{
  "id": "98-56",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "98-56",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 105166,
      "date": "1998-01-16",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:56:35.994941",
      "title": "The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Proposed Quota Increase: Issues for Congress",
      "summary": "The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the international lender-of-last-resort. Each of the\n182\nmembers of the IMF have a \"quota,\" which broadly reflects the size of its economy and its relative\nposition in the world economy. Among other things, quotas determine the size of a country's\ncontribution to the IMF's capital. Thus, they provide the funds out of which the IMF makes its\nloans. \n  Under the IMF's Articles of Agreement, a general review of the adequacy of the IMF's quota\nresources must be conducted at least every five years. The Eleventh General Quota Review has just\nbeen completed with a recommendation that quotas be increased by 45 percent. This would result\nin an SDR 66 billion increase (about $88 billion) in total IMF quotas, to SDR 212 billion ($283\nbillion).\n  The U.S. quota would increase by SDR 10.6 billion ($14.2 billion), to SDR 37.1 billion ($49.7\nbillion). The U.S. share of total quotas would drop from 18.1 percent to 17.5 percent. The United\nStates, which would continue to have the largest quota, would retain its veto over major decisions\nin the IMF. Under the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, U.S. participation in the proposed quota\nincrease must be authorized by Congress. In addition, under a compromise formula reached in 1980,\nthe necessary funds must be appropriated.\n  Current proposals for funding the IMF -- an increase in quotas and the \"New Arrangements to\nBorrow\" (NAB) -- raise a variety of serious issues, including:\n    contagion : how to prevent the spread of financial difficulties from\none market\nand economy to others in an integrated world economy;  \n    moral hazard : whether \"bailouts\" and IMF financing, by sending the\nwrong\nsignals, encourage precisely the type of economic behavior that they were meant to\ndeter;  \n    conditionality : whether the economic policy changes and\nperformance targets\nthat the IMF requires of its borrowers in return for a loan are appropriate and\neffective;  \n    transparency : whether information on IMF program design, in\nparticular, and\ngovernment economic and financial information and data, in general, are accurate, timely, and widely\navailable to the public, including investors, so as to allow for more accurate assessment and greater\naccountability; and, finally,  \n    asymmetry : the relative lack of leverage of the IMF over its non-\nborrowing members and the resulting limitation on its ability to prevent crises.  \n  The crisis in Asia is eroding the IMF's financial base. Its \"usable\" resources are estimated to\nbe not more than about $38.4 billion, with a liquidity ratio of 79.1%, and may be considerably less. \nBoth are approaching historically low levels.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Economic Policy",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Industry and Trade"
  ]
}