{ "id": "97-799", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "97-799", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 100725, "date": "1997-08-21", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:57:56.081941", "title": "Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues -- Background and Recent Developments", "summary": "For many years, NATO allies Greece and Turkey have been adversaries in bilateral disputes\nwhich have produced crises and even brought them to the brink of war. One series of disputes\ninvolves Aegean Sea borders. The two disagree over the border in the air, continental shelf, and\nterritorial sea, over the status of islands in the Sea, and over the ownership of Aegean islets. \n In the aftermath of a January 1996 crisis over the sovereignty of the Imia/Kardak islet, various\ndispute resolution initiatives were undertaken. NATO proposed military-related confidence-building\nmeasures, some of which are being implemented. The President of the European Union Council of\nMinisters proposed a committee of wise men, which was accepted in the form of Greek and Turkish\ncommittees of experts who are exchanging views via the President. In March 1996, Turkey\nsuggested ways to address Aegean issues. A year later, Greece made a decisive overture that\naccelerated bilateral diplomacy. Finally, in July 1997, the United States instigated a joint Greek-\nTurkish declaration of principles that is said to equal a non-aggression pact. The principles have yet\nto be applied to specific Aegean disputes.\n Whether or not Greece and Turkey want to change the nature of their relations and resolve the\nAegean disputes is uncertain. Strong motivations to resolve exist. Greece wants to meet the criteria\nfor joining the European Monetary Union and must control defense spending to do so. It can only\ncut defense spending if the \"Turkish threat\" recedes. Greece also wants to cultivate a more positive\nimage in European circles and its relations with Turkey are an impediment. Turkish secularists want\nto be part of Europe and to stop Greek use of the veto in the European Union as a weapon in bilateral\ndisputes. The influential Turkish military may favor a rapprochement with Athens. In both\ncountries, however, there may be domestic political constraints on policy change. In Greece, the\nlegacy of former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who asserted that Turkey is the greatest threat\nto Greece, affects the current government's maneuverability. In Turkey, nationalist former Prime\nMinister Bulent Ecevit is now Deputy Prime Minister and the government's primary foreign policy\nspokesman, and there is no new thinking in Ankara to match that of Athens.\n The United States wants stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and, after the Imia/Kardak crisis,\nsought to become more active in dispute resolution. U.S. neutrality in the crisis, however, was\nperceived in Greece as favoritism toward Turkey and prevented the United States from engaging\nimmediately. The U.S. desire to be a force for positive change persevered and reached fruition with\nthe Madrid declaration in July 1997. The United States is determined to stay on course and work\nwith the parties to apply the Madrid principles to specific disputes.\n The prospects for Aegean resolutions are better now than they have been in years, but domestic\npolitical developments in both Greece and Turkey could affect the outlook detrimentally.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/97-799", "sha1": "fafae64b4eb0fd47a3dca6e697546ff66311c8a3", "filename": "files/19970821_97-799_fafae64b4eb0fd47a3dca6e697546ff66311c8a3.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/19970821_97-799_fafae64b4eb0fd47a3dca6e697546ff66311c8a3.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "European Affairs", "Foreign Affairs", "Middle Eastern Affairs", "National Defense" ] }