{
  "id": "IN10743",
  "type": "CRS Insight",
  "typeId": "INSIGHTS",
  "number": "IN10743",
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  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 462946,
      "date": "2017-07-31",
      "retrieved": "2017-08-22T13:41:33.548019",
      "title": "Rwanda\u2019s August 4 Presidential Election",
      "summary": "Politics and the 2017 Presidential Election\nThe circumstances of Rwanda\u2019s August 4 presidential election highlight some of the policy challenges in approaching a country that arguably combines effective governance with political repression. President Paul Kagame, in office since 2000, is campaigning for a third term. A constitutional referendum in 2015 changed the presidential term from seven to five years but exempted the sitting President from the shortened term and from a two-term limit until 2024 (Article 101, Article 172). \nThe referendum was scheduled following \u201cnational consultations\u201d in which over 3.7 million Rwandans petitioned for changing the term limit. Over 98% of voters backed the new constitution, which could permit Kagame to remain in office until 2034\u2013and thereafter be immune from prosecution \u201cfor treason or serious and deliberate violation of the constitution\u201d (Article 114). \nObservers view a Kagame victory as overwhelmingly likely. He won previous elections in 2010 and 2003 by over 93%. The State Department characterized the political environment in 2010 as \u201criddled by a series of worrying actions taken by the Government of Rwanda, which appear to be attempts to restrict the freedom of expression.\u201d Observers reported possible vote tabulation irregularities and other concerns with legislative elections in 2013. \nKagame faces two untested opponents, Frank Habineza of the Democratic Green Party and independent candidate Philippe Mpayimana. Habineza, the most well-known opposition candidate, was not allowed to register as a candidate in 2010 and spent two years in exile after his deputy was decapitated in what some viewed as a possible political assassination. Mpayimana, a journalist, was a refugee from the 1994 Rwandan genocide and has spent much of his life outside of Rwanda. \nIn early July, the National Electoral Commission barred three other candidates, stating that they had not met nomination requirements. One of them, Diane Shima Rwigara, a Kagame critic and would-be first female independent presidential candidate, was the target of what many observers considered a smear campaign shortly after announcing her candidacy in June, when purported nude photos of her were circulated online. Rwigara has asserted that the death in 2015 of her father, a widely known businessman, was a targeted assassination.\nKagame\u2019s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is the dominant force in Rwandan politics and has sharply restricted space for dissent. Political opponents, journalists, and human rights activists are reportedly subject to legal constraints, detention, intimidation, and sometimes deadly assault. Many have fled the country, and some have accused the government of plotting assassinations. Amnesty International has described the 2017 elections as taking place in \u201ca climate of fear.\u201d\nIn 2015, Obama Administration officials expressed concerns about the referendum, Kagame\u2019s decision to run again, and limits on political space. The Trump Administration has made few public statements on Rwanda to date, but in a July press release commemorating Rwanda\u2019s National Day, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson expressed an interest in \u201ccontinuing... to work with Rwanda on expanding efforts to strengthen democracy and respect for human rights.\u201d \nPossible Issues for Congress\nRwanda has become known for its rapid development and security gains since the 1994 genocide, in which over 800,000 people were killed. The RPF, a former rebel movement, took power in 1994, stopping the genocide. Under President Kagame, the government\u2019s efforts to improve health systems, the economy, and gender equality have received substantial support from donors, including the United States, and poverty rates have reportedly decreased. For some observers, Rwanda\u2019s economic dynamism and efficient state services are proof of progress. Others question whether the country\u2019s tightly controlled political environment may ultimately undermine stability.\nRwanda\u2019s development, political stability, and influence on regional security are of particular congressional interest. In the 114th Congress, the House and Senate held hearings on political and security trends in central Africa, and the House held an additional hearing focused specifically on Rwanda. Other potential issues for Congress include the authorization, appropriation, and oversight of bilateral aid (totaling $159 million in FY2016), along with significant additional military aid in support of Rwanda\u2019s international peacekeeping deployments. The Trump Administration has proposed decreasing bilateral aid to $105 million in FY2018, reflecting proposed cuts to global development funding. \nSome Members of Congress have paired support for development efforts with expressions of concern over Rwanda\u2019s political climate, including alleged assassinations. Some have raised concerns about U.S. support for Rwanda in light of reports that Rwanda has backed rebel movements in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) requires the Secretary of State to certify that governments in Africa\u2019s Great Lakes region, including Rwanda, are not \u201cfacilitating or otherwise participating in destabilizing activities in a neighboring country\u201d prior to receiving certain military aid. (See CRS\u2019s Rwanda: In Brief for more on legislative restrictions on U.S. aid.)\nOutlook\nPresident Kagame\u2019s likely third term victory arguably presents a challenge for long-standing U.S. efforts to promote democracy in a region where electoral transfers of power are rare. At the same time, the United States appears likely to continue to partner with the Rwandan government on development and peacekeeping initiatives.\nAs Congress considers FY2018 appropriations legislation, Members may assess U.S. funding and prioritization of democracy and human rights promotion in Rwanda. Members interested in Rwanda\u2019s development trajectory may also consider U.S. support for developing Rwanda\u2019s domestic energy resources\u2014a current area of focus for Rwanda\u2014and options for increasing Rwanda\u2019s utilization of tariff preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, discussed in CRS In Focus IF10149). Rwanda\u2019s AGOA eligibility is currently under an out-of-cycle review in response to concerns by the U.S. used clothing industry regarding a regional import ban. AGOA eligibility determinations are made by the executive branch based on criteria established in statute by Congress, including some related to human rights and good governance.\nFigure 1. Rwanda at a Glance\n/\nComparative size: slightly smaller than Maryland\nIndependence: 1962, from Belgium\nPopulation, growth rate: 13 million, 2.5%\nLanguages: Kinyarwanda, French, English (all three official)\nReligions: Roman Catholic 49.5%, Protestant 39.4%, other Christian 4.5%, Muslim 1.8%, other/none 4.8% (2002 est.)\nMedian age: 19 years\nLife expectancy: 60.1 years\nInfant mortality rate: 56.8 deaths/1,000 live births \nHIV/AIDS adult prevalence: 2.9% (2015 est.)\nLiteracy: 70.5% (male 73.2%, female 68%) (2015 est.)\nGDP: $8.4 billion, $729 per capita\nGDP growth rate: 5.9%\nKey exports: coffee, tea, hides, tin ore\nTop export partners: Democratic Republic of the Congo 19.8%, US 10.8%, China 10.3%, Swaziland 7.9%, Malaysia 7%, Pakistan 6.2%, Germany 5.9%, Thailand 5.5% (2015)\nKey imports: foodstuffs, machinery + equipment, steel, petroleum products, cement + construction material\nTop import partners: Uganda 15.8%, Kenya 11.8%, India 8.7%, China 8.7%, United Arab Emirates 8.6%, Russia 6.6%, Tanzania 5.1% (2015)\n\nSource: Graphic created by CRS. Fact information from trade data are from Global Trade Atlas. Other data are from the CIA World Fact Book and International Monetary Fund. Figures refer to 2016 estimates unless otherwise noted.",
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