{ "id": "IN10699", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN10699", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 461401, "date": "2017-05-22", "retrieved": "2017-10-02T23:00:49.473574", "title": "Iran\u2019s Presidential Elections", "summary": "Election and Implications\nIranians went to the polls on May 19, 2017, to vote for president and municipal officials countrywide amid tensions between Iran and the United States. With a 73% turnout of eligible voters, Iran\u2019s Interior Ministry declared the incumbent President Hassan Rouhani the winner late on May 19, winning 57% of the vote to that of his strongest competitor, Ibrahim Raisi, who garnered 38% of the vote. Remaining candidates and invalid votes accounted for the remainder. \nIn 2013, Rouhani received 50.7% of the votes, narrowly avoiding a run-off in a divided field that included several hardline candidates. In contrast to his 2013 victory, Rouhani faced a unified hardline field. Responding to calls from hardliners seeking to improve Raisi\u2019s chances, Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf, the other hardliner approved to run, exited the race on May 15. The four other candidates approved to run subsequently either dropped out, or remained in the race but endorsed one of the two top candidates. Iranian polls indicated that Rouhani was likely to prevail, but polling in Iran is widely considered to be unreliable. Rouhani warned against the state apparatus working on behalf of Raisi, including tasking the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Basij militia to transport Raisi voters to the polls or try to intimidate voters in cities where Rouhani supporters are prevalent. \nRouhani\u2019s victory virtually ensures that Iran will continue to adhere to the multilateral nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). However, it is less certain whether he will be able to implement campaign promises to loosen restrictions on free expression or engage the United States on a broader range of issues than the JCPOA. Because Iran\u2019s national security policy is primarily within the purview of the Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene\u2019i (who is Commander-in-Chief of Iran\u2019s armed forces), Rouhani is unlikely to be able to alter Iran\u2019s regional activities that the Trump Administration has termed provocative, including missile tests and support for regional allies that act against U.S. interests or allies. \nThe Trump Administration has already taken several steps against Iran. On April 19, the Trump Administration certified to Congress, pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17), that Iran is complying with the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement (the JCPOA). Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated, however, that the JCPOA \u201conly delays [Iran\u2019s] goal of becoming a nuclear state\u201d and has failed to curb Iran\u2019s objectionable regional behavior. He announced that the United States\u2019 Iran policy\u2014including the JCPOA\u2014is under review. In recent weeks, the Trump Administration has imposed sanctions on additional entities allegedly supporting Iran\u2019s missile program and has launched strikes on Iran\u2019s key regional ally, Syria, for its use of chemical weapons. Additional sanctions on Iran\u2019s missile program and on the IRGC, such as S. 722 in the Senate, are under consideration. During his late May trip to Saudi Arabia and Israel, President Donald Trump firmly aligned the United States with those two countries\u2019 efforts to counter Iran\u2019s regional influence and gave little, if any, indication of intent to engage Iran diplomatically. \nElection Background\nIran holds presidential elections every four years. The post of president is subordinate to that of Supreme Leader, but Iran\u2019s president has significant influence on economic policy and government operations. Iran\u2019s elections are characterized by the State Department as \u201cfalling short of international standards for free, fair elections,\u201d primarily because a 12-member appointed body called the Council of Guardians vets all election candidates. Approximately 1,600 persons filed to run, including incumbent President Hassan Rouhani. On April 27, the Council of Guardians approved the candidacy of Rouhani and five others\u2014a winnowing of the field that was consistent with past elections. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, a run-off between the two top finishers is to be held less than two weeks later. Aside from Rouhani and Raisi, the other candidates approved to run were Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf, Tehran mayor and a stalwart of the IRGC; Mostafa Mirsalim, the centrist former culture minister; and two moderate candidates, Rouhani\u2019s first Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri and Mostafa Hashemitaba. \nRouhani emphasized to his mainly urban, young, and intellectual supporters that he delivered sanctions relief under the JCPOA and ended Iran\u2019s international isolation. But according to a substantial number of reports, many Iranians are not benefitting significantly from sanctions relief. \nRouhani\u2019s victory was particularly significant in that Raisi is said to be Khamenei\u2019s favorite to succeed him as Supreme Leader. In mid-2016, Khamene\u2019i appointed Raisi, a longtime state prosecutor and judicial official, as head of the large economic conglomerate (Astan-e-Qods Razavi Foundation) centered on the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad. Raisi based his campaign on an appeal to rural and working-class voters, many of whom benefit from regime largesse such as that provided by state-linked foundations and support the Supreme Leader. In addition, Khamene\u2019i\u2019s recent speeches had criticized Rouhani for failing to advance the \u201cresistance economy\u201d\u2014the hardline concept of building up Iran\u2019s domestic industries and reducing reliance on imports. On April 30, 2017, Khamene\u2019i, referring to the JCPOA, stated that \u201cit is not correct\u201d when Rouhani says that since he took office, \u201cthe shadow of war has been faded away.\u201d Despite Khamene\u2019i\u2019s apparent backing, Raisi\u2019s long prior service in the judiciary was widely viewed as harming his prospects\u2014candidates who come from the judiciary and the security apparatus, including the IRGC, have tended to fare poorly in elections. Raisi was part of the judiciary apparatus that allegedly approved the 1988 execution of a significant number of Iranian prisoners. The other hardliner approved to run, Qalibaf, had previously run twice and lost, although he generally received praise for his performance as Tehran\u2019s mayor.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10699", "sha1": "3b771e9e9ec1bedd8337c774bc0a8c63cba4ccd6", "filename": "files/20170522_IN10699_3b771e9e9ec1bedd8337c774bc0a8c63cba4ccd6.html", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 461213, "date": "2017-05-15", "retrieved": "2017-05-16T14:28:15.460173", "title": "Iran\u2019s Presidential Elections", "summary": "Policy Context\nIranian voters go to the polls on May 19, 2017, to vote for president and municipal officials countrywide amid tensions between Iran and the United States. On April 19, the Trump Administration certified to Congress, pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17), that Iran is complying with the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated, however, that the JCPOA \u201conly delays [Iran\u2019s] goal of becoming a nuclear state\u201d and has failed to curb Iran\u2019s objectionable regional behavior. He announced that the United States\u2019 Iran policy\u2014including the JCPOA\u2014is under review. In recent weeks, the Trump Administration has imposed sanctions on additional entities allegedly supporting Iran\u2019s missile program and has launched strikes on Iran\u2019s key regional ally, Syria, for its use of chemical weapons. The Administration reportedly is contemplating increased support for a Saudi-led coalition battling Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nElection Field Finalized\nIran holds presidential elections every four years. The post of president is subordinate to that of \u201cSupreme Leader,\u201d but Iran\u2019s president has significant influence on economic policy and government operations. Iran\u2019s elections are characterized by the State Department as \u201cfalling short of international standards for free, fair elections,\u201d primarily because a 12-member appointed body called the Council of Guardians is empowered to vet all election candidates. Approximately 1,600 persons filed to run, including incumbent President Hassan Rouhani. On April 27, the Council of Guardians approved Rouhani and five other candidates to run\u2014a winnowing of the field that was consistent with past elections. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, a run-off between the two top finishers is to be held less than two weeks later. \nThe other five candidates approved were: Ibrahim Raisi, a purported close ally of the Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene\u2019i; Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf, Tehran mayor and a stalwart of the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Mostafa Mirsalim, the centrist former culture minister; and two moderate candidates, Rouhani\u2019s first Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri and Mostafa Hashemitaba. \nRouhani emphasizes to his mainly urban, young, and intellectual supporters that he delivered sanctions relief under the JCPOA and ended Iran\u2019s international isolation. But, according to a substantial number of reports, many Iranians are not benefitting significantly from sanctions relief, perhaps adversely affecting Rouhani\u2019s election prospects. In 2013, Rouhani received 50.7% of the votes, narrowly avoiding a run-off in a divided field that included several hardline candidates. There are only two hardliners in the 2017 race. One is mid-ranking cleric Ibrahim Raisi, who is said to be Khamenei\u2019s favorite to succeed him as Supreme Leader. In mid-2016, Khamene\u2019i appointed Raisi, a longtime state prosecutor and judicial official, as head of the large economic conglomerate (Astan-e-Qods Razavi Foundation) centered on the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad. Raisi\u2019s fate in the election might determine his chances to eventually succeed Khamene\u2019i. \nRaisi is basing his campaign on an appeal to rural and working class voters, many of whom benefit from regime largesse such as that provided by state-linked foundations such as Astan-e-Qods Razavi and support the Supreme Leader. Khamene\u2019i\u2019s recent speeches have criticized Rouhani for failing to advance the \u201cresistance economy\u201d\u2014the hardline concept of building up Iran\u2019s domestic industries and reducing reliance on imports. On April 30, 2017, Khamene\u2019i, referring to the JCPOA, stated that \u201cit is not correct\u201d when Rouhani says that since he took office, \u201cthe shadow of war has been faded away.\u201d Despite Khamene\u2019i\u2019s apparent backing, Raisi\u2019s long prior service in the judiciary could harm his prospects\u2014candidates who come from the judiciary and the security apparatus, including the IRGC, have tended to fare poorly in elections. Raisi was part of the judiciary apparatus that allegedly approved the 1988 execution of a significant number of Iranian prisoners. The other hardliner approved to run, Qalibaf, has previously run twice and lost, although he generally receives praise for his performance as Tehran\u2019s mayor. \nProspects and Implications\nThe candidate field changed after the approved candidate list was announced. To satisfy hardliners seeking to improve Raisi\u2019s chances, Qalibaf exited the race on May 15. Jahangiri, is widely expected to drop out before the voting to help Rouhani\u2019s chances. On May 15, Hashemitaba said he remains in the race but he endorsed Rouhani. These changes left the election as primarily a contest between Rouhani and Raisi. Mirsalim is widely considered a minor candidate, although he could garner enough votes to deny the two front-runners a first round victory. Iranian polls in May have indicated that Rouhani is likely to prevail. However, polling in Iran is widely considered to be unreliable. There is also the potential for the Supreme Leader and his allies to put the state apparatus to work on behalf of Raisi, including tasking the IRGC and its Basij militia to distribute pro-Raisi leaflets and transport his likely supporters to the polls, and intimidate voters in cities where Rouhani voters are prevalent. \nA Raisi victory would have significant implications for U.S. policy. Even though all the candidates described the JCPOA as an established fixture and would be likely to continue implementing it, a more hardline president might discontinue Rouhani\u2019s efforts to promote diplomatic engagement with the West. A Raisi presidency might also try to remove even those few restraints Rouhani has managed to impose on actions that U.S. officials characterize as provocative. Further provocative actions, which include missile tests and support for regional allies that act against U.S. interests or allies, could put Iran on a collision course with the Trump Administration, which has already taken several steps against Iran, as discussed above. The Trump Administration and Congress are considering imposing new sanctions on Iran\u2019s missile program and on the IRGC, but have refrained from announcing decisions on any possible actions, reportedly to avoid harming Rouhani\u2019s reelection prospects.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10699", "sha1": "eb4152672e1b8c757adcf076384349e996a7d6de", "filename": "files/20170515_IN10699_eb4152672e1b8c757adcf076384349e996a7d6de.html", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 460925, "date": "2017-05-05", "retrieved": "2017-05-09T14:58:20.374213", "title": "Iran\u2019s Presidential Elections", "summary": "Policy Context\nIranian voters go to the polls on May 19, 2017, to vote for president and municipal officials countrywide amid tensions between Iran and the United States. On April 19, the Trump Administration certified to Congress, pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17), that Iran is complying with the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). \n\nSecretary of State Rex Tillerson stated, however, that the JCPOA \u201conly delays [Iran\u2019s] goal of becoming a nuclear state\u201d and has failed to curb Iran\u2019s objectionable regional behavior. He announced that the United States\u2019 Iran policy\u2014including the JCPOA\u2014is under review. In recent weeks, the Trump Administration has imposed sanctions on additional entities allegedly supporting Iran\u2019s missile program and has launched strikes on Iran\u2019s key regional ally, Syria, for its use of chemical weapons. The Administration reportedly is also contemplating increased support for an effort by a Saudi-led Arab coalition battling Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nElection Field Finalized\nIran holds presidential elections every four years. The post of president is subordinate to that of \u201cSupreme Leader,\u201d but Iran\u2019s president has significant influence on economic policy and government operations. Iran\u2019s elections are characterized by the State Department as \u201cfalling short of international standards for free, fair elections,\u201d primarily because a 12-member appointed body called the Council of Guardians is empowered to vet all election candidates. Approximately 1,600 persons filed to run, including incumbent President Hassan Rouhani. On April 27, the Council of Guardians approved Rouhani and five other candidates to run\u2014a winnowing of the field that was consistent with past elections. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, a run-off is to be held about three weeks later. \nThe other five candidates are Ibrahim Raisi, a purported close ally of the Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene\u2019i; Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf, Tehran mayor and a stalwart of the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Mostafa Mirsalim, the centrist former culture minister; and two moderate candidates, Rouhani\u2019s first Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri and Mostafa Hashemitaba. To improve Rouhani\u2019s chances of achieving a first-round victory, one main competitor for moderate votes, Jahangiri, is widely expected to drop out before the voting. \nRouhani emphasizes to his mainly urban, young, and intellectual supporters that he delivered sanctions relief under the JCPOA and ended Iran\u2019s international isolation. But, according to a substantial number of reports, many Iranians are not benefitting significantly from sanctions relief, perhaps adversely affecting Rouhani\u2019s election prospects. In 2013, Rouhani received 50.7% of the votes, narrowly avoiding a run-off in a divided field that included several hardline candidates. There are only two hardliners in the 2017 race. One is mid-ranking cleric Ibrahim Raisi, who is said to be Khamenei\u2019s favorite to succeed him as Supreme Leader. In mid-2016, Khamene\u2019i appointed Raisi, a longtime state prosecutor and judicial official, as head of the large economic conglomerate (Astan-e-Qods Razavi Foundation) centered on the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad. Raisi\u2019s fate in the election might determine his chances to eventually succeed Khamene\u2019i. \nRaisi is basing his campaign on an appeal to rural and working class voters, many of whom benefit from regime largesse such as that provided by state-linked foundations such as Astan-e-Qods Razavi and support the Supreme Leader. Khamene\u2019i\u2019s recent speeches have criticized Rouhani for failing to advance the \u201cresistance economy\u201d\u2014the hardline concept of building up Iran\u2019s domestic industries and reducing reliance on imports. On April 30, 2017, Khamene\u2019i, referring to the JCPOA, stated that \u201cit is not correct\u201d when Rouhani says that since he took office, \u201cthe shadow of war has been faded away.\u201d Despite Khamene\u2019i\u2019s apparent backing, Raisi\u2019s long prior service in the judiciary could harm his prospects\u2014candidates who come from the judiciary and the security apparatus, including the IRGC, have tended to fare poorly in elections. Raisi was part of the judiciary apparatus that allegedly approved the 1988 execution of a significant number of Iranian prisoners. The other hardliner in the race, Qalibaf, has previously run twice and lost, although he generally receives praise for his performance as Tehran\u2019s mayor. \nProspects and Implications\nThe probable outcome of the election, including whether Rouhani can again garner enough votes to avoid a run-off, is unclear. Also unclear is the degree to which three televised candidate debates will affect voter preferences. One Iranian poll in early May indicated that if the election proceeds to a runoff, Rouhani would likely defeat either Raisi or Qalibaf. However, polling in Iran is widely considered to be unreliable. There is also the potential for the Supreme Leader and his allies to put the state apparatus to work on behalf of Rouhani\u2019s challenger, including tasking the IRGC and its Basij militia to distribute pro-Raisi leaflets and transport his likely supporters to the polls, and intimidate voters in cities where Rouhani voters are prevalent. Some of these steps were widely reported to have been taken by the regime in the 2005 and 2009 elections. \nAny outcome will have significant implications for U.S. policy. Even though all the candidates have described the JCPOA as an established fixture and would be likely to continue implementing it, a more hardline president might discontinue Rouhani\u2019s efforts to promote diplomatic engagement with the West. A hardline president might also try to remove even those few restraints Rouhani has managed to impose on actions that U.S. officials characterize as provocative. Further provocative actions, which include missile tests and support for regional allies that act against U.S. interests or allies, could put Iran on a collision course with the Trump Administration, which has already taken several steps against Iran, as discussed above. The Trump Administration and Congress are considering imposing new sanctions on Iran\u2019s missile program and on the IRGC, but have refrained from announcing decisions on any possible actions, reportedly to avoid harming Rouhani\u2019s reelection prospects.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10699", "sha1": "062d71b32bc5f0e222ba1092c916b623ca3bf7be", "filename": "files/20170505_IN10699_062d71b32bc5f0e222ba1092c916b623ca3bf7be.html", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] } ], "topics": [ "CRS Insights" ] }