{ "id": "IN10916", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN10916", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 581978, "date": "2018-06-12", "retrieved": "2018-09-13T22:58:33.687226", "title": "The June 12 Trump-Kim Jong-un Summit", "summary": "On June 12, 2018, President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met in Singapore to discuss North Korea\u2019s nuclear program, building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and the future of U.S. relations with North Korea (known officially as the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea, or DPRK). During their summit, the first-ever meeting between leaders of the two countries, Trump and Kim issued a brief joint statement in which Trump \u201ccommitted to provide security guarantees to the DPRK,\u201d and Kim \u201creaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.\u201d The Singapore document is shorter on details than previous nuclear agreements with North Korea and acts as a statement of principles in four areas\nNormalization: The two sides \u201ccommit to establish\u201d new bilateral relations.\nPeace: The United States and DPRK agree to work to build \u201ca lasting and stable peace regime.\u201d \nDenuclearization: North Korea \u201ccommits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,\u201d as was also promised in an April 2018 summit between Kim and South Korean leader Moon Jae-in.\nPOW/MIA remains: The two sides will work to recover the remains of thousands of U.S. troops unaccounted for during the Korean War. \nSpeaking at a press conference without Kim after the summit, Trump said\nU.S.-DPRK denuclearization negotiations would continue and resume at an early date;\nKim pledged to destroy a \u201cmajor missile engine testing site\u201d;\nHe will invite Kim to the White House; \nHe raised human rights issues with Kim, though \u201crelatively briefly compared to denuclearization.\u201d Trump appeared to downplay the state of DPRK human rights by saying that human rights conditions are also \u201crough in a lot of places\u201d; \nThe United States would suspend annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which Trump called \u201cwar games\u201d and \u201cprovocative,\u201d during nuclear negotiations. He said the move, which was not accompanied by any apparent commensurate move by Pyongyang and reportedly surprised South Korea and U.S. military commanders, would save \u201ca tremendous amount of money.\u201d Trump also expressed a hope of eventually withdrawing the approximately 30,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. Postsummit remarks by the Administration created confusion about whether all exercises or only some types will be suspended. \nNotable items not present in the statement or Trump\u2019s remarks include details about a timeframe or verification protocols for denuclearization, and a commitment by Kim to dismantle the DPRK\u2019s ballistic missile program. \nOutcomes \nThe summit highlighted the change from 2017, when escalating tensions between North Korea and the United States led to increasingly tight U.S. and international sanctions and fears of a military conflict. In addition to the reduction of tensions, both sides can point to specific gains that have occurred since early 2018. \nU.S. gains include\nKim Jong-un\u2019s public statements committing to begin a process of negotiating complete denuclearization;\nNorth Korea\u2019s moratorium on nuclear and missile testing while dialogue continues;\nNorth Korea\u2019s apparent destruction in May of its Pyunggye-ri nuclear test site before international journalists; \nKim\u2019s statement that he would destroy a missile test site; and\nNorth Korea\u2019s release of three U.S. detainees and agreement to restart the POW/MIA recovery program, which the United States suspended in 2005.\nDPRK gains include\nBreaking free from its diplomatic isolation. Following Trump\u2019s March 2018 announcement that he would hold a summit, Kim has re-established friendly relations with China and Russia, and held two summits with South Korean President Moon;\nBoosting Kim\u2019s legitimacy and prestige by using nuclear and missile advancements to obtain a meeting with the U.S. President as an equal;\nLoosening enforcement of sanctions against the DPRK economy;\nAn expectation of future foreign investment and economic and energy assistance if it denuclearizes;\nA U.S. promise to provide \u201csecurity guarantees\u201d; and\nTrump\u2019s announcement of a unilateral cessation of U.S.-South Korean military exercises and his statement that he hopes to withdraw all U.S. forces from South Korea. \nQuestions \nThe summit meeting raises numerous questions, including\nDid North Korea promise to abandon its nuclear weapons? What specific steps are needed to realize the DPRK\u2019s commitment \u201cto work toward complete denuclearization?\u201d [emphasis added] Should a timeline be set? Will this be subject to international verification? Some Korea-watchers worry Kim will use a prolonged negotiation, dismantlement, and verification process as a delaying tactic while sanctions pressure eases. \nWhat does \u201cdenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula\u201d mean? Does this mean the same thing to both countries? Does this phrasing have implications for the U.S. alliance with South Korea?\nHow will talks about denuclearization, a possible peace declaration, and U.S.-DPRK normalization be sequenced and/or linked, if at all? Will the Trump Administration link these talks to inter-Korean talks, and vice versa?\nWill the United States be able to maintain a global pressure coalition while engaging with North Korea? Although Trump Administration officials have said international pressure against North Korea will continue until North Korea either denuclearizes or takes concrete and irreversible steps (as yet undefined) to denuclearize, the incentives for countries to maintain the intensity of the pressure campaign, and scrutiny of countries\u2019 implementation of sanctions, arguably have diminished.\nWhat are the implications for U.S. alliances, especially with South Korea? Combined with his apparent lack of prior consultation with Seoul, Trump\u2019s statements on U.S. troops in South Korea are likely to weaken U.S. allies\u2019 confidence in the durability of U.S. security commitments and provide China and Russia with an argument against future U.S. exercises with allies.\nShould negotiations include North Korea\u2019s other objectionable practices and programs, like the DPRK\u2019s human rights record, cyberattacks, chemical and biological weapons, and sizeable conventional forces?\nWhat will Congress\u2019s role be? Congress could play a direct role in several aspects of an evolving U.S.-DPRK relationship. In addition to approving funding to implement various U.S. commitments and new U.S. diplomatic offices in North Korea, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has testified that a U.S.-DPRK nuclear agreement would be submitted to the Senate as a treaty. Congress could also support or oppose moves not to enforce or lift sanctions. Congress may also weigh in on moves that affect U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10916", "sha1": "a6a298deaf4d6e761ab9fe2e0af12ca5066cc055", "filename": "files/20180612_IN10916_a6a298deaf4d6e761ab9fe2e0af12ca5066cc055.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10916", "sha1": "b2bb7f0d0cb0598c23b57d7744119134e56da470", "filename": "files/20180612_IN10916_b2bb7f0d0cb0598c23b57d7744119134e56da470.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "CRS Insights" ] }