{ "id": "IN10943", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN10943", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, CRSReports.Congress.gov", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 615188, "date": "2020-01-29", "retrieved": "2020-01-30T23:01:59.364732", "title": "Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Timeline", "summary": "The trade practices of U.S. trading partners and the U.S. trade deficit are a focus of the Trump Administration. Citing these and other concerns, the President has imposed tariff increases under three U.S. laws: \n(1) Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 1) on U.S. imports of washing machines and solar products due to concerns over their injurious effects on domestic U.S. industry; \n(2) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Table 2) on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and potentially motor vehicles/parts and titanium sponge due to concerns that imports threaten to impair the national security; and \n(3) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 on U.S. imports from China (Table 3) due to concerns over its intellectual property rights practices, from the European Union (EU) due to concerns over subsidies on the manufacture of large civil aircraft, and potentially on U.S. imports from France (Table 4) due to concerns over its digital services tax (DST). \nCongress delegated aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President through these trade laws. These authorities allow the President, based on agency investigations, to take various actions, including imposing import restrictions to address specific concerns (see text box). They have been used infrequently in the past two decades, in part due to the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enforceable dispute settlement system. Prior to this Administration, U.S. import restrictions were last imposed under these trade laws in 1986 for Section 232, in 2009 for Section 301, and in 2002 for Section 201. The President also proposed increasing tariffs on imports from Mexico using authorities delegated by Congress under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), but they were subsequently suspended. The tables below focus on U.S. unilateral tariff actions and do not include Section 301 tariffs related to the large civil aircraft dispute with the EU, which were authorized by a WTO dispute settlement panel. For information on retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.\nIncreasing U.S. tariffs or imposing other import restrictions through these laws potentially opens the United States to complaints that it is violating its WTO and free trade agreement (FTA) commitments. Several U.S. trading partners, including China and the European Union, have initiated dispute settlement proceedings and responded with retaliatory tariffs. The retaliatory actions also raise questions with regard to their adherence to WTO commitments, which the United States has raised.\nTimeline and Status of U.S. Trade Actions\nThe tables below provide a timeline of key events related to each trade action. In addition to tariffs, the President has imposed quotas, or quantitative limits, on U.S. imports of certain goods from specified countries, as well as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), for which one tariff applies up to a specific quantity or value of imports and a higher tariff applies above that threshold.\nTable 1. Section 201 Global Safeguard Investigations\nKey Dates\n5/17/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on solar cells/modules.\n6/5/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on large residential washers.\n9/22/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative solar cells/modules injury determination.\n10/5/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative large residential washers injury determination.\n11/13/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on solar cells/modules to President.\n12/4/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on large residential washers to President.\n1/23/2018\u2014President proclaims actions on solar cells/modules and large residential washers, effective February 7, 2018.\n8/7/2019\u2014ITC releases its mid-term review on the safeguard on large residential washers.\n12/23/2019\u2014ITC announces investigation, as directed by the President, to consider the economic effect of potentially increasing TRQ threshold for solar cells.\n1/23/2020\u2014President proclaims change to quarterly basis for allocation of large residential washer quota, beginning February 7, 2020.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nSolar Cells: 4-year TRQ with 30% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\nSolar Modules: 4-year 30% tariff, descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washers: 3-year TRQ, 20% in quota tariff descending 2% annually, 50% above quota tariff descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washer Parts: 3-year TRQ, 50% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\n\nCountries Affected\nCanada excluded from the duties on washers. Certain developing countries excluded if they account for less than 3% individually or 9% collectively of U.S. imports of solar cells or large residential washers, respectively. All other countries included.\n\nCurrent Status\nEffective February 7, 2018.\n\nTable 2. Section 232 Steel, Aluminum, Auto, Uranium, and Titanium Sponge Investigations\nKey Dates\n4/2017\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigations on U.S. steel and aluminum imports.\n1/2018\u2014Commerce submits steel and aluminum reports to President.\n3/23/2018\u2014United States imposes steel and aluminum duties. Temporary exemptions to May 1 in place for certain U.S. security partners (later extended to June 1). \n4/30/2018\u2014President exempts South Korea from steel duties; imposes a quota arrangement.\n5/23/2018\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigation on U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports.\n5/31/2018\u2014President permanently exempts Argentina and Brazil from steel duties, and Argentina from aluminum duties, based on quota arrangements. Australia permanently exempted from both duties without a quota.\n7/18/2018\u2014Commerce initiates uranium investigation based on industry petition.\n2/17/2019\u2014Commerce submits motor vehicle report to President (no public release).\n3/4/2019\u2014Commerce initiates titanium sponge investigation based on industry petition.\n4/16/2019\u2014Commerce submits uranium report to President (no public release).\n5/17/2019\u2014President proclaims motor vehicle and parts imports a national security threat and directs USTR to negotiate with European Union (EU), Japan, and others to resolve.\n5/19/2019\u2014President exempts Canada and Mexico from steel and aluminum duties. Canada, Mexico, and United States announce process for reinstating tariffs should imports surge.\n7/12/2019\u2014President does not concur with Commerce findings that uranium imports threaten to impair national security, but establishes U.S. Nuclear Fuel Working Group to develop recommendations to revive domestic industry.\n10/14/2019\u2014President announces plans to increase the steel tariffs on imports from Turkey to 50% in response to Turkish military actions but later suspends the planned increase.\n11/19/2019\u2014Commerce submits titanium sponge report to President (no public release).\n12/2/2019\u2014President announces plans to reinstate steel and aluminum tariffs on imports from Argentina and Brazil due to currency issues. (Tariffs have not been reinstated to date.)\n1/24/2020\u2014President proclaims certain derivative products of steel and aluminum (e.g., nails, wires, and select motor vehicle body parts) subject to 25% and 10% tariffs, respectively, effective February 8, 2020.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nAluminum: 10% tariffs on certain aluminum and aluminum derivatives, effective indefinitely.\nSteel: 25% tariffs on certain steel and steel derivatives, effective indefinitely.\nAutos and Parts: No tariffs currently in effect, pending negotiations.\n\nCountries Affected\nAluminum: Argentina,* Australia, Canada, and Mexico exempted. All other countries included.\nSteel: Argentina,* Australia, Brazil,* Canada, Mexico, and South Korea* exempted. All other countries included.\nAutos and Parts: EU, Japan, and other countries \u201cdeemed necessary\u201d targeted for negotiations.\n (*) Quantitative import restrictions imposed in place of tariffs. \n\nCurrent Status\nAluminum: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018. Effective February 8, 2020 for aluminum derivatives.\nSteel: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018. Effective February 8, 2020 for steel derivatives.\nAutos and Parts: National security threat declared, but no import restrictions imposed within 180 days raising questions over possible expiration of tariff authority under this investigation.\nUranium: President determined imports are not a national security threat.\nTitanium Sponge: Investigation completed. Determination on national security threat pending.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 3. Section 301 Investigation of China\u2019s IP and Innovation Policies\nKey Dates\n8/14/2017\u2014President directs USTR to consider investigation on China\u2019s laws, policies, practices, or actions affecting U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfers.\n3/22/2018\u2014USTR releases Section 301 report and finds that China\u2019s policies are \u201cunreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\u201d President signs memorandum proposing to (1) implement tariffs on certain Chinese imports; (2) initiate a WTO dispute settlement case against China\u2019s discriminatory technology licensing; and (3) propose new investment restrictions on Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.\n7/6/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 1 tariffs (25% tariff on $34 billion of U.S. imports).\n8/23/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 2 tariffs (25% tariff on $16 billion of U.S. imports).\n9/24/2018\u2014In response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, United States imposes stage 3 tariffs (10% tariffs on $200 billion of U.S. imports).\n12/1/2018\u2014President announces new negotiations with China to resolve U.S. concerns.\n5/5/2019\u2014President tweets negotiations are moving too slowly, and plans to increase stage 3 tariffs to 25% and to prepare tariffs on remaining Chinese imports (stage 4, on approximately $300 billion of U.S. imports).\n5/10/2019\u2014United States imposes stage 3 tariff increase to 25%.\n8/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that China has not followed through with commitments to buy U.S. agricultural products and USTR releases a two-part plan to impose 10% tariffs on approximately $300 billion of U.S. imports (stage 4). The first part (4A) is to take effect on September 1, 2019; the second part (4B) is to take effect on December 15, 2019.\n8/23/2019\u2014In response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, President Trump directs USTR to further increase tariffs by raising stage 1-3 tariffs to 30% in October 2019, and stage 4 tariffs to 15% on their effective dates (September 1, 2019 \u2013 4A, December 15, 2019 \u2013 4B).\n9/1/2019\u2014United States imposes stage 4A tariffs of 15%.\n10/11/2019\u2014President Trump suspends the proposed October tariff increases, and announces a forthcoming \u201cphase one\u201d deal with China.\n12/15/2019\u2014USTR suspends potential stage 4B tariffs of 15% before they take effect.\n1/15/2019\u2014United States and China sign \u201cphase one\u201d deal, addressing some trade and investment issues and committing China to purchase $200 billion in additional U.S. exports. The agreement leaves in place the majority of existing tariffs.\n1/15/2020\u2014USTR issues a notice to reduce stage 4A tariffs from 15% to 7.5%, effective February 14, 2020.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nStage 1\u201425% import tariff on 818 U.S. tariff lines (approx. $34 billion). \nStage 2\u201425% import tariff on 279 U.S. tariff lines (approx. $16 billion). \nStage 3\u201425% import tariff on 5,733 U.S. tariff lines* (approx. $200 billion).\nStage 4A\u201415% import tariff on 3,229 U.S. tariff lines* (approx. $126 billion) (proposed reduction to 7.5% on February 14, 2020).\nStage 4B\u2014proposed 15% import tariff on 542 tariff lines (approx. $156 billion) (suspended).\n (*) A limited number of stage 3 tariff lines were adjusted to align with changes to the HTSUS in September 2018. Stage 3 and 4 tariff lists also include a small number of partial tariff lines.\n\nCountries Affected\nChina.\n\nCurrent Status\nStage 1\u2014Effective July 6, 2018 (25%);\nStage 2\u2014Effective August 23, 2018 (25%); \nStage 3\u2014Effective September 24, 2018 (10%), increased May 10, 2019 (25%), or June 15, 2019 on products exported from China before May 10 (25%); \nStage 4A\u2014Effective September 1, 2019 (15%), proposed reduction February 14, 2020 (7.5%). \nStage 4B\u2014Suspended indefinitely.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 4. Section 301 Investigation of France\u2019s Digital Service Tax (DST)\nKey Dates\n07/16/2019\u2014USTR initiates investigation of France\u2019s Digital Services Tax (DTS).\n12/2/2019\u2014USTR issues report on France\u2019s DST, finding the tax discriminates against major U.S. digital companies.\n12/6/2019\u2014USTR seeks comments on proposed 100% tariffs on a preliminary list of French products, and schedules hearings for January 7 and 8.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nProposed (potentially up to 100%) tariff on selected imports from France (63 U.S. tariff lines, approx. $2.4 billion in annual imports), and potential fees or restrictions on services from France.\n\nCountries Affected\nFrance.\n\nCurrent Status\nProposed.\n\nTable 5. Proposed Tariffs on Mexico under IEEPA\nKey Dates\n5/30/2019\u2014President announces intent to invoke IEEPA authorities to impose 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico, starting June 10, 2019, and increasing by 5% monthly to 25% in response to concerns over Mexico\u2019s immigration policies affecting the United States.\n6/7/2019\u2014President tweets that the United States reached an agreement with Mexico (see State Department announcement), suspending the proposed tariffs indefinitely.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nProposed 5% import tariff on all U.S. imports from Mexico, increasing by 5% monthly to a maximum of 25% (currently suspended).\n\nCountries Affected\nMexico.\n\nCurrent Status\nSuspended indefinitely.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10943", "sha1": "4d13308c5354b20e078e9718a4804c1e483b7c1c", "filename": "files/20200129_IN10943_4d13308c5354b20e078e9718a4804c1e483b7c1c.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10943", "sha1": "0efe3c9c853ab60f13a4fcc55bf0130a378a1bf6", "filename": "files/20200129_IN10943_0efe3c9c853ab60f13a4fcc55bf0130a378a1bf6.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4865, "name": "Import Policy" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 606622, "date": "2019-10-24", "retrieved": "2019-10-24T22:03:20.834448", "title": "Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Timeline", "summary": "The trade practices of U.S. trading partners and the U.S. trade deficit are a focus of the Trump Administration. Citing these and other concerns, the President has imposed tariff increases under three U.S. laws: \n(1) Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 1) on U.S. imports of washing machines and solar products; \n(2) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Table 2) on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and potentially motor vehicles/parts and titanium sponge (the President decided not to impose tariffs on uranium imports, after an investigation); and \n(3) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 3) on U.S. imports from China. \nCongress delegated aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President through these trade laws. These statutory authorities allow the President, based on agency investigations, to take various actions, including imposing import restrictions to address specific concerns (see text box). They have been used infrequently in the past two decades, in part due to the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enforceable dispute settlement system. Prior to this Administration, U.S. import restrictions were last imposed under these trade laws in 1986 for Section 232, in 2001 for Section 301, and in 2002 for Section 201. The President also proposed increasing tariffs on imports from Mexico using authorities delegated by Congress under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), but subsequently suspended the proposed tariffs citing an agreement reached with Mexico (Table 4). This product focuses on unilateral tariff actions by the Administration, and does not include recently imposed increased tariffs on U.S. imports from the European Union (EU), which were sanctioned by a WTO dispute settlement panel. For information on retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.\nU.S. Laws Related To Trump Administration Trade Actions\nSection 201 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the President to impose temporary duties and other trade measures if the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines a surge in imports is a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry.\nSection 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962\u2014Allows the President to adjust imports if the Department of Commerce finds certain products are imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair U.S. national security.\nSection 301 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\nInternational Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977\u2014Allows the President to regulate the importation of any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest if the President declares a national emergency to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.\n\nIncreasing U.S. tariffs or imposing other import restrictions through these laws potentially opens the United States to complaints that it is violating its WTO and free trade agreement (FTA) commitments. Several U.S. trading partners, including China and the European Union, have initiated dispute settlement proceedings and imposed retaliatory tariffs in response. The retaliatory actions also raise questions with regard to their adherence to WTO commitments, which the United States has raised at the WTO.\nTimeline and Status of U.S. Trade Actions\nThe tables below provide a timeline of key events related to each trade action. In addition to tariffs, the President has imposed quotas, or quantitative limits on U.S. imports of certain goods from specified countries, as well as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), for which one tariff applies up to a specific quantity or value of imports and a higher tariff applies above that threshold.\nTable 1. Section 201 Global Safeguard Investigations\nKey Dates\n5/17/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on solar cells/modules.\n6/5/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on large residential washers.\n9/22/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative solar cells/modules injury determination.\n10/5/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative large residential washers injury determination.\n11/13/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on solar cells/modules to President.\n12/4/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on large residential washers to President.\n1/23/2018\u2014President proclaims actions on solar cells/modules and large residential washers, effective February 7, 2018.\n8/7/2019\u2014ITC releases its mid-term review on the safeguard on large residential washers.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nSolar Cells: 4-year TRQ with 30% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\nSolar Modules: 4-year 30% tariff, descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washers: 3-year TRQ, 20% in quota tariff descending 2% annually, 50% above quota tariff descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washer Parts: 3-year TRQ, 50% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\n\nCountries Affected\nCanada excluded from the duties on washers. Certain developing countries excluded if they account for less than 3% individually or 9% collectively of U.S. imports of solar cells or large residential washers, respectively. All other countries included.\n\nCurrent Status\nEffective February 7, 2018.\n\nTable 2. Section 232 Steel, Aluminum, Auto, Uranium, and Titanium Sponge Investigations\nKey Dates\n4/2017\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigations on U.S. steel (4/19) and aluminum (4/26) imports.\n1/2018\u2014Commerce submits steel (1/11) and aluminum (1/17) investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/23/2018\u2014United States imposes steel and aluminum duties. Temporary exemptions to May 1 in place for certain U.S. security partners (later extended to June 1). \n4/30/2018\u2014President permanently exempts South Korea from steel duties, based on a quota arrangement.\n5/23/2018\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigation on U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports.\n5/31/2018\u2014President permanently exempts Argentina and Brazil from steel duties, and Argentina from aluminum duties, based on quota arrangements. Australia permanently exempted from both duties without a quota.\n7/18/2018\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. uranium imports based on industry petition.\n2/17/2019\u2014Commerce submits motor vehicle and parts investigation findings and recommendations to President (no public release).\n3/4/2019\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. titanium sponge imports based on industry petition.\n4/16/2019\u2014Commerce submits uranium investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n5/17/2019\u2014President proclaims motor vehicle and parts imports a national security threat and directs USTR to negotiate with European Union (EU), Japan, and others to resolve threat.\n5/19/2019\u2014President exempts Canada and Mexico from steel and aluminum duties. Canada, Mexico, and United States announce process for reinstating tariffs should imports surge.\n7/12/2019\u2014President does not concur with Commerce findings that uranium imports threaten to impair national security, but establishes U.S. Nuclear Fuel Working Group to develop recommendations to revive domestic industry.\n10/14/2019\u2014In response to Turkey\u2019s military actions in Syria, President Trump announces a plan to increase the steel tariffs on products from Turkey to 50%. After Turkey announces a ceasefire, President Trump indefinitely suspends the tariff increase.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nAluminum: 10% tariffs on specified list of aluminum imports, effective indefinitely.\nSteel: 25% tariffs on specified list of steel imports, effective indefinitely.\nAutos and Parts: No tariffs currently in effect, pending negotiations.\n\nCountries Affected\nAluminum: Argentina,* Australia, Canada, and Mexico exempted. All other countries included.\nSteel: Argentina,* Australia, Brazil,* Canada, Mexico, and South Korea* exempted. All other countries included.\nAutos and Parts: EU, Japan, and other countries \u201cdeemed necessary\u201d targeted for negotiations.\n (*) Quantitative import restrictions imposed in place of tariffs. \n\nCurrent Status\nAluminum: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nSteel: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nAutos and Parts: National security threat declared. Negotiations to resolve threat are ongoing with USTR to report to the President on their status within 180 days of May 17, 2019.\nUranium: President determined imports are not a national security threat.\nTitanium Sponge: Investigation ongoing. Determination on national security threat pending.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 3. Section 301 Investigation of China\u2019s IP and Innovation Policies\nKey Dates\n8/14/2017\u2014President directs USTR to consider investigation on China\u2019s laws, policies, practices, or actions affecting U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfers.\n3/22/2018\u2014USTR releases Section 301 report and finds that China\u2019s policies are \u201cunreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\u201d President signs memorandum proposing to (1) implement tariffs on certain Chinese imports; (2) initiate a WTO dispute settlement case against China\u2019s discriminatory technology licensing; and (3) propose new investment restrictions on Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.\n4/6/2018\u2014USTR publishes proposed list of products to be subject to additional 25% tariff.\n5/19/2018\u2014United States and China release joint statement as initial negotiations held to resolve U.S. concerns.\n5/29/2018\u2014President announces U.S. plan to proceed with Section 301 actions, including 25% tariff on $50 billion of U.S. imports.\n6/15/2018\u2014USTR releases two-stage plan to impose 25% tariffs on approximately $50 billion of Chinese imports.\n6/18/2018\u2014President directs USTR to propose additional list of imports (stage 3) valued at $200 billion to be subject to 10% tariff if China retaliates against Section 301 tariffs.\n7/6/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 1 tariffs (25% tariff on $34 billion of U.S. imports).\n8/23/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 2 tariffs (25% tariff on $16 billion of U.S. imports).\n9/24/2018\u2014In response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, United States imposes stage 3 tariffs (10% tariffs on $200 billion of U.S. imports initially set to increase to 25% on January 1, 2019).\n12/1/2018\u2014President announces new negotiations with China to resolve U.S. concerns and declares stage 3 tariffs will remain at 10%.\n5/5/2019\u2014President tweets negotiations are moving too slowly, and plans to increase stage 3 tariffs to 25% and to prepare tariffs on remaining Chinese imports (stage 4).\n5/10/2019\u2014United States imposes stage 3 tariff increase to 25%.\n5/17/2019\u2014USTR publishes proposed stage 4 tariff list (up to 25% tariff on $300 billion of U.S. imports).\n6/18/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that he plans to meet with President Xi during G-20 and resume staff-level talks with China.\n8/1/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that China has not followed through with commitments to buy U.S. agricultural products and announces a 10% tariff on remaining U.S. imports from China (stage 4) will take effect September 1, 2019.\n8/14/2019\u2014USTR releases a two-part plan to impose 10% tariffs on approximately $300 billion of U.S. imports (stage 4). The first part (4A) will take effect on September 1, 2019; the second part (4B) will take effect on December 15, 2019.\n8/23/2019\u2014In response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, President Trump directs USTR to further increase tariffs on approximately $550 billion worth of U.S. imports from China by 5%, raising stage 1-3 tariffs to 30% on October 1, 2019, and stage 4 tariffs to 15% on their effective dates (September 1, 2019 \u2013 4A, December 15, 2019 \u2013 4B).\n9/1/2019\u2014United States imposes stage 4A tariffs of 15%.\n9/3/2019\u2014USTR issues request for comments on proposed tariff increase from 25% to 30% on stage 1-3 tariffs.\n9/11/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that the United States will delay the proposed increase from 25% to 30% on stage 1-3 tariffs from October 1 to October 15.\n10/11/2019\u2014President Trump suspends the proposed October 15 tariff increases, and announces progress in U.S.-China trade talks, projecting that an initial, limited agreement (\u201cphase one deal\u201d) could be finalized in mid-November.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nStage 1\u201425% import tariff on 818 U.S. tariff lines (approx. $34 billion). \nProposed increase to 30% (currently suspended).\nStage 2\u201425% import tariff on 279 U.S. tariff lines (approx. $16 billion). \nProposed increase to 30% (currently suspended).\nStage 3\u201425% import tariff on 5,733 U.S. tariff lines* (approx. $200 billion).\nProposed increase to 30% (currently suspended).\nStage 4\u201415% import tariff on 3771 U.S. tariff lines* (approx. $300 billion); 4A covers 3229 tariff lines and 4B covers 542 tariff lines.\n(*) A limited number of stage 3 tariff lines were adjusted to align with changes to the HTSUS in September 2018. Stage 3 and 4 tariff lists also include a small number of partial tariff lines.\n\nCountries Affected\nChina.\n\nCurrent Status\nStage 1\u2014Effective July 6, 2018 (25%);\nStage 2\u2014Effective August 23, 2018 (25%); \nStage 3\u2014Effective September 24, 2018 (10%), increased May 10, 2019 (25%), or June 15, 2019 on products exported from China before May 10 (25%); \nStage 4\u2014Effective September 1, 2019 (15%, stage 4A) and proposed effective December 15, 2019 (15%, stage 4B).\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 4. Proposed Tariffs on Mexico under IEEPA\nKey Dates\n5/30/2019\u2014President announces intent to invoke IEEPA authorities to impose 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico, starting June 10, 2019, and increasing by 5% monthly to 25% in response to concerns over Mexico\u2019s immigration policies affecting the United States.\n6/7/2019\u2014President tweets that the United States reached an agreement with Mexico (see State Department announcement), suspending the proposed tariffs indefinitely.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nProposed 5% import tariff on all U.S. imports from Mexico, increasing by 5% monthly to a maximum of 25% (currently suspended).\n\nCountries Affected\nMexico.\n\nCurrent Status\nSuspended indefinitely.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10943", "sha1": "3275ed20f660e7e485906c90b06c9c796120f188", "filename": "files/20191024_IN10943_3275ed20f660e7e485906c90b06c9c796120f188.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10943", "sha1": "3fbdbcbef04e5421e28e12b4f839ad577441962c", "filename": "files/20191024_IN10943_3fbdbcbef04e5421e28e12b4f839ad577441962c.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4865, "name": "Import Policy" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 604954, "date": "2019-09-12", "retrieved": "2019-09-16T22:04:19.288607", "title": "Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Timeline", "summary": "The trade practices of U.S. trading partners and the U.S. trade deficit are a focus of the Trump Administration. Citing these and other concerns, the President has imposed tariff increases under three U.S. laws: \n(1) Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 1) on U.S. imports of washing machines and solar products; \n(2) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Table 2) on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and potentially motor vehicles/parts and titanium sponge (the President decided not to impose tariffs on uranium imports, after an investigation); and \n(3) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 3) on U.S. imports from China. \nCongress delegated aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President through these trade laws. These statutory authorities allow the President, based on agency investigations, to take various actions, including imposing import restrictions to address specific concerns (see text box). They have been used infrequently in the past two decades, in part due to the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enforceable dispute settlement system. Prior to this Administration, U.S. import restrictions were last imposed under these trade laws in 1986 for Section 232, in 2001 for Section 301, and in 2002 for Section 201. The President also proposed increasing tariffs on imports from Mexico using authorities delegated by Congress under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), but subsequently suspended the proposed tariffs citing an agreement reached with Mexico (Table 4). For information on retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.\nU.S. Laws Related To Trump Administration Trade Actions\nSection 201 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the President to impose temporary duties and other trade measures if the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines a surge in imports is a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry.\nSection 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962\u2014Allows the President to adjust imports if the Department of Commerce finds certain products are imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair U.S. national security.\nSection 301 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\nInternational Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977\u2014Allows the President to regulate the importation of any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest if the President declares a national emergency to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.\n\nIncreasing U.S. tariffs or imposing other import restrictions through these laws potentially opens the United States to complaints that it is violating its WTO and free trade agreement (FTA) commitments. Several U.S. trading partners, including China and the European Union, have initiated dispute settlement proceedings and imposed retaliatory tariffs in response. The retaliatory actions also raise questions with regard to their adherence to WTO commitments, which the United States has raised at the WTO.\nTimeline and Status of U.S. Trade Actions\nThe tables below provide a timeline of key events related to each trade action. In addition to tariffs, the President has imposed quotas, or quantitative limits on U.S. imports of certain goods from specified countries, as well as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), for which one tariff applies up to a specific quantity or value of imports and a higher tariff applies above that threshold.\nTable 1. Section 201 Global Safeguard Investigations\nKey Dates\n5/17/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on solar cells/modules.\n6/5/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on large residential washers.\n9/22/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative solar cells/modules injury determination.\n10/5/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative large residential washers injury determination.\n11/13/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on solar cells/modules to President.\n12/4/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on large residential washers to President.\n1/23/2018\u2014President proclaims actions on solar cells/modules and large residential washers, effective February 7, 2018.\n8/7/2019\u2014ITC releases its mid-term review on the safeguard on large residential washers.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nSolar Cells: 4-year TRQ with 30% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\nSolar Modules: 4-year 30% tariff, descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washers: 3-year TRQ, 20% in quota tariff descending 2% annually, 50% above quota tariff descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washer Parts: 3-year TRQ, 50% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\n\nCountries Affected\nCanada excluded from the duties on washers. Certain developing countries excluded if they account for less than 3% individually or 9% collectively of U.S. imports of solar cells or large residential washers, respectively. All other countries included.\n\nCurrent Status\nEffective February 7, 2018.\n\nTable 2. Section 232 Steel, Aluminum, Auto, Uranium, and Titanium Sponge Investigations\nKey Dates\n4/2017\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigations on U.S. steel (4/19) and aluminum (4/26) imports.\n1/2018\u2014Commerce submits steel (1/11) and aluminum (1/17) investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/23/2018\u2014United States imposes steel and aluminum duties. Temporary exemptions to May 1 in place for certain U.S. security partners (later extended to June 1). \n4/30/2018\u2014President permanently exempts South Korea from steel duties, based on a quota arrangement.\n5/23/2018\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigation on U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports.\n5/31/2018\u2014President permanently exempts Argentina and Brazil from steel duties, and Argentina from aluminum duties, based on quota arrangements. Australia permanently exempted from both duties without a quota.\n7/18/2018\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. uranium imports based on industry petition.\n2/17/2019\u2014Commerce submits motor vehicle and parts investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/4/2019\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. titanium sponge imports based on industry petition.\n4/16/2019\u2014Commerce submits uranium investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n5/17/2019\u2014President proclaims motor vehicle and parts imports a national security threat and directs USTR to negotiate with European Union (EU), Japan, and others to resolve threat.\n5/19/2019\u2014President exempts Canada and Mexico from steel and aluminum duties. Canada, Mexico, and United States announce process for reinstating tariffs should imports surge.\n7/12/2019\u2014President does not concur with Commerce findings that uranium imports threaten to impair national security, but establishes U.S. Nuclear Fuel Working Group to develop recommendations to revive domestic industry.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nAluminum: 10% tariffs on specified list of aluminum imports, effective indefinitely.\nSteel: 25% tariffs on specified list of steel imports, effective indefinitely.\nAutos and Parts: No tariffs currently in effect, pending negotiations.\n\nCountries Affected\nAluminum: Argentina,* Australia, Canada, and Mexico exempted. All other countries included.\nSteel: Argentina,* Australia, Brazil,* Canada, Mexico, and South Korea* exempted. All other countries included.\nAutos and Parts: EU, Japan, and other countries \u201cdeemed necessary\u201d targeted for negotiations.\n (*) Quantitative import restrictions imposed in place of tariffs. \n\nCurrent Status\nAluminum: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nSteel: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nAutos and Parts: National security threat declared. Negotiations to resolve threat are ongoing with USTR to report to the President on their status within 180 days of May 17, 2019.\nUranium: President determined imports are not a national security threat.\nTitanium Sponge: Investigation ongoing. Determination on national security threat pending.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 3. Section 301 Investigation of China\u2019s IP and Innovation Policies\nKey Dates\n8/14/2017\u2014President directs USTR to consider investigation on China\u2019s laws, policies, practices, or actions affecting U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfers.\n3/22/2018\u2014USTR releases Section 301 report and finds that China\u2019s policies are \u201cunreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\u201d President signs memorandum proposing to (1) implement tariffs on certain Chinese imports; (2) initiate a WTO dispute settlement case against China\u2019s discriminatory technology licensing; and (3) propose new investment restrictions on Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.\n4/6/2018\u2014USTR publishes proposed list of products to be subject to additional 25% tariff.\n5/19/2018\u2014United States and China release joint statement as initial negotiations held to resolve U.S. concerns.\n5/29/2018\u2014President announces U.S. plan to proceed with Section 301 actions, including 25% tariff on $50 billion of U.S. imports.\n6/15/2018\u2014USTR releases two-stage plan to impose 25% tariffs on approximately $50 billion of Chinese imports.\n6/18/2018\u2014President directs USTR to propose additional list of imports (stage 3) valued at $200 billion to be subject to 10% tariff if China retaliates against Section 301 tariffs.\n7/6/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 1 tariffs (25% tariff on $34 billion of U.S. imports).\n8/23/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 2 tariffs (25% tariff on $16 billion of U.S. imports).\n9/24/2018\u2014In response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, United States imposes stage 3 tariffs (10% tariffs on $200 billion of U.S. imports initially set to increase to 25% on January 1, 2019).\n12/1/2018\u2014President announces new negotiations with China to resolve U.S. concerns and declares stage 3 tariffs will remain at 10%.\n5/5/2019\u2014President tweets negotiations are moving too slowly, and plans to increase stage 3 tariffs to 25% and to prepare tariffs on remaining Chinese imports (stage 4).\n5/10/2019\u2014United States imposes stage 3 tariff increase to 25%.\n5/17/2019\u2014USTR publishes proposed stage 4 tariff list (up to 25% tariff on $300 billion of U.S. imports).\n6/18/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that he plans to meet with President Xi during G-20 and resume staff-level talks with China.\n8/1/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that China has not followed through with commitments to buy U.S. agricultural products and announces a 10% tariff on remaining U.S. imports from China (stage 4) will take effect September 1, 2019.\n8/14/2019\u2014USTR releases a two-part plan to impose 10% tariffs on approximately $300 billion of U.S. imports (stage 4). The first part (4A) will take effect on September 1, 2019; the second part (4B) will take effect on December 15, 2019.\n8/23/2019\u2014In response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, President Trump directs USTR to further increase tariffs on approximately $550 billion worth of U.S. imports from China by 5%, raising stage 1-3 tariffs to 30% on October 1, 2019, and stage 4 tariffs to 15% on their effective dates (September 1, 2019 \u2013 4A, December 15, 2019 \u2013 4B).\n9/1/2019\u2014United States imposes stage 4A tariffs of 15%.\n9/3/2019\u2014USTR issues request for comments on proposed tariff increase from 25% to 30% on stage 1-3 tariffs.\n9/11/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that the United States will delay the proposed increase from 25% to 30% on stage 1-3 tariffs from October 1 to October 15.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nStage 1\u201425% import tariff on 818 U.S. imports (approx. $34 billion). \nProposed increase to 30% (pending).\nStage 2\u201425% import tariff on 279 U.S. imports (approx. $16 billion). \nProposed increase to 30% (pending).\nStage 3\u201425% import tariff on 5,733 U.S. imports (approx. $200 billion).\nProposed increase to 30% (pending).\nStage 4\u201415% import tariff on 3,796 U.S. imports (approx. $300 billion); 4A covers 3,242 products and 4B covers 554 products.\n\nCountries Affected\nChina.\n\nCurrent Status\nStage 1\u2014Effective July 6, 2018 (25%); proposed increase to take effect October 15, 2019 (30%).\nStage 2\u2014Effective August 23, 2018 (25%); proposed increase to take effect October 15, 2019 (30%).\nStage 3\u2014Effective September 24, 2018 (10%), May 10, 2019, or June 15, 2019, on products exported from China before May 10 (25%); proposed increase to take effect October 15, 2019 (30%).\nStage 4\u2014Effective September 1, 2019 (15%, stage 4A) and proposed effective December 15, 2019 (15%, stage 4B).\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 4. Proposed Tariffs on Mexico under IEEPA\nKey Dates\n5/30/2019\u2014President announces intent to invoke IEEPA authorities to impose 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico, starting June 10, 2019, and increasing by 5% monthly to 25% in response to concerns over Mexico\u2019s immigration policies affecting the United States.\n6/7/2019\u2014President tweets that the United States reached an agreement with Mexico (see State Department announcement), suspending the proposed tariffs indefinitely.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nProposed 5% import tariff on all U.S. imports from Mexico, increasing by 5% monthly to a maximum of 25% (proposed, approx. $346.5 billion).\n\nCountries Affected\nMexico.\n\nCurrent Status\nSuspended indefinitely.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10943", "sha1": "2f4a0a627dd700f3acf78f1d2e7957ed8a870153", "filename": "files/20190912_IN10943_2f4a0a627dd700f3acf78f1d2e7957ed8a870153.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10943", "sha1": "f94a4a1c1cf4df2ecc87474d4b970bbcc5118e1f", "filename": "files/20190912_IN10943_f94a4a1c1cf4df2ecc87474d4b970bbcc5118e1f.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4865, "name": "Import Policy" } ] }, { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Timeline", "retrieved": "2020-09-05T09:20:47.758925", "id": "IN10943_15_2019-09-06", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2019-09-06_IN10943_2df9b078f4ef65e2abb7fb88ba766875e371213f.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN10943/15", "sha1": "2df9b078f4ef65e2abb7fb88ba766875e371213f" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2019-09-06_IN10943_2df9b078f4ef65e2abb7fb88ba766875e371213f.html" } ], "date": "2019-09-06", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "IN", "active": false, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=IN10943", "type": "CRS Insight" }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 603798, "date": "2019-08-16", "retrieved": "2019-08-16T22:10:26.762304", "title": "Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Timeline", "summary": "The trade practices of U.S. trading partners and the U.S. trade deficit are a focus of the Trump Administration. Citing these and other concerns, the President has imposed tariff increases under three U.S. laws: \n(1) Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 1) on U.S. imports of washing machines and solar products; \n(2) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Table 2) on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and potentially motor vehicles/parts and titanium sponge (the President decided not to impose tariffs on uranium imports, after an investigation); and \n(3) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 3) on U.S. imports from China. \nCongress delegated aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President through these trade laws. These statutory authorities allow the President, based on agency investigations, to take various actions, including imposing import restrictions to address specific concerns (see text box). They have been used infrequently in the past two decades, in part due to the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enforceable dispute settlement system. Prior to this Administration, U.S. import restrictions were last imposed under these trade laws in 1986 for Section 232, in 2001 for Section 301, and in 2002 for Section 201. The President also proposed increasing tariffs on imports from Mexico using authorities delegated by Congress under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), but subsequently suspended the proposed tariffs citing an agreement reached with Mexico (Table 4). For information on retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.\nU.S. Laws Related To Trump Administration Trade Actions\nSection 201 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the President to impose temporary duties and other trade measures if the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines a surge in imports is a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry.\nSection 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962\u2014Allows the President to adjust imports if the Department of Commerce finds certain products are imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair U.S. national security.\nSection 301 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\nInternational Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977\u2014Allows the President to regulate the importation of any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest if the President declares a national emergency to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.\n\nIncreasing U.S. tariffs or imposing other import restrictions through these laws potentially opens the United States to complaints that it is violating its WTO and free trade agreement (FTA) commitments. Several U.S. trading partners, including China and the European Union, have initiated dispute settlement proceedings and imposed retaliatory tariffs in response. The retaliatory actions also raise questions with regard to their adherence to WTO commitments, which the United States has raised at the WTO.\nTimeline and Status of U.S. Trade Actions\nThe tables below provide a timeline of key events related to each trade action. In addition to tariffs, the President has imposed quotas, or quantitative limits on U.S. imports of certain goods from specified countries, as well as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), for which one tariff applies up to a specific quantity or value of imports and a higher tariff applies above that threshold.\nTable 1. Section 201 Global Safeguard Investigations\nKey Dates\n5/17/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on solar cells/modules.\n6/5/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on large residential washers.\n9/22/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative solar cells/modules injury determination.\n10/5/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative large residential washers injury determination.\n11/13/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on solar cells/modules to President.\n12/4/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on large residential washers to President.\n1/23/2018\u2014President proclaims actions on solar cells/modules and large residential washers, effective February 7, 2018.\n8/7/2019\u2014ITC releases its mid-term review on the safeguard on large residential washers.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nSolar Cells: 4-year TRQ with 30% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\nSolar Modules: 4-year 30% tariff, descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washers: 3-year TRQ, 20% in quota tariff descending 2% annually, 50% above quota tariff descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washer Parts: 3-year TRQ, 50% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\n\nCountries Affected\nCanada excluded from the duties on washers. Certain developing countries excluded if they account for less than 3% individually or 9% collectively of U.S. imports of solar cells or large residential washers, respectively. All other countries included.\n\nCurrent Status\nEffective February 7, 2018.\n\nTable 2. Section 232 Steel, Aluminum, Auto, Uranium, and Titanium Sponge Investigations\nKey Dates\n4/2017\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigations on U.S. steel (4/19) and aluminum (4/26) imports.\n1/2018\u2014Commerce submits steel (1/11) and aluminum (1/17) investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/23/2018\u2014United States imposes steel and aluminum duties. Temporary exemptions to May 1 in place for certain U.S. security partners (later extended to June 1). \n4/30/2018\u2014President permanently exempts South Korea from steel duties, based on a quota arrangement.\n5/23/2018\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigation on U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports.\n5/31/2018\u2014President permanently exempts Argentina and Brazil from steel duties, and Argentina from aluminum duties, based on quota arrangements. Australia permanently exempted from both duties without a quota.\n7/18/2018\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. uranium imports based on industry petition.\n2/17/2019\u2014Commerce submits motor vehicle and parts investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/4/2019\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. titanium sponge imports based on industry petition.\n4/16/2019\u2014Commerce submits uranium investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n5/17/2019\u2014President proclaims motor vehicle and parts imports a national security threat and directs USTR to negotiate with European Union (EU), Japan, and others to resolve threat.\n5/19/2019\u2014President exempts Canada and Mexico from steel and aluminum duties. Canada, Mexico, and United States announce process for reinstating tariffs should imports surge.\n7/12/2019\u2014President does not concur with Commerce findings that uranium imports threaten to impair national security, but establishes U.S. Nuclear Fuel Working Group to develop recommendations to revive domestic industry.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nAluminum: 10% tariffs on specified list of aluminum imports, effective indefinitely.\nSteel: 25% tariffs on specified list of steel imports, effective indefinitely.\nAutos and Parts: No tariffs currently in effect, pending negotiations.\n\nCountries Affected\nAluminum: Argentina,* Australia, Canada, and Mexico exempted. All other countries included.\nSteel: Argentina,* Australia, Brazil,* Canada, Mexico, and South Korea* exempted. All other countries included.\nAutos and Parts: EU, Japan, and other countries \u201cdeemed necessary\u201d targeted for negotiations.\n (*) Quantitative import restrictions imposed in place of tariffs. \n\nCurrent Status\nAluminum: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nSteel: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nAutos and Parts: National security threat declared. Negotiations to resolve threat are ongoing with USTR to report to the President on their status within 180 days of May 17, 2019.\nUranium: President determined imports are not a national security threat.\nTitanium Sponge: Investigation ongoing. Determination on national security threat pending.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 3. Section 301 Investigation of China\u2019s IP and Innovation Policies\nKey Dates\n8/14/2017\u2014President directs USTR to consider investigation on China\u2019s laws, policies, practices, or actions affecting U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfers.\n3/22/2018\u2014USTR releases Section 301 report and finds that China\u2019s policies are \u201cunreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\u201d President signs memorandum proposing to: (1) implement tariffs on certain Chinese imports; (2) initiate a WTO dispute settlement case against China\u2019s discriminatory technology licensing; and (3) propose new investment restrictions on Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.\n4/6/2018\u2014USTR publishes proposed list of products to be subject to additional 25% tariff.\n5/19/2018\u2014United States and China release joint statement as initial negotiations held to resolve U.S. concerns.\n5/29/2018\u2014President announces U.S. plan to proceed with Section 301 actions, including 25% tariff on $50 billion of U.S. imports.\n6/15/2018\u2014USTR releases two-stage plan to impose 25% tariffs on approximately $50 billion of Chinese imports.\n6/18/2018\u2014President directs USTR to propose additional list of imports (stage 3) valued at $200 billion to be subject to 10% tariff if China retaliates against Section 301 tariffs.\n7/6/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 1 tariffs (25% tariff on $34 billion of U.S. imports).\n8/23/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 2 tariffs (25% tariff on $16 billion of U.S. imports).\n9/24/2018\u2014In response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, United States imposes stage 3 tariffs (10% tariffs on $200 billion of U.S. imports initially set to increase to 25% on January 1, 2019).\n12/1/2018\u2014President announces new negotiations with China to resolve U.S. concerns and declares stage 3 tariffs will remain at 10%.\n5/5/2019\u2014President tweets negotiations are moving too slowly, and plans to increase stage 3 tariffs to 25% and to prepare tariffs on remaining Chinese imports (stage 4).\n5/10/2019\u2014United States imposes stage 3 tariff increase to 25%.\n5/17/2019\u2014USTR publishes proposed stage 4 tariff list (up to 25% tariff on $300 billion of U.S. imports).\n6/18/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that he plans to meet with President Xi during G-20 and resume staff-level talks with China.\n8/1/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that China has not followed through with commitments to buy U.S. agricultural products and announces a 10% tariff on remaining U.S. imports from China (stage 4) will take effect September 1, 2019.\n8/14/2019\u2014USTR releases a two-part plan to impose 10% tariffs on approximately $300 billion of U.S. imports (stage 4). The first part (4A) will take effect on September 1, 2019; the second part (4B) will take effect on December 15, 2019.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nStage 1\u201425% import tariff on 818 U.S. imports (final, approx. $34 billion).\nStage 2\u201425% import tariff on 279 U.S. imports (final, approx. $16 billion).\nStage 3\u201410% import tariff increased to 25% on 5,733 U.S. imports (final, approx. $200 billion). \nStage 4\u201410% import tariff on 3,796 U.S. imports (proposed, approx. $300 billion); 4A covers 3,242 products and 4B covers 554 products).\n\nCountries Affected\nChina.\n\nCurrent Status\nStage 1\u2014Effective July 6, 2018.\nStage 2\u2014Effective August 23, 2018.\nStage 3\u2014Effective September 24, 2018 (10%), May 10, 2019 or June 15, 2019 on products exported from China before May 10 (25%).\nStage 4\u2014Proposed to take effect September 1, 2019 (stage 4A) and December 15, 2019 (stage 4B).\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 4. Proposed Tariffs on Mexico under IEEPA\nKey Dates\n5/30/2019\u2014President announces intent to invoke IEEPA authorities to impose 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico, starting June 10, 2019, and increasing by 5% monthly to 25% in response to concerns over Mexico\u2019s immigration policies affecting the United States.\n6/7/2019\u2014President tweets that the United States reached an agreement with Mexico (see State Department announcement), suspending the proposed tariffs indefinitely.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nProposed 5% import tariff on all U.S. imports from Mexico, increasing by 5% monthly to a maximum of 25% (proposed, approx. $346.5 billion).\n\nCountries Affected\nMexico.\n\nCurrent Status\nSuspended indefinitely.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10943", "sha1": "0e3d0f5bdedec6dc862f05d6f9537ed4be480455", "filename": "files/20190816_IN10943_0e3d0f5bdedec6dc862f05d6f9537ed4be480455.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10943", "sha1": "09b633990ff5af52a1f98b59a5d5d0f1d5a6bd99", "filename": "files/20190816_IN10943_09b633990ff5af52a1f98b59a5d5d0f1d5a6bd99.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4865, "name": "Import Policy" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 603448, "date": "2019-08-09", "retrieved": "2019-08-12T22:06:06.664516", "title": "Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Timeline", "summary": "The trade practices of U.S. trading partners and the U.S. trade deficit are a focus of the Trump Administration. Citing these and other concerns, the President has imposed tariff increases under three U.S. laws: \n(1) Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 1) on U.S. imports of washing machines and solar products; \n(2) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Table 2) on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and potentially motor vehicles/parts and titanium sponge (the President decided not to impose tariffs on uranium imports, after an investigation); and \n(3) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 3) on U.S. imports from China. \nCongress delegated aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President through these trade laws. These statutory authorities allow the President, based on agency investigations, to take various actions, including imposing import restrictions to address specific concerns (see text box). They have been used infrequently in the past two decades, in part due to the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enforceable dispute settlement system. Prior to this Administration, U.S. import restrictions were last imposed under these trade laws in 1986 for Section 232, in 2001 for Section 301, and in 2002 for Section 201. The President also proposed increasing tariffs on imports from Mexico using authorities delegated by Congress under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), but subsequently suspended the proposed tariffs citing an agreement reached with Mexico (Table 4). For information on retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.\nU.S. Laws Related To Trump Administration Trade Actions\nSection 201 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the President to impose temporary duties and other trade measures if the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines a surge in imports is a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry.\nSection 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962\u2014Allows the President to adjust imports if the Department of Commerce finds certain products are imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair U.S. national security.\nSection 301 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\nInternational Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977\u2014Allows the President to regulate the importation of any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest if the President declares a national emergency to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.\n\nIncreasing U.S. tariffs or imposing other import restrictions through these laws potentially opens the United States to complaints that it is violating its WTO and free trade agreement (FTA) commitments. Several U.S. trading partners, including China and the European Union, have initiated dispute settlement proceedings and imposed retaliatory tariffs in response. The retaliatory actions also raise questions with regard to their adherence to WTO commitments, which the United States has raised at the WTO.\nTimeline and Status of U.S. Trade Actions\nThe tables below provide a timeline of key events related to each trade action. In addition to tariffs, the President has imposed quotas, or quantitative limits on U.S. imports of certain goods from specified countries, as well as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), for which one tariff applies up to a specific quantity or value of imports and a higher tariff applies above that threshold.\nTable 1. Section 201 Global Safeguard Investigations\nKey Dates\n5/17/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on solar cells/modules.\n6/5/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on large residential washers.\n9/22/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative solar cells/modules injury determination.\n10/5/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative large residential washers injury determination.\n11/13/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on solar cells/modules to President.\n12/4/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on large residential washers to President.\n1/23/2018\u2014President proclaims actions on solar cells/modules and large residential washers, effective February 7, 2018.\n8/7/2019\u2014ITC releases its mid-term review on the safeguard on large residential washers.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nSolar Cells: 4-year TRQ with 30% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\nSolar Modules: 4-year 30% tariff, descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washers: 3-year TRQ, 20% in quota tariff descending 2% annually, 50% above quota tariff descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washer Parts: 3-year TRQ, 50% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\n\nCountries Affected\nCanada excluded from the duties on washers. Certain developing countries excluded if they account for less than 3% individually or 9% collectively of U.S. imports of solar cells or large residential washers, respectively. All other countries included.\n\nCurrent Status\nEffective February 7, 2018.\n\nTable 2. Section 232 Steel, Aluminum, Auto, Uranium, and Titanium Sponge Investigations\nKey Dates\n4/2017\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigations on U.S. steel (4/19) and aluminum (4/26) imports.\n1/2018\u2014Commerce submits steel (1/11) and aluminum (1/17) investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/23/2018\u2014United States imposes steel and aluminum duties. Temporary exemptions to May 1 in place for certain U.S. security partners (later extended to June 1). \n4/30/2018\u2014President permanently exempts South Korea from steel duties, based on a quota arrangement.\n5/23/2018\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigation on U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports.\n5/31/2018\u2014President permanently exempts Argentina and Brazil from steel duties, and Argentina from aluminum duties, based on quota arrangements. Australia permanently exempted from both duties without a quota.\n7/18/2018\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. uranium imports based on industry petition.\n2/17/2019\u2014Commerce submits motor vehicle and parts investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/4/2019\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. titanium sponge imports based on industry petition.\n4/16/2019\u2014Commerce submits uranium investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n5/17/2019\u2014President proclaims motor vehicle and parts imports a national security threat and directs USTR to negotiate with European Union (EU), Japan, and others to resolve threat.\n5/19/2019\u2014President exempts Canada and Mexico from steel and aluminum duties. Canada, Mexico, and United States announce process for reinstating tariffs should imports surge.\n7/12/2019\u2014President does not concur with Commerce findings that uranium imports threaten to impair national security, but establishes U.S. Nuclear Fuel Working Group to develop recommendations to revive domestic industry.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nAluminum: 10% tariffs on specified list of aluminum imports, effective indefinitely.\nSteel: 25% tariffs on specified list of steel imports, effective indefinitely.\nAutos and Parts: No tariffs currently in effect, pending negotiations.\n\nCountries Affected\nAluminum: Argentina,* Australia, Canada, and Mexico exempted. All other countries included.\nSteel: Argentina,* Australia, Brazil,* Canada, Mexico, and South Korea* exempted. All other countries included.\nAutos and Parts: EU, Japan, and other countries \u201cdeemed necessary\u201d targeted for negotiations.\n (*) Quantitative import restrictions imposed in place of tariffs. \n\nCurrent Status\nAluminum: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nSteel: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nAutos and Parts: National security threat declared. Negotiations to resolve threat are ongoing with USTR to report to the President on their status within 180 days of May 17, 2019.\nUranium: President determined imports are not a national security threat.\nTitanium Sponge: Investigation ongoing. Determination on national security threat pending.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 3. Section 301 Investigation of China\u2019s IP and Innovation Policies\nKey Dates\n8/14/2017\u2014President directs USTR to consider investigation on China\u2019s laws, policies, practices, or actions affecting U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfers.\n3/22/2018\u2014USTR releases Section 301 report and finds that China\u2019s policies are \u201cunreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\u201d President signs memorandum proposing to: (1) implement tariffs on certain Chinese imports; (2) initiate a WTO dispute settlement case against China\u2019s discriminatory technology licensing; and (3) propose new investment restrictions on Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.\n4/6/2018\u2014USTR publishes proposed list of products to be subject to additional 25% tariff.\n5/19/2018\u2014United States and China release joint statement as initial negotiations held to resolve U.S. concerns.\n5/29/2018\u2014President announces U.S. plan to proceed with Section 301 actions, including 25% tariff on $50 billion of U.S. imports.\n6/15/2018\u2014USTR releases two-stage plan to impose 25% tariffs on approximately $50 billion of Chinese imports.\n6/18/2018\u2014President directs USTR to propose additional list of imports (stage 3) valued at $200 billion to be subject to 10% tariff if China retaliates against Section 301 tariffs.\n7/6/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 1 tariffs (25% tariff on $34 billion of U.S. imports).\n8/23/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 2 tariffs (25% tariff on $16 billion of U.S. imports).\n9/24/2018\u2014In response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, United States imposes stage 3 tariffs (10% tariffs on $200 billion of U.S. imports initially set to increase to 25% on January 1, 2019).\n12/1/2018\u2014President announces new negotiations with China to resolve U.S. concerns and declares stage 3 tariffs will remain at 10%.\n5/5/2019\u2014President tweets negotiations are moving too slowly, and plans to increase stage 3 tariffs to 25% and to prepare tariffs on remaining Chinese imports (stage 4).\n5/10/2019\u2014United States imposes stage 3 tariff increase to 25%.\n5/17/2019\u2014USTR publishes proposed stage 4 tariff list (25% tariff on $300 billion of U.S. imports).\n6/18/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that he plans to meet with President Xi during G-20 and resume staff-level talks with China.\n8/1/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that China has not followed through with commitments to buy U.S. agricultural products and announces a 10% tariff on remaining U.S. imports from China (stage 4) will take effect September 1, 2019.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nStage 1\u201425% import tariff on 818 U.S. imports (final, approx. $34 billion).\nStage 2\u201425% import tariff on 279 U.S. imports (final, approx. $16 billion).\nStage 3\u201410% import tariff increased to 25% on 5,733 U.S. imports (final, approx. $200 billion). \nStage 4\u201410% import tariff on 3,812 U.S. imports (proposed, approx. $300 billion).\n\nCountries Affected\nChina.\n\nCurrent Status\nStage 1\u2014Effective July 6, 2018.\nStage 2\u2014Effective August 23, 2018.\nStage 3\u2014Effective September 24, 2018 (10%), May 10, 2019 or June 15, 2019 on products exported from China before May 10 (25%).\nStage 4\u2014Proposed to take effect September 1, 2019.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 4. Proposed Tariffs on Mexico under IEEPA\nKey Dates\n5/30/2019\u2014President announces intent to invoke IEEPA authorities to impose 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico, starting June 10, 2019, and increasing by 5% monthly to 25% in response to concerns over Mexico\u2019s immigration policies affecting the United States.\n6/7/2019\u2014President tweets that the United States reached an agreement with Mexico (see State Department announcement), suspending the proposed tariffs indefinitely.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nProposed 5% import tariff on all U.S. imports from Mexico, increasing by 5% monthly to a maximum of 25% (proposed, approx. $346.5 billion).\n\nCountries Affected\nMexico.\n\nCurrent Status\nSuspended indefinitely.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10943", "sha1": "701572a8cfb6f0d906f71aec7eff4e077057b63c", "filename": "files/20190809_IN10943_701572a8cfb6f0d906f71aec7eff4e077057b63c.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10943", "sha1": "a465eadb258c0260068590b7b3435f0494f67a05", "filename": "files/20190809_IN10943_a465eadb258c0260068590b7b3435f0494f67a05.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4865, "name": "Import Policy" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 600757, "date": "2019-06-21", "retrieved": "2019-07-02T22:08:56.891071", "title": "Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Timeline", "summary": "The trade practices of U.S. trading partners and the U.S. trade deficit are a focus of the Trump Administration. Citing these and other concerns, the President has imposed tariff increases under three U.S. laws: \n(1) Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 1) on U.S. imports of washing machines and solar products; \n(2) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Table 2) on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and potentially motor vehicles and parts, uranium, and titanium sponge; and \n(3) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Table 3) on U.S. imports from China. \nCongress delegated aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President through these trade laws. These statutory authorities allow the President, based on agency investigations, to take various actions, including to impose import restrictions to address specific concerns (see text box). They have been used infrequently in the past two decades, in part due to the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enforceable dispute settlement system. Prior to this Administration, U.S. import restrictions were last imposed under these trade laws in 1986 for Section 232, in 2001 for Section 301, and in 2002 for Section 201. The President also proposed increasing tariffs on imports from Mexico using authorities delegated by Congress under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), but subsequently suspended the proposed tariffs citing an agreement reached with Mexico (Table 4). For information on retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.\nU.S. Laws Related To Trump Administration Trade Actions\nSection 201 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the President to impose temporary duties and other trade measures if the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines a surge in imports is a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry.\nSection 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962\u2014Allows the President to adjust imports if the Department of Commerce finds certain products are imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair U.S. national security.\nSection 301 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\nInternational Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977\u2014Allows the President to regulate the importation of any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest if the President declares a national emergency to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.\n\nIncreasing U.S. tariffs or imposing other import restrictions through these laws potentially opens the United States to complaints that it is violating its WTO and free trade agreement (FTA) commitments. Several U.S. trading partners, including China and the European Union, have initiated dispute settlement proceedings and imposed retaliatory tariffs in response. The retaliatory actions also raise questions with regard to their adherence to WTO commitments, which the United States has raised at the WTO.\nTimeline and Status of U.S. Trade Actions\nThe tables below provide a timeline of key events related to each trade action. In addition to tariffs, the President has imposed quotas, or quantitative limits on U.S. imports of certain goods from specified countries, as well as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), for which one tariff applies up to a specific quantity or value of imports and a higher tariff applies above that threshold.\nTable 1. Section 201 Global Safeguard Investigations\nKey Dates\n5/17/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on solar cells/modules.\n6/5/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on large residential washers.\n9/22/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative solar cells/modules injury determination.\n10/5/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative large residential washers injury determination.\n11/13/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on solar cells/modules to President.\n12/4/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on large residential washers to President.\n1/23/2018\u2014President proclaims actions on solar cells/modules and large residential washers, effective February 7, 2018.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nSolar Cells: 4-year TRQ with 30% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\nSolar Modules: 4-year 30% tariff, descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washers: 3-year TRQ, 20% in quota tariff descending 2% annually, 50% above quota tariff descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washer Parts: 3-year TRQ, 50% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\n\nCountries Affected\nCanada excluded from the duties on washers. Certain developing countries excluded if they account for less than 3% individually or 9% collectively of U.S. imports of solar cells or large residential washers, respectively. All other countries included.\n\nCurrent Status\nEffective February 7, 2018.\n\nTable 2. Section 232 Steel, Aluminum, Auto, Uranium, and Titanium Sponge Investigations\nKey Dates\n4/2017\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigations on U.S. steel (4/19) and aluminum (4/26) imports.\n1/2018\u2014Commerce submits steel (1/11) and aluminum (1/17) investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/23/2018\u2014United States imposes steel and aluminum duties. Temporary exemptions to May 1 in place for certain U.S. security partners (later extended to June 1). \n4/30/2018\u2014President permanently exempts South Korea from steel duties, based on a quota arrangement.\n5/23/2018\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigation on U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports.\n5/31/2018\u2014President permanently exempts Argentina and Brazil from steel duties, and Argentina from aluminum duties, based on quota arrangements. Australia permanently exempted from both duties without a quota.\n7/18/2018\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. uranium imports based on industry petition.\n2/17/2019\u2014Commerce submits motor vehicle and parts investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/4/2019\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. titanium sponge imports based on industry petition.\n4/16/2019\u2014Commerce submits uranium investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n5/17/2019\u2014President proclaims motor vehicle and parts imports a national security threat and directs USTR to negotiate with European Union (EU), Japan, and others to resolve threat.\n5/19/2019\u2014President exempts Canada and Mexico from steel and aluminum duties. Canada, Mexico, and United States announce process for reinstating tariffs should imports surge.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nAluminum: 10% tariffs on specified list of aluminum imports, effective indefinitely.\nSteel: 25% tariffs on specified list of steel imports, effective indefinitely.\nAutos and Parts: No tariffs currently in effect, pending negotiations.\n\nCountries Affected\nAluminum: Argentina,* Australia, Canada, and Mexico exempted. All other countries included.\nSteel: Argentina,* Australia, Brazil,* Canada, Mexico, and South Korea* exempted. All other countries included.\nAutos and Parts: EU, Japan, and other countries \u201cdeemed necessary\u201d targeted for negotiations.\n (*) Quantitative import restrictions imposed in place of tariffs. \n\nCurrent Status\nAluminum: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nSteel: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nAutos and Parts: National security threat declared. Negotiations to resolve threat are ongoing with USTR to report to the President on their status within 180 days of May 17, 2019.\nUranium: Investigation completed. Determination on national security threat pending.\nTitanium Sponge: Investigation ongoing. Determination on national security threat pending.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 3. Section 301 Investigation of China\u2019s IP and Innovation Policies\nKey Dates\n8/14/2017\u2014President directs USTR to consider investigation on China\u2019s laws, policies, practices, or actions affecting U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfers.\n3/22/2018\u2014USTR releases Section 301 report and finds that China\u2019s policies are \u201cunreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\u201d President signs memorandum proposing to: (1) implement tariffs on certain Chinese imports; (2) initiate a WTO dispute settlement case against China\u2019s discriminatory technology licensing; and (3) propose new investment restrictions on Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.\n4/6/2018\u2014USTR publishes proposed list of products to be subject to additional 25% tariff.\n5/19/2018\u2014United States and China release joint statement as initial negotiations held to resolve U.S. concerns.\n5/29/2018\u2014President announces U.S. plan to proceed with Section 301 actions, including 25% tariff on $50 billion of U.S. imports.\n6/15/2018\u2014USTR releases two-stage plan to impose 25% tariffs on approximately $50 billion of Chinese imports.\n6/18/2018\u2014President directs USTR to propose additional list of imports (stage 3) valued at $200 billion to be subject to 10% tariff if China retaliates against Section 301 tariffs.\n7/6/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 1 tariffs (25% tariff on $34 billion of U.S. imports).\n8/23/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 2 tariffs (25% tariff on $16 billion of U.S. imports).\n9/24/2018\u2014In response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, United States imposes stage 3 tariffs (10% tariffs on $200 billion of U.S. imports initially set to increase to 25% on January 1, 2019).\n12/1/2018\u2014President announces new negotiations with China to resolve U.S. concerns and declares stage 3 tariffs will remain at 10%.\n5/5/2019\u2014President tweets negotiations are moving too slowly, and plans to increase stage 3 tariffs to 25% and to prepare tariffs on remaining Chinese imports (stage 4).\n5/10/2019\u2014United States imposes stage 3 tariff increase to 25%.\n5/17/2019\u2014USTR publishes proposed stage 4 tariff list (25% tariff on $300 billion of U.S. imports).\n6/18/2019\u2014President Trump tweets that he plans to meet with President Xi during G-20 and resume staff-level talks with China.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nStage 1\u201425% import tariff on 818 U.S. imports (final, approx. $34 billion).\nStage 2\u201425% import tariff on 279 U.S. imports (final, approx. $16 billion).\nStage 3\u201410% import tariff increased to 25% on 5,733 U.S. imports (final, approx. $200 billion). \nStage 4\u201425% import tariff on 3,812 U.S. imports (proposed, approx. $300 billion).\n\nCountries Affected\nChina.\n\nCurrent Status\nStage 1\u2014Effective July 6, 2018.\nStage 2\u2014Effective August 23, 2018.\nStage 3\u2014Effective September 24, 2018 (10%), May 10, 2019 or June 15, 2019 on products exported from China before May 10 (25%).\nStage 4\u2014Proposed.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade.)\nTable 4. Proposed Tariffs on Mexico under IEEPA\nKey Dates\n5/30/2019\u2014President announces intent to invoke IEEPA authorities to impose 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico, starting June 10, 2019, and increasing by 5% monthly to 25% in response to concerns over Mexico\u2019s immigration policies affecting the United States.\n6/7/2019\u2014President tweets that the United States reached an agreement with Mexico (see State Department announcement), suspending the proposed tariffs indefinitely.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nProposed 5% import tariff on all U.S. imports from Mexico, increasing by 5% monthly to a maximum of 25% (proposed, approx. $346.5 billion).\n\nCountries Affected\nMexico.\n\nCurrent Status\nSuspended indefinitely.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10943", "sha1": "da71e2c5490585c4d74b1bd9d8dcc6cdf9d3b914", "filename": "files/20190621_IN10943_da71e2c5490585c4d74b1bd9d8dcc6cdf9d3b914.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10943", "sha1": "0555b0faad794cca1a5bd294352fb7b892bed87c", "filename": "files/20190621_IN10943_0555b0faad794cca1a5bd294352fb7b892bed87c.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4865, "name": "Import Policy" } ] }, { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Timeline", "retrieved": "2020-09-05T09:20:47.757349", "id": "IN10943_11_2019-06-05", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2019-06-05_IN10943_e0218cc208ac834a410da6f8592ad87fce766dea.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN10943/11", "sha1": "e0218cc208ac834a410da6f8592ad87fce766dea" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2019-06-05_IN10943_e0218cc208ac834a410da6f8592ad87fce766dea.html" } ], "date": "2019-06-05", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "IN", "active": false, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=IN10943", "type": "CRS Insight" }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 598792, "date": "2019-05-24", "retrieved": "2019-05-29T22:01:13.866712", "title": "Escalating Tariffs: Timeline", "summary": "The trade practices of U.S. trading partners and the U.S. trade deficit are a focus of the Trump Administration. Citing these and other concerns, the President has imposed tariffs under three U.S. laws that allow the Administration to take such action: (1) Section 201 (Table 1) on U.S. imports of washing machines and solar products; (2) Section 232 (Table 2) on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and potentially autos, uranium, and titanium sponge; and (3) Section 301 (Table 3) on U.S. imports from China. Congress delegated aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President through these trade laws. These statutory authorities allow presidential action, based on agency investigations, to take various actions, including import restrictions to address specific concerns (see text box). They have been used infrequently in the past two decades, in part due to the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enforceable dispute settlement system. Prior to this Administration, U.S. import restrictions were last imposed under these trade laws in 1986 for Section 232, in 2001 for Section 301, and in 2002 for Section 201. For information on retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating Tariffs: Potential Impacts.\nU.S. Laws Related To Trump Administration Trade Actions\nSection 201 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the President to impose temporary duties and other trade measures if the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines a surge in imports is a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry.\nSection 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962\u2014Allows the President to adjust imports if the Department of Commerce finds certain products are imported in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair U.S. national security.\nSection 301 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\n\nIncreasing U.S. tariffs or imposing other import restrictions through these laws potentially opens the United States to complaints that it is violating its WTO and free trade agreement (FTA) commitments. Several U.S. trading partners, including China and the European Union, have initiated dispute settlement proceedings and imposed retaliatory tariffs in response. The retaliatory actions also raise questions with regard to their adherence to WTO commitments.\nTimeline and Status of U.S. Trade Actions\nThe tables below provide a timeline of key events related to each trade action. In addition to tariffs, the President has imposed quotas, or quantitative limits on U.S. imports of certain goods from specified countries, as well as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), for which one tariff applies up to a specific quantity of imports and a higher tariff applies above that threshold.\nTable 1. Section 201 Global Safeguard Investigations\nKey Dates\n5/17/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on solar cells/modules.\n6/5/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on large residential washers.\n9/22/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative solar cells/modules injury determination.\n10/5/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative large residential washers injury determination.\n11/13/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on solar cells/modules to President.\n12/4/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on large residential washers to President.\n1/23/2018\u2014President proclaims actions on solar cells/modules and large residential washers, effective February 7, 2018.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nSolar Cells: 4-year TRQ with 30% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\nSolar Modules: 4-year 30% tariff, descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washers: 3-year TRQ, 20% in quota tariff descending 2% annually, 50% above quota tariff descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washer Parts: 3-year TRQ, 50% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\n\nCountries Affected\nCanada excluded from the duties on washers. Certain developing countries excluded if they account for less than 3% individually or 9% collectively of U.S. imports of solar cells or large residential washers, respectively. All other countries included.\n\nCurrent Status\nEffective February 7, 2018.\n\nTable 2. Section 232 Steel, Aluminum, Auto, Uranium, and Titanium Sponge Investigations\nKey Dates\n4/2017\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigations on U.S. steel (4/19) and aluminum (4/26) imports.\n1/2018\u2014Commerce submits steel (1/11) and aluminum (1/17) investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/23/2018\u2014United States imposes steel and aluminum duties. Temporary exemptions to May 1 in place for certain U.S. security partners (later extended to June 1). \n4/30/2018\u2014President permanently exempts South Korea from steel duties, based on a quota arrangement.\n5/23/2018\u2014Commerce self-initiates investigation on U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports.\n5/31/2018\u2014President permanently exempts Argentina and Brazil from steel duties, and Argentina from aluminum duties, based on quota arrangements. Australia permanently exempted from both duties without a quota.\n7/18/2018\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. uranium imports based on industry petition.\n2/17/2019\u2014Commerce submits motor vehicle and parts investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n3/4/2019\u2014Commerce initiates investigation on U.S. titanium sponge imports based on industry petition.\n4/16/2019\u2014Commerce submits uranium investigation findings and recommendations to President.\n5/17/2019\u2014President proclaims motor vehicle and parts imports a national security threat and directs USTR to negotiate with European Union (EU), Japan, and others to resolve threat.\n5/19/2019\u2014President exempts Canada and Mexico from steel and aluminum duties. Canada, Mexico, and United States announce process for reinstating tariffs should imports surge.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nAluminum: 10% tariffs on specified list of aluminum imports, effective indefinitely.\nSteel: 25% tariffs on specified list of steel imports, effective indefinitely.\nAutos and Parts: No tariffs currently in effect, pending negotiations.\n\nCountries Affected\nAluminum: Argentina,* Australia, Canada, and Mexico exempted. All other countries included.\nSteel: Argentina,* Australia, Brazil,* Canada, Mexico, and South Korea* exempted. All other countries included.\nAutos and Parts: EU, Japan, and other countries \u201cdeemed necessary\u201d targeted for negotiations.\n (*) Quantitative import restrictions imposed in place of tariffs. \n\nCurrent Status\nAluminum: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nSteel: Tariffs effective March 23, 2018.\nAutos and Parts: National security threat declared. Negotiations to resolve threat ongoing.\nUranium: Investigation completed. Determination on national security threat pending.\nTitanium Sponge: Investigation ongoing. Determination on national security threat pending.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating Tariffs: Potential Impacts.)\nTable 3. Section 301 Investigation of China\u2019s IP and Innovation Policies\nKey Dates\n8/14/2017\u2014President directs USTR to consider investigation on China\u2019s laws, policies, practices, or actions affecting U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfers.\n3/22/2018\u2014USTR releases Section 301 report and finds that China\u2019s policies are \u201cunreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\u201d President signs memorandum proposing to: (1) implement tariffs on certain Chinese imports; (2) initiate a WTO dispute settlement case against China\u2019s discriminatory technology licensing; and (3) propose new investment restrictions on Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.\n4/6/2018\u2014USTR publishes proposed list of products to be subject to additional 25% tariff.\n5/19/2018\u2014United States and China release joint statement as initial negotiations held to resolve U.S. concerns.\n5/29/2018\u2014President announces U.S. plan to proceed with Section 301 actions, including 25% tariff on $50 billion of U.S. imports.\n6/15/2018\u2014USTR releases two-stage plan to impose 25% tariffs on approximately $50 billion of Chinese imports.\n6/18/2018\u2014President directs USTR to propose additional list of imports (stage 3) valued at $200 billion to be subject to10% tariff if China retaliates against Section 301 tariffs.\n7/6/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 1 tariffs (25% tariff on $34 billion of U.S. imports).\n8/23/2018\u2014United States imposes stage 2 tariffs (25% tariff on $16 billion of U.S. imports).\n9/24/2018\u2014In response to Chinese retaliatory tariffs, United States imposes stage 3 tariffs (10% tariffs on $200 billion of U.S. imports to increase to 25% on January 1, 2019).\n12/1/2018\u2014President announces new negotiations with China to resolve U.S. concerns and declares stage 3 tariffs will remain at 10%.\n5/5/2019\u2014President tweets negotiations are moving too slowly, and plans to increase stage 3 tariffs to 25% and to prepare tariffs on remaining Chinese imports (stage 4).\n5/10/2019\u2014United States imposes stage 3 tariff increase to 25%.\n5/17/2019\u2014USTR publishes proposed stage 4 tariff list (25% tariff on $300 billion of U.S. imports).\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nStage 1\u201425% import tariff on 818 U.S. imports (final, approx. $34 billion).\nStage 2\u201425% import tariff on 279 U.S. imports (final, approx. $16 billion).\nStage 3\u201410% import tariff increased to 25% on 5,733 U.S. imports (final, approx. $200 billion). \nStage 4\u201425% import tariff on 3,812 U.S. imports (proposed, approx. $300 billion).\n\nCountries Affected\nChina\n\nCurrent Status\nStage 1\u2014Effective July 6, 2018.\nStage 2\u2014Effective August 23, 2018.\nStage 3\u2014Effective September 24, 2018 (10%), May 10, 2019 (25%).\nStage 4\u2014Proposed.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating Tariffs: Potential Impacts.)", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10943", "sha1": "737333579231322f4d9118ca1ecfc995aab4284f", "filename": "files/20190524_IN10943_737333579231322f4d9118ca1ecfc995aab4284f.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10943", "sha1": "6595cffbb67ce4b119c8b6531f3bf771a867d8a1", "filename": "files/20190524_IN10943_6595cffbb67ce4b119c8b6531f3bf771a867d8a1.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4865, "name": "Import Policy" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 585559, "date": "2018-09-24", "retrieved": "2018-09-25T13:07:53.518428", "title": "Escalating Tariffs: Timeline", "summary": "Concerns over trading partner trade practices and the U.S. trade deficit have been a focus of the Trump Administration. Citing these concerns and others, the President has imposed tariffs under three U.S. laws and authorities that allow the Administration to unilaterally impose trade restrictions: (1) Section 201 (Table 1) on U.S. imports of washing machines and solar products; (2) Section 232 (Table 2) on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and potentially autos and uranium, and (3) Section 301 (Table 3) on U.S. imports from China. Congress delegated aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President through these trade laws. These statutory authorities allow presidential action, based on agency investigations and other criteria, to impose import restrictions to address specific concerns (see text box). They have been used infrequently in the past two decades, in part due to the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enforceable dispute settlement system. Prior to this Administration, U.S. import restrictions were last imposed under these trade laws in 1982 for Section 232, 2001 for Section 301, and 2002 for Section 201. For more on the impact of these actions, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating Tariffs: Potential Impacts.\nU.S. Laws Related To Trump Administration Trade Actions\nSection 201 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the President to impose temporary duties and other trade measures if the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines a surge in imports is a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry.\nSection 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962\u2014Allows the President to take action to adjust imports of products the Department of Commerce finds to be imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair U.S. national security.\nSection 301 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\n\nIncreasing U.S. tariffs or imposing other import restrictions through these laws potentially opens the United States to complaints that it is violating its WTO and free trade agreement (FTA) commitments. Several U.S. trading partners, including Canada, China, Mexico, and the European Union, have initiated dispute settlement proceedings and imposed retaliatory tariffs in response. The retaliatory actions also raise questions with regard to their adherence to WTO commitments.\nTimeline and Status of U.S. Trade Actions\nThe tables below provide a timeline of key events related to each U.S. trade action. In addition to tariffs, the President has imposed quotas, or quantitative limits on U.S. imports of certain goods from specified countries, as well as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), for which one tariff applies up to a specific quantity of imports and a higher tariff applies above that threshold.\nTable 1. Section 201 Global Safeguard Investigations\nKey Dates\n5/17/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on solar cells/modules.\n6/5/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on large residential washers.\n9/22/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative solar cells/modules injury determination.\n10/5/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative large residential washers injury determination.\n11/13/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on solar cells/modules to President.\n12/4/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on large residential washers to President.\n1/23/2018\u2014President proclaims actions on solar cells/modules and large residential washers, effective February 7, 2018.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nSolar Cells: 4-year TRQ with 30% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\nSolar Modules: 4-year 30% tariff, descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washers: 3-year TRQ, 20% in quota tariff descending 2% annually, 50% above quota tariff descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washer Parts: 3-year TRQ, 50% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\n\nCountries Affected\nCanada excluded from the duties on washers. Certain developing countries excluded if they account for less than 3% individually or 9% collectively of U.S. imports of solar cells or large residential washers, respectively. All other countries included.\n\nCurrent Status\nEffective February 7, 2018.\n\nTable 2. Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Investigations\nKey Dates\n4/2017\u2014Commerce initiates investigations on effects on national security of U.S. steel (4/19) and aluminum (4/26) imports. President signs memoranda prioritizing steel and aluminum investigations.\n1/2018\u2014Commerce submits steel (1/11) and aluminum (1/17) findings and recommendations to President.\n3/8/2018\u2014President proclaims steel and aluminum duties, effective March 23, 2018, temporarily exempting Canada and Mexico.\n3/22/2018\u2014President temporarily exempts Argentina, Australia, Brazil, South Korea and the European Union (EU) in addition to Canada and Mexico from steel and aluminum duties.\n4/30/2018\u2014President permanently exempts South Korea from steel duties, based on a quota arrangement. South Korea\u2019s exemption from aluminum duties expires.\n5/31/2018\u2014President permanently exempts Argentina, Australia, and Brazil from steel duties, and Argentina and Australia from aluminum duties, based on quota arrangements. Brazil\u2019s exemption from aluminum duties, and Canada, Mexico, and EU\u2019s exemptions from steel and aluminum duties expire.\n8/10/2018\u2014President doubles the tariff rates to 50% on steel imports from Turkey, effective August 13, 2018.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nAluminum: 10% tariffs on specified list of aluminum imports effective indefinitely.\nSteel: 25% tariffs on specified list of steel imports effective indefinitely; 50% tariffs on steel imports from Turkey.\n\nCountries Affected\nAluminum: Australia and Argentina* permanently exempted. \nSteel: Australia, Argentina*, Brazil*, and South Korea* permanently exempted.\nAll other countries included.\n(*) Quantitative import restrictions imposed in place of tariffs. \n\nCurrent Status\nEffective March 23, 2018.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating Tariffs: Potential Impacts.)\nTable 3. Section 301 China Trade Barriers Investigation\nKey Dates\n8/14/2017\u2014President directs USTR to determine whether it should investigate China\u2019s laws, policies, practices, or actions affecting U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfers.\n8/18/2017\u2014USTR announces it will proceed with Section 301 case against China.\n3/22/2018\u2014USTR releases Section 301 report and finds that China\u2019s policies are \u201cunreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\u201d President signs memorandum proposing to: (1) implement tariffs on certain Chinese imports; (2) initiate a WTO dispute settlement case against China\u2019s discriminatory technology licensing; and (3) propose new investment restrictions on Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.\n4/3/2018\u2014USTR releases proposed list of 1,300 tariff lines to be subject to 25% import tariff.\n4/5/2018\u2014President directs USTR to consider additional list of Chinese imports to be subject to 25% tariff if China retaliates.\n5/29/2018\u2014President Trump announces U.S. plan to proceed with Section 301 actions, including 25% tariff on $50 billion of U.S. imports from China.\n6/15/2018\u2014USTR releases two-stage plan to impose 25% tariffs on approximately $50 billion of Chinese imports (includes final stage 1 product list).\n6/18/2018\u2014President directs USTR to propose a list of imports from China valued at $200 billion (stage 3) that would be subject to an additional 10% tariff if China retaliates against Section 301 tariffs, and an additional $200 billion if such retaliation occurs again.\n7/10/2018\u2014USTR releases list of proposed imports (stage 3) subject to additional 10% tariff accounting for approximately $200 billion of U.S. imports in 2017.\n8/1/2018\u2014President directs USTR to consider increasing the proposed stage 3 tariffs from 10% to 25% on $200 billion of U.S. imports from China.\n8/7/2018\u2014USTR publishes final list of stage 2 tariffs.\n9/7/2018\u2014President threatens potential stage 4 tariffs on $267 billion of U.S. imports. (As of this writing USTR has not made a formal announcement or published a proposed list of products covered by these tariffs.)\n9/17/2018\u2014USTR publishes final list of stage 3 tariffs and announces that tariffs on these products will begin at 10% and increase to 25% on January 1, 2019. \n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nStage 1\u201425% import tariff on 818 U.S. imports (final, approx. $34 billion)\nStage 2\u201425% import tariff on 279 U.S. imports (final, approx. $16 billion).\nStage 3\u201410% import tariff increasing to 25% on January 1, 2019 on 5,745 U.S. imports (final, approx. $200 billion). \n\nCountries Affected\nChina\n\nCurrent Status\nStage 1\u2014Effective July 6, 2018.\nStage 2\u2014Effective August 23, 2018.\nStage 3\u2014Effective September 24, 2018.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating Tariffs: Potential Impacts.)", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10943", "sha1": "93a6168461979faa25a892a9dd1583ce592f6b4a", "filename": "files/20180924_IN10943_93a6168461979faa25a892a9dd1583ce592f6b4a.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10943", "sha1": "1e060493a8e6f7d945ea7efcad4fa67a6082c898", "filename": "files/20180924_IN10943_1e060493a8e6f7d945ea7efcad4fa67a6082c898.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 583907, "date": "2018-08-17", "retrieved": "2018-08-23T13:09:38.716480", "title": "Escalating Tariffs: Timeline and Potential Impact", "summary": "Concerns over the U.S. trade deficit and trading partner trade practices have been a focus of the Trump Administration. Citing these concerns, the President has imposed tariffs under three U.S. laws that allow the Administration to impose trade restrictions based on certain criteria unilaterally: (1) Section 201 (Table 1) on U.S. imports of washing machines and solar products; (2) Section 232 (Table 2) on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and potentially autos and uranium, and (3) Section 301 (Table 3) on U.S. imports from China. In 2017, U.S. imports of goods subject to the additional tariffs, which range from 10% to 50%, totaled $80 billion (Table 4), a figure that would increase should additional proposed tariffs go into effect (Figure 1). While the tariffs may benefit some import-competing U.S. producers, they are also likely to increase costs for downstream users of imported products and some consumer prices. The Administration is likely using the tariffs in part to pressure affected countries into broader trade negotiations, such as the recently announced U.S.-EU trade liberalization talks, but it is unclear what specific outcomes the Administration is seeking.\nFigure 1. Trump Administration Tariffs and Affected Imports\n/\nSource: CRS calculations with data from U.S. Census Bureau sourced through Global Trade Atlas.\nNotes: Based on 2017 import values. Increased U.S. import tariffs may reduce demand for imports lowering annual import values.\nCongress delegated aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President through these trade laws. These statutory authorities allow presidential action, based on agency investigations and other criteria, to impose import restrictions to address specific concerns (see text box). They have been used infrequently in the past two decades, in part due to the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enforceable dispute settlement system. Prior to this Administration, U.S. import restrictions were last imposed under these trade laws in 1982 for Section 232, 2001 for Section 301, and 2002 for Section 201.\nU.S. Laws Related To Trump Administration Trade Actions\nSection 201 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the President to impose temporary duties and other trade measures if the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines a surge in imports is a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry.\nSection 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962\u2014Allows the President to take action to adjust imports of products the Department of Commerce finds to be threatening to impair U.S. national security.\nSection 301 of the Trade Act of 1974\u2014Allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\n\nIncreasing U.S. tariffs or imposing other import restrictions through these laws potentially opens the United States to complaints that it is violating its WTO and free trade agreement (FTA) commitments. Several U.S. trading partners, including Canada, China, Mexico, and the European Union, have initiated dispute settlement proceedings and imposed retaliatory tariffs in response. The retaliatory tariffs in effect cover almost $60 billion of U.S. annual exports, based on 2017 export data (Table 5). \nRetaliation may be amplifying the potential negative effects of the U.S. tariff measures. Economically, retaliatory tariffs broaden the scope of U.S. industries potentially harmed, targeting those reliant on export markets and sensitive to price fluctuations, such as agricultural commodities. Some U.S. manufacturers have announced plans to shift production to other countries in order to avoid the tariffs on U.S. exports. Lost market access resulting from the retaliatory tariffs may compound concerns raised by many U.S. exporters that the United States increasingly faces higher tariffs than some competitors in foreign markets as other countries proceed with trade liberalization agreements eliminating tariffs, such as the recently signed EU-Japan FTA. Negative effects could grow if a tit-for-tat process of retaliation continues and the scale of trade affected increases. For example, in response to China\u2019s retaliation against the first stage of U.S. Section 301 tariffs, USTR has proposed counter-retaliation tariffs covering an additional $200 billion of U.S. imports, doubling the current tariff coverage and potentially affecting approximately half of U.S. annual imports from China. China has responded by proposing an additional list of imports potentially subject to retaliatory tariffs, accounting for approximately $53 billion of U.S. exports in 2017.\nAdditional actions by the Administration could result in considerably larger potential trade effects. On March 23, 2018, the Commerce Department initiated a new Section 232 investigation on U.S. auto and auto parts imports. Motor vehicles and parts accounted for $361 billion of U.S. imports in 2017. The EU, which accounts for more than $50 billion of U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports, has reportedly threatened comparable retaliatory measures. The globally integrated nature of the industry could complicate the impact of the tariffs. For example, affiliates of foreign motor vehicle firms operating in the United States exported more than $49 billion (nearly $70 billion including wholesale trade) in 2015. Although the auto investigation remains ongoing, the Administration has stated it will not impose tariffs while the recently announced U.S.-EU trade talks are ongoing. On July 18, the Administration began a fourth Section 232 investigation on U.S. uranium imports.\nMany Members of Congress and U.S. businesses, interest groups, and trade partners, including major allies, have weighed in on the President\u2019s actions. While some U.S. stakeholders support the President\u2019s use of unilateral trade actions, many have raised concerns, including the chairs of the Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, about potential negative impacts. In July 2017, Congress passed a nonbinding resolution directing appropriations bill conferees to include language giving Congress a role in Section 232 determinations, and several Members have introduced legislation that would constrain the President\u2019s authority (e.g., S. 3013 and S. 3266). As it debates the Administration\u2019s import restrictions, Congress may consider the following:\nDelegation of Authority. Among these statutes, only Section 201 requires an affirmative finding by an independent agency (the ITC) before the President may restrict imports. Section 232 and Section 301 investigations are undertaken by the Administration, giving the President broad discretion in their use. Are additional congressional checks on such discretion necessary? \nEconomic Implications and Escalation. The Administration\u2019s tariffs imposed to date cover approximately 3% of annual U.S. goods and services imports; pending investigations and threatened further counter-retaliations could potentially increase this to nearly one-third. While most economists estimate that the current level of tariffs is unlikely to have major effects on the overall U.S. economy, these effects may be substantial for individual firms reliant either on imports subject to the U.S. tariffs or exports facing retaliatory measures. The potential drag on economic growth could also be significant if tit-for-tat action escalates. What are the Administration\u2019s objectives from the tariff increases and do potential benefits justify the potential costs?\nInternational Trading System. While the Administration argues that the imposition of U.S. import restrictions is within its rights under international trade agreement obligations, U.S. trade partners disagree and have initiated dispute proceedings, and begun retaliating. The United States has initiated its own dispute proceedings arguing the retaliation violates trade agreement obligations. What are the risks to the international trading system of continued unilateral action?\nThe tables below provide a timeline of key events related to each U.S. trade action, as well as the range of potential trade volumes affected by the U.S. tariffs and U.S. trading partners\u2019 retaliations. In addition to tariffs, the President has imposed quotas, or quantitative limits on U.S. imports of certain goods from specified countries, as well as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), for which one tariff applies up to a specific quantity of imports and a higher tariff applies above that threshold.\nTimeline and Status of U.S. Trade Actions\nTable 1. Section 201 Global Safeguard Investigations\nKey Dates\n5/17/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on solar cells/modules.\n6/5/2017\u2014U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on large residential washers.\n9/22/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative solar cells/modules injury determination.\n10/5/2017\u2014ITC makes affirmative large residential washers injury determination.\n11/13/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on solar cells/modules to President.\n12/4/2017\u2014ITC submits report and recommended action on large residential washers to President.\n1/23/2018\u2014President proclaims actions on solar cells/modules and large residential washers, effective February 7, 2018.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nSolar Cells: 4-year TRQ with 30% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\nSolar Modules: 4-year 30% tariff, descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washers: 3-year TRQ, 20% in quota tariff descending 2% annually, 50% above quota tariff descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washer Parts: 3-year TRQ, 50% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\n\nCountries Affected\nCanada excluded from the duties on washers. Certain developing countries excluded if they account for less than 3% individually or 9% collectively of U.S. imports of solar cells or large residential washers, respectively. All other countries included.\n\nCurrent Status\nEffective February 7, 2018.\n\nTable 2. Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Investigations\nKey Dates\n4/2017\u2014Commerce initiates investigations on effects on national security of U.S. steel (4/19) and aluminum (4/26) imports. President signs memoranda prioritizing steel and aluminum investigations.\n1/2018\u2014Commerce submits steel (1/11) and aluminum (1/17) findings and recommendations to President.\n3/8/2018\u2014President proclaims steel and aluminum duties, effective March 23, 2018, temporarily exempting Canada and Mexico.\n3/22/2018\u2014President temporarily exempts Argentina, Australia, Brazil, South Korea and the European Union (EU) in addition to Canada and Mexico from steel and aluminum duties.\n4/30/2018\u2014President permanently exempts South Korea from steel duties, based on a quota arrangement. South Korea\u2019s exemption from aluminum duties expires.\n5/31/2018\u2014President permanently exempts Argentina, Australia, and Brazil from steel duties, and Argentina and Australia from aluminum duties, based on quota arrangements. Brazil\u2019s exemption from aluminum duties, and Canada, Mexico, and EU\u2019s exemptions from steel and aluminum duties expire.\n8/10/2018\u2014President doubles the tariff rates to 50% on steel imports from Turkey, effective August 13, 2018.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nAluminum: 10% tariffs on specified list of aluminum imports effective indefinitely.\nSteel: 25% tariffs on specified list of steel imports effective indefinitely; 50% tariffs on steel imports from Turkey.\n\nCountries Affected\nAluminum: Australia and Argentina* permanently exempted. \nSteel: Australia, Argentina*, Brazil*, and South Korea* permanently exempted.\nAll other countries included.\n(*) Quantitative import restrictions imposed in place of tariffs. \n\nCurrent Status\nEffective March 23, 2018.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see Table 5)\n\nTable 3. Section 301 China Trade Barriers Investigation\nKey Dates\n8/14/2017\u2014President directs USTR to determine whether it should investigate China\u2019s laws, policies, practices, or actions affecting U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfers.\n8/18/2017\u2014USTR announces it will proceed with Section 301 case against China.\n3/22/2018\u2014USTR releases Section 301 report and finds that China\u2019s policies are \u201cunreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\u201d President signs memorandum proposing to: (1) implement tariffs on certain Chinese imports; (2) initiate a WTO dispute settlement case against China\u2019s discriminatory technology licensing; and (3) propose new investment restrictions on Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.\n4/3/2018\u2014USTR releases proposed list of 1,300 tariff lines to be subject to 25% import tariff.\n4/5/2018\u2014President directs USTR to consider additional list of Chinese imports to be subject to 25% tariff if China retaliates.\n5/29/2018\u2014President Trump announces U.S. plan to proceed with Section 301 actions, including 25% tariff on $50 billion of U.S. imports from China.\n6/15/2018\u2014USTR releases two-stage plan to impose 25% tariffs on approximately $50 billion of Chinese imports (includes final stage 1 product list).\n6/18/2018\u2014President directs USTR to propose a list of imports from China valued at $200 billion (stage 3) that would be subject to an additional 10% tariff if China retaliates against Section 301 tariffs, and an additional $200 billion if such retaliation occurs again.\n7/10/2018\u2014USTR releases list of proposed imports (stage 3) subject to additional 10% tariff accounting for approximately $200 billion of U.S. imports in 2017.\n8/1/2018\u2014President directs USTR to consider increasing the proposed stage 3 tariffs from 10% to 25% on $200 billion of U.S. imports from China.\n8/7/2018\u2014USTR publishes final list of stage 2 tariffs. \n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nStage 1\u201425% import tariff on 818 U.S. imports (final, approx. $34 billion)\nStage 2\u201425% import tariff on 279 U.S. imports (final, approx. $16 billion).\nStage 3\u201410% or 25% import tariff on 6,031 U.S. imports (proposed, approx. $200 billion). \n\nCountries Affected\nChina\n\nCurrent Status\nStage 1\u2014Effective July 6, 2018.\nStage 2\u2014Effective August 23, 2018.\nStage 3\u2014Proposed, hearing 8/20-8/27 to determine final list and rate.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see Table 5)\n\nPotential Trade Affected\nTable 4. Proposed and Existing U.S. Import Restrictions\nU.S. Trade Action\nU.S. Imports (millions, 2017)\nAdditional Tariff\nPotential Tariff Revenue (millions, 2017)\nEffective Date\n\nSection 201\n\nSolar Cells/ Modules\n$5,196\nTRQ (0%, 30%)/ 30%\n$1,559\nFebruary 7, 2018\n\n\nLarge Washers/ Washer Parts\n$1,927\n TRQ (20%, 50%)/ TRQ (0%, 50%)\n$964\nFebruary 7, 2018\n\n\nTotal\n$7,123\n\n$2,523\n\n\nSection 232\n\nAluminum\n$16,643\n10%\n$1,664\nMarch 23, 2018\n\n\nSteel\n$23,369\n25%a\n$6,140\nMarch 23, 2018\n\n\nTotal\n$40,012\n\n$7,805\n\n\nSection 301\nChina - Stage 1\n$32,262\n25%\n$8,066\nJuly 6, 2018\n\n\nChina - Stage 2 (revised)\n$13,680\n25%\n$3,420\nAugust 23, 2018\n\n\nChina - Stage 3\n$197,214\n10% or 25%\n $19,721-$49,304\nTBD\n\n\nTotal\n$243,156\n\n$31,207-$60,789\n\n\nTotal in Effect\n$79,397\n\n$18,393\n\n\nTotal Proposed or in Effect\n$290,291\n\n$41,534-$71,117 \n\n\nSource: Calculations by CRS based on trade data from U.S. Census Bureau and tariff data from Administration notifications.\nNotes: Potential tariff revenue estimated using 2017 import values. This does not account for potential fluctuations in demand resulting from the tariffs or other variables. It is useful for comparing the magnitude of the various tariff actions but should not be used to estimate actual tariff collection. TRQ tariff revenue estimated assuming all imports are subject to over quota tariff.\nU.S. steel tariff is 50% on imports from Turkey. \nTable 5. Proposed and Existing Retaliatory Actions\nRetaliatory Trade Action\nU.S. Exports (millions, 2017)\nAdditional Tariff\nPotential Tariff Revenue (millions, 2017)\nEffective Date\n\nSection 201\n\nSouth Korea (Solar and Washers)\n$1,377a\nTBD\n$474a\n2021\n\n\nChina (Solar and Washers)\n$654a\nTBD\n$220a\n2021\n\n\nJapan (Solar)\n$83a\nTBD\n$25a\n2021\n\n\nTotal\n$2,114\n\n$719\n\n\nSection 232\n\nCanada\n$12,748 \n10-25%\n$1,920 \nJuly 1, 2018\n\n\nMexico\n$3,691 \n7-25%\n$730 \nPartial-June 5, Full-July 5, 2018\n\n\nEuropean Union (EU)\u2014Stage 1\n$3,204 \n10-25%\n$781 \nJune 25, 2018\n\n\nEU\u2014Stage 2\n$4,239 \n10-50%\n$931 \n2021\n\n\nChina\n$2,969 \n15-25%\n$645 \nApril 2, 2018\n\n\nJapan\n$1,911a\nTBD\n$440a\nTBD\n\n\nTurkey\n$1,788 \n4-140%b\n$935 \nJune 21, 2018b\n\n\nIndia\n$1,396 \n10-50%\n$240 \nSept. 18, 2018\n\n\nRussia\n$347\n25-40%\n$105\nAugust 6, 2018c\n\n\nRussia\u2014Stage 2\nTBD\nTBD\nTBD\n2021\n\n\nTotal\n$32,292 \n\n$6,727 \n\n\nSection 301\nChina\u2014Stage 1\n$33,834\n25%\n$8,459\nJuly 6, 2018\n\n\nChina\u2014Stage 2\n$14,108\n25%\n$3,527\nAugust 23, 2018\n\n\nChina\u2014Stage 3\n$53,296\n5%-25%\n$6,882\n\n\n\nTotal\n$101,238\n\n$18,868\n\n\nTotal in Effect\n$58,580\n\n$13,575\n\n\nTotal Proposed or in Effect\n$135,644\n\n$26,314\n\n\nSource: CRS calculations based on import data of U.S. trade partner countries sourced from Global Trade Atlas and tariff details from WTO or government notifications.\nNotes: Potential tariff revenue estimated using 2017 import values in dollars (foreign trade data converted to U.S. dollars based on monthly average exchange rates during the relevant time periods). This does not account for potential fluctuations in demand resulting from the tariffs or other variables. It is useful for comparing the magnitude of the various tariff actions but should not be used to estimate actual tariff collection.\nRetaliation announcements did not include a product list or specific tariff values. Retaliatory export and tariff value estimated based on retaliation commensurate with U.S. tariff actions. \nTurkey\u2019s retaliatory tariffs have been in effect since June 2018. Turkey increased the tariff rates in August 2018 in response to the Trump Administration\u2019s decision to increase the U.S. steel tariff on Turkish imports to 50%. \nRussia published its list of retaliatory tariff rates and products on July 6, 2018. The tariffs appear to go into effect within 30 days of publication.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10943", "sha1": "072f0a9ea7b8761a57743b337506ceb08d30f00f", "filename": "files/20180817_IN10943_072f0a9ea7b8761a57743b337506ceb08d30f00f.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=IN/ASPX/IN10943_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180817_IN10943_images_e212c9dc0b564cb44b247dd18abbc54cc184532f.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10943", "sha1": "dc0e00e4845362f7935b000c418d0d53536aeade", "filename": "files/20180817_IN10943_dc0e00e4845362f7935b000c418d0d53536aeade.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 583469, "date": "2018-07-31", "retrieved": "2018-08-07T13:40:02.856888", "title": "Escalating Tariffs: Timeline and Potential Impact", "summary": "Concerns over the U.S. trade deficit and trading partner trade practices have been a focus of the Trump Administration. Citing these concerns, the President has imposed tariffs under three U.S. laws that allow the Administration to impose trade restrictions based on certain criteria unilaterally: (1) Section 201 (Table 1) on U.S. imports of washing machines and solar products; (2) Section 232 () on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, and potentially autos and uranium, and (3) Section 301 (Table 3) on U.S. imports from China. In 2017, U.S. imports of goods subject to the additional tariffs, which range from 10%-50%, totaled $80 billion (Table 4), a figure that would increase should additional proposed tariffs go into effect (Figure 1). While the tariffs may benefit some import-competing U.S. producers, they are also likely to increase costs for downstream users of imported products and some consumer prices. The Administration is likely using the tariffs in part to pressure affected countries into broader trade negotiations, such as the recently announced U.S.-EU trade liberalization talks, but it is unclear what specific outcomes the Administration is seeking.\nFigure 1. Trump Administration Tariffs and Affected Imports\n/\nSource: CRS calculations with data from U.S. Census Bureau sourced through Global Trade Atlas.\nNotes: Based on 2017 import values. Increased U.S. import tariffs may reduce demand for imports lowering annual import values.\nCongress delegated aspects of its constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce to the President through these trade laws. These statutory authorities allow presidential action, based on agency investigations and other criteria, to impose import restrictions to address specific concerns (see text box). They have been used infrequently in the past two decades, in part due to the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enforceable dispute settlement system. Prior to this Administration, U.S. import restrictions were last imposed under these trade laws in 1982 for Section 232, 2001 for Section 301, and 2002 for Section 201.\nU.S. Laws Related To Trump Administration Trade Actions\nSection 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 \u2013 Allows the President to impose temporary duties and other trade measures if the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determines a surge in imports is a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry.\nSection 232 of Trade Expansion Act of 1962 \u2013 Allows the President to take action to adjust imports of products the Department of Commerce finds to be threatening to impair U.S. national security.\nSection 301 of Trade Act of 1974 \u2013 Allows the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to suspend trade agreement concessions or impose import restrictions if it determines a U.S. trading partner is violating trade agreement commitments or engaging in discriminatory or unreasonable practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\n\nIncreasing U.S. tariffs or imposing other import restrictions through these laws potentially opens the United States to complaints that it is violating its WTO and free trade agreement (FTA) commitments. Several U.S. trading partners, including Canada, China, Mexico, and the European Union have initiated dispute settlement proceedings and imposed retaliatory tariffs in response. The retaliatory tariffs in effect cover approximately $60 billion of U.S. annual exports, based on 2017 export data (Table 5). \nRetaliation may be amplifying the potential negative effects of the U.S. tariff measures. Economically, retaliatory tariffs broaden the scope of U.S. industries potentially harmed, targeting those reliant on export markets and sensitive to price fluctuations, such as agricultural commodities. Some U.S. manufacturers have announced plans to shift production to other countries in order to avoid the tariffs on U.S. exports. Lost market access resulting from the retaliatory tariffs may compound concerns raised by many U.S. exporters that the United States increasingly faces higher tariffs than some competitors in foreign markets as other countries proceed with trade liberalization agreements eliminating tariffs, such as the recently signed EU-Japan FTA. Negative effects could grow if a tit-for-tat process of retaliation continues and the scale of trade affected increases. For example, in response to China\u2019s retaliation against U.S. Section 301 tariffs, USTR has proposed counter-retaliation tariffs covering an additional $200 billion of U.S. imports, doubling the current tariff coverage and potentially affecting approximately half of U.S. annual imports from China.\nAdditional actions by the Administration could result in considerably larger potential trade effects. On March 23, 2018, the Commerce Department initiated a new Section 232 investigation on U.S. auto and auto parts imports. Motor vehicles and parts accounted for $361 billion of U.S. imports in 2017. The EU, which accounts for more than $50 billion of U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports, has reportedly threatened comparable retaliatory measures. The globally integrated nature of the industry could complicate the impact of the tariffs. For example, affiliates of foreign motor vehicle firms operating in the United States exported more than $49 billion (nearly $70 billion including wholesale trade) in 2015. Although the auto investigation remains ongoing, the Administration has stated it will not impose tariffs while the recently announced U.S.-EU trade talks are ongoing. On July 18, the Administration began a fourth Section 232 investigation on U.S. uranium imports.\nMany Members of Congress and U.S. businesses, interest groups, and trade partners, including major allies, have weighed in on the President\u2019s actions. While some U.S. stakeholders support the President\u2019s use of unilateral trade actions, many have raised concerns, including the Chairs of the Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, about potential negative impacts. In July 2017, Congress passed a nonbinding resolution directing appropriations bill conferees to include language giving Congress a role in Section 232 determinations, and several Members have introduced legislation that would constrain the President\u2019s authority (e.g., S. 3013 and S. 3266). As it debates the Administration\u2019s import restrictions, Congress may consider the following:\nDelegation of Authority. Among these statutes, only Section 201 requires an affirmative finding by an independent agency (the ITC) before the President may restrict imports. Section 232 and Section 301 investigations are undertaken by the Administration, giving the President broad discretion in their use. Are additional congressional checks on such discretion necessary? \nEconomic Implications and Escalation. The Administration\u2019s tariffs imposed to date cover approximately 3% of annual U.S. goods and services imports; pending investigations and threatened further counter-retaliations could potentially increase this to nearly one-third. While most economists estimate that the current level of tariffs is unlikely to have major effects on the overall U.S. economy, these effects may be substantial for individual firms reliant either on imports subject to the U.S. tariffs or exports facing retaliatory measures. The potential drag on economic growth could also be significant if tit-for-tat action escalates. What are the Administration\u2019s objectives from the tariff increases and do potential benefits justify the potential costs?\nInternational Trading System. While the Administration argues that the imposition of U.S. import restrictions is within its rights under international trade agreement obligations, U.S. trade partners disagree and have initiated dispute proceedings, and begun retaliating. The United States has initiated its own dispute proceedings arguing the retaliation violates trade agreement obligations. What are the risks to the international trading system of continued unilateral action?\nThe tables below provide a timeline of key events related to each U.S. trade action, as well as the range of potential trade volumes affected by the U.S. tariffs and U.S. trading partners\u2019 retaliations. In addition to tariffs, the President has imposed quotas, or quantitative limits on U.S. imports of certain goods from specified countries, as well as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), for which one tariff applies up to a specific quantity of imports and a higher tariff applies above that threshold.\nTimeline and Status of U.S. Trade Actions\nTable 1. Section 201 Global Safeguard Investigations\nKey Dates\n5/17/2017 \u2013 U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on solar cells/modules.\n6/5/2017 \u2013 U.S. industry petition initiates ITC injury investigation on large residential washers.\n9/22/2017 \u2013 ITC makes affirmative solar cells/modules injury determination.\n10/5/2017 \u2013 ITC makes affirmative large residential washers injury determination.\n11/13/2017 \u2013 ITC submits report and recommended action on solar cells/modules to President.\n12/4/2017 \u2013 ITC submits report and recommended action on large residential washers to President.\n1/23/2018 \u2013 President proclaims actions on solar cells/modules and large residential washers, effective February 7, 2018.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nSolar Cells: 4-year TRQ with 30% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\nSolar Modules: 4-year 30% tariff, descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washers: 3-year TRQ, 20% in quota tariff descending 2% annually, 50% above quota tariff descending 5% annually.\nLarge Residential Washer Parts: 3-year TRQ, 50% above quota tariff, descending 5% annually.\n\nCountries Affected\nCanada excluded from the duties on washers. Certain developing countries excluded if they account for less than 3% individually or 9% collectively of U.S. imports of solar cells or large residential washers, respectively. All other countries included.\n\nCurrent Status\nEffective February 7, 2018.\n\nTable 2. Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Investigations\nKey Dates\n4/2017 \u2013 Commerce initiates investigations on effects on national security of U.S. steel (4/19) and aluminum (4/26) imports. President signs memoranda prioritizing steel and aluminum investigations.\n1/2018 \u2013 Commerce submits steel (1/11) and aluminum (1/17) findings and recommendations to President.\n3/8/2018 \u2013 President proclaims steel and aluminum duties, effective March 23, 2018, temporarily exempting Canada and Mexico.\n3/22/2018 \u2013 President temporarily exempts Argentina, Australia, Brazil, South Korea and the European Union (EU) in addition to Canada and Mexico from steel and aluminum duties.\n4/30/2018 \u2013 President permanently exempts South Korea from steel duties, based on a quota arrangement. South Korea\u2019s exemption from aluminum duties expires.\n5/31/2018 \u2013 President permanently exempts Argentina, Australia, and Brazil from steel duties, and Argentina and Australia from aluminum duties, based on quota arrangements. Brazil\u2019s exemption from aluminum duties, and Canada, Mexico, and EU\u2019s exemptions from steel and aluminum duties expire.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nAluminum: 10% tariffs on specified list of aluminum imports effective indefinitely.\nSteel: 25% tariffs on specified list of steel imports effective indefinitely.\n\nCountries Affected\nAluminum: Australia and Argentina* permanently exempted. \nSteel: Australia, Argentina*, Brazil*, and South Korea* permanently exempted.\nAll other countries included.\n(*) Quantitative import restrictions imposed in place of tariffs. \n\nCurrent Status\nEffective March 23, 2018.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see Table 5)\n\nTable 3. Section 301 China Trade Barriers Investigation\nKey Dates\n8/14/2017 \u2013 President directs USTR to determine whether it should investigate China\u2019s laws, policies, practices, or actions affecting U.S. intellectual property and forced technology transfers.\n8/18/2017 \u2013 USTR announces it will proceed with Section 301 case against China.\n3/22/2018 \u2013 USTR releases Section 301 report and finds that China\u2019s policies are \u201cunreasonable or discriminatory, and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.\u201d President signs memorandum proposing to: (1) implement tariffs on certain Chinese imports; (2) initiate a WTO dispute settlement case against China\u2019s discriminatory technology licensing; and (3) propose new investment restrictions on Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.\n4/3/2018 \u2013 USTR releases proposed list of 1,300 tariff lines to be subject to 25% import tariff.\n4/5/2018 \u2013 President directs USTR to consider additional list of Chinese imports to be subject to 25% tariff if China retaliates.\n5/29/2018 \u2013 President Trump announces U.S. plan to proceed with Section 301 actions, including 25% tariff on $50 billion of U.S. imports from China.\n6/15/2018 \u2013 USTR releases two-stage plan to impose 25% tariffs on approximately $50 billion of Chinese imports.\n6/18/2018 \u2013 President directs USTR to propose a list of imports from China valued at $200 billion that would be subject to an additional 10% tariff if China retaliates against Section 301 tariffs, and an additional $200 billion if such retaliation occurs again.\n7/10/2018 \u2013 USTR releases list of proposed imports subject to additional 10% tariff accounting for approximately $200 billion of U.S. imports in 2017.\n\nU.S. Import Restriction\nStage 1 \u2013 25% import tariff on 818 U.S. imports (final, approx. $34 billion)\nStage 2 \u2013 25% import tariff on 228 U.S. imports (proposed, approx. $16 billion).\nStage 3 \u2013 10% import tariff on 6,031 U.S. imports (proposed, approx. $200 billion). \n\nCountries Affected\nChina\n\nCurrent Status\nStage 1 \u2013 Effective July 6, 2018.\nStage 2 \u2013 Proposed, hearing 7/24 to determine final list.\nStage 3 \u2013 Proposed, hearing 8/20 to determine final list.\n(Retaliation also in effect, see Table 5)\n\nPotential Trade Affected\nTable 4. Proposed and Existing U.S. Import Restrictions\nU.S. Trade Action\nU.S. Imports (millions, 2017)\nAdditional Tariff\nPotential Tariff Revenue* (millions, 2017)\nEffective Date\n\nSection 201\n\nSolar Cells/ Modules\n$5,196\nTRQ (0%, 30%)/ 30%\n$1,559\nFebruary 7, 2018\n\n\nLarge Washers/ Washer Parts\n$1,927\n TRQ (20%, 50%)/ TRQ (0%, 50%)\n$964\nFebruary 7, 2018\n\n\nTotal\n$7,123\n\n$2,523\n\n\nSection 232\n\nAluminum\n$16,643\n10%\n$1,664\nMarch 23, 2018\n\n\nSteel\n$23,369\n25%\n$5,842\nMarch 23, 2018\n\n\nTotal\n$40,012\n\n$7,507\n\n\nSection 301\nChina - Stage 1\n$32,262\n25%\n$8,066\nJuly 6, 2018\n\n\nChina - Stage 2\n$14,116\n25%\n$3,529\nTBD\n\n\nChina - Stage 3\n$197,214\n10%\n $19,721\nTBD\n\n\nTotal\n$243,592\n\n$31,316\n\n\nTotal in Effect\n$79,975\n\n$18,095\n\n\nTotal Formally Proposed\n$293,421\n\n$41,345\n\n\nSource: Calculations by CRS based on trade data from U.S. Census Bureau and tariff data from Administration notifications.\nNotes: (*) Potential tariff revenue estimated using 2017 import values. This does not account for potential fluctuations in demand resulting from the tariffs or other variables. It is useful for comparing the magnitude of the various tariff actions but should not be used to estimate actual tariff collection. TRQ tariff revenue estimated assuming all imports are subject to over quota tariff.\nTable 5. Proposed and Existing Retaliatory Actions\nRetaliatory Trade Action\nU.S. Exports (millions, 2017)\nAdditional Tariff\nPotential Tariff Revenue* (millions, 2017)\nEffective Date\n\nSection 201\n\nSouth Korea (Solar and Washers)\n$1,377**\nTBD\n$474**\n2021\n\n\nChina (Solar and Washers)\n$654**\nTBD\n$220**\n2021\n\n\nJapan (Solar)\n$83**\nTBD\n$25**\n2021\n\n\nTotal\n$2,114\n\n$719\n\n\nSection 232\n\nCanada\n$12,748 \n10-25%\n$1,920 \nJuly 1, 2018\n\n\nEuropean Union (EU) \u2013 Stage 1\n$3,204 \n10-25%\n$781 \nJune 25, 2018\n\n\nEU \u2013 Stage 2\n$4,239 \n10-50%\n$931 \n2021\n\n\nMexico\n$3,691 \n7-25%\n$730 \nPartial-June 5, Full-July 5, 2018\n\n\nRussia\n$3,008**\nTBD\n$515**\nTBD\n\n\nChina\n$2,969 \n15-25%\n$645 \nApril 2, 2018\n\n\nJapan\n$1,911**\nTBD\n$440**\nTBD\n\n\nTurkey\n$1,788 \n5-40%\n$267 \nJune 21, 2018\n\n\nIndia\n$1,396 \n10-50%\n$240 \nJune 21, 2018\n\n\nTotal\n$33.834 \n\n$6,469 \n\n\nSection 301\nChina \u2013 Stage 1\n$33,834\n25%\n$8,459\nJuly 6, 2018\n\n\nChina \u2013 Stage 2\n$14,345\n25%\n$3,586\nTBD\n\n\nTotal\n$48,179\n\n$12,045\n\n\nTotal in Effect\n$59,630\n\n$13,042\n\n\nTotal Formally Proposed\n$85,247\n\n$19,233\n\n\nSource: CRS calculations based on import data of U.S. trade partner countries sourced from Global Trade Atlas and tariff details from WTO or government notifications.\nNotes: (*) Potential tariff revenue estimated using 2017 import values. This does not account for potential fluctuations in demand resulting from the tariffs or other variables. It is useful for comparing the magnitude of the various tariff actions but should not be used to estimate actual tariff collection. (**) Retaliation announcements did not include a product list or specific tariff values. 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