\nwere from $21 billion to $125 billion. Although the RAND authors present a series of increasingly\nambitious deployments, their report highlights a $42 billion, joint (air/ground) power projection\nprogram, similar to the type of defense posture outlined by the Clinton Administration. It appears\nthat if the CBO had used the same reduced threat assumption for its comparable defense posture, its\nestimate would have been over $60 billion. Part of the cost disparity may arise from different\nperceptions of what constitutes an \"adequate\" defense. Also, it would appear that more micro-level\nassumptions -- those regarding specific types of weapon systems and equipment necessary -- can\nhave a major effect on aggregate costs. \n  In December 1997, NATO announced that its staff had estimated the 10-year cost of\nenlargement at $1.5 billion. Unlike the other studies, this one did not include the aggregate\ndeployment expenses of individual member countries, but focused strictly on increased costs for\nNATO's common budget to fund programs for new members. The U.S. Department of Defense\nreportedly has concurred with the new NATO estimate. \n  As they debate expansion, policymakers may encounter some longer-term issues that will affect\ncosts, including: the timing of expenditures associated with expansion; possible economic benefits\nfor the United States; the ability of Russia to rebuild its armed forces; future rounds of NATO\nexpansion; alliance burdensharing, and political pressures.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}