{ "id": "IN10938", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN10938", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 583180, "date": "2018-07-26", "retrieved": "2018-08-07T13:49:06.956019", "title": "Australia and New Zealand React to China\u2019s Growing Influence in the South Pacific", "summary": "Overview \nThe July 24, 2018, Australia-United States Ministerial (AUSMIN) Joint Statement points to \u201cdeepening engagement [between the United States and Australia] in the Indo-Pacific.\u201d Canberra and Wellington are increasingly responding to Chinese influence operations in the Pacific region, as demonstrated by a number of recent actions, including Australia\u2019s passage of new foreign interference legislation; announcement of an possible new Australia-Vanuatu security agreement; New Zealand\u2019s adoption of a new Strategic Defence Policy Statement; steps toward a new Pacific Islands Forum security agreement; and increased aid from Australia and New Zealand to Pacific island states. In addition, Australia is boosting its defense budget, both Australia and New Zealand are making new military procurements, and Australia, New Zealand, and the United States held an inaugural Pacific Security Cooperation Dialogue in June 2018 \u201cto discuss a wide range of security issues and identify areas to strengthen cooperation with Pacific Island countries on common regional challenges.\u201d A review of these developments may assist Congress as it exercises oversight of the Administration\u2019s Indo-Pacific strategy.\nRising Concern over China\u2019s Influence\nChina is interfering in Australian and New Zealand domestic affairs, increasing its aid to the region, and reportedly attempting to develop a military presence in Vanuatu. \nIn responding to reports of China\u2019s efforts to establish a naval presence in Vanuatu, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull stated \u201cWe would view with great concern the establishment of any foreign military bases in those Pacific island countries\u201d and New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern stated that \u201cwe take a strong position in the Pacific against militarization.\u201d Chinese aid to Pacific island states, as tracked by the Lowy Institute Mapping Foreign Assistance in the Pacific project, increased significantly from 2006 to 2016, with cumulative aid commitments totaling $1.78 billion over that period. China also reportedly plans to hold a summit with Pacific Island leaders in Papua New Guinea in November 2018, ahead of the APEC Forum.\nRevelations regarding China\u2019s attempts to influence Australia\u2019s domestic politics, universities, and media, which are discussed in Clive Hamilton\u2019s book, Silent Invasion, appear to be altering Australian perceptions of China, which previously had been shaped, to a large extent, by the economic opportunity that China represents. \nSimilarly, in September 2017, New Zealanders\u2019 concerns about China\u2019s efforts to influence New Zealand politics increased following revelations that New Zealand Member of Parliament Jian Yang previously worked for China\u2019s military intelligence. Anne-Marie Brady\u2019s work \u201cMagic Weapons: China\u2019s Political Influence Activities Under Xi Jinping\u201d examines China\u2019s foreign political influence activities in New Zealand. \nAustralia and New Zealand Respond\nAustralia is undertaking a number of measures to counter China\u2019s growing influence in Australia and the region, and to enhance its regional security posture. On June 28, 2018, the Australian parliament passed new espionage, foreign interference and foreign influence laws. Australia and Vanuatu will also reportedly negotiate a security treaty. This follows reports that Prime Minister Turnbull warned China against establishing a military presence on Vanuatu. \nAustralia\u2019s defense budget is set to increase to 2% of GDP by 2021 and is expected to increase 80% over the decade from A$32.4 billion in FY2016-FY2017 to A$58.7 billion in FY2025-FY2026. [1 $A=0.74 $US] Two of Australia\u2019s larger defense procurement projects are the A$50 billion purchase of 12 French Barracuda Block 1A submarines and 72 F-35A Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. Australia is also planning to purchase air warfare destroyers, anti-submarine frigates and offshore patrol vessels. This effort has been described as the most comprehensive regeneration of Australia\u2019s navy since WWII.\nIn February 2018 Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern\u2019s government announced a reset of New Zealand\u2019s policy toward the Pacific that is driven in part by a view that \u201cthe Pacific has become an increasingly contested strategic space, under which New Zealand has to work harder to maintain our positive influence.\u201d In discussing the Pacific reset, Foreign Minister Winston Peters called for a reenergized approach and stated, \u201cThere has never been a time since 1945 when Australia and New Zealand need to work together more closely in the Pacific.\u201d \nSubsequently, New Zealand in July 2018 released a Strategic Defence Policy Statement that one report called \u201cmore bold and frank in terms of the Government\u2019s foreign policy position, and its singling out of countries, than anything a New Zealand government has released in recent years.\u201d The Policy Statement observes that \u201cAs Pacific island countries\u2019 relationships with non-traditional partners continue to develop, traditional partners such as New Zealand and Australia will be challenged to maintain influence.\u201d Specifically, the Policy Statement notes that \u201cChina\u2019s more confident assertion of its interests has at times raised tensions with neighbouring states and with the United States.\u201d The statement drew objections from China but was defended by Peters.\nNew Zealand also in July 2018 announced the purchase of four Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft. In addition to representing a boost to New Zealand\u2019s military capability, the P-8A is viewed by some as a \u201cdown payment on New Zealand\u2019s continued membership of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing framework, along with Australia, Canada, the UK, and US, and prospective partnership with other stakeholders in the international rules-based order.\u201d \nAustralia and New Zealand support the Pacific Islands Forum and are working with Pacific island states on new initiatives and assistance. Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific island states have announced plans to sign a new security agreement during the gathering of the 18-nation Pacific Island Forum in September 2018, a move Australian and New Zealand observers have tied to concerns about their countries\u2019 ability to maintain relations with the region in the face of rising Chinese engagement. In May 2018, New Zealand announced a $500 million increase over four years that will represent a 30% increase in New Zealand\u2019s aid to the Pacific while Australia announced an increase in aid with the region to receive $979 million over the next two years.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10938", "sha1": "d46ab02a9305e1b7c5ef196ee84e883e141e2d5d", "filename": "files/20180726_IN10938_d46ab02a9305e1b7c5ef196ee84e883e141e2d5d.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10938", "sha1": "7cad1e678973e431ea742b42bef13d52cc6aecd1", "filename": "files/20180726_IN10938_7cad1e678973e431ea742b42bef13d52cc6aecd1.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4903, "name": "Strategy, Operations, & Emerging Threats" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4911, "name": "East Asia & Pacific" } ] } ], "topics": [ "CRS Insights" ] }