{ "id": "IN10900", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN10900", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 601898, "date": "2018-05-11", "retrieved": "2020-01-02T16:30:02.455773", "title": "Lebanon\u2019s 2018 Elections", "summary": "On May 6, 2018, Lebanon held its first legislative elections in nine years. The results showed that parties allied with Hezbollah increased their share of seats from roughly 44% to 53%. However, as in past Lebanese governments, rival parliamentary blocs will likely need to reach consensus in order to secure the passage of major policy initiatives.\nThe 128 seats in Lebanon\u2019s parliament, known formally as the Chamber of Deputies, are divided evenly between Christians and Muslims. This reflects Lebanon\u2019s broader political system in which power is divided among the country\u2019s various religious groups or \u201cconfessions.\u201d In what is referred to as Lebanon\u2019s confessional system, the presidency is reserved for a Maronite Christian, the prime minister post for a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament for a Shi\u2019a Muslim. Confessional allotments (in varying proportions) also extend to the division of seats in electoral districts.\nThe May 2018 parliamentary elections were the first since 2009 and the first held under Lebanon\u2019s new electoral law, passed in 2017. The new law established a hybrid system of proportional representation, in a departure from the country\u2019s previous winner-take-all system. Under the new law, Lebanese cast two votes: one for a fixed electoral list in their district and a second for their preferred candidate within that list. The tabulation of these two votes, along with the assignment of electoral seats to specific sects, in some cases resulted in candidates not attaining a seat despite receiving more votes than a rival. In light of this, Lebanese officials are calling for the new electoral law to be amended. \nDivision of Electoral Districts by Confessional Group\nLebanese electoral law has traditionally allocated each seat within an electoral district to a specific religious community. The allocation of seats by sect is shaped by demographic and political considerations, which are at times controversial. Lebanon officially recognizes 18 religious sects (4 Muslim, 12 Christian, the Druze sect, and Judaism), not all of which are represented in every district. For example, the district of Jbeil/Keserouan has eight electoral seats, of which seven are reserved for Maronite Christians, and one for a Shi\u2019a. The neighboring district of Baalbeck/Hermel has 10 electoral seats: 6 for Shi\u2019a, 2 for Sunnis, and 1 each for Maronite and Catholic Christians. The 2017 electoral law reduced the number of electoral districts from 26 to 15. In doing so, it also realigned the number of seats assigned to each district, as well as the sectarian distribution of those seats.\n\nElection Results\nThe political coalition known as March 8, which includes Hezbollah, the Shi\u2019a Amal Movement, the Maronite Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), and allied parties, won 68 seats according to Lebanese vote tallies. This is enough to secure a simple majority (65 out of 128 seats) in parliament, but falls short of the two-thirds majority needed to push through major initiatives such as a revision to the constitution. Hezbollah itself did not gain any additional seats.\nThe rival March 14 coalition (which includes the Sunni Future Movement, the Maronite Lebanese Forces, and allied MPs) lost 10 seats. Prime Minister Hariri\u2019s Future Movement absorbed the largest loss (roughly a third of its seats) but remains the largest Sunni bloc in parliament. The Lebanese Forces party was among the largest winners, increasing its share of seats from 8 to 14.\nMarch 8 continues to hold enough seats to prevent the establishment of a two-thirds quorum, which in practice has been required for votes on certain issues such as the election of a president (a task that in Lebanon falls to parliament). Beginning in 2014, March 8 MPs repeatedly boycotted legislative sessions, preventing the body from reaching quorum. As a result, the office of the presidency stood vacant for over two years until Hariri\u2019s Future Movement agreed to back FPM leader Michel Aoun for the post.\nMany observers and Lebanese political leaders contend that the alliances that previously defined March 8 and March 14 have evolved since the formation of the two coalitions in 2005, with some arguing that the coalitions\u2014particularly March 14\u2013are weakened or defunct. However, the broad contours of March 8 and March 14 may still impact government formation.\nTable 1. Election Results\nPolitical Party\nPrimary Sectarian Affiliation\nOutgoing Parliament\nCurrent Seats \nLoss/Gain\n2018 Election\n# of Seats Won\n\n\u201cMarch 8\u201d Coalition\n\n\n\n\n\nFree Patriotic Movement (FPM)\n pro-FPM Christians\nMaronite Christian\n19 \n \n+3\n19\n3\n\nAmal Movement\nShi\u2019a Muslim\n13 \n+2\n15\n\nHezbollah\nShi\u2019a Muslim\n13 \n-\n13\n\nMarada\nMaronite Christian\n3 \n-\n3\n\nTashnaq (ARF)\nethnic Armenian\n2 \n+1\n3\n\nBa\u2019th Party\nSecular/Arab nationalist\n2 \n-1\n1\n\nSyrian Social Nationalist Party \nSecular/Syrian nationalist\n2 \n-\n2\n\nLebanese Democratic Party\nSecular/Druze\n2 \n-1\n1\n\nAl Ahbash\nSunni Muslim\n- \n+1\n1\n\nTadamun Party\nMaronite Christian\n1 \n-1\n-\n\npro-March 8 Sunnis \nSunni Muslim\n-\n+4\n4\n\npro-March 8 Christians \nChristian\n-\n+2\n2\n\npro-March 8 Shi\u2019a \nShi\u2019a Muslim\n-\n+1\n1\n\nTOTAL\n\n57\n\n68\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\u201cMarch 14\u201d Coalition\n\n\n\n\n\nFuture Movement\n pro-Future Christian\n pro-Future Sunni\nSunni Muslim\n33 \n-12\n19\n1\n1\n\nLebanese Forces (LF)\n pro-LF Christians\nChristian\n8 \n+6\n13\n1\n\nPhalange (Kataeb)\nChristian\n5\n-2\n3\n\nHanshaq Party\nethnic Armenian\n2 \n-2\n-\n\nRamgavar Party\nethnic Armenian\n1 \n-1\n-\n\nDemocratic Left Movement\nSecular\n1 \n-1\n-\n\nJama\u2019a Islamiya\nSunni Muslim\n1 \n-1\n-\n\nNational Liberation Party\nChristian\n1 \n-1\n-\n\npro-March 14 Christians\nChristian\n\n+3\n3\n\npro-March 14 Shi\u2019a\nShi\u2019a Muslim\n\n+1\n1\n\nTOTAL\n\n52\n\n42\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOther\n\n\n\n\n\nProgressive Socialist Party\nDruze\n11\n-2\n9\n\nSabaa/Kilna Watani\ncivil society coalition\n-\n+1\n1\n\nAzm Movement\nSunni Muslim\n1\n+3\n4\n\nGlory Movement\nSunni Muslim\n2\n-2\n-\n\nIndependent Sunnis \nSunni Muslim\n-\n+1\n1\n\nIndependent Christians \nChristian\n-\n+3\n3\n\nVacant \n\n3\n\n\n\nUnknown affiliation\n\n2\n\n\n\nTOTAL\n\n19\n\n18\n\nSource: For political affiliation/characterization of candidates, see \u201cOfficial election results\u2014How Lebanon\u2019s Next Parliament will look,\u201d Daily Star, May 8, 2018.\nNotes: Results are organized by affiliation to the March 8 or March 14 political coalitions to facilitate comparison with the 2009 legislative elections. Coalition totals are based on Daily Star vote tallies (see source note). The affiliation of some deputies with March 8 or March 14 may be disputed, which could result in variances in coalition totals. Some deputies\u2019 affiliation with a particular bloc or coalition has changed since the 2009 legislative elections. Some analysts contend that March 8 and March 14 are no longer the primary political divisions inside Lebanon.\nGovernment Formation\nThe conclusion of legislative elections clears the way for the formation of a new government, in the shape of a new Cabinet. Known formally as the Council of Ministers, the Cabinet is comprised of 30 ministerial posts, currently distributed among 10 parties. At the end of May, the newly elected parliament is to convene to elect a Shi\u2019a speaker (Amal MP Nabih Berri has served as speaker since 1992 and is expected to be reelected). Following consultations with parliamentary blocs, President Aoun is to name a new Sunni prime minister (or potentially reappoint current Prime Minister Hariri). The premier-designate is to hold consultations with political blocs to form a Cabinet, and present those ministers to the president for his approval. \nThe process of government formation can be lengthy\u2014in some cases lasting months\u2014as parties compete for key ministerial posts. In the past, the opposition has sought a blocking one-third plus one of Cabinet seats (11 out of 30), in order to obtain a de-facto veto over cabinet decisions that require a two-thirds majority. Given the March 8 coalition\u2019s gains in parliament, it is likely that the coalition will also secure a majority of cabinet seats. Lebanon\u2019s outgoing cabinet, formed in December 2016, also has a March 8 majority. \nIssues for Congress\nMembers may consider whether and to what extent the election results should impact U.S. policy towards Lebanon. Some Members contend that the United States should limit its engagement with a government in which Hezbollah is a member. Others have argued that U.S. interests in Lebanon\u2014including weakening Hezbollah\u2014are most effectively accomplished by bolstering Lebanese state institutions and serving as a counterweight to Iranian influence there.\nConsistent with prior annual appropriations legislation, Section 7041(e) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, states that U.S. funding for the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) may not be made available if either body is controlled by a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. Hezbollah has held one-two seats in each of the six Lebanese governments formed since July 2005. Since 2006, the United States has provided nearly $1.7 billion in training and equipment to the LAF and over $160 million to the ISF.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10900", "sha1": "396b8141c08c9101289c793ac10d7479513b0219", "filename": "files/20180511_IN10900_396b8141c08c9101289c793ac10d7479513b0219.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10900", "sha1": "f997eda9f63dfbb2993eccb0831efbe3719e1ec2", "filename": "files/20180511_IN10900_f997eda9f63dfbb2993eccb0831efbe3719e1ec2.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Appropriations", "CRS Insights" ] }