{ "id": "IN10826", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN10826", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 576060, "date": "2017-11-29", "retrieved": "2018-05-10T13:53:59.817669", "title": "Zimbabwe\u2019s Political Transition: Issues for Congress", "summary": "In mid-November 2017, spurred by an intraparty rivalry within the ruling Zimbabwe National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party to succeed then-President Robert Mugabe (age 93), the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) seized control of key national political and military facilities. The ZDF then reportedly pressed Mugabe\u2014head of state since independence in 1980\u2014to resign, reverse his recent dismissal of Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa in favor of Mugabe\u2019s wife, Grace Mugabe, and halt a ZANU-PF purge of Mnangagwa\u2019s supporters. (See CRS Insight IN10819, Zimbabwe: A Military-Compelled Transition? and CRS Report R44633, Zimbabwe: Current Issues and U.S. Policy.) \nZANU-PF subsequently removed Mugabe as party leader, appointed Mnangagwa as his interim successor, and expelled Grace Mugabe and several of her allies. Mugabe resigned as president on November 21, preempting impeachment proceedings initiated against him. Zimbabweans\u2019 initial reactions to the ZDF intervention appeared broadly positive. \nSuccession: Mnangagwa Becomes President\nZANU-PF then nominated Mnangagwa to serve as national president, nominally in accordance with the country\u2019s constitution\u2014although this has been contested\u2014and Mnangagwa was sworn in on November 24. In his inaugural address, he vowed to\nserve all citizens \u201cregardless of ... political affiliation\u201d or other characteristics;\nprotect foreign direct investment (FDI), increase liquidity in the economy, and service public domestic and foreign debt obligations;\nrelax trade procedures and related transaction costs, and seek to foster export growth; \nprioritize agricultural development and foster a job-creation-focused economic recovery, including by attracting FDI; and\npursue \u201cre-engagement\u201d with foreign nations, including those which \u201chave had issues with us,\u201d and request that those that have maintained \u201ceconomic and political sanctions against us ... [to re]consider\u201d such measures.\nMnangagwa also pledged to compensate farmers from whom land was seized under Mugabe and \u201curgently and definitely\u201d address land tenure reform\u2014but also offered a mixed message on land tenure, a highly contested issue, by stating that past land redistributions and related policies decisions \u201ccannot be challenged or reversed.\u201d\nHe also quashed prior speculation that the 2018 elections might be postponed, and called for an end to corruption, illicit foreign currency exports, and cross-border goods smuggling. He also later called for \u201cillegally externalized funds and assets\u201d to be repatriated, and announced a three-month amnesty from prosecution for those returning such assets. \nProspects Under Mnangagwa\nWhile Mnangagwa\u2019s inaugural address suggests that he plans to pursue a reformist agenda and govern in an inclusive manner, he has a long-standing reputation as a hardliner within ZANU-PF, which has a history of suppressing the opposition and civil society. He is also a former top security sector official, and was reportedly complicit in massive human rights violations in the 1980s targeting a former liberation war faction. Mnangagwa also reappointed as Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa, a former Justice Minister viewed as responsible for many repressive laws and legal actions. \nMnangagwa is expected to announce his full cabinet soon. Whether he may appoint opposition figures to the cabinet\u2014potentially including Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai \u2014has yet to be seen. Should Mnangagwa and his ZANU-PF allies attempt to sideline the opposition or not robustly pursue the reform agenda he has set out, ZANU-PF might face political risks, given Mnangagwa\u2019s untested electoral strength, widespread socioeconomic discontent, and an uncertain post-Mugabe political landscape.\n/\nIssues for Congress\nZimbabwe\u2019s transition could provide the United States with a crucial opening to advance long-standing U.S. assistance and congressional objectives in Zimbabwe. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called Mugabe\u2019s resignation an \u201coverdue\u201d and \u201chistoric moment\u201d for Zimbabwe, which he said \u201chas an extraordinary opportunity to set itself on a new path.\u201d He also called for \u201cfree and fair elections\u201d and for \u201cZimbabwe\u2019s leaders to implement much-needed political and economic reforms.\u201d The State Department also urged \u201cunwavering respect for the rule of law and for established democratic practices.\u201d \nZimbabwe: Congressional Role\nCongress has repeatedly addressed Zimbabwe\u2019s political future in hearings and shaped key aspects of U.S. policy toward the country, notably by passing the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (ZDERA). ZDERA prohibited U.S. support for multilateral debt relief and credit for Zimbabwe\u2019s government pending free and fair elections, credible land reform, security force subordination to civilian leadership, and adherence to the rule of law\u2014particularly regarding civil freedoms and property rights. It also called for U.S. sanctions against persons undermining the rule of law or abetting political violence. Later-enacted executive branch sanctions target persons who engage in such activity or participate in public corruption. Congress has also restricted and conditioned assistance to Zimbabwe in annual appropriations legislation. \n\nSubsequent U.S. responses, if any, are likely to depend on Mnangagwa\u2019s record in office and the relative credibility of the 2018 elections. If U.S. policymakers view his actions as negative, they might respond with new targeted sanctions, censure, and other tactics to compel change. Should they, instead, see Mnangagwa and/or his potential post-2018 successor as actively pursuing a credible agenda of governance reforms and other actions aligned with U.S. bilateral objectives, they might be willing to provide assistance to help foster such aims. \nOne option for doing so would be to provide intensive technical assistance\u2014potentially in close coordination with Zimbabwe\u2019s other development partners\u2014aimed at ensuring that Mnangagwa is able to fulfill his inaugural vows and the attainment of related key U.S goals, such as the following:\nEnsuring free and fair elections, including through electoral technical assistance and robust domestic and foreign election monitoring.\nReversing negative economic trends, possibly accompanied by a strongly conditioned deal to clear Zimbabwe\u2019s large international debts and arrears. \nRobust rule of law and human rights capacity-building, especially tied to full implementation of the 2013 constitution.\nAccountability for diamond revenue, both past and future.\nTransparent land reform, as outlined in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA), and support for agricultural development and reform.\nSecurity sector reform.\nCongress could also potentially\nreview ZDERA and consider successor legislation tied to current circumstances; and\nconsider setting out explicit conditions that would have to be met in order to prompt U.S. consideration of changes to the current U.S. Zimbabwe sanctions.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10826", "sha1": "ddbfacff2629ca61e445a0b1dbc20175dc09140a", "filename": "files/20171129_IN10826_ddbfacff2629ca61e445a0b1dbc20175dc09140a.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=IN/ASPX/IN10826_files&id=/0.png": "files/20171129_IN10826_images_1719de45b90b3e05d10caf28fb707bd10f3a6e15.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10826", "sha1": "f36012d9e25cacf6bcf28ee036d054a956cce97e", "filename": "files/20171129_IN10826_f36012d9e25cacf6bcf28ee036d054a956cce97e.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 575807, "date": "2017-11-22", "retrieved": "2017-11-28T14:32:40.206111", "title": "Zimbabwe\u2019s Political Transition: Issues for Congress", "summary": "In mid-November 2017, spurred by an intra-party rivalry within the ruling Zimbabwe National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party to succeed President Robert Mugabe, 93, the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) seized control of key national political and military facilities. \nThe ZDF then initiated efforts to force Mugabe to resign, reverse Mugabe\u2019s recent dismissal of Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa in favor of Mugabe\u2019s wife, Grace Mugabe, and halt ZANU-PF\u2019s purge of Mnangagwa\u2019s supporters. (See CRS Insight IN10819, Zimbabwe: A Military-Compelled Transition?, and for further Zimbabwe background, CRS Report R44633, Zimbabwe: Current Issues and U.S. Policy.) ZANU-PF removed Mugabe as party leader, appointed Mnangagwa as his interim successor, and expelled Grace Mugabe and several of her allies. \nPreempting an impeachment vote, Mugabe resigned November 21. Zimbabweans\u2019 initial reactions to the ZDF intervention appeared broadly positive. They turned out for large, peaceful demonstrations, and, after the resignation, celebrations.\nInternational responses to the military intervention have been cautious: the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the United States\u2014which generally oppose coups\u2014initially called for constitutional governance and peaceful dialogue. The United States has since urged \u201cunwavering respect for the rule of law and for established democratic practices\u201d and declared that the \u201cpath forward must lead to free and fair elections.\u201d The Chairperson of the AU Commission welcomed Mugabe\u2019s decision to resign and recognized the will of the people for a \u201cpeaceful transfer of power in a manner that secures the democratic future of their country.\u201d\n/\nConsiderations for the Transition\nThe question of who may succeed President Mugabe arguably presents the most immediate and pressing challenge for Zimbabwe\u2019s political system, and for foreign governments engaged with the country. The stakes are high. Succession outcomes are likely to shape future developments in all major policy arenas, and the succession process could generate political and economic instability, possibly violent, in the wider southern Africa region. Succession is subject to the interplay of diverse, primarily domestic factors, however, making it an unpredictable and fluid process, and one not readily influenced by U.S. or other foreign policy interventions.\nMnangagwa and his ZANU-PF allies are widely viewed as likely to take the lead in shaping Zimbabwe\u2019s prospective political transition, possibly with Mnangagwa as acting president and with Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai as prime minister in a government of national unity (GNU). Mnangagwa and his allies may attempt to sideline the opposition, seek a renewed electoral mandate in polls slated for 2018, and potentially perpetuate the widely criticized, often repressive, governance approach pursued by ZANU-PF in recent years. Such a tack could be politically risky, given Mnangagwa\u2019s untested electoral strength, widespread socioeconomic discontent, and an uncertain post-Mugabe political landscape.\nA more ambitious move would be to capitalize on political transformation and reform opportunities presented by Mugabe\u2019s exit by pursuing a more inclusive approach to governance. Such a decision could garner substantial international and Zimbabwean domestic support. \nUnder a new GNU, the 2018 elections might be delayed, pending greater party and electoral administration preparations, full implementation of the 2013 constitution, and attempts to address the foundering economy. A GNU could also act as a mechanism for addressing more divisive challenges (e.g., land tenure reform, diamond sector transparency, and security sector reform). A key departure point for a GNU could be the partially implemented, regionally mediated 2009-2013 coalition government reform roadmap abandoned after elections in 2013. \nIssues for Congress\nZimbabwe\u2019s transition could provide the United States with a crucial opening to advance long-standing U.S. assistance and congressional objectives in Zimbabwe. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has briefly set out State Department views on the intervention. A separate State Department statement calls for \u201can expedient transition to democratic, civilian order ... through democratic, transparent and constitutional processes...[and] respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms\u201d\u2014and for the ZDF to \u201cexercise restraint, respect the rule of law, [and] uphold the constitutionally protected rights of all citizens.\u201d In the short term, the United States is likely to look toward Zimbabwean stakeholders to negotiate a transition, likely aided by SADC mediation\u2014as several U.S. Senators have called for.\nSubsequent U.S. responses, if any, may depend on the nature of any prospective outcome. If U.S. policymakers viewed the outcome as negative, they might respond with increased targeted sanctions, expressions of censure, and other tactics to compel change. \nA prospectively credible transition aligned with U.S. bilateral objectives, might, instead, spur U.S. policymakers to support such a process. One option for doing so would be intensive technical assistance\u2014in close coordination with Zimbabwe\u2019s other development partners\u2014aimed at\nEnsuring free and fair elections, including through electoral technical assistance and robust domestic and foreign election monitoring.\nReversing negative economic trends, possibly accompanied by a strongly conditioned deal to clear Zimbabwe\u2019s large international debts and arrears.\nRobust rule of law and human rights capacity-building, especially tied to implementing the 2013 constitution.\nAccountability for diamond revenue, both past and future.\nTransparent land reform, as outlined in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA), and support for agricultural development and reform.\nSecurity sector reform.\nCongress could also potentially\nreview ZDERA and consider successor legislation tied to current circumstances; and\nconsider setting out explicit conditions that would have to be met in order to prompt U.S consideration of changes to the current U.S. Zimbabwe sanctions.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10826", "sha1": "ab44e25a2b70871fd2f7255865112fec193a655c", "filename": "files/20171122_IN10826_ab44e25a2b70871fd2f7255865112fec193a655c.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=IN/ASPX/IN10826_files&id=/0.png": "files/20171122_IN10826_images_1719de45b90b3e05d10caf28fb707bd10f3a6e15.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10826", "sha1": "127e545f59f2d2367ca4e647f5fedd6694ce7cb8", "filename": "files/20171122_IN10826_127e545f59f2d2367ca4e647f5fedd6694ce7cb8.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Appropriations", "CRS Insights" ] }