{
  "id": "98-837",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "98-837",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 105244,
      "date": "1998-10-01",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:51:14.759941",
      "title": "Taiwan: The \"Three No's,\" Congressional-Administration Differences, and U.S. Policy Issues",
      "summary": "The controversy between the Clinton Administration and congressional critics over President\nClinton's public affirmation in Shanghai on June 30, 1998 of the so-called \"three no's\" regarding U.S.\npolicy toward Taiwan is the latest episode in over 20 years of arguments between the Administration\nand the Congress over appropriate U.S. policy in the U.S.-People's Republic of China (PRC)-Taiwan\nrelationship. The \"three no's\" involve U.S. non-support for: Taiwan independence; one China, one\nTaiwan; and Taiwan representation in international organizations where statehood is a requirement.\n  Administration supporters argue that the \"three no's\" are consistent with past U.S. statements,\nand do little damage to U.S. interests in Taiwan while discouraging movement in Taiwan toward\npolitical independence that might prompt a hostile PRC response. In contrast, many in Congress\nviewed the President as sacrificing U.S. interests and those of Taiwan for the sake of a smooth\nsummit meeting in China. In response, they criticized the \"three no's\" and proposed resolutions in\nthe Senate and House reaffirming support for Taiwan. The resolutions ( S.Con.Res. 107 ;\n S.Con.Res. 30 ; and  H.Con.Res. 301 ) passed in the weeks following the\nPresident's China trip.\n  Sometimes acrimonious congressional-executive debate over the appropriate balance in U.S.\npolicy toward Beijing and Taipei dates back at least to the 1970s, before the normalization of U.S.\nrelations with the PRC and the cut off of official U.S. relations with Taiwan. The debate results from\nthe executive branch's tendency to give priority to relations with Beijing over relations with Taiwan,\nand the Congress' tendency to be more receptive to Taiwan concerns regardless of PRC sensitivities;\nfrom often intense PRC-Taiwan competition for international, especially U.S., support; and from \nambiguity in U.S. policy which appears at times to tilt in favor of PRC-backed positions but\nconcurrently also strongly supports Taiwan.\n  As Congress considers whether and how to further adjust U.S. policy in the wake of President\nClinton's statement of the \"three no's,\" it can consider sets of questions in key areas of policy concern,\nnotably: the impact of the President's \"three no's\" declaration; the consequences of PRC-Taiwan\nrivalry for U.S. and other international support; prospects for parallel U.S. engagement with both\nBeijing and Taipei; the PRC-Taiwan military balance; the U.S. role in promoting PRC-Taiwan talks\nto ease tensions and promote better relations; and the U.S. policy approach toward Taiwan self-\ndetermination.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/98-837",
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}