{
  "id": "98-41",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "98-41",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 105130,
      "date": "1998-01-14",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:56:38.063941",
      "title": "Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Forces Doing Too Much?",
      "summary": "Are U.S. forces doing too much? Arguably. Although the armed forces of the United States are\nmeeting mission requirements while maintaining an acceptable level of readiness, indications are that\nunder the current strategy, with existing forces postured and organized for high intensity conflict,\nthe sustainment of both high levels of activity and high readiness will be difficult. Whether or not\nU.S. forces can continue to sustain the current level of effort is an open question. With either the\naddition of new global commitments, a reduction in available forces, or a decrease in funding,\nreadiness may be in jeopardy. Under different strategies, readiness could be more sustainable but\nthe level of risk to U.S. interests may increase. Reductions in force structure or funding without\ncommensurate reductions in assigned missions may, regardless of the overall strategy, jeopardize\nreadiness and operations. \n  This issue is in a new context for U.S. forces: peacetime operations are larger, longer, more\nintense, and more complex than ever; the stockpiled capacity of the global-war-based force is\ndiminished; high levels of activity may no longer equate to high readiness; and the force structure\nhas decreased more than the infrastructure. With the size of current commitments larger than\nanticipated in the Bottom Up Review, workloads on the smaller force are demonstrably higher. U.S.\nmilitary power designed to react to threats is now more often a proactive tool of foreign policy. \nCompetition for resources between new missions and standing requirements is heightened by open-\nended operations and the needs of regional commanders.  It is difficult to assess the stress in\nthis new\ncontext as measurements of both activity and readiness need improvement; there is no \"Opportunity\nCost\" evaluation; and no clear picture of what constitutes a sustainable level of effort.  \n  Understanding the new demands is the first step toward resolution. Measures are OPTEMPO\nfor the rate of unit activity, and PERSTEMPO for the sum of all individual absences and activity. \nTempos are too high/low if they are causing forces to lose their capacity to sustain operations and\nmeet crises. Tempos affect the dynamic relationship of budget, readiness, and force structure\ndecisions and bear attention in these areas: readiness, quality of life, modernization, personnel, and\nretention. The most significant negative impact of tempos that are too high is the reduction in time\nand resources for relevant, necessary training, the basis of readiness and long-term effectiveness. \nOver time, the continual wear on personnel and their families may result in difficulties retaining and\nrecruiting high quality volunteers.\n  Areas of congressional action bearing on readiness concern the National Guard and Reserve,\nmilitary infrastructure, military end-strength, specialized units and equipment, incentives, increased\nreporting to Congress by DoD, and the option of ending operations that are not moving toward a\npredefined \"Exit.\" Oversight areas include validating employment concepts, considering resources\nfor training while deployed, reviewing and setting minimum training time guidelines, prioritization\nof, and early determination of, exercise requirements, determining the number and duration of\nrequired inspections, and ascertaining and allowing appropriate \"down time\" for units following\ndeployments.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/98-41",
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}