{ "id": "97-820", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "97-820", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 314696, "date": "1997-09-04", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:57:50.004941", "title": "Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse?", "summary": "All quantitative indicators show a sharp, and in most cases an accelerating, decline in the size\nof the\nRussian armed forces. Since 1986, Russian military manpower has decreased by over 70 percent;\ntanks and other armored vehicles by two-thirds; and artillery, combat aircraft, and surface warships\nby one-third. Weapons procurement has been plummeting for over a decade. In some key\ncategories, such as aircraft, tanks, and surface warships, procurement has virtually stopped. This has\nled not only to a decline in present inventory, but implies a long-term crisis of bloc obsolescence in\nthe future. Russian Government decisions and the budget deficit crisis have hit the Ministry of\nDefense very hard, cutting defense spending drastically and transforming the Defense Ministry into\na residual claimant on scarce resources. Many experts believe that if these budgetary constraints\ncontinue for 2-3 more years, they must lead either to more drastic force reductions or to military\ncollapse.\n Military capabilities are also in decline. Reportedly, few, if any, of Russia's army divisions are\ncombat-ready. Field exercises, flight training, and out-of-area naval deployments have been sharply\nreduced. Morale is low, partly because of non-payment of servicemen's salaries. Draft evasion and\ndesertion are rising. Half the officers say they plan to quit the military in 1998.\n Despite these problems, the Russian Army can be formidable vis-\u00e0-vis weak neighbors\n such\nas the Baltic states. Russian forces are dominant in the Caucasus and Moldova, and are a key factor\nin Central Asia, but seem less useful vis-\u00e0-vis Ukraine. The Russian Army, however, has\nlittle\ncapability to threaten Central and Eastern Europe and is no longer dominant in East Asia.\n The Yeltsin regime appears to have concluded that to the extent that it faces a security threat,\nit is more an internal than an external threat. It has taken better care of internal security forces than\nthe army. The armed forces are becoming more politicized. Many U.S. and Russian specialists warn\nof a military calamity (implosion, mutiny, or coup) if present trends continue. \n As concern about the military crisis intensified in 1997, the Yeltsin regime said military reform\nwas a top priority. Plans were announced to further reduce the size of the army, consolidate military\nservices and command structures, pay all military salary arrearages, and move toward an all-\nvolunteer force that is more compact and mobile. There is widespread resistance to the proposed\nreforms within the military and from opposition political parties, calling into question whether and\nto what extent the reforms will be implemented.\n Estimates are that, at the soonest, it might take Russia ten years to rebuild its conventional\nmilitary capabilities. Compared to the cold war era, the military threat to the West is greatly reduced,\nwhile warning time is greatly increased. There is a danger, however, that Russia might become\nembroiled in a military conflict on its", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/97-820", "sha1": "1c5ffc47f9b832324fa5b29bfee9862367aa9e32", "filename": "files/19970904_97-820_1c5ffc47f9b832324fa5b29bfee9862367aa9e32.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/19970904_97-820_1c5ffc47f9b832324fa5b29bfee9862367aa9e32.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Economic Policy", "Foreign Affairs", "National Defense", "Russian, Central Asian, and Eurasian Affairs" ] }