{
  "id": "98-672",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "98-672",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 103800,
      "date": "1998-08-11",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:52:49.867941",
      "title": "U.S. Intelligence and India's Nuclear Tests: Lessons Learned",
      "summary": "The U.S. Intelligence Community did not have advance knowledge that India intended to\nconduct\nnuclear tests beginning on May 11, 1998. Although intelligence agencies cannot have\nforeknowledge of every significant development in world affairs, many observers (and senior\nintelligence officials) believe that, in view of the election of an Indian government committed to\n\"inducting\" nuclear weapons, much greater attention should have been given to indications of\nimpending nuclear tests. A commission headed by retired Admiral David Jeremiah reviewed the\nIntelligence Community's performance and recommended a number of measures to improve future\nperformance. Some of the most important of these were addressed in the FY1997 Intelligence\nAuthorization Act ( P.L. 104-293 ) but implementing the legislation has been delayed as filling key\npositions has been delayed. A persisting problem is the tendency of analysts to discount seemingly\nirrational initiatives by other countries.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
      "formats": [
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          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/98-672",
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          "filename": "files/19980811_98-672_fab899e7514f8c944024bf5f0ff791a484f4f5b9.pdf",
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      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}