{ "id": "98-931", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "98-931", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 105279, "date": "1998-11-19", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:48:50.921941", "title": "East Asia and the Pacific: Issues at the End of the 105th Congress", "summary": "U.S. policy in East Asia and the Pacific since the end of the cold war is subject to often\ncompeting\npulls from U.S. economic, security and political interests. Nonetheless, workable agreement has been\nreached on keeping some U.S. military forces actively involved in the region, keeping U.S. markets\nopen to regional exports, and toning down at least temporarily earlier U.S. emphasis on human rights\nand other values in policy toward China and some other regional states.\n Interviews with twenty-five congressional staff members of both parties and both chambers who\ndeal directly with issues in U.S. policy toward East Asia and the Pacific revealed sharp differences\non appropriate U.S. policy on many sensitive issues. But the September-October 1998 interviews\nalso showed several areas of broad agreement on features of Clinton Administration and\ncongressional decision-making, and general priorities for U.S. policy attention:\n Clinton Administration policies were widely seen as reactive, showing episodic\nattention, and lacking an overall strategic framework. Some Administration supporters in Congress\njudged that strict policy coherence and consistent high-level attention were unlikely and unwarranted,\nespecially given other U.S. priorities. They added that the \"bottom line\" results of U.S. regional\npolicy have been good for U.S. interests, an evaluation not shared by its\ncritics. \n Congress played a secondary role to the Administration in conducting foreign\npolicy. Some staff were sharply critical of alleged congressional ignorance and incompetence, but\nmost strongly supported congressional activism in regional policy. Acting upon differences over\npolicy, alleged partisan interests, and concern over perceived Administration shortcomings, Congress\nused funding, appointment decisions, oversight, and other powers to influence U.S.\npolicy. \n There was a major split in Congress between those who relied mainly on greater\nU.S. economic engagement to secure U.S. interests in regional prosperity and peace; and those who\nargued that such interchange must be accompanied by vigorous U.S. political and security measures\nto press for change in those areas. A third view--seeking broad U.S. disengagement from the region--\nwas not favored by those interviewed but was said to enjoy important influence in\nCongress. \n Issues in U.S. policy toward northeast Asia had clear priority over issues in\nsoutheast Asia. The confrontation with North Korea was often cited as the most dangerous military\nflashpoint; U.S. relations with China were seen by many as posing the most important long-term\nstrategic challenge for U.S. interests. The broad Asian economic crisis and frustrations in U.S.-Japan\neconomic relations headed the list of priority issues for several of those interviewed. Other\nhighlighted issues included movements away from free market practices in southeast Asia; poverty\nand dislocation in Indonesia; and rising U.S. trade deficits with Japan, China, and some other regional\neconomies.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/98-931", "sha1": "2b33627acb279a8c5532966f7930aab439ec899e", "filename": "files/19981119_98-931_2b33627acb279a8c5532966f7930aab439ec899e.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/19981119_98-931_2b33627acb279a8c5532966f7930aab439ec899e.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Economic Policy", "Foreign Affairs", "National Defense" ] }