{ "id": "IN10634", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN10634", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 462506, "date": "2017-07-11", "retrieved": "2017-12-14T14:35:28.789224", "title": "Overview of U.S. Sanctions Regimes on Russia", "summary": "Background\nOn December 29, 2016, President Barack Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for malicious cyber activity. These were the latest in a series of U.S. sanctions regimes that have been imposed on Russia over the last several years in response to activities that are state-sponsored or allegedly conducted by government officials. In addition, a number of Russian individuals and entities are subject to sanctions for terrorism, transnational crime, and weapons proliferation.\nThe United States\u2019 use of economic sanctions in furtherance of national security or foreign policy is implemented, primarily, by the Departments of State (visas, arms embargos, arms sales, foreign aid, and in limited circumstances, prohibiting the use of U.S. passports to travel), Commerce (commercial exports), Defense (arms sales), Justice (investigation and prosecution), and the Treasury (blocking assets, prohibiting transactions, licensing export transactions, financial services, and in limited circumstances, restricting transactions related to travel). Interagency consulting occurs in implementing and administering any economic sanctions regime. \nIn the 115th Congress, Members are considering legislation (for example, title II of S. 722) to strengthen sanctions imposed on Russia related to its invasion of Ukraine and cyber intrusions, and to require sanctions on Russia for other activities, including human rights abuses, corruption, and material support of the government of Syria.\nUkraine \nSince 2014, the United States has imposed sanctions on almost 600 individuals and entities in response to Russia\u2019s annexation of Ukraine\u2019s Crimea region and its subsequent support of separatists in eastern Ukraine (see CRS In Focus IF10552, U.S. Sanctions on Russia Related to the Ukraine Conflict). The United States, in coordination with the European Union and others, promised to impose increasing costs on Russia until it \u201cabides by its international obligations and returns its military forces to their original bases and respects Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty and territorial integrity.\u201d \nThese sanctions derive from a series of executive orders issued in 2014, when President Obama declared Russia\u2019s activities in Ukraine to constitute a threat to U.S. national security. Sanctions apply to a number of Russian officials and members of Putin\u2019s \u201cinner circle,\u201d as well as to key financial, defense, and energy companies, and companies that do business in Crimea. Legislation (P.L. 113-95, P.L. 113-272) that partially codifies these executive orders includes mandatory and discretionary sanctions. The legislation also specifically requires sanctions against state-run arms exporter Rosoboronexport; Russian entities that transfer weapons to Syria, Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova; and Gazprom, if it is found to withhold natural gas from NATO member states. \nIn addition to Treasury blocking assets and State denying visas, Treasury restricts transactions related to investment and financing for five state-controlled banks; transactions related to financing for a major state-controlled defense conglomerate and four energy companies; and transactions related to deepwater, Arctic offshore, and shale oil exploration projects. The Departments of State and Commerce, in addition, deny export licenses for military, dual-use, and energy-related goods for designated end-users (almost 200 in all, most of which are also subject to Treasury-administered sanctions).\nMalicious Cyber Activity\nIn December 2016, the Obama Administration identified four individuals and five entities as \u201ctampering with, altering, or causing a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions.\u201d Designees include Russia\u2019s leading spy agency (Federal Security Service, or FSB), military intelligence (Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU), and senior GRU officials (including its head). In addition, two individuals are subject to sanctions for malicious cyber activity unrelated to elections. Designees are subject to sanctions\u2014blocking of assets under U.S. jurisdiction, prohibitions on transactions with U.S. persons, and denial of entry into the United States.\nHuman Rights \nCongress enacted the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (title IV, P.L. 112-208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) to require the President to identify the person(s) involved in the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky, and the ensuing cover-up, or who are \u201cresponsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights\u201d in Russia. Designees are subject to sanctions\u2014blocking of assets and visa denial. To date, 44 individuals are subject to Magnitsky sanctions.\nSyria \nA series of executive orders impose sanctions on the Syrian government and its supporters. Russian designees include the private bank Tempbank and its managers, and the Russian Financial Alliance (RFA) Bank, including shareholder Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, a former regional politician (and the World Chess Federation president). The Central Bank of Russia revoked RFA Bank\u2019s license in December 2016.\nTerrorism and Transnational Crime\nTreasury\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control has identified several Russian individuals and entities, and foreign nationals with Russian addresses, under other sanctions regimes premised on legislative requirements or Executive Orders. The designations are primarily part of sanctions regimes related to terrorism and transnational crime, and are subject to restrictions on access to assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited from engaging in transactions with U.S. persons.\nWeapons Proliferators\nSeveral laws require the President, when he determines that trade occurs in weapons of mass destruction or advanced conventional weapons, to impose economic sanctions on those engaged in the trade\u2014individuals, entities, or states, depending on the activity\u2014of 1-to-2 years\u2019 duration. Restrictions cover a range, but generally include a cutoff of procurement contracts with the U.S. government. \nPursuant to requirements of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 109-353; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), for example, U.S. government procurement contracts, certain export licenses, U.S. foreign aid, and trade in U.S. Munitions List-controlled goods and services are not available to Rosoboronexport (with exceptions), nor to a number of Russian defense companies. In addition, Russia\u2019s Independent Petroleum Company of Moscow is subject to sanctions related to North Korea\u2019s weapons activities pursuant to authorities enacted in the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122; 22 U.S.C. 9201 et seq.).\nOther Restrictions Based on Export Controls\nThe Department of Commerce\u2019s Bureau of Industry Security (BIS) controls exports to Russia based on a matrix of end-user, end-use (with possible dual-use applications), various obligations defined by treaties and international agreements related to controls for weapons proliferation, and national security and foreign policy determinations. Restrictions identify end-users, military end-use, sectors, and regions (the latter two triggered by Ukraine events). Russia is also defined as a country for which national security controls are in place, and for which nuclear-related exports are controlled, to meet obligations to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.\nRestrictions on U.S. Government Funding\nForeign aid and State Department programs benefiting Russia are significantly constrained in current foreign operations appropriations (P.L. 115-31, \u00a77015(f), \u00a77070). There are also restrictions on Defense and Energy appropriations (P.L. 115-31, divisions C and D, respectively). Finally, Russia is identified as failing to meet minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking, which requires limits on aid and cultural exchanges, the latter of which is waived for U.S. national interests.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10634", "sha1": "cf3b6c03c7dfa8661dadcbcc5b00ea991a5166b1", "filename": "files/20170711_IN10634_cf3b6c03c7dfa8661dadcbcc5b00ea991a5166b1.html", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 458168, "date": "2017-01-11", "retrieved": "2017-03-31T19:03:13.898766", "title": "Overview of U.S. Sanctions Regimes on Russia", "summary": "Background\nOn December 29, 2016, President Barack Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for malicious cyber activity. These are the latest in a series of U.S. sanctions regimes that have been imposed on Russia over the last several years in response to activities that are state-sponsored or allegedly conducted by government officials. In addition, a number of Russian individuals and entities are subject to sanctions for terrorism, transnational crime, and weapons proliferation.\nThe United States\u2019 use of economic sanctions in furtherance of national security or foreign policy is implemented, primarily, by the Departments of State (visas, arms embargos, arms sales, foreign aid, and in limited circumstances, prohibiting the use of U.S. passports to travel), Commerce (commercial exports), Defense (arms sales), Justice (investigation and prosecution), and the Treasury (blocking assets, prohibiting transactions, licensing export transactions, financial services, and in limited circumstances, restricting transactions related to travel). Interagency consulting occurs in implementing and administering any economic sanctions regime. \nIn the 115th Congress, Members are drafting legislation to require sanctions on Russia for its cyber intrusions and other aggressive activities (pending in the Senate), and election interference (pending in the House).\nMalicious Cyber Activity\nThe Obama Administration has identified four individuals and five entities as \u201ctampering with, altering, or causing a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions.\u201d Designees include Russia\u2019s leading spy agency (Federal Security Service, or FSB), military intelligence (Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU), and senior GRU officials (including its head). In addition, two individuals are subject to sanctions for malicious cyber activity unrelated to elections. Designees are subject to sanctions\u2014blocking of assets under U.S. jurisdiction, prohibitions on transactions with U.S. persons, and denial of entry into the United States.\nHuman Rights \nCongress enacted the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (title IV, P.L. 112-208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) to require the President to identify the person(s) involved in the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky, and the ensuing cover-up, or who are \u201cresponsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights\u201d in Russia. Designees are subject to sanctions\u2014blocking of assets and visa denial. To date, 44 individuals are subject to Magnitsky sanctions.\nUkraine \nSince 2014, the United States has imposed sanctions on over 520 individuals and entities in response to Russia\u2019s invasion and annexation of Ukraine\u2019s Crimea region and support of separatist militants in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (see CRS In Focus IF10552, U.S. Sanctions on Russia Related to the Ukraine Conflict). The United States, in coordination with the European Union and others, promised to impose increasing costs on Russia until it \u201cabides by its international obligations and returns its military forces to their original bases and respects Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty and territorial integrity.\u201d \nThese sanctions derive from a series of executive orders issued in 2014, when President Obama declared Russia\u2019s activities in Ukraine to constitute a threat to U.S. national security. Sanctions apply to a number of Russian officials and members of Putin\u2019s \u201cinner circle,\u201d as well as to key financial, defense, and energy companies, and companies that do business in Crimea. Legislation (P.L. 113-95, P.L. 113-272) that partially codifies these executive orders includes mandatory and discretionary sanctions. The legislation also specifically requires sanctions against state-run arms exporter Rosoboronexport; Russian entities that transfer weapons to Syria, Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova; and Gazprom, if it is found to withhold natural gas from NATO member states. \nIn addition to Treasury blocking assets and State denying visas, Treasury restricts transactions related to investment and debt-holding for five state-controlled banks; transactions related to debt-holding for a major state-controlled defense conglomerate and four energy companies; and transactions related to deepwater, Arctic offshore, and shale oil exploration projects. The Departments of State and Commerce, in addition, deny export licenses for military, dual-use, and energy-related goods for Crimea-located and other designated end-users (over 160 in all, most of which are also subject to Treasury-administered sanctions).\nSyria \nA series of executive orders impose sanctions on the Syrian government and its supporters. Russian designees include the private bank Tempbank and its managers, and Russian Financial Alliance Bank, including shareholder Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, a former regional politician (and the World Chess Federation president).\nTerrorism and Transnational Crime\nTreasury\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control has identified several Russian individuals and entities, and foreign nationals with Russian addresses, under other sanctions regimes premised on legislative requirements or Executive Orders. The designations are primarily part of sanctions regimes related to terrorism and transnational crime, and are subject to restrictions on access to assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited from engaging in transactions with U.S. persons.\nWeapons Proliferators\nSeveral laws require the President, when he determines that trade occurs in weapons of mass destruction or advanced conventional weapons, to impose economic sanctions on those engaged in the trade\u2014individuals, entities, or states, depending on the activity\u2014of 1-to-2 years\u2019 duration. Restrictions cover a range, but generally include a cutoff of procurement contracts with the U.S. government. \nPursuant to requirements of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 109-353; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), for example, U.S. government procurement contracts, certain export licenses, U.S. foreign aid, and trade in U.S. Munitions List-controlled goods and services are not available to Rosoboronexport (with exceptions), nor to a number of Russian defense companies. \nOther Restrictions Based on Export Controls\nThe Department of Commerce\u2019s Bureau of Industry Security (BIS) controls exports to Russia based on a matrix of end-user, end-use (with possible dual-use applications), various obligations defined by treaties and international agreements related to controls for weapons proliferation, and national security and foreign policy determinations. Restrictions identify end-users, military end-use, sectors, and regions (the latter two triggered by Ukraine events). Russia is also defined as a country for which national security controls are in place, and for which nuclear-related exports are controlled, to meet obligations to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.\nRestrictions on U.S. Government Funding\nForeign aid and State Department programs benefiting Russia are significantly constrained in current foreign operations appropriations (P.L. 114-113; \u00a77015(f), \u00a77070). There are also restrictions on Defense and Energy appropriations (P.L. 114-92). Finally, Russia is identified as failing to meet minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking, which requires limits on aid and cultural exchanges, the latter of which is waived for U.S. national interests.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10634", "sha1": "8c84372d0f73cb9c45f6bf6a8b10219ddcc9b3d6", "filename": "files/20170111_IN10634_8c84372d0f73cb9c45f6bf6a8b10219ddcc9b3d6.html", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Appropriations", "CRS Insights", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }