{ "id": "IN10885", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN10885", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 580817, "date": "2018-05-02", "retrieved": "2018-08-23T13:24:42.380199", "title": "Cuba After the Castros", "summary": "As expected, Cuban President Ra\u00fal Castro stepped down from power on April 19, 2018, and the communist government\u2019s 605-member National Assembly of People\u2019s Power selected First Vice President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel Berm\u00fadez as president of the Council of State. Pursuant to Cuba\u2019s Constitution (Article 74), the president of the Council of State is also Cuba\u2019s head of state and government. Castro, currently 86 years old, just finished his second five-year term as president. He will remain in his position as first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), which could give him continued influence over government policy.\nD\u00edaz-Canel, who turned 58 a day after becoming president, had served as first vice president since 2013, which made him the official constitutional successor in case Castro could not fulfill his duties. D\u00edaz-Canel\u2019s appointment represented a move toward generational change in Cuba\u2019s political system. An engineer by training, D\u00edaz-Canel became a member of the Politburo, the party\u2019s highest decisionmaking body, in 2003, held top PCC positions in two provinces, and served as higher education minister.\nAlthough some analysts believe D\u00edaz-Canel to be a moderate and potentially more open to reform, a leaked video from August 2017 appears to contradict that characterization. The video shows him speaking at a closed Communist Party meeting earlier in the year strongly criticizing dissidents and independent voices (including those arguing for political reform), criticizing the expansion of Cuba\u2019s private sector, and characterizing U.S. efforts toward normalization under President Obama as an attempt to destroy the Cuban revolution. Some observers speculate that D\u00edaz-Canel\u2019s rhetoric could have been aimed at increasing his acceptance by so-called hard-liners in Cuba\u2019s political system who are more resistant to change.\nSignificance of the Political Transition\nCuba\u2019s political transition is the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government. A majority of Cubans today have lived only under the rule of the Castros. Ra\u00fal had ruled since 2006, when Fidel stepped down because of poor health. Ra\u00fal served as president provisionally until the National Assembly officially selected him as president in 2008. Ra\u00fal\u2019s departure can be viewed as a culmination of the generational leadership change that began several years ago in the government\u2019s lower ranks.\nAnother notable aspect of the transition is that it is the first time Cuba\u2019s head of government will not be the leader of the PCC. Although separating the roles of government and party leaders could elevate the role of government institutions over the PCC, Ra\u00fal Castro has indicated that he expects D\u00edaz-Canel to take over as first secretary of the PCC when Castro\u2019s term as party leader ends. \nAnother important element of the transition is the composition of the new 31-member Council of State. The National Assembly selected 72-year-old Salvador Vald\u00e9s Mesa as first vice president. He is not from the younger generation but also not from the historical revolutionary period. Vald\u00e9s Mesa, who already has been serving as one of five vice presidents and is on the Politburo, is the first Afro-Cuban to hold such a high government position. Of the Council of State\u2019s members, 45% are new, 48% are women, and 45% are Afro-Cuban or mixed race. Several older revolutionary-era leaders remain on the council, including Ramiro Vald\u00e9s, aged 86, who continues as a vice president.\nLooking ahead, an important question will be the extent of influence that Castro and other revolutionary figures could continue to have on government policy. Some observers believe Ra\u00fal will maintain a role in the decisionmaking process, especially since he will head the PCC until 2021. Reports indicate, however, that Castro will retire to the city of Santiago in eastern Cuba, away from the capital of Havana, where he likely would have less opportunity to influence policymaking.\nChallenges for Cuba\u2019s Next President\nAlthough most observers do not anticipate immediate major policy changes under President D\u00edaz-Canel, his government will face two enormous challenges\u2014reforming the moribund economy and responding to desires for greater freedom. \nRa\u00fal Castro managed the opening of Cuba\u2019s economy to the world, with diversified trade relations, increased foreign investment, and a growing private sector (about 580,000 workers, or 12% of the workforce, at the end of 2017). Yet the slow pace of economic reform has stunted economic growth (0.5% in 2016 and an estimated 0.9% in 2017) and disheartened Cubans yearning for more economic freedom. Over the past year, the government appeared to backtrack by restricting private-sector development and slowing reforms. In 2013, the government announced it would end its dual-currency system, which creates economic distortions, but currency unification has been delayed in large part because of concerns about inflation and its related social impact. A challenge for D\u00edaz-Canel will be moving forward with economic reforms opposed by some conservative elements in the party and state bureaucracy. \nFew observers expect the next government to ease its tight control over the political system, at least in the short to medium term, but the government will need to contend with increasing calls for political reform and freedom of expression. The liberalization of some individual freedoms that occurred under Ra\u00fal Castro (such as legalization of cellular phones and personal computers and expansion of internet connectivity) has increased Cubans\u2019 appetite for access to information and desire for social and political expression. More broadly, if the next government continues to repress political dissidents and human rights activists, it will remain a point of contention in Cuba\u2019s foreign relations. \nAt this juncture, Cuba\u2019s transition to a post-Castro era likely will not affect relations with the United States, but in the future, it could lessen the antipathy of some opposed to normalizing relations. Although the Trump Administration has partially rolled back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s actions to normalize relations with Cuba, many Obama-era policy changes remain in place. Human rights in Cuba have been a long-standing U.S. interest, particularly for many Members of Congress. The D\u00edaz-Canel government\u2019s progress in improving Cuba\u2019s human rights record could be a key determinant for additional U.S. actions normalizing bilateral relations.\nAlso see CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, and CRS Report R44822, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10885", "sha1": "fb8de3102f694964979929683d105377b4e6e502", "filename": "files/20180502_IN10885_fb8de3102f694964979929683d105377b4e6e502.html", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 580170, "date": "2018-04-17", "retrieved": "2018-04-24T13:09:51.890160", "title": "Cuba After the Castros", "summary": "Cuban President Ra\u00fal Castro is expected to step down from power on April 19, 2018 (although some reports indicate it could be a day earlier) when the communist government\u2019s 605-member National Assembly of People\u2019s Power selects a new president and 30 other members of the Council of State. Pursuant to Cuba\u2019s Constitution (Article 74), the president of the Council of State is also Cuba\u2019s head of state and government. Castro, currently 86 years old, is in his second five-year term and indicated in 2013 that he would not seek a third term. Most observers expect First Vice President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel Berm\u00fadez to be chosen as president, although Ra\u00fal is expected to continue in his position as first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), which could give him continued influence over government policy.\nCurrently 57 years of age, D\u00edaz-Canel became first vice president in 2013, which made him the official constitutional successor in case Castro could not fulfill his duties. His appointment represented a move toward generational change in Cuba\u2019s political system. At the time, D\u00edaz-Canel\u2014an engineer by training\u2014had been serving as one of the Council of State\u2019s five other vice presidents. He became a member of the Politburo, the party\u2019s highest decisionmaking body, in 2003, and held top PCC positions in two provinces. D\u00edaz-Canel served as higher education minister from 2009 to 2012.\nAlthough some analysts believe D\u00edaz-Canel to be a moderate and potentially more open to reform, a leaked video from August 2017 appears to contradict that characterization. The video shows him speaking at a closed Communist Party meeting earlier in the year strongly criticizing dissidents and independent voices (including those arguing for political reform), criticizing the expansion of Cuba\u2019s private sector, and characterizing U.S. efforts toward normalization under President Obama as an attempt to destroy the Cuban revolution. Some observers speculate that D\u00edaz-Canel\u2019s rhetoric could have been aimed at increasing his acceptance by so-called hardliners in Cuba\u2019s political system more resistant to change.\nSignificance of the Political Transition\nCuba\u2019s impending political transition is notable because it would be the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government. A majority of Cubans today have lived under the rule only of the Castros. Ra\u00fal has ruled since 2006, when Fidel stepped down because of poor health. He served provisionally as president until the National Assembly selected him officially as president in 2008. Ra\u00fal\u2019s departure can be viewed as a culmination of the generational leadership change that began several years ago in the government\u2019s lower ranks.\nAnother notable aspect of the transition is that it will be the first time that Cuba\u2019s head of government will not be the leader of the PCC. A legacy of Ra\u00fal Castro is that he strengthened government institutions compared to the rule of Fidel Castro, which tended to be characterized by chaotic policymaking. Separating the roles of government and party leaders could elevate the role of government institutions over the PCC.\nLooking ahead, an important question will be the extent of influence that Castro and other revolutionary figures could continue to have on government policy. Some observers believe that Ra\u00fal will continue to have a role in the decisionmaking process, especially since he is expected to head the PCC until 2021. Reports indicate, however, that Castro will retire to the city of Santiago in eastern Cuba, away from the capital of Havana, where he would likely have less opportunity to influence policymaking. Other important signs to look for are who will be the next first vice president (the designated successor), and whether other historical figures will remain on the Council of State, such as Jos\u00e9 Ram\u00f3n Machado and Ramiro Vald\u00e9s (both also serve on the PCC\u2019s Politburo). The retirement of such figures would indicate the extent of generational change.\nChallenges for Cuba\u2019s Next President\nAlthough most observers do not anticipate immediate major policy changes under Cuba\u2019s next president, the new government will face two enormous challenges\u2014reforming the moribund economy, and responding to desires for greater freedom. \nRa\u00fal Castro managed the opening of Cuba\u2019s economy to the world, with diversified trade relations, increased foreign investment, and a growing private sector (about 580,000 workers, or 12% of the workforce, at the end of 2017). Yet the slow pace of economic reform has stunted economic growth (0.5% in 2016 and an estimated 0.9% in 2017) and disheartened Cubans yearning for more economic freedom. Over the past year, the government appeared to backtrack by restricting private-sector development and slowing reforms. In 2013, the government announced that it would end its dual-currency system that creates economic distortions, but currency unification has been delayed in large part because of concerns about inflation and its related social impact. A challenge for the next president will be moving forward with economic reforms opposed by some conservative elements in the party and state bureaucracy. \nFew observers expect the next government to ease its tight control over the political system, at least in the short to medium term, but it will need to contend with increasing calls for political reform and freedom of expression. The liberalization of some individual freedoms that occurred under Ra\u00fal Castro (such as legalization of cell phones and personal computers, and expansion of internet connectivity) has increased Cubans\u2019 appetite for access to information and the desire for more social and political expression. More broadly, if the next government continues to repress political dissidents and human rights activists, it will remain a point of contention in Cuba\u2019s foreign relations. \nAt this juncture, Cuba\u2019s transition to a post-Castro era will not likely affect relations with the United States, but in the future, it could lessen the antipathy of some opposed to normalizing relations. Although the Trump Administration has partially rolled back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s actions to normalize relation with Cuba, many Obama-era policy changes remain in place. Human rights in Cuba have been a long-standing U.S. interest, particularly for many Members of Congress. The next government\u2019s progress in improving its human rights record could be a key determinant for additional U.S. actions normalizing bilateral relations.\nAlso see CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, and CRS Report R44822, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10885", "sha1": "38bb172b58989a774d1a0481d795eb3ae490d080", "filename": "files/20180417_IN10885_38bb172b58989a774d1a0481d795eb3ae490d080.html", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] } ], "topics": [ "CRS Insights", "Constitutional Questions" ] }